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Amanda MIRACLE; Christopher Lovett; Michael Behrens; Rob Catlett; Charles Emmer; Brenda Koerner; Sheryl Lidzy; Michael Morales; Lynnette Sievert, Plaintiffs - Appellees, and Dan Colson; Max McCoy, Plaintiffs, v. Ken HUSH, President; Brent Thomas, Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs; Kevin Johnson, General Counsel; Steven Lovett; Julene Miller; Bill Feuerborn; Cheryl Harrison-Lee; Shane Bangerter; Ann Brandau; Mark Hutton; Shellaine Kiblinger; Jon Rolph; Allen Schmidt; Helen Van Etten; Carl Ice; Cynthia Lane; Blake Benson; Diane Mendoza; Wint Winter; John Dicus, Defendants - Appellants.
In this interlocutory appeal, we examine whether qualified immunity extends to personnel at Emporia State University (“ESU”) and members of the Kansas Board of Regents (“KBOR”) regarding the termination of several tenured professors pursuant to a suspension of tenure protections. The Plaintiffs, a group of nine professors,1 brought a variety of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including violations without due process of their protected property interest in continued employment, their liberty interest in their reputation absent due process, their right to freedom of association, and their right to equal protection, stemming from the claim that they were fired because of their political beliefs and activities. Defendants, administrative members of the university that terminated Plaintiffs and members of KBOR—which is responsible for supervising public universities throughout the state—moved to dismiss all claims against them as barred by qualified immunity. The District Court for the District of Kansas denied the motion to dismiss for most claims because it found that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants appealed to our court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. JURISDICTION
First, we briefly address Plaintiffs’ argument that we do not have jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ qualified immunity claim at this time. Despite Plaintiffs’ assertion that overcoming qualified immunity is central to their claims, and thus is not an immediately appealable collateral order, it is well-established that interlocutory appeals are appropriate to determine whether such claims could be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. See, e.g., Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., 147 F.4th 1206 (10th Cir. 2025). One of the primary justifications for allowing an interlocutory appeal of a decision denying qualified immunity is that government actors are entitled “not to be forced to litigate the consequences of official conduct.” See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). To preserve this entitlement, courts will review a denial of qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on questions of law, prior to the claims proceeding to an otherwise final disposition. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review the “final” order denying qualified immunity. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009).
II. BACKGROUND
A key to our opinion is that this case comes to us at the motion-to-dismiss stage. A defendant asserting qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage faces a more challenging standard of review than when that defense is asserted at summary judgment. Luethje v. Kyle, 131 F.4th 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2025). “This is because the court analyzes only ‘the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint’ ” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014)); see Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that in defendant's appeal from partially denied motion to dismiss for qualified immunity “we adopt the facts as stated in the complaint”). Similarly, at the motion to dismiss stage, we view the facts and make all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Frey v. Town of Jackson, 41 F.4th 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2022).
Plaintiffs were all tenured professors at ESU, a public university in Kansas, as of January 2021. Defendant Hush was the interim President of ESU, Defendant Thomas was at times Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs and Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and Defendants Lovett and Johnson were associate general counsel and general counsel, respectively, for ESU. At the time, ESU policy stated that tenured faculty could only be fired for cause, or if their program was discontinued, or in the event of financial exigency. To terminate for cause, ESU would organize a faculty committee to assess the cause for dismissal.
The Kansas Board of Regents (“KBOR”) is a state body that supervises postsecondary education institutions in the state of Kansas, and it is made up of members appointed by the governor. The remaining non-ESU Defendants are members of KBOR. KBOR has its own policy on terminations—known as the Workforce Management Plan (“WMP”). Similar to ESU's policy, the WMP stated that tenured faculty could be terminated only for adequate cause, “except in the case of program or unit discontinuance or under extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigency.” (I Aplt. App. 35 ¶ 47.) However, in a meeting on January 20, 2021, KBOR voted to temporarily amend its WMP. The temporary amendment, citing the financial pressures caused by COVID-19, stated that “notwithstanding any other Board or institutional policy, any state university employee, including a tenured faculty member, may be suspended, dismissed, or terminated from employment by their respective university.” (Id. at 146 (emphasis omitted).) The amended WMP also said that universities need not demonstrate nor declare financial exigency before terminating any employee, “and no existing university policy hearing procedures shall apply to such decisions.” (Id.)
Before acting on this new policy, however, the amended WMP provided that universities had to submit to KBOR a plan for how they would carry out this process. Originally, universities had forty-five days to get KBOR's approval for a framework to terminate employees under the amended WMP. Shortly thereafter, KBOR voted to extend this window to July 1, 2021. Though neither the district court nor the parties discussed how many Kansas state universities presented a framework for approval, it appears that none submitted frameworks in the forty-five-day window and only one university (not ESU) is shown to have considered submitting a framework following this initial extension. There is nothing in the second amended complaint (“SAC”) reflecting whether this other university did or did not submit a framework for approval.2 Sixteen months after the WMP amendment, in May 2022, KBOR reopened the window and removed the application deadline entirely, though the expiration date of the tenure suspension amendment remained December 31, 2022. On September 14 and 15, 2022, Hush and Thomas presented a framework to KBOR for ESU to implement, which had been drafted jointly by the ESU Defendants, suggesting that 7% of ESU faculty could be impacted. KBOR approved ESU's Framework on September 15. The same day, ESU terminated all nine Plaintiffs, to be effective on May 16, 2023.
The termination letters Plaintiffs received from interim President Hush, allegedly drafted along with university counsel Lovett and Johnson, did not state precise or tailored reasons for the terminations. Rather, the letters generally stated that Plaintiffs were being terminated “due to extreme financial pressures accelerated by COVID-19 pandemic, decreased program and university enrollment, continuing and ongoing increases in the cost of operations across campus, and substantive changes in the educational marketplace.” (Id. at 46 ¶ 75.) Then, similar to the approved ESU Framework, the letters listed a series of general, non-specific and non-exclusive bases for termination, including: low enrollment, cost of operations, reduction in revenues for specific departments, current or future market considerations, necessary restructuring, realignment of resources, performance evaluations, teaching and research productivity, and low service productivity.
The SAC alleged that ESU was not facing any financial exigency. In presenting the ESU Framework to KBOR, it was alleged that President Hush acknowledged this fact explicitly. ESU was alleged to be experiencing increased enrollment, was fully funded, had seen a decrease in operating costs, and had recently reported significant profits and increased enrollment from some of the departments in which the terminated professors taught—all as revealed during a presentation by ESU to KBOR entitled “Review Low Enrollment Programs Under Strategic Program Alignment.” (SAC Ex. 6 (KBOR Meeting Agenda, Mar. 17-18, 2021).)3 In this same presentation, the SAC alleges that some Plaintiffs received individual commendations for their performance, and ESU recommended continuing to fund their programs—a recommendation that KBOR ratified.4
Plaintiffs allege that they were instead terminated because of their political beliefs and activities. These activities included speaking in favor of unionization, collecting signatures for unionization, attending meetings to discuss the amended WMP prior to their terminations, and holding liberal political beliefs.
