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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Brett MORGAN, Defendant - Appellant.
When an adult exploits a child's innocence to create pornography, the child suffers lasting harm. To prevent this harm, Congress criminalizes the production and possession of child pornography.
Defendant Brett Morgan secretly filmed and photographed five young girls in his care, mostly while they were nude. A jury convicted him for production, attempted production, and possession of child pornography. Defendant raises several challenges to his convictions on appeal. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
Defendant victimized five young girls in his care. He sexually abused his former stepdaughter (MV1) and used her friendships with other underage girls to gain access to new victims (MV2, MV3, MV4, and MV5). He then sexually abused at least one of these victims and secretly recorded each of them, mostly while they were nude.
Defendant's abuse surfaced after seven-year-old MV3, a friend of Defendant's stepdaughter, pointed to a brush between her mother's knees and said “you have a d-i-c-k.” Her parents contacted law enforcement. During a forensic interview, MV3 explained that Defendant engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct with her and MV1. She said that Defendant licked and touched their genitals every day, and that he tried to get her to “suck or play” with his penis, but she refused. She also said that Defendant tried to take pictures of their genitals with a red-and-black phone.
Detective Jonathan Elledge interviewed Defendant later that day and seized the red-and-black phone. Law enforcement then obtained search warrants for Defendant's phone and home. Officers discovered secretly recorded videos and images of the five minors, several of which featured the minors nude in a bathtub. Law enforcement located the bathtub from the recordings in Defendant's home along with a hidden camera pointed at the tub.
A grand jury returned a ten-count indictment against Defendant based on these images and videos. In the indictment, the government charged Defendant with three counts of production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (Counts 1, 2, and 9), six counts of attempted production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), and one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2) (Count 10). We describe the images and videos underlying each count in chronological order.
On December 10, 2022, Defendant created a thirty-nine-second video and photo of MV2. The video and photo capture images of MV2's covered genitals and up her nightshirt while she plays a virtual reality (“VR”) video game. The government charged Defendant with attempted production of child pornography involving MV2 based on this video and photo. This charge constituted Count 7.
On December 22, 2022, Defendant created an hourlong video of MV1 and MV2 undressing and entering his bathtub. He recorded this video with a hidden camera that he placed across from the bathtub in his bedroom. The government charged Defendant with attempted production of child pornography involving MV1 based on this video. This charge constituted Count 9.
On January 7, 2023, Defendant created a zoomed-in screenshot of MV2's genitals taken from the December 22, 2022 video underlying Count 9. The government charged Defendant with production of child pornography involving MV2 based on this screenshot. This charge constituted Count 8.
On January 28, 2023, Defendant created a twenty-two-minute video of MV1 and MV2 nude in his bathtub. Unlike the video underlying Count 9, Defendant positioned the hidden camera next to the tub rather than across the room. During this video, MV1 says to MV2 that Defendant wanted them to “do things” to each other. Defendant enters the frame and directs the girls to display their genitals to the hidden lightbulb camera and tells MV2 to spread her vagina in the light. MV1 and MV2 display their genitals to the hidden lightbulb camera. The government charged Defendant with production of child pornography involving MV1 and MV2 based on this video. These charges constituted Counts 1 and 2 respectively.
On April 6, 2023, Defendant created a photo of MV1 and MV5 nude in his bathtub. Like Counts 1 and 2, Defendant positioned the hidden lightbulb next to the bathtub. The government charged Defendant with attempted production of child pornography involving both MV1 and MV5 based on this photograph. This charge constituted Count 6.
On June 5, 2023, Defendant created a four-minute and forty-nine-second video of MV1, MV3, and MV4 nude in his bathtub. Defendant is heard off-screen saying “let's take off all of our clothes and get into the tub,” and “[b]efore you can get dressed and after you are out of the tub you need to get into the shower.” The government charged Defendant with attempted production of child pornography involving MV1, MV3, and MV4. These charges constituted Counts 3, 4, and 5 respectively.
As of July 4, 2023, Defendant possessed a close-up image of a prepubescent vagina spread by adult fingers. Investigators discovered this image on Defendant's phone in a password-protected folder. The government charged Defendant with possession of child pornography based on this image. This charge constituted Count 10.
At trial, the jury heard testimony from law enforcement, some of the victims’ parents, and MV3. They also viewed the videos and photos. The jury convicted Defendant on all counts, and the district judge imposed an eighty-year prison term. Defendant appealed.
II.
Defendant raises six issues on appeal. He argues: (1) we should reverse his convictions for attempted production of child pornography (Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9) because the government presented insufficient evidence or that we should vacate these convictions because the district court erroneously instructed the jury; (2) we should reverse his conviction for production of child pornography under Count 8 because the government presented insufficient evidence; (3) we should vacate his convictions for production and possession of child pornography (Counts 1, 2, 8, and 10) because the district court's jury instruction misstated the law; (4) the district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of uncharged sexual abuse; (5) Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 are plainly multiplicitous under the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (6) these claimed trial errors cumulatively prejudiced him.
We address and ultimately reject each of Defendant's arguments below.
A.
Before we address Defendant's issues on appeal, we pause to discuss the legal standard applicable to Defendant's convictions.
Defendant's convictions for producing, and for attempting to produce, child pornography required the government to prove that he “use[d]” (or attempted to use) “any minor to engage in ․ sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.” § 2251(a), (e). “[S]exually explicit conduct” includes, among other things, “actual or simulated” “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.”1 § 2256(2)(A)(v). The parties dispute the applicable legal standard. Specifically, the parties dispute whether the minor must do anything to engage in a lascivious exhibition of her genitals under the child exploitation statutes.
Under the government's view, the minor's conduct may be completely innocent. Even still, that minor engages in sexually explicit conduct when the defendant depicts their otherwise non-sexual conduct in a sexually explicit manner (by, for example, focusing the depiction on the child's genitals). According to the government, then, a defendant uses a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct when he “produce[s] a depiction of a lascivious exhibition of the minor's genitals ․”
Defendant instead insists that one cannot produce a depiction (or attempt to produce a depiction) of a “lascivious exhibition” by filming or photographing a minor's non-sexual conduct (such as innocent nudity in a bathtub). Defendant's argument runs along two strands. First, Defendant claims that an innocently behaving minor has not “engage[d] in any sexually explicit conduct.” Second, Defendant argues that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “lascivious exhibition of the genitals,” read in context, demonstrates that the minor's conduct must “connote[ ] the commission of a sexual act” to be lascivious.
