Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Darnell NOLLEY, Plaintiff, Waseem Daker, Movant - Appellant, v. Warden Gregory MCLAUGHLIN, Macon State Prison, Ricky Myrick, Director of Investigations and Compliance Inmate Affairs, Macon State Prison, Lisa Fountain, Interim Manager of Inmate Affairs Unit, Macon State Prison, Lieutenant Samuel Ridley, Macon State Prison, Lieutenant Dominico Demundo, Macon State Prison, et al., Defendants - Appellees, Don Blakely, Deputy Warden of Security, Macon State Prison, et al., Defendants.
Waseem Daker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his motion to intervene, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, in a civil rights action filed by another inmate, Darnell Nolley. Mr. Daker argues that the district court erred in finding his motion barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915, because the PLRA does not require a filing fee for intervention, the PLRA does not address or restrict intervention, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address or restrict intervention by a prisoner. We affirm.
Under Rule 24(a)(2), a person may intervene as a matter of right if he claims “an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” See Athens Lumber Co. v. F.E.C., 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982). Under Rule 24(b)(1)(B), a person may permissibly intervene if they have “a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” In exercising its discretion as to permissive intervention, “the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). See Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989).
Briefly stated, even assuming that Mr. Daker's motion to intervene was timely and not barred by the PLRA, cf. Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 2001) (addressing the PLRA's effect on joinder), the district court did not err in denying intervention. First, Mr. Daker does not have an interest in Mr. Nolley's disciplinary hearing claim, which involved separate conduct and issues. Second, Mr. Daker is at a different prison than Mr. Nolley and in a different Tier II confinement. Third, with one exception, the defendants in Mr. Nolley's case were not involved in Mr. Daker's confinement. See D.E. 109 at 6; D.E. 112 at 1-2.
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM:
Thank you for your feedback!
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Docket No: No. 17-14158
Decided: April 02, 2020
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)