The KBOR amended WMP and ESU's approved framework each provided a mechanism for professors to appeal a termination in a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). All nine Plaintiffs exercised this option to appeal. The appeal process involved individual hearings in which Defendants Hush, Lovett, and Johnson defended the university's decision to terminate each professor, though allegedly without stating the precise reason for termination. The ESU Framework, as well as the amended WMP, required the university chief executive officer to provide “any supporting evidence or documentation” in response to a professor's notice of appeal. (SAC Ex. 3 at 15 (KBOR Meeting Minutes Jan. 20, 2021); SAC Ex. 10 at 20 (KBOR Meeting Minutes May 18–19, 2022); SAC Ex. 11 at 9 (KBOR Meeting Minutes Sept. 14–15, 2022).) ESU allegedly did not provide any evidence to justify the terminations. Plaintiffs were entitled to submit a pre-hearing brief and could present arguments, but they could not conduct discovery, call witnesses, cross-examine the university witnesses, nor present further evidence. The OAH reversed the termination decisions of six Plaintiffs and affirmed the termination decisions of three Plaintiffs.5 ESU then filed state court petitions for review of the six reversals. While those claims remain pending, ESU placed those six Plaintiffs on paid leave, restricting their access to university locations and resources needed to maintain tenure.
Plaintiffs sued Defendants under § 1983 for eliminating their protected property interest in continued employment without complying with procedural or substantive due process, their liberty interest in their reputation without due process, their right to freedom of association, their right to equal protection, and for engaging in a conspiracy to contravene these rights. Defendants respond that they have qualified immunity that bars relief on all claims. Therefore, Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.6
To overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity defense, Plaintiffs are required to allege a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established. See Est. of Deweese v. Hancock, 186 F.4th 1276, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2026). The district court denied the motion to dismiss the property interest claims because it found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a protected property interest that confers constitutional due process protections. The district court also denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the equal protection, freedom of association, and accompanying conspiracy claims. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the liberty interest claims against the KBOR Defendants and Thomas because Plaintiffs had not alleged any statements attributed to them, but denied the motion to dismiss for Hush, Lovett, and Johnson because they allegedly drafted the termination letters at issue.
We conclude that Plaintiffs’ SAC sufficiently alleges they had a property interest under state law, which entitled them to due process protections. Likewise, the lack of procedural process provided to Plaintiffs prior to the adoption of the ESU Framework and the lack of substantive justification for the subsequent terminations are sufficient plausibly to allege clearly established violations of procedural due process at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to allow Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim, including the civil conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their property interest to the extent it is based on the deprivation of procedural due process, to go forward.
We conclude, however, that Plaintiffs failed to allege a clearly established deprivation of substantive due process. We, therefore, reverse the denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss on that claim, as well as on Count III's civil conspiracy claim to the extent it is based on an alleged substantive due process violation.
As to the remaining constitutional claims (the liberty interest, freedom of association, equal protection, and other overarching conspiracy claims), there is insufficient support in the SAC's factual allegations for these claims against the KBOR Defendants, and Defendants Thomas, Lovett, and Johnson. Therefore, we reverse the district court's decision not to dismiss and instruct the district court on remand to dismiss the remaining constitutional claims against these Defendants. Because Defendants do not challenge the district court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss these claims as to Defendant Hush, we will not question the district court's determination as to that decision.
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Defendants initially argue that Plaintiffs’ property interest claims should be dismissed because they did not have a tenured property interest in continued employment or, alternatively, that any property interest they did have had been validly terminated. Defendants then argue that any remaining constitutional claims should be dismissed against all Defendants other than Hush because Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to support the claims. We will address each in turn.
A. Property Interest Claims
We begin by analyzing Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants deprived them of a property interest without due process. We conclude both that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a legitimate tenured property interest in continued employment created under state law, and that they sufficiently alleged that Defendants did not afford adequate procedural due process to the Plaintiffs when violating this property interest. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision to deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss on Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims, including the conspiracy to deprive them of their property interest in violation of procedural due process. We conclude, however, that Plaintiffs failed to allege a clearly established violation of substantive due process and, therefore, reverse the district court's decision to deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss on that claim, as well as the civil conspiracy claim to the extent it is based on a substantive due process violation.
i. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that they had a property interest in continued employment created under state law
Plaintiffs had all received tenure from ESU prior to the WMP amendment. Plaintiffs allege that this gave them a legitimate property interest in their continued employment as tenured faculty members that is protected under the Due Process Clause. We agree.
“Property interests are not created by the Constitution, ‘they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’ ” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). To determine whether Plaintiffs had a property interest, then, we look for a state law basis to create that interest. “State law sources for property interests can include statutes, municipal charters or ordinances, and express or implied contracts.” Schulz v. City of Longmont, 465 F.3d 433, 444 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kingsford v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 247 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Pursuant to both ESU policy and KBOR's WMP pre-2021, tenured faculty could only be fired for cause, for program discontinuance, or for financial exigency. Therefore, Plaintiffs had a state-law basis for their conditional property interest in continued employment that cannot be deprived without due process, see, e.g., Kosik v. Cloud Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 827 P.2d 59, 63 (Kan. 1992); Brenna v. S. Colo. State Coll., 589 F.2d 475, 476 (10th Cir. 1978), unless there was either cause to terminate, their program was discontinued, or there was a financial exigency.
Defendants argue that public employees only have a legitimate expectation of continued employment if they can only be fired “for cause.” Therefore, Defendants assert that because the preexisting KBOR and ESU policies stated that tenured professors could be fired for reasons other than cause—specifically, program discontinuance or financial exigency—Plaintiffs have no legitimate expectation in continued employment, and thus they have no property interest in continued employment. This position is in error.
Time and again, we have recognized that government employees had a legitimate expectation of continued employment in analogous circumstances. For example, in West v. Grand County, we considered the termination of a legal secretary to the county attorney whose contract provided that she “could not be terminated except for cause, curtailment of work, or lack of funds.” 967 F.2d 362, 364 (10th Cir. 1992). We recognized that precedent “made it clear that when a person's employment can be terminated only for specified reasons, his or her expectation of continued employment is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 366 (citing, among other cases, Goudeau v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 37, 823 F.2d 1429, 1431–32 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding property right in expectation of continued employment when individual could only be terminated for specified reasons “including a lack of work or funds”)). The fact that these specified reasons reached beyond “cause” is of no moment for the issue of establishing a property right.