The government's position is correct. We adopted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of “lascivious exhibition” from United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987) in United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 245 (10th Cir. 1989). In Wiegand, the Ninth Circuit viewed the term “lascivious” as “no different in its meaning than ‘lewd,’ a commonsensical term ․” Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1243; see also United States v. Reedy, 845 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1988). It then acknowledged that the term lascivious has a “connotation” that adults who engage in lascivious exhibitions “intend ․ [a] sexual invitation by [their] pose.” Id. at 1244. The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that it must interpret lasciviousness differently in the context of a statute that applies “to the conduct of children,” because children often will not comprehend or intend sexual connotations. Id. (noting that “it would be almost incredible” for a 10-year-old to “register sexual coyness”).
Thus, in the context of the child exploitation statutes, the term lascivious does not refer to “a characteristic of the child photographed ․” Id. The child's conduct need not “show[ ] sexual activity or willingness to engage in it,” nor must the child strike an “unnatural” pose for an exhibition of their genitals to be lascivious. Id. Instead, lasciviousness refers to “the exhibition which the photographer sets up for an audience that consists of himself or likeminded pedophiles.” Id.; accord United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The ‘lascivious exhibition’ is not the work of the child, whose innocence is not in question, but of the producer or editor of the video.”). A depiction of a child is lascivious, not because of the child's conduct, but because it “feature[s] the child photographed as a sexual object.” Id.
We adopted this understanding of lascivious in Wolf without qualification, quoting heavily from the Wiegand decision. See 890 F.2d at 244–247. To determine whether a minor engages in a lascivious exhibition under our cases, then, we “do not consider [the victim's] actions or state of mind” or “place[ ] the onus of lust on the child being photographed.” United States v. Wells, 843 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245). Instead, lasciviousness turns on the overall content of the visual depiction. Id. at 1254. And “a visual depiction of a minor is ‘a lascivious exhibition because the photographer array[s] it to suit his peculiar lust.” Id. at 1254 (quoting Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245) (emphasis altered).
Returning to the parties’ dispute, our cases foreclose Defendant's argument that a minor's innocent conduct cannot be sexually explicit. Instead, we have explained that a depiction “of a child ‘engaged in sexually explicit conduct’ within the meaning of” § 2251 is a depiction “of a child's sex organs displayed lasciviously—that is, so presented by the photographer as to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of a voyeur.” Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245 (quoting Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1244) (emphasis added). By producing such a depiction, a defendant uses the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct. See United States v. Theis, 853 F.3d 1178, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a defendant violates the “use” element of § 2251 when he photographs a child “in order to create pornography” (quoting United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1996))). And for similar reasons, our cases foreclose Defendant's argument that the minor's conduct must “connote[ ] the commission of a sexual act” to be lascivious. We have “explicitly ‘rejected th[is] notion ․’ ” Wells, 843 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245). Again, the term lascivious describes the depiction—not the child's conduct. See id. (citing Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245).
Implicit in Defendant's arguments is the idea that a minor does not suffer abuse when a defendant depicts their otherwise innocent conduct in a sexually explicit manner. Indeed, he claims that characteristics of the depiction, such as the focal point, setting, and the intent behind it do not “tell us whether the child was abused ․” According to Defendant, understanding abuse requires an exclusive focus on “the conduct engaged in by (or forced upon) the minor.” Id.
To the contrary, “the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); see also Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (legislative finding of the same). As we explained in Wolf, interpreting lasciviousness as characteristic of the depiction rather than the child's conduct reflects the purposes underlying child exploitation statutes. Wolf, 890 F.2d at 247. Congress sought to protect “the invasion of the child's ‘vulnerability’ ” by the voyeur. Id. (quoting Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1245). The conduct criminalized is that of the “pornographic photographer,” who “subordinates the humanity” of the child to his own sexuality, makes the child “a mere means of serving the voyeur's purposes,” and “treat[s]” the child “as a thing.” Id. (quoting Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1245).
Consistent with this understanding, we have affirmed convictions under § 2251 even when the child has not “done” anything sexually explicit aside from being the subject of the defendant's lascivious depiction. In Wolf we affirmed a conviction under § 2251 even though the defendant photographed the child as she slept. 890 F.2d at 243. Although the child slept, the defendant used her to engage in sexually explicit conduct by creating a lascivious depiction of her genitals. Id. at 245–46. “To find otherwise,” we explained “would ignore the obvious exploitative nature of the depiction” and “pervert both the language and logic” of the statute.2 Id. at 246.
In Wells we similarly upheld a conviction against the defendant's sufficiency argument even though the evidence showed that the minor engaged only in “common bathroom activities” and “viewed her own actions as nonsexual.” 843 F.3d at 1255. In assessing evidentiary sufficiency, we did not “consider [the minor's] actions or state of mind” but instead focused our analysis on the defendant's actions and intent in creating the exploitative depiction. Id. at 1255–56. We found the evidence sufficient when the defendant filmed the victim in a sexually suggestive setting, focused the videos on the victim's genitals, and had a sexual interest toward the victim. Id. at 1256–57. Thus, in Wells and Wolf, we “explicitly ‘rejected the notion that’ ” the minor's conduct or state-of-mind must be sexual. See id. at 1254 (quoting Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245). Instead, a minor's otherwise innocent conduct can become sexually explicit through the defendant's exploitative depiction of that conduct.3
In sum, where the “sexually explicit conduct” at issue is the lascivious exhibition of a minor's genitals, a defendant uses that minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct when he produces a visual depiction of a lascivious exhibition of that minor's genitals. See Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245 (quoting Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1244); Theis, 853 F.3d at 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2017) (use element met when a minor “is photographed in order to create pornography.” (quoting Sirois, 87 F.3d at 41)). Having described the applicable legal standard, we turn to Defendant's arguments on appeal.
B.
Defendant first argues that we should reverse his convictions for attempted production of child pornography (Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9) because the government presented insufficient evidence to the jury. Alternatively, Defendant contends that we should vacate these convictions because the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the mens rea element for an attempt offense. We reject both arguments.
1.
We review a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction de novo. United States v. Xiang, 12 F.4th 1176, 1184 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Delgado-Uribe, 363 F.3d 1077, 1081 (10th Cir. 2004)). This review is “highly deferential,” and we will only reverse the jury's verdict if “no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 868–69 (10th Cir. 2019)). In assessing what a rational juror could have found, we view all evidence in the “light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Simpkins, 90 F.4th 1312, 1318 (10th Cir. 2024) (citing Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243, 136 S.Ct. 709, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016)).
The jury convicted Defendant on Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 for attempted production of child pornography under § 2251(a) and (e). To prove an attempt, “the government must show (1) specific intent to commit the crime, and (2) a substantial step towards completion of the crime.” United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 831 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d 1243, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015)). We conclude the government presented sufficient evidence to prove, for each attempt count, that Defendant specifically intended to produce a visual depiction of a lascivious exhibition of a minor's genitals and that he took a substantial step toward that end.
a.
We begin with evidence of Defendant's specific intent to produce depictions of his victims’ genitals displayed lasciviously. Defendant bought a light bulb with a hidden camera to secretly film his victims for an extended period in his bathroom— where he knew they would be nude. See United States v. Wilson, 142 F.4th 1045, 1051 (8th Cir. 2025) (finding sufficient evidence under similar circumstances). Nudity “further contributes” to a rational jury's conclusion as to lasciviousness (or here, attempted lasciviousness). Wells, 843 F.3d at 1256. And the bathroom can be a “sexually suggestive setting.”4 Id.
Defendant initially placed the hidden camera across his bedroom and pointed it at the bathtub. After filming MV1 and MV2 in his bathtub for an hour from this vantage point (Count 9), he created a zoomed-in screenshot of MV2's genitals (Count 8) and repositioned the camera to be closer to his victims (Counts 1–6). This pattern suggests that Defendant sought to depict more than “mere nudity,” Isabella, 918 F.3d at 831 (acknowledging that “mere nudity is not sufficient to constitute child pornography ․” (quoting United States v. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 2005)), and that he instead “ ‘intended or designed’ the videos” to focus more closely on his victims’ genitals and to “elicit a sexual response.” Wells, 843 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Wolf, 890 F.2d at 244); see also id. at 1257 (repositioning camera “because of [ ] carnal response” to minor indicative of Defendant's sexual intent toward the victim); Wilson, 142 F.4th at 1052 (finding screenshots of pubic area culled from footage of minor evinced intent).
Defendant also sexually abused MV1 and MV3 while they were in his care. This evidence supports the jury's findings because it demonstrates Defendant's sexual interest toward the victims. See Wells, 843 F.3d at 1256–57 (considering the defendant's actions that “demonstrated his sexual desires” toward the victim).
That Defendant possessed child pornography and produced child pornography using the same hidden camera in the same bathroom involving some of the same victims is more evidence relevant to the intent element for each attempt count. See Isabella, 918 F.3d at 834 n.17 (noting that specific intent may be inferred from evidence that demonstrates a common scheme to violate § 2251). Defendant possessed an image of a minor's genitals spread by adult fingers. As already mentioned, after failing to film his victims closely enough in the first hourlong video (Count 9), Defendant paused the video and zoomed it in to create a lascivious depiction of MV2's genitals (Count 8) and repositioned his camera. During the twenty-two-minute video underlying Counts 1 and 2, Defendant directed MV1 and MV2 to display their genitals directly into his lightbulb camera. Also in this video, MV1 tells MV2 that Defendant wanted them to “do things” to each other.
The evidence underlying each count further supports the jury's convictions. Beginning with Count 7, Defendant filmed a thirty-nine-second video of MV2 playing a VR video game in her nightgown and underwear. He also photographed her. Defendant positioned the camera up MV2's skirt and between her legs “such that the genital/vaginal area is emphasized and is in fact the primary subject of the picture.” Wolf, 890 F.2d at 246; see also Wells, 843 F.3d at 1255–56 (a jury can reasonably consider the focal point of the videos in determining lasciviousness). Although MV2 is not completely nude, we have never held that a completed, let alone an attempted, violation of the statute requires nudity. See United States v. Helton, 302 F. App'x 842, 847 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citing Horn, 187 F.3d at 789–90 (finding a lascivious exhibition when the depiction focused on the minor's covered genitals)). The jury could have also inferred intent from the fact that, only a short time later, Defendant filmed MV2 nude in his bathroom and created a zoomed-in screenshot of her genitals.
Count 9 involves a secretly recorded, roughly hourlong video of MV1 and MV2 undressing and getting into Defendant's bathtub. As discussed above, the length and location of this video support the jury's conclusion that Defendant intended to produce a lascivious display of MV1's genitals when he secretly recorded her nude in the bathroom for about an hour. Defendant also perused this hourlong video to identify a suitable moment to screenshot and zoom-in to create a lascivious depiction of MV2's genitals. See Wells, 843 F.3d at 1255 (highlighting Defendant's reviewing and “cull[ing]” of footage). And Defendant positioned his hidden camera closer to his victims after filming this video. Defendant's later actions create a reasonable inference of his intent in creating the depiction underlying Count 9.
Count 6 involves a photo that Defendant took of MV1 and MV5 nude in his bathtub. Although Defendant failed to capture a lascivious exhibition of either girls’ genitals, the jury could have rationally concluded that he intended to do so. Defendant created and stored this screenshot after he repositioned his hidden camera. Defendant angled the camera downward toward the inside of the tub. The nude minors are the central focus of the image. And as already discussed, Defendant used MV1 (featured in this photo) and another victim (MV2) to produce child pornography in his bathtub with the same hidden camera before taking this photo. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could infer that Defendant intended to create child pornography when he screenshotted MV1 and MV5 nude in his bathtub.