The Fourth Circuit has stated, in relation to a tenured teacher's property interest, that “[t]he national academic community's understanding of the concept of tenure incorporates the notion that a college may refuse to renew a tenured teacher's contract because of financial exigency so long as its action is demonstrably bona fide.” Krotkoff v. Goucher Coll., 585 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1978). This, the Fourth Circuit said, is the “most widely-accepted academic definition of tenure.” Id. at 679 (quoting Ronald C. Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6 J. of Law and Educ. 279, 280 (1977)). The Fourth Circuit concluded that, not only does the exception to tenure for financial exigency fall short of eliminating professors’ property interest, this exception is essentially taken as granted in the definition of tenure. Indeed, Defendants themselves allegedly posited as much both during KBOR's discussion of the new policy and in ESU's briefs to the OAH, stating “tenure does not mean that a job is guaranteed regardless of financial circumstances.” (SAC Ex. 3 at 13 (KBOR Meeting Minutes Jan. 20, 2021); SAC Ex. 7. at 3 (ESU response to Administrative Appeal).) The existence of enumerated circumstances under which tenured professors can be terminated does not destroy the tenured professors’ expectation in continued employment absent those circumstances.
To be sure, other enumerated reasons for termination affect the Plaintiffs’ expectation. In the situation of a bona fide financial exigency or discontinuance of a program, Plaintiffs here would no longer have a property interest in continued employment. See Krotkoff, 585 F.2d at 680. But this does not totally eliminate their property interest; it just shapes its contours. Given the alleged lack of financial exigency, or program discontinuance, or other enumerated cause for termination, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a legitimate expectation of their continued employment.
ii. Procedural due process
We now address Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants violated their procedural due process rights. We begin by discussing the applicable clearly established law setting out the process required and relevant exceptions. Then, we proceed to discuss the process provided and whether it satisfied due process. We conclude Plaintiffs adequately pled that Defendants violated their procedural due process rights when KBOR approved the ESU Framework as a predicate to the terminations, thereby weakening Plaintiffs’ tenure rights, and Plaintiffs’ cause of action ripened when the Plaintiffs were then terminated by ESU.
a. Deprivation of a property interest in continued public employment without notice or hearing is a clearly established violation of constitutional rights, with some exceptions
Unlike the creation of their property interest, which we examine under state law, deprivation of that interest without due process is a question of federal constitutional law. The right to due process “is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 413 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). “While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Arnett, 413 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring)). “In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, ‘the question remains what process is due.’ ” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). The answer to that question is found in federal law. See id.
Typically, as “has been settled for some time now,” id. at 542 (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 n.10 (1984)), one “essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of ․ property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ ” Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
A pretermination hearing “need not be elaborate” if it is followed by a separate and adequate post-termination hearing. Id. at 545. But at some point, the terminated employee must be afforded an evidentiary hearing in a “meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1460 n.4 (10th Cir. 1989). We have previously found hearings adequate when the terminated employee was represented by counsel, could present evidence, and could call witnesses on their behalf. E.g., West, 967 F.2d at 369; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488–89 (listing ability to present witnesses as one of “minimum requirements of due process”). Additionally, “[w]hile not necessary in every case, ‘procedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood.’ ” Walker v. United States, 744 F.2d 67, 70 (10th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted) (quoting Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).7 Finally, “[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (citations omitted).
There are, however, some exceptions to these procedural requirements that are relevant here: specifically, for legislative acts that strip rights and for large scale reductions in force due to bona fide financial concerns.
While the Supreme Court has “described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest,’ ” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)), courts have long recognized that legislative acts may deprive individuals of their property interests without any specific opportunity for a hearing beyond that inherent in a legislative context. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). In Bi-Metallic, the Supreme Court stated that citizens, even those particularly injured by a new law, are not entitled to the notice and hearing typical of due process when the alleged violation comes in the form of legislation. Id. at 444–45. And it did not matter that the generally applicable law in Bi-Metallic was an increase in property tax for all Denver residents and was passed by the Colorado Tax Commission and the State Board of Equalization rather than the state legislature. Id. at 445 (“If the result in this case had been reached, as it might have been by the state's doubling the rate of taxation, no one would suggest that the 14th Amendment was violated unless every person affected had been allowed an opportunity to raise his voice against it before the body intrusted [sic] by the state Constitution with the power.”). It was the action itself that was legislative. See id. at 446 (distinguishing from Londoner v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), when hearing was required because a “relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds”).
The Court said that notice and a hearing are not required for the adoption of such a generally applicable law for two reasons: 1) it would be too burdensome to allow a hearing for every potentially affected person from a legislative act, and 2) those that oppose the law can pursue change by voting out the legislators. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445 (stating that the affected parties’ “rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”). Therefore, the legislative process intrinsically “provides constitutionally adequate process simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and ․ affording those within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements.” United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985).
Second, a pretermination hearing may not be required when terminations of “a large number of employees” are “the result of a bona fide reduction in force.” West, 967 F.2d at 367 (collecting out-of-circuit cases). But if it appears that the reduction in force is actually a “subterfuge” and the employees assert that “the reduction in force was a sham aimed particularly at” them, a pretermination hearing is an important check on public employers circumventing constitutional requirements. Id. at 368–69.
b. Process provided
At the outset, we consider that there are two potential points at which Plaintiffs’ property interest may have been deprived. The first is when KBOR amended the WMP. However, we find that Plaintiffs’ property interest was intact following the legislative amendment of the WMP. This law merely authorized ESU and other educational institutions to take steps to modify its contractual rights with its professors. It did not by itself accomplish such a modification.
The second is the two-step process by which Plaintiffs’ employment contracts were modified by ESU: when ESU obtained approval of its Framework as a predicate to its intended firing of the Plaintiffs, and then the ultimate firing of the Plaintiffs together resulted in the contravention of their property right. We thus consider the two steps in tandem as a unified execution process by which ESU wrongfully fired the tenured professors. Plaintiffs plausibly state a claim that neither of these two steps provided due process. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims.
1. The WMP Amendment by KBOR did not by itself deprive Plaintiffs of their property interest
We first consider the procedural due process provided by KBOR in amending the WMP prior to terminating Plaintiffs’ contracts. KBOR amended its WMP on January 20, 2021. The presentation of and vote on this amendment were not preceded by any public notice nor hearings, and public comment was not permitted at the meeting. The amended WMP also was not formally published.
Defendants argue this was a legislative act, for which less due process is required, as opposed to an administrative or adjudicative act. A recent Kansas Supreme Court decision applied this reasoning to permit the revocation of tenure protections from all K-12 teachers in Kansas via an act of the state legislature. Scribner v. Bd. of Educ. of U.S.D. No. 492, 419 P.3d 1149 (Kan. 2018). Defendants urge us to do the same here.