Counts 3, 4, and 5 involve Defendant's attempted use of MV1, MV3, and MV4 respectively to create child pornography. These counts involve a roughly five-minute-long video in which Defendant directs the three minors to “take off all of [their] clothes and get into the tub.” The camera retains the same proximity to the tub and the same angle as in Count 6, and the minors’ genitals are briefly visible as they enter the tub.
Again, the jury could infer Defendant's intent from the length of the video, its sexually suggestive location, and because Defendant told the minors to get nude and directed them toward the hidden camera. See Wells, 843 F.3d at 1256 (explaining that a jury could conclude that the bathroom is a sexually suggestive setting); Wilson, 142 F.4th at 1051 (finding sufficient evidence after the defendant placed cameras where minors were “most likely to be naked” and “set them to record for an extended period of time, and hid them to avoid detection”). Defendant also created this video after he produced lascivious exhibitions of MV1 and MV2's genitals in the same bathtub with the same hidden camera, and after he had instructed MV1 to “do things” with another victim in his bathtub. See Isabella, 918 F.3d at 834 n.17 (jury may infer intent from evidence of a common scheme).
Thus, the government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, for each count, that Defendant specifically intended to produce a depiction of a lascivious exhibition of his victims’ genitals.
b.
The jury also needed to conclude that Defendant took a substantial step toward producing child pornography. “[A] substantial step is appropriately found where the defendant undertook ‘an act adapted to, approximating, and which in the ordinary and likely course of things will result in, the commission of [a] particular crime.’ ” United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Fleming, 667 F.3d 1098, 1107 (10th Cir. 2011)). Whether the defendant took a substantial step is a “highly fact-specific inquiry,” United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d 1243, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1195 (10th Cir. 2011)), but we have said that the defendant must do “something more than mere preparation,” Gordon, 710 F.3d at 1150 (quoting Fleming, 667 F.3d at 1107).
Here, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to conclude that Defendant took a substantial step toward producing lascivious exhibitions of his victims’ genitals. Defendant used his stepdaughter's friendships with other minor girls to gain access to them so he could exploit them. For Count 7, Defendant placed his phone between MV2's legs and filmed and photographed her genitals. For the remaining attempt counts (Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9), Defendant bought a hidden lightbulb camera and recorded the nude victims in his bathtub for extended periods of time. He repositioned this camera to film his victims more closely. Defendant told his stepdaughter (who is featured in every attempt count besides Count 7) that he expected her to “do things” with another victim in his bathtub.
Although the videos and photographs underlying the attempt counts did not actually result in a lascivious exhibition of the genitals (at least as charged by the government), a substantial step “may be less than the last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime.” Gordon, 710 F.3d at 1150 (quoting Fleming, 667 F.3d at 1107). Defendant took every step necessary to violate § 2251(a) for each attempt count aside from successfully capturing a lascivious display of his victims’ genitals. A jury could rationally conclude that these acts were “adapted to,” and “in the ordinary and likely course of things” would, result in Defendant completing the crime. Id. at 1151 (quoting Fleming, 667 F.3d at 1107).
2.
Defendant also asks us to vacate his attempt convictions because the district court erroneously instructed the jury. “We review jury instructions de novo, examining whether[,] as a whole, the instructions accurately informed the jury of the issues and the governing law.” Wilson v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 80 F.4th 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Defendant claims that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury on the mens rea element required for an attempt conviction. Again, to prove an attempt, the government must show that the defendant had a specific intent to commit the crime. Isabella, 918 F.3d at 831 (citing Faust, 795 F.3d at 1248).
The instruction told the jury that the government had to prove “[t]he defendant knowingly attempted to use [a] Minor Victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.” It explained that this required the jury to find “the defendant (1) knowingly took a substantial step toward using the Minor Victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct; (2) with the intent to make a visual depiction of this sexually explicit conduct.” The instruction then defined attempt: “in order to prove an attempt, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant intended to commit the crime, and that (2) the defendant took a substantial step towards commission of that crime.” Defendant highlights two purported issues with this instruction.
First, Defendant points out that the instruction required the jury to find only that he intended to make a visual depiction of the minors’ sexually explicit conduct. According to Defendant, this instruction failed to convey the requirement that he also intended to use the minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct
But we explained in Theis that a defendant “uses” a minor when he “intentionally films or photographs a minor's sexually explicit conduct.” 853 F.3d at 1182 (collecting cases). Thus, by proving to the jury that Defendant “inten[ded] to make a visual depiction” of the minor victims’ “sexually explicit conduct,” the government also proved that he intended to use the minor victims to engage in sexually explicit conduct.
Defendant next challenges the instructional phrase “knowingly attempted to use” because “knowingly” committing a crime is different than specifically intending to commit a crime. Defendant is correct that knowledge and intent describe different states of mind. Knowledge requires the government to prove the defendant's “general intent” to commit the crime. United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980)). And general intent only requires that the defendant act “voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident.” Id. at 642 (quoting United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1420 (10th Cir. 1986)). Specific intent, meanwhile, requires that the defendant's “act was committed voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do something the law forbids.” Id. (quoting Hall, 805 F.2d at 1420).
Even still, we conclude that the jury instruction did not misstate the law when considered as a whole. Although the phrase “knowingly attempted to use” is inartful, this phrase did not permit the jury to convict Defendant on the lesser mens rea of knowledge. On its face, the instruction still required the jury to find that Defendant attempted to use each victim. The instruction twice specified the requirements of attempt. Right after discussing the elements of the crime, the instruction elaborated that “to prove the defendant attempted to commit the offense,” the government had to prove that the defendant “inten[ded] to make a visual depiction of [the Minor Victim engaged in sexually explicit conduct.]” This accurately states the law. The instruction then explained attempt one more time, stating explicitly that “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant intended to commit the crime ․” We conclude that the instructions, when read as a whole, accurately informed the jury of the mens rea required for an attempt offense.
C.
Defendant next argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to convict him for producing child pornography on Count 8. Count 8 relies on a zoomed-in screenshot of MV2's genitals captured from a secret recording of MV1 and MV2 undressing and entering Defendant's bathtub. Defendant contends that this evidence shows only that he used an electronic device to create the lascivious display of MV2's genitals, not that he used MV2.