Since Bi-Metallic, courts have considered more granular criteria to inform Bi-Metallic’s two-part inquiry into the feasibility of providing notice and hearings and the likelihood that affected individuals can take political action in response. See, e.g., Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 838 F.3d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 2016). One consideration in drawing the line between legislative and executive actions, what Defendants refer to as the “key question,” Aplt. Br. 23, is how many people are affected by the government action. Onyx, 838 F.3d at 1046. The more people that are affected, the more burdensome it is to hold individual hearings and the more likely it is that the collective group of affected people could vote the relevant government actors out of office if they are displeased—suggesting it was a legislative act. Id. (citing Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir. 2004); Kaahumanu v. Cnty. of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2003)). Another consideration is whether the decision-making body was elected or appointed, id., as this also impacts the ability of affected individuals to vote the relevant government actors out. An elected body tilts the conclusion toward considering an act legislative. Finally, courts have also considered whether the policy itself is a general policy formulation, again suggesting a legislative act, as opposed to a grant of a variance or specific application of a previously formulated policy. In other words, courts ask whether the impetus for the policy was “generalizations concerning a policy or state of affairs” or “adjudicative facts that ‘relate with greater specificity to individuals or particular situations.’ ” Id. (quoting Developments in the Law—Zoning, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1427, 1509 (1978)).
Here, the adoption of the amended WMP related to only tenured employees of public universities in Kansas. They comprise a small portion of the general public, but it could be said that providing individualized hearings to all affected faculty members would be infeasible. Further, here the amended WMP pronounced a general policy for all public Kansas universities in response to the financial state of affairs brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, the strongest factor weighing against a legislative classification is the fact that KBOR is an appointed body, which diminishes the affected individuals’ ability to vote the KBOR members out in response to this change in tenure rights. The two Bi-Metallic inquiries, then, could come out either way. Ultimately, however, we need not conclusively decide whether this action was legislative because it did not actually impact Plaintiffs’ property interest and is, thus, not relevant to the due process claims. To determine whether qualified immunity applies, we look to “the deprivation of an actual constitutional right” and “whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). Evidently, the “clearly established” analysis only begins when the alleged deprivation occurs. Since the amended WMP did not deprive Plaintiffs of their property interest, it does not factor into the due process analysis.
In this sense, this case is quite similar to Bi-Metallic’s predecessor, Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). In Londoner, similar to here, there was a multi-step approach required to ultimately deprive individuals of their property right (there, via assessing a new tax). Id. at 377. The first step there was for the board of public works to submit a proposed ordinance to the city council for local improvements after receiving a majority of signatures from the affected landowners. Id. The second step was to get the city council's approval for the ordinance. Id. And the third step was to assess the tax to pay for the improvement after providing notice and a hearing to the affected landowners. Id. Plaintiffs alleged errors at both the first and third step—that the board did not get the signatures required to submit the proposal, and the board never provided sufficient notice and hearing. Id. at 378, 380. The Supreme Court found the latter was a due process violation. Id. at 386 (noting that state statute's attempt to reduce notice and hearing to the submission of written complaints could not replace due process's requirement of “the right to support [plaintiff's] allegations by argument, however brief: and, if need be, by proof, however informal”). As to the former, it said there was no constitutional violation because “[t]he proceedings, from the beginning up to and including the passage of the ordinance authorizing the work, did not include any assessment or necessitate any assessment, although they laid the foundation for an assessment, which might or might not subsequently be made.” Id. at 378. In other words, the plaintiffs were not yet deprived of a right because there was no certainty that a tax would be approved or even needed. That is analogous to the multi-step approach here, in which the amended WMP “laid the foundation” for the subsequent deprivation of Plaintiffs’ property interest in tenure but did not itself deprive Plaintiffs’ of their property interest.
Based on the SAC, it is indisputable that no one lost their tenure rights as a direct result of the WMP amendment. The amendment simply created a mechanism by which universities could subsequently seek authorization to suspend tenure at their university on the basis of particular findings. Cf. Price ex rel. Price v. W. Res., Inc., 232 F.3d 779, 789-90 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that legislative process provides due process when it is the legislation itself that extinguishes property interests); Scribner, 419 P.3d at 1154–55 (describing direct deprivation of teachers’ property interest by state legislative act). As the amended WMP states, universities still could not terminate any employees pursuant to its policy change unless and until they submitted an individualized framework that KBOR approved, something one member of KBOR allegedly stated should be done “judiciously and through as much process as possible.” (SAC Ex. 3 at 13 (KBOR Meeting Minutes Jan. 20, 2021).). Therefore, just as in Londoner, after the WMP amendment, had further steps not been taken, Plaintiffs would still have had their full tenure rights. Any asserted injury by the later terminated professors before ESU adopted its Framework would have been premature and not ripe. At that stage, no professors had yet been terminated nor was it foregone that they would later be terminated under the revised WMP. Indeed, any professor at a Kansas public university that did not get a framework approved never had their tenure rights jeopardized. The mere enactment of the amended WMP, without more, would not have yet injured Plaintiffs.8
The dissent suggests that, even if the amended WMP had not stripped Plaintiffs of their property interest, a reasonable official may have thought it did—as a result, a reasonable official could have believed Plaintiffs no longer had tenure after the WMP was temporarily amended and could be fired without further process. There are two problems with this argument.
First, the “provision in the WMP that ostensibly eliminated the plaintiffs’ tenure protections” and the “separate procedural provision” requiring framework approval that the dissent references actually appear in the same subsection of the same amendment to the WMP (SAC Ex. 3 at 14-15 Ch. II(C)(6)(b)(ii)), in immediately successive paragraphs. A “reasonable official” cannot rely on one part of a regulation to justify a deprivation when another part of the same regulation explicitly sets forth terms required to deprive the plaintiff of their rights. See Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1252 (10th Cir. 2003) (“In this case, the district court concluded that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, based on defendants’ reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78–3a–301. However, § 78–3a–301 does not authorize removal absent pre-deprivation procedures. Thus, reliance on section 78–3a–301 alone could not render the defendants’ conduct objectively reasonable, insofar as the statute did not authorize the unconstitutional conduct in question.”); Mimics, Inc. v. Vill. of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 847 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[Official]’s reliance on the statute and regulations [to violate clearly established constitutional rights] does not make his conduct objectively reasonable because there is evidence that [the official] did not comply with the terms of the statute and regulations [placing procedural limits on conduct].”); see also Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755, 771 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that, “if the text of a statute clearly establishes the contours of a right, the statute alone is sufficient to put an objectively reasonable official on notice that conduct within the plain text of the statute violates that right for purposes of qualified immunity”), rev'd on other grounds, Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 541 (2007).
Second, what a “reasonable official” would do must be evaluated “in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014). Here, those particular circumstances would have made the ESU Defendants acutely aware that tenured faculty could not be terminated without an approved framework because they were the very same officials who were tasked with creating the framework to seek approval from the KBOR Defendants. Certainly, reasonable officials would understand that Plaintiffs retained their legitimate expectation of continued employment when the officials themselves were in the position to get the framework that authorized the terminations approved. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (asking whether the “contours” of the right were “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We conclude that the amended WMP did not by itself eliminate Plaintiffs’ property interest. Thus, we proceed to consider the next stage at which Plaintiffs’ property interest may have been eliminated: KBOR's approval of the ESU Framework as a prologue to the individual terminations.
2. It is sufficiently alleged that the two-step process of adopting the ESU Framework and subsequently terminating Plaintiffs collectively deprived Plaintiffs of their property interest without procedural due process
Following the ratification of the temporarily amended WMP, universities still needed to present to KBOR a framework for how they would implement the amended WMP and receive KBOR's approval before any faculty member with tenure could be terminated pursuant to the change in university policy. ESU administrators developed the “ESU Framework” and presented it to KBOR on September 14 and 15, 2022. KBOR approved the ESU Framework, paving the way for ESU to terminate tenured professors. The same day the Framework received approval, ESU issued termination decisions to the Plaintiffs to be effective at the end of the school year, with an opportunity to appeal the termination to OAH. Because this two-step process marked the point at which ESU was first permitted to suspend tenure and terminate tenured faculty, and the Plaintiffs’ tenure rights were terminated, that collective action deprived Plaintiffs of their tenure right to be terminated only for enumerated reasons, and Plaintiffs suffered injury by being terminated. We conclude that this two-step process did not afford Plaintiffs the process due for two reasons: 1) Plaintiffs allege they were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the adoption of the ESU Framework, and 2) when Plaintiffs did receive a hearing after receiving their termination letters, they allege the hearing was inadequate.
Defendants claim on appeal that KBOR's approval of the ESU Framework was a legislative action as well, which does not require notice and a hearing. However, Defendants did not argue to the district court that this act was legislative rather than executive, (see Dist. Ct. Mem & Order re Mot. to Reconsider at 8 (describing legislative versus executive classification as “wholly absent from the initial briefing, and [ ] undeveloped in the briefing on Defendants’ motion to reconsider”)), and thus the legislative classification argument was waived. See Coones v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 166 F.4th 1, 27-28 (10th Cir. 2026).9
In any event, there is an alternative basis for denying qualified immunity on this ground: we conclude that at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the approval of the ESU Framework by KBOR is sufficiently alleged as an executive rather than legislative activity.
The combination of Bi-Metallic and Londoner clearly establish that the deprivation of a property interest through executive action without notice and without an opportunity to be heard violates procedural due process. And the two touchstone considerations set forth in Bi-Metallic both point us towards an executive classification here: the relatively small number of exceptionally affected individuals both makes notice and hearings practicable and makes political action in response against the Defendants impractical.
Additionally, Onyx provides four more granular considerations to analyze in determining whether an action falls into the Londoner executive classification or the Bi-Metallic legislative classification. See Onyx, 838 F.3d at 1046. “Under any of these standards,” the ESU Framework appears executive at this stage. Id. at 1047 (finding all four inquiries pointed towards legislative classification). First, KBOR's members were appointed rather than elected, and that counsels against a legislative classification. In addition, when KBOR approved the new ESU Framework, it was specifically directed at employees of ESU, suggesting this was an executive action. Additionally, as opposed to a general policy pronouncement, the ESU Framework is an application of the previously formulated policy to reduce faculty size, specifically including the likely termination of these Plaintiffs. Finally, the ESU administrators presented on, and KBOR weighed, facts that related with greater specificity to the particular situation at ESU, rather than the general concerns about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on universities generally or the long-term financial difficulty of the universities to maintain their current staffing. Onyx establishes that when all four considerations point in the same direction, that classification (whether the act is executive or legislative) is compelled. Nonetheless, had even one of the more granular inquiries pointed to a legislative action, that would not have changed our analysis because ultimately the two overarching inquiries put forth by Bi-Metallic are satisfied on their face at the motion-to-dismiss stage that the ESU Framework's elimination of tenure was an executive action, taken pursuant to the WMP amendment. And rather than a bona fide reduction in force, Plaintiffs allege that it was a subterfuge to fire certain professors with whom the administration disagreed, partly because of Plaintiffs’ political activity. As a result, the lack of proper notice and a hearing at this stage of events plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Though no one case contains all of the same facts presented here, these precedents apply with obvious clarity. See Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2017). Precedent establishes that tenure is a protected property interest, Brenna, 589 F.2d at 476, and that the deprivation of a protected property interest through executive action without appropriate process is a due process violation, even when done in a multi-step approach, Londoner, 210 U.S. at 377, 386.
Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges that faculty were not put on notice of ESU's intention to present a framework to KBOR, nor were ESU tenured faculty given an opportunity to be heard either at this meeting or in a separate hearing regarding the ESU Framework.10 Importantly, we typically require “ ‘some kind of a hearing’ prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment.” Loudermill, 470 U.S at 542 (emphasis added) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70). A pretermination hearing balances “the competing interests at stake,” including “the private interests in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination.” Id. at 542–43 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The professors did have a hearing prior to their individual terminations, but only after the ESU Framework was passed as a predicate to those terminations.
Further, the hearings themselves were deficient. Plaintiffs allege that their OAH hearings were insufficient because they could not call witnesses, cross-examine Defendants, nor admit exhibits outside of their prehearing brief, and they were never informed of the specific reasons supporting each of their terminations. We agree that these deficiencies support a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Most clearly, constitutional termination hearings are premised on the fact that the employee is aware of and able to respond to the reason for termination. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (“The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 517 (10th Cir. 1998). The SAC alleges that the ESU Defendants refrained from specifying the reasons—beyond the laundry list of generic possibilities contained in the Framework—why each professor was selected for termination and refrained from providing any evidence to support the terminations.
Therefore, Plaintiffs plausibly state a claim that Defendants violated their clearly established procedural due process rights when ESU contravened Plaintiffs’ property interests by taking away their traditional tenure rights without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. While the KBOR amended WMP stated that “no existing university policy hearing procedures shall apply” to decisions to terminate tenured faculty, (SAC, Ex. 3 at 14 (KBOR Meeting Minutes Jan. 20, 2021)), the government “may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of [a property] interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting Arnett, 413 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring)).11
iii. Substantive due process
In addition to their procedural due process claims, Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their property interest in continued employment in violation of substantive due process. The SAC specifically alleges that Defendants violated substantive due process by the same means they deprived Plaintiffs of procedural due process: by denying the existence of and taking without due process Plaintiffs’ property right in tenure, and denying Plaintiffs a reason for their termination and an adequate hearing. Plaintiffs contend that this “conduct shocks the conscience ․ and is patently arbitrary and capricious ․ and is without a rational basis.”12 (1 Aplt. App. 58 ¶¶ 119-20.)
To the extent Plaintiffs have stated a substantive due process violation under the facts alleged here, Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that that violation was clearly established. See Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1172 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's substantive due process claim because plaintiff did not offer, and the court could not find, “clearly established precedent that [defendant's] alleged actions violate substantive due process”).
Plaintiffs also cannot support their substantive due process claim by asserting that Defendants fired them because of Plaintiffs’ activities protected by the First Amendment. Those assertions must be alleged specifically as a First Amendment claim, not as a more general substantive due process claim. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998).
Defendants are, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims, as well as their conspiracy claims to the extent they are based on the deprivation of substantive due process.