Defendant's argument rests on his misapprehension of what it means to “use” a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct under § 2251. Although Defendant may have used an electronic device to produce the lascivious display of his victim's genitals, our cases make clear that he also used MV2 as the subject of the child pornography he produced.
The crime targeted by the sexual exploitation statutes is the “pornographic photographer[’s] subordinat[ion]” of the child to his own sexuality. Wolf, 890 F.2d at 247 (quoting Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1245). “[T]he ‘conduct’ governed by the statute” is the exploitative “exhibition that the photographer sets up ․” Id. A depiction is lascivious “because the photographer array[s] it to suit his peculiar lust.” Wells, 843 F.3d at 1255 (citing Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245) (emphasis altered).
Neither the logic of our cases interpreting the child exploitation statutes nor the purposes underlying these statutes suggest that exploitation occurs only through original, but not altered, images. Indeed, Congress defined “child pornography” to include visual depictions that have been “adapted” or “modified to appear” as though a minor “is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” § 2256(8)(C).
Thus, when a defendant adapts, modifies or arrays a video or photograph to produce “a picture of a child's sex organs displayed lasciviously,” he produces a “picture of a child ‘engaged in sexually explicit conduct’ within the meaning of” § 2251. Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245 (quoting Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1244); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“[A]lter[ed] innocent pictures of real children ․ implicate the interests of real children.”). Defendant did precisely this when he created a screenshot of MV2 nude at a suitable time and zoomed-into her genitals. And in producing this depiction of MV2's genitals lasciviously exhibited, Defendant used MV2 to engage in sexually explicit conduct. Theis, 853 F.3d at 1181–82. The government therefore presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant for production of child pornography under Count 8.5
D.
Defendant also asks us to vacate his convictions for producing child pornography (Counts 1, 2, and 8) as well as his conviction for possessing child pornography (Count 10) because of purported errors in the jury instruction. Defendant contends that the district court's “lascivious exhibition” instruction erred because it informed the jury that it (1) could consider six factors known as the “Dost factors,” and (2) could consider “whether the visual depictions would appeal to persons who are sexually attracted to children.” We review de novo whether the jury instruction accurately stated the governing law. Wilson, 80 F.4th at 1173 (quoting Henning, 530 F.3d at 1221).
Congress defined “sexually explicit conduct” to include the “actual or simulated” “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.” § 2256(2)(A)(v). The statute does not elaborate on the meaning of “lascivious,” see Wells, 843 F.3d at 1253 (citing Wolf, 890 F.2d at 243), but we have said that it has the same meaning as the word “ ‘lewd,’ a commonsensical term ․,” Reedy, 845 F.2d at 241 (quoting Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1243).
In United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), the court identified six factors “the trier of fact should look to ․ among any others that may be relevant” in determining whether a particular depiction constitutes a lascivious exhibition. Id. at 832. These factors are:
(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area;
(2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity;
(3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child;
(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;
(5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; [and]
(6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.
Wells, 843 F.3d at 1253 (citing Wolf, 890 F.2d at 244).
Most circuit courts, including the Tenth Circuit, see Wells, 843 F.3d at 1253 (citing Wolf, 890 F.2d at 244), have endorsed these “Dost factors” as an aid in determining whether a depiction constitutes a lascivious exhibition. See United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 234, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2024) (collecting cases). Defendant does not dispute this point. Instead, he argues that we have never published an opinion approving the Dost factors’ use in jury instructions and that their inclusion here constituted error.6
1.
To begin, Defendant contends that permitting a jury to consider the Dost factors constitutes error. According to Defendant, the Dost factors are “not workable for instructing the jury” because they are “a list of difficult-to-apply, judicially-created factors” that encourage an “unprincipled detour from the statute's text ․”
The problem with Defendant's criticism is that his view of the statute's text squarely contradicts our cases interpreting that text. Defendant criticizes the Dost factors for focusing on characteristics of the photographer and the depiction rather than on “the conduct engaged in by (or forced upon) the minor.” But as discussed above, lasciviousness describes the “exhibition which the photographer sets up,” not the child's conduct. See Wells, 843 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Wolf, 890 F.2d at 245). The question for the jury is whether the “overall content of [each] visual depiction” constitutes a lascivious exhibition. Id. (quoting Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832). The Dost factors are each relevant to answering this question.
We therefore decline to conclude that the Dost factors cannot be used to instruct juries. Although the Dost factors, “[a]s a definition of the word ‘lascivious’ ․ are imperfect and vulnerable to criticism,” United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 252 (2d Cir. 2008), they can be a helpful tool for instructing juries. Where, as here, they do not purport to be definitional, the Dost factors can “mitigate the risk that jurors will react to raw images in a visceral way, rely on impulse or revulsion, or lack any framework for reasoned dialogue in the jury room.” Id. at 253; see also United States v. Heinrich, 57 F.4th 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2023) (“ ‘[S]exually explicit’ and ‘lascivious’ are ordinary, common-sense concepts. The Dost factors are simply helpful guidelines, not a checklist to be applied mechanically.”).
“We need not decide whether the Dost factors would govern in every case that touches on child pornography.” Rivera, 546 F.3d at 253. Instead, we join the majority of circuits that have considered the question and conclude that a district court does not categorically err in permitting the jury to consider the Dost factors to determine whether the overall content of a visual depiction constitutes a lascivious exhibition.7
2.
Defendant also argues that, even if we do not categorically prohibit the use of the Dost factors in jury instructions, the district court erred in its use of these factors in this case. First, Defendant claims that the district court improperly relied on the Dost factors to define “lascivious exhibition” for the jury. Second, Defendant claims that the district court's instruction to the jury that it could “decide the weight or lack of weight to be given to any of the[ ] [Dost] factors,” as well as its instruction that the jury “may consider whether the visual depictions would appeal to persons who are sexually attracted to children,” permitted the jury to convict him for non-lascivious images.
We agree with Defendant that jury instructions should not define lascivious exhibition via the Dost factors because they “are not definitional—nor do they purport to be.” Rivera, 546 F.3d at 252. But that did not happen here. Instruction 13, titled “Sexually Explicit Conduct Definition,” stated that sexually explicit conduct “includes lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.” It informed the jury that, to “determine whether a visual depiction” is a lascivious exhibition, it “must consider the overall content of the visual depiction ․” The instruction then told the jury, in considering the depiction's content, it “may, but [was] not required to, consider the” Dost factors.
The instruction tasked the jury with determining whether the visual depictions were lascivious exhibitions of the anus, genitals, or pubic area based on their overall content. This correctly stated the law. See Kroeker, 2025 WL 1878790, *4 (citing Wells, 843 F.3d at 1254). The instruction did not define the term lascivious using the Dost factors. Indeed, an instruction cannot define a word by a list of factors that the jury is “not required to” consider. Instead, lascivious within the instruction took on its commonsensical definition, and the instruction provided the Dost factors as an option to help determine whether the overall content of the images met that definition.
Defendant also argues that the district court erred by allowing the jury to “decide the weight or lack of weight to be given to any of the[ ] [Dost] factors,” which he argues permitted the jury to give dispositive weight to any single Dost factor. According to Defendant, the jury could convict him “solely because the image is one of nudity (the fourth factor),” or “merely because [Defendant] believed” the images were lascivious exhibitions under the sixth factor.
Instructing the jury that it could convict based on a non-lascivious depiction of nudity would constitute error under our cases. See Isabella, 918 F.3d at 831 (quoting Soderstrand, 412 F.3d at 1151–52). And a jury could not properly convict a defendant for an image that is lascivious “merely in [that defendant's] estimation ․” See Williams, 553 U.S. at 301, 128 S.Ct. 1830; see also Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1245 (“The crime punished by the statutes against the sexual exploitation of children, however, does not consist of the cravings of the person posing the child or in the cravings of his audience. Private fantasies are not within the statute's ambit.”). But after reading the jury instruction in context, as we must, United States v. Woodmore, 127 F.4th 193, 218 (10th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647, 664 (10th Cir. 2005)), we conclude that it did not permit the jury to reach its conclusion in an erroneous manner. And “[a]s a matter of law, we presume that jurors follow the instructions they are given.” United States v. Rudolph, 152 F.4th 1197, 1225 (10th Cir. 2025) (citing Stouffer v. Duckworth, 825 F.3d 1167, 1181 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v. Fleming, 667 F.3d 1098, 1106 (10th Cir. 2011)).
To reiterate, this instruction assigned the jury one overarching task: to determine whether each visual depiction is a lascivious exhibition. As Defendant acknowledges on appeal, juries can understand and apply these commonsense terms. See Reedy, 845 F.2d at 241 (quoting Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1243). The district court then gave the jury one mandatory instruction for completing its task: it must consider the visual depiction's overall content “while taking into account the age of the child depicted.”
The district court also instructed the jury that it “may, but [was] not required to” consider whether the child was nude in each depiction under the fourth Dost factor. Yet, this optional consideration could assist the jury only in considering the image's overall content to determine whether it is a lascivious exhibition. A jury that gives dispositive weight to non-lascivious nudity has not followed these instructions. First, this hypothetical jury has not considered the overall content of the depiction. Second, it has ignored its overarching task by failing to determine that the nudity made the visual depiction lascivious. Understood in context, then, the instruction did not permit the jury to convict Defendant based on non-lascivious images. See Sanders, 107 F.4th at 263 (addressing a similar challenge and reaching the same conclusion).
The district court also instructed the jury that it could consider “[w]hether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer” under the sixth Dost factor. The instruction elaborated on this factor, informing the jury that it was “not necessary that the images be intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the average viewer” and that it could “consider whether the visual depictions would appeal to persons who are sexually attracted to children.”
Defendant claims that the sixth factor, as well as the district court's instruction elaborating on this factor, allowed the jury to convict him for his sexual response to objectively non-lascivious images or to convict him because a non-lascivious image of a child could appeal to someone sexually attracted to children. As one judge stated the concern: “[a] pedophile may be aroused by photos of children at a bus stop wearing winter coats, but these are not pornographic.” United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 829 (5th Cir. 2011) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
At first blush, it is not clear that “the subjective arousal of the viewer is the relevant inquiry” under the sixth factor. Sanders, 107 F.4th at 262. After all, this factor instructs the trier of fact to consider “ ‘whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response,’ not whether a sexual response was elicited.” Id. This language refers both to characteristics of the depiction (its design) and the intentions of the image's producer. Yet, in Wells, we expressly considered whether the visual depictions aroused the defendant under the sixth factor. See 843 F.3d at 1256–57. Defendant thus correctly suggests that a jury could have considered his subjective sexual response, or the sexual response of other pedophiles, to the depictions under the sixth factor.8
The instruction, however, did not permit the jury to convict Defendant based solely on such responses. Instead, it required the jury to determine that each visual depiction was lascivious, and it informed the jury that it must consider the overall content of the depiction to make this determination. A determination that a visual depiction is lascivious based—not on its content—but solely on the subjective response of Defendant or of pedophiles conflicts with the jury instruction. Thus, the instructions did not permit the jury to convict Defendant for visual depictions that the jury did not consider to be lascivious based on their overall content.
E.
Defendant also argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his uncharged sexual abuse of MV1 and MV3 at trial. He challenges the admission of MV3's out-of-court statements (heard by the jury in two separate instances) as well as MV3's live testimony about this sexual abuse.
The jury heard this evidence in three ways. First, the government called Detective Elledge to testify about the investigation into Defendant. During this testimony, Detective Elledge briefly discussed statements MV3 made to him about Defendant's sexual abuse. Defendant did not object to the admission of these statements.
Next, the government called MV3 to testify to Defendant's sexual abuse. MV3's testimony about this abuse was incomplete and equivocal, so the government moved at its conclusion to recall Detective Elledge so that he could discuss the abuse claims MV3 made in more detail. The government argued that it could admit this evidence under the residual hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 807. The district court admitted this evidence over Defendant's objection.
The government then recalled Detective Elledge and the jury heard about Defendant's uncharged sexual-abuse conduct for the third time. We address the admission of this evidence below.
1.