B. Other Constitutional Claims
Plaintiffs also brought multiple non-property interest claims. Though the district court dismissed some, those that remain are: Plaintiffs’ liberty interest claims against Defendant Hush and the university attorneys, Johnson and Lovett; Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims against all Defendants; Plaintiffs’ freedom of association claims against all Defendants; and Plaintiffs’ related overarching civil conspiracy claims against all Defendants. Defendants on appeal argue that all but those claims against Hush fail to allege a plausible claim for relief because they do not specify what conduct each Defendant engaged in that violated Plaintiffs’ rights, and thus qualified immunity applies.
Preliminarily, we address Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants waived this ground for dismissal of the freedom of association claims by failing adequately to present it to the district court. Defendants respond that they did adequately raise the freedom of association issue to the district court in two ways. First, Defendants argue that the following catch-all statement necessarily included the freedom of association claims: “Plaintiffs failed to ‘identify specific actions taken by particular defendants’ so as to ‘make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom’ and to ‘show that [each] Defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation.’ ” (Aplt. Reply Br. 16 (alteration in original).) Second, Defendants argue their statement that Plaintiffs failed plausibly to plead the terminations were motivated by Plaintiffs’ activism or beliefs was a clear reference to the freedom of association claims. Though Defendants could have been clearer, we find that Defendants’ references did sufficiently convey that they sought dismissal of the freedom of association claims and the grounds for the dismissal. Therefore, we will consider the factual basis for each of the remaining claims. To reiterate, because we are addressing this interlocutory appeal at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we adopt the facts pleaded in the complaint. See Peterson, 371 F.3d at 1201.
i. KBOR Defendants
Beginning with the KBOR Defendants, the district court erred by finding that the SAC alleged sufficient facts tying them to the non-property interest constitutional violations. Each of these alleged violations relates to the selection of the individual Plaintiffs for termination: whether the specific Plaintiffs were terminated because they “were ‘problematic’ for advocating issues disfavored by the ESU Administration” (SAC ¶ 166), whether the specific Plaintiffs’ terminations “were substantially motivated by [their] associations with and in [certain] groups and activities” (id. ¶ 195), and whether there was a conspiracy to violate their rights to equal protection and freedom of association. But Plaintiffs do not allege KBOR played any part in selecting which professors ESU would terminate. It is alleged that ESU made the termination decisions after KBOR approved the Framework, and there is no reason to believe KBOR knew which professors would be terminated. Therefore, the KBOR Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims, and we remand with instruction for the district court to dismiss these claims against the KBOR Defendants.
ii. Defendant Thomas
Next, Plaintiffs’ SAC similarly does not allege that Defendant Thomas played any part in selecting which professors were terminated. Rather, the only factual allegation is that Thomas was aware of Plaintiffs’ attempts to unionize. Therefore, Defendant Thomas is entitled to qualified immunity on these claims, and we remand with instruction for the district court to dismiss the non-property interest claims against Defendant Thomas.
iii. Defendants Lovett and Johnson
There is nothing in Plaintiffs’ SAC to allege that Defendants Lovett and Johnson, operating as the university attorneys, were involved in deciding which professors were terminated. Plaintiffs allege only that both were involved in drafting the termination letters. Therefore, we remand with instruction for the district court to dismiss the equal protection, freedom of association, and conspiracy claims against Lovett and Johnson.
As to the liberty interest claims, the SAC cites reputational damage due to the termination letters’ vague reference to job performance as a potential reason for termination.13 This would be sufficient to allege the violation of a constitutional right. That said, it is not clearly established that Lovett and Johnson violated that right, given that only Hush's signature appears on the termination letters. In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the Supreme Court stated that, “for purposes of [Securities and Exchange Commission] Rule 10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement.” 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011). “And in the ordinary case, attribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made by—and only by—the party to whom it is attributed.” Id. at 142–43. Though controlling law is not very clear on whether this rule extends beyond the Rule 10b–5 context, cf. id. at 142 (recognizing need to “give ‘narrow dimensions’ ” to the right of action under Rule 10b–5 based on legislative history (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008))), that lack of clarity in and of itself defeats this claim because it is not clearly established that Lovett and Johnson did violate Plaintiffs’ rights by helping draft the termination letter as non-signatories. We, therefore, remand with instruction to dismiss these claims, as well.
iv. Defendant Hush
As Defendants do not challenge the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss the non-property claims against Defendant Hush, we will not question the district court's decision now.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiffs had a state-created property interest in tenure rights to continued employment, which Defendants allegedly contravened without procedural due process in violation of clearly established law, we AFFIRM the district court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss the procedural due process and accompanying conspiracy claims against all Defendants. We REVERSE the district court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss the substantive due process and accompanying conspiracy claims because Plaintiffs failed to allege and show that any such substantive due process violation was clearly established at the time of the offending conduct. We also REVERSE the district court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ non-property interest claims against the KBOR Defendants and Defendants Thomas, Lovett and Johnson because of their lack of alleged participation in the selection of which professors were terminated and the drafting of the termination letters. We REMAND this case to the district court with instruction to dismiss the non-property interest claims against these Defendants and the substantive due process claims against all Defendants.
The majority holds, without citing a factually analogous case, that state officials knowingly violated the professors’ procedural due process rights by terminating them after a legislative enactment that, at least arguably, stripped them of their tenure. The best the majority can muster is the “quite similar” case of Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), which involved the imposition of a municipal tax—a case not similar at all. Maj. op. at 22. Because state officials had no notice that terminating the professors would violate procedural due process, I respectfully dissent from Part III.A.i. of the majority opinion.1
I.
“Officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless they ‘(1) violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’ ” Palacios v. Fortuna, 61 F.4th 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018)). The second prong of qualified immunity, the clearly established prong, serves as a notice requirement—before we hold an official liable for violating someone's rights, we must ensure that the “contours” of the right were “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation omitted).
“Sufficiently clear” is a high bar. Though we do not require a plaintiff to identify “a case directly on point, [ ] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). That is so because we do not “define the relevant constitutional right ‘at a high level of generality.’ ” Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam)). Rather, “the clearly established law must be particularized to the facts of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted).
II.
This case presents a novel factual scenario. And, because “clearly established law must be particularized to the facts of the case,” Perry, 892 F.3d at 1123 (quotation omitted), I would dismiss the plaintiffs’ property interest claims on the clearly established prong of qualified immunity.