We begin with the admission of MV3's out-of-court statements during Detective Elledge's initial testimony. Before trial, the government moved to admit all the uncharged sexual-abuse evidence on two grounds relevant here: (1) because it was intrinsic to the crimes charged (i.e., res gestae); and (2) because, even if this evidence were extrinsic to the crimes charged, the district court could admit it under Federal Rule of Evidence 414 as evidence of prior acts of child molestation in a child-molestation case. The district court admitted the evidence on both grounds.
On appeal, Defendant purports to challenge the district court's res gestae finding. Relying on United States v. Cass, 127 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 1997) and United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2009), he argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted these statements as “background information about the investigation” because the government used these statements for more expansive purposes—including for “truth-related purposes.”
Defendant's argument does not address the district court's res gestae ruling. The district court did not admit the sexual-abuse evidence (which included more than just MV3's out-of-court statements) solely for background-investigation purposes. The district court instead admitted this evidence as “res gestae—meaning inextricably intertwined with the charged conduct.” United States v. Piette, 45 F.4th 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added).
As Defendant acknowledges, res gestae is a relevance rule. When evidence is “inextricably intertwined with the charged conduct,” id., it is “intrinsic” to that conduct and is not subject to the general bar on propensity evidence under Rule 404(b). See id. at 1155. Res gestae is not a hearsay exception, so whether the government offered it for its truth does not matter—unlike in Cass and Hinson. Thus, Defendant cannot show error in the district court's res gestae decision by showing that the government relied on the sexual-abuse evidence for truth-related purposes.
At bottom, Defendant's arguments, and the cases he relies on to make these arguments on appeal, address hearsay. But Defendant waived any hearsay argument (at least as it relates to the first, unobjected-to admission of MV3's out-of-court statements) because he did not raise a contemporaneous hearsay objection and does not argue for plain error in his opening brief. See United States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2024) (first quoting United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019); and then citing United States v. Wright, 848 F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 2017)) (unpreserved issues are waived when an appellant fails to argue for plain error). Defendant also disclaims any hearsay argument on appeal.
We therefore decline to find error in the district court's admission of the sexual-abuse evidence (including MV3's out-of-court statements during Detective Elledge's initial testimony) as res gestae.
2.
Next, we turn to the admission of the sexual-abuse evidence more generally. Defendant contends that the district court should have excluded all the uncharged sexual-abuse evidence (including MV3's live testimony) as unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. Defendant does not ask us to review the district court's Rule 403 determination, rather, he contends that the district court failed to explain its decision and requests a remand so that the district court can provide more detail.
Typically, the decision “to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion.” United States v. Perrault, 995 F.3d 748, 764 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998)). But in United States v. Castillo, we explained that “it is important that the trial court ‘make a reasoned, recorded’ statement of its 403 decision when it admits evidence under Rules 413–415.” 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1332). When a district court fails to do so, we remand for the district court to explain its ruling. See id.; see also Seeley v. Chase, 443 F.3d 1290, 1297 (10th Cir. 2006).
The Castillo rule stems from the “unique nature of character evidence ․” 140 F.3d at 884. Here, however, the district court also admitted the evidence as res gestae. Res gestae evidence is considered intrinsic to the conduct charged such that it is “part and parcel of the proof of the offense ․ charged in the indictment.” Piette, 45 F.4th at 1155 (quoting United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1995)). Res gestae evidence does not constitute character evidence and is not barred under Rule 404(b)(1)’s prohibition of such evidence. Id. Thus, evidence admitted as res gestae does not implicate the concerns raised in Castillo, and the Castillo requirement does not apply.
As explained above, Defendant does not challenge the district court's decision to admit the sexual-abuse evidence as res gestae on appeal. Because the district court admitted the sexual-abuse evidence on this unchallenged basis along with admitting it under Rule 414, we do not require a Castillo remand.
3.
Finally, we turn to the admission of MV3's out-of-court statements after the government called Detective Elledge to testify for a second time. This time, Defendant made a hearsay objection at trial. The district court admitted these statements under the residual-hearsay exception over this objection. We begin by assessing whether the district court erred in admitting these statements.
a.
MV3 provided testimony at trial about Defendant's claimed sexual abuse. Some of this testimony was incomplete or equivocal. For instance, the government asked what happened at Defendant's house and MV3 responded that she did not want to talk about it. She testified that Defendant touched her in a way she did not like, but could not describe what Defendant did. She also testified that Defendant had taken pictures of her but that she did not know what he was taking pictures of.
The government then asked MV3 if she ever saw Defendant touch anyone else, and she testified that Defendant had touched MV1. She said that Defendant touched her and MV1 “everywhere” without clothes on and that he did so “[k]ind of every day,” but could not recall details. Finally, she testified that Defendant had shown her his penis.
After this testimony, the government called Detective Elledge to testify for a second time. He then discussed statements made by MV3 during her forensic interview. He said that MV3 claimed Defendant “licked and touched [the inside] of her genitals,” that this happened every day she went to the house, that she saw Defendant lick MV1's genitals, that Defendant tried to use MV1 to force MV3's legs open, and that she saw Defendant take a picture of MV1's genitals with his phone. He also testified to statements including that Defendant showed MV3 pictures of MV1's genitals, that Defendant tried to take a picture of MV3's genitals, that Defendant showed MV3 his penis and told her to keep it secret, and that Defendant asked MV3 to “suck or play” with his penis but that she refused.
Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Detective Elledge's testimony under the residual-hearsay exception after MV3 testified at trial. “The residual-hearsay exception under Rule 807 is a catchall to the recognized hearsay exceptions housed in Rules 803 and 804 ․” United States v. McFadden, 116 F.4th 1069, 1081 (10th Cir. 2024) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)). This exception “should be used only in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Burgess, 99 F.4th 1175, 1183 (10th Cir. 2024)). This caution ensures that the exception “does not ‘swallow the entirety of the hearsay rule.’ ” Id. at 1081–82 (quoting United States v. Hammers, 942 F.3d 1001, 1011 (10th Cir. 2019)). Under the residual-hearsay exception, a court may admit hearsay if it is “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness,” and “is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a).
Defendant does not contest the trustworthiness of MV3's forensic interview statements. But he argues that the district court erred in admitting these statements as more probative than MV3's live testimony about Defendant's sexual abuse. “We review the district court's Rule 807 ruling for abuse of discretion.” Burgess, 99 F.4th at 1183 (citing Hammers, 942 F.3d at 1009–10).