This case is different from the mine run of cases the majority cites in which courts have held that a public employer violated an employee's due process rights by terminating him without individualized process. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 16 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)). Here, the state government, at least arguably, stripped the plaintiffs of their “legitimate expectation of continued employment,” Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998), through a legislative enactment, which obviates the need for pretermination, individualized process, see Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Elbert Cnty., 838 F.3d 1039, 1044–45 (10th Cir. 2016). And, if the plaintiffs lacked a property interest in their continued public employment before they were terminated, then they cannot succeed on a due process challenge. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Two state actions arguably extinguished the plaintiffs’ property interests in their continued employment prior to their termination. The first was the Kansas Board of Regents’ (“KBOR”) amendment to its policy on terminations—the Workforce Management Plan (“WMP”)—which permitted Kansas state universities to fire “any state university employee, including a tenured faculty member” for a list of reasons including, but not limited to, “performance evaluations, teaching and research productivity, low service productivity, low enrollment, cost of operations, [and] reduction in revenues.” App'x Vol. I at 39–40 (emphasis added). The second was KBOR's later authorization of Emporia State University's (“ESU”) decision-making framework (the “Framework”).
A.
As to the first, the majority recognizes that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the WMP amendment was a legislative act. See Maj. Op. at 21–22. But it ultimately sidesteps that issue by deciding that the WMP amendment did not strip the plaintiffs of their employment-based property right. The majority's account ignores the arguable difference between tangible property and a “property” interest in continued employment, and the conceptual difficulties that arise as a result of those differences.
In defense of its position, the majority compares this case to Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). Londoner involved a challenge to the city of Denver's procedural requirements for implementing a new tax on property owners. Id. at 377. Under the city charter, before the city could assess a new tax on property owners to pay for improvements that would benefit the property owner's land, the city had to comply with a three-step process. Id. First, it had to compile the signatures of a majority of affected owners and submit a resolution to the city council. Id. Second, the city council had to pass the resolution. Id. And third, the city had to provide the property owners with process and an opportunity to be heard. Id. When property owners challenged a new tax based on the city's failure to comply with the first requirement, the Court held that the city's failure to comply was not a due process violation because no tax, at that point, had been assessed; the property owners had not yet been deprived of property. Id. at 378.
The majority holds that the constitutional question in this case is “beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, because, like the first step in Londoner, the WMP merely “laid the foundation” for the subsequent deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights, Maj. Op. at 23. However, in so holding, the majority elides the difference between a property interest in employment and tangible property.
In Londoner, the Court assumed that the procedural prerequisite to imposing a special tax assessment on landowners’ property, a petition in that case, was conceptually distinct from the underlying property interest itself. But that assumption is arguably not warranted when the “property” at issue is an interest in continued employment. The procedural prerequisites for removing a tenured employee are what define tenure. It is only due to the existence of procedural prerequisites, usually a requirement to find “cause,” that an employee can have a “legitimate expectation of continued employment.” Hennigh, 155 F.3d at 1253.
But, because procedural prerequisites define the property interest in employment, changes to those procedural prerequisites necessarily change the nature of the property interest in a way distinct from tangible property. Imagine, by way of example, that KBOR had changed the state tenure rules to permit a university to fire “any professor for any reason upon the filing of a single sheet of paper that states the university's intent to fire the faculty member.” Cf. Scribner v. Bd. of Educ. of U.S.D. No. 492, 419 P.3d 1149, 1154 (Kan. 2018) (holding a state statute that contained a procedural requirement for school districts to provide notice of nonrenewal of teachers’ contracts still stripped the teachers of their property right in continued employment). One could argue, as the majority does here, that professors in that system retain tenure until a professor is terminated or until it is “foregone that they would later be terminated.” Maj. Op. at 24. However, I would argue that a professor in that system, at least arguably, does not retain a legitimate expectation of continued employment. See Scribner, 419 P.3d at 1154 (holding that teachers lost their property interest in employment when the Kansas legislature amended the previously required “comprehensive due process procedure” for teacher terminations). After all, any legitimate expectation of continued employment is created by procedural prerequisites to termination. And so it would seem then that the removal of the same destroys any such expectation. The factual scenario at issue here is different in degree, not in kind.
The state deprives a person of tangible property when it takes that property from him. But neither our precedent nor the Court's makes it clear when the state takes a person's “legitimate expectation of continued employment.” Hennigh, 155 F.3d at 1253. Because the deprivation of an employee's property interest in continued employment occurs when the employee loses his “legitimate expectation of continued employment,” not when he loses his job, I submit that Londoner, which concerns a different type of property, is not “particularized to the facts of the case,” Perry, 892 F.3d at 1123 (quotation omitted), and does not “place[ ] the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
The majority further asserts that no reasonable official could have concluded that the WMP stripped the plaintiffs of their property rights because the WMP included an additional procedural requirement—submitting a framework for KBOR approval. Maj. Op. at 24–26. But the majority's arguments on that front assume what they set out to prove: that the plaintiffs retained a property right, and therefore the failure to follow additional pre-deprivation procedures before terminating the plaintiffs violated that right.
The majority writes that “[a] ‘reasonable official’ cannot rely on one part of a regulation to justify a deprivation when another part of the same regulation explicitly sets forth terms required to deprive the plaintiff of their rights.” Maj. Op. at 25. But that is only true if the regulation does not strip the rights-holder of his right entirely. If a regulation strips the rights-holder of his right, then the failure to otherwise follow a “state procedural requirement[ ] [ ] does not in itself deny federal constitutional due process.” Onyx Props. LLC, 838 F.3d at 1044.
As it relates to this case, the question remains whether a reasonable officer could believe that the removal of the plaintiffs’ prototypical tenure protection removed their property interest in continued employment. If the answer is no, then a reasonable officer would not be aware that terminating the plaintiffs violated their rights because “[v]iolation of state procedural requirements,” here the requirement to submit a framework, “does not in itself deny federal constitutional due process.” Id.
Whether the WMP stripped the plaintiffs of their legitimate expectation of continued employment presents a difficult, novel question of law. One could reason by analogy that Londoner’s property rule—that when a state creates a multi-step procedure to take someone's property, the deprivation only occurs at the end of that procedure—applies with equal force to employment entitlements. But the relevant inquiry here—for qualified immunity purposes—is whether a “reasonable official” evaluating the plaintiffs’ property rights at the time of the deprivation would have recognized that, despite a provision in the WMP that ostensibly eliminated the plaintiffs’ tenure protections, App'x Vol. I at 39 (“[A]ny state university employee, including a tenured faculty member, may be ․ terminated from employment.”), a procedural requirement was sufficient to preserve that tenure for due process purposes, id. at 40 (stating that “[t]he chief executive officer of a state university ․ shall present to the Board for approval a framework for the university's decision-making under this provision”). Whether a public employee retains a “legitimate expectation of continued employment,” Hennigh, 155 F.3d at 1253, in a system where he can be fired for a non-exhaustive list of reasons based on authorization from a third-party is a question that our case law does not answer. And, in the absence of case law “particularized to the facts of the case,” Perry, 892 F.3d at 1123 (quotation omitted), that places the “constitutional question beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, a “reasonable official” lacks notice and is thus not liable, Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 (quotation omitted).
B.
Even if it were clearly established that the WMP amendment did not extinguish the plaintiffs’ tenure, and that the plaintiffs thus retained due process protections until KBOR authorized the Framework, it is still debatable whether the Framework provided the plaintiffs with sufficient process. Recall that legislative enactments provide “all the process that is due.” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982). Accordingly, if reasonable officials could believe that KBOR's approval of the Framework was a legislative action, then the defendants would not be liable for failing to provide additional process prior to terminating the plaintiffs. And here, again, our case law provides little guidance to reasonable officials.
The majority, for its part, holds that the Framework is an executive action, relying on Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), to clearly establish the test to determine whether an action is legislative or executive. See Maj. Op. at 28. Curiously, the Bi-Metallic Court actually held that the state action in that case, a tax increase, was a legislative action. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445–46. And it did so on the ground that the “rule of conduct applie[d] to more than a few people” and the affected people could exercise “their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.” Id. at 445.
The same could arguably be said of the Framework. While ESU only fired eleven professors using the Framework, the Framework applied equally to all the tenured professors at ESU. Accordingly, it affected “more than a few people.” Id. And, because KBOR members are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Kansas Senate, K.S.A. § 74-3202a, the affected people had the ability to exercise “their power,” albeit “remote[ly], over those who make the rule,” Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445. Thus, to the extent Bi-Metallic announced a rule to distinguish legislative action from executive action, it is not clearly established that the Framework falls on the executive side of that line.
Moreover, the majority's pronouncement that Bi-Metallic clearly established the method for distinguishing legislative action from executive action is hard to square with our precedent. We have explicitly never decided on the proper framework to determine whether an action is legislative or executive. See Onyx Props., 838 F.3d at 1047 (considering several approaches for distinguishing legislative actions from executive actions but ultimately deciding that “under any of these standards” the challenged action was legislative). And, because we have considered several tests post–Bi-Metallic, we have impliedly decided that Bi-Metallic did not clearly establish a method to distinguish legislative actions from executive ones.
Accordingly, the defendants could reasonably believe that KBOR's authorization of the Framework, which affected all ESU employees, was legislative. Without case law clearly establishing the contrary proposition, qualified immunity applies. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
III.
This case poses a difficult legal question at the edge of our clearly established precedent. It is clearly established that public employers cannot fire tenured employees without process. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542. It is also clearly established that legislative enactments provide “all the process that is due.” Logan, 455 U.S. at 433. The majority applies those precedents to the novel factual scenario at issue here to determine that the defendant-officials violated the plaintiffs’ rights. However, because the defendant-officials lacked the majority's guidance when they terminated the plaintiffs, I would hold that qualified immunity shields the defendants from liability on the plaintiffs’ property interest claims.
FOOTNOTES
1. Eleven professors sued Defendants in the district court. Since, two of those professors agreed with Defendants to stipulate that the appeal would be dismissed with prejudice as to them. See ECF No. 25, Stipulation to Dismiss Plaintiffs-Appellees Colson and McCoy (July 25, 2025). Therefore, nine professors remain as Plaintiffs.
2. The Second Amended Complaint is the operative pleading document in this case.
3. Documents attached to pleadings are “part of the pleading for all purposes,” and thus may be considered on a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
4. “Plaintiffs allege in the SAC that ESU did not qualify for that financial exigency provision [amended by KBOR] because ESU was fully funded during the academic year for which Plaintiffs received termination notices. They allege that overall enrollment had in fact increased, operating revenues had increased, and operating expenditures had gone down.” (Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order 29 (footnote omitted).) Additionally, Exhibit 6 to the SAC, a KBOR Meeting Agenda, stated that the History Program in which some of the Plaintiffs taught brought in a net revenue of $593,000, was efficiently run, was awarded a “With Excellence” designation by the university's Office of Institutional Effectiveness, and had “highly productive” faculty members. (SAC Ex. 6 (KBOR Meeting Agenda, Mar. 17-18, 2021).) Specifically, it recognized that Plaintiff Chris Lovett won the 2019 Edgar Langsdorf Award for Excellence from the Kansas State Historical Society and Plaintiff Amanda Miracle won the Schillinger award for service to ESU women in 2017. Some other programs that Plaintiffs worked in were also listed as profitable.
5. Specifically, the OAH reversed the terminations of Plaintiffs Behrens, Catlett, Emmer, Miracle, Morales, and Sievert, while affirming the terminations of Plaintiffs Koerner, Lidzy, and Lovett. Of the two Plaintiffs that have since settled, one had their termination reversed and the other had their termination affirmed.
6. Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the lower court also cited Rule 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as a basis for dismissal. Defendants argued that, by failing to demonstrate their injuries were caused by Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements of standing. The district court rejected this argument, and Defendants did not challenge this rejection in their Motion to Reconsider to the district court, nor did they raise any standing arguments in their appellate briefs, focusing instead on Rule 12(b)(6) and their qualified immunity defense. Therefore, we will do the same.
7. “[W]hether the Due Process Clause requires that the terminated employee be offered the right to cross-examine or confront witnesses depends upon the significance and nature of the factual disputes at issue.” West, 967 F.2d at 369.
8. The amended WMP also was not published with the Kansas Secretary of State, as required by Kansas’ rules and regulations filing act. Though Defendants argue these actions were exempt from the filing act because they were “agency personnel” measures, Kan. Stat. § 77-415(b)(2)(B), we do not address that argument because of our conclusion that the mere enactment of the amended WMP by itself did not create an actionable claim for Plaintiffs, which was not ripe until the amended WMP was actually invoked to support their terminations.
9. While Plaintiffs bore the initial burden to demonstrate that Defendants violated a clearly established right, Plaintiffs were not required to raise and rebut in their response to the motion to dismiss every possible defense Defendants might have, but failed to, argue.
10. Though it appears from the KBOR meeting minutes prior to its approval of the ESU Framework, which were attached to the SAC, that the ESU administration consulted faculty and staff on changes they would like to see at the university, this outreach did not come in the context of the development of the ESU Framework, nor did ESU give any indication that such a framework was being developed. Likely for this reason, Defendants do not argue that this campus outreach served as notice or an opportunity to be heard on the specific government actions of drafting and adopting the ESU Framework and eliminating tenure protections.
11. Count III's conspiracy claim also survives Defendants’ motion to dismiss to the same extent as Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims.
12. In making these assertions, Plaintiffs rely on Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 515, 529 (rejecting tenured professor's substantive due process claim challenging his termination because “the defendants’ actions were not arbitrary, did not lack a rational basis, and were not shocking to the conscience”), and Brenna, 589 F.2d at 477 (stating that “ ‘[s]ubstantive’ due process requires only that termination” of a property interest in continued tenured employment “not be arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis”).
13. The proper remedy for a reputational injury is a name-clearing hearing. Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency, 998 F.2d 1550, 1558 (10th Cir. 1993). Neither party addressed this requirement, nor, consequently, whether the OAH Hearings would have satisfied this requirement. As such, the district court will be better suited to answer this question on remand after the parties have provided further discovery and briefing.
1. I join the remainder of the opinion.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
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Docket No: No. 25-3032
Decided: November 09, 2026
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
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