We recently reviewed Rule 807 determinations under similar circumstances in Burgess and McFadden. As we explained in Burgess, “[e]ven when a child witness is available and has testified ․ courts have admitted hearsay evidence of the child's prior out-of-court statements about sexual abuse, deeming those out-of-court statements to be more probative than the child's in-court testimony.” 99 F.4th at 1186. We did “not derive any per se rule” from such cases but concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in Burgess because the child testified inconsistently with the forensic-interview statements admitted under Rule 807. See id. at 1185–87.
But in McFadden, we determined that a district court abused its discretion in “nearly identical” circumstances to Burgess. 116 F.4th at 1088, 1090. We reached this determination based on “one key difference” between these cases involving the child's testimony. 116 F.4th at 1088–89. In Burgess, “the child's testimony differed from the original accusation.” Id. at 1089 (citing Burgess, 99 F.4th at 1182). In McFadden, by contrast, the child's “testimony reflect[ed] his original allegation.” Id. at 1089. Because the child's testimony reflected his prior allegation in McFadden, we concluded that his “tepid trial testimony d[id] not justify admitting more zealous ․ statements under the residual-hearsay exception.” Id. To conclude otherwise would cause “Rule 807’s purportedly stringent admissibility standard [to] wilt.” Id. (citing United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1133 (10th Cir. 2019)). Thus, “ambivalence[ ] alone” does not warrant the residual hearsay exception. Id. (quoting Hammers, 942 F.3d at 1011).
We agree with Defendant that the district court abused its discretion by admitting MV3's forensic-interview statements under Rule 807. To determine whether a hearsay statement was “more probative on the point for which it [was] offered,” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2), we “begin with the point for which the government offered the ․ evidence.” McFadden, 116 F.4th at 1086. Unlike in McFadden and Burgess, the government did not charge Defendant for the sexual-abuse discussed by MV3 at trial or during her forensic interview. The government instead charged Defendant with production, attempted production, and possession of child pornography. MV3's testimony was relevant because it showed Defendant's sexual interest in children. This testimony, even without the details from MV3's forensic interview, was highly probative of Defendant's sexual interest in children. Any extra detail provided at most a marginal boost in probativeness “on the point for which it [was] offered.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2).
Further, as in McFadden, the government cannot point to more than ambivalence in MV3's live testimony as justification for applying the residual-hearsay exception. Although MV3 could not testify to Defendant's abuse in detail, she testified that he “touched her in a way she didn't like,” that he took pictures of her, that he touched her and MV1 “everywhere” and “everyday” while they were nude, and that he showed her his penis. Nothing about this testimony contradicted MV3's forensic interview statements.
We conclude that MV3's consistent trial testimony concerning uncharged sexual-abuse evidence did not create the “extraordinary circumstances” that would “justify admitting more zealous, yet consistent, statements under the residual-hearsay exception.” McFadden, 116 F.4th at 1089 (quoting Dalton, 918 F.3d at 1133). The district court abused its discretion in admitting MV3's out-of-court statements under this exception.
b.
We next consider whether this error was harmless. “Even where we have determined that the district court abused its discretion, we still may not grant relief if the district court's error was harmless.” United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Burks v. Okla. Pub. Co., 81 F.3d 975, 980–81 (10th Cir. 1996)). We review an error under Rule 807 under the nonconstitutional harmless-error standard, McFadden, 116 F.4th at 1094 (citing United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1067 (10th Cir. 2011)), such that the “error is harmless ‘unless a substantial right of a party is affected,’ ” id. (quoting United States v. Chavez, 976 F.3d 1178, 1204 (10th Cir. 2020)). An error affects a substantial right if it “had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such an effect.” Chavez, 976 F.3d at 1204 (quoting United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1207 (10th Cir. 2009)). The government bears the burden to prove harmlessness. McFadden, 116 F.4th at 1094 (citing United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 712 (10th Cir. 2005)).
The government argues that any error was harmless because MV3's out-of-court statements merely reiterated her trial testimony. The government also argues that the district court further reduced any harm because it provided multiple limiting instructions to the jury. We agree and conclude that the district court's error was harmless.
As noted in McFadden, erroneously admitted evidence under the residual-hearsay exception will often be harmless “for the same reason that it is not ‘more probative’ under Rule 807(a)(2): [because the hearsay] statements ․ mirror[ ] [other] trial testimony.” 116 F.4th at 1095 (citing United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 1999); 21 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5035.2 (2d ed.) (June 2024 update); United States v. Otuonye, 995 F.3d 1191, 1208 (10th Cir. 2021)). In other words, when a hearsay statement is not “more probative” under Rule 807(a)(2) because it is cumulative of properly admitted evidence, it is also cumulative for purposes of harmless error and “will usually be harmless.” Id. (quoting Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5035.2).
The sexual-abuse evidence demonstrated Defendant's sexual interest in children. This was a relevant consideration for the jury in determining whether Defendant produced (and attempted to produce) child pornography. MV3's testimony was probative of this point, as was Detective Elledge's initial, unobjected-to testimony.
The inadmissible evidence closely “mirror[ed] [this] trial testimony.” McFadden, 116 F.4th at 1095. At most, the jury heard additional details about Defendant's sexual abuse of MV1 and MV3 for the first time. This included that Defendant touched his victims’ genitals, that he tried to force MV3's legs open (including with help from MV1), and that he asked MV3 to “suck or play” with his penis. But this evidence served only “to prove what ha[d] already been established by other evidence”—that Defendant had a sexual interest in children. See Otuonye, 995 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Smith v. Sec'y of N.M. Dep't of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 829 (10th Cir. 1995)). Indeed, as Defendant concedes on appeal, MV3's testimony was “just as probative on this point.”
Finally, we note that the district court further diminished any risk of harm by instructing the jury four separate times that it could not consider this evidence other than for the crimes charged. Chavez, 976 F.3d at 1204 (explaining that we consider “whether the district court's instructions to the jury mitigated” any error in assessing harmlessness (quoting United States v. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173, 1197 (10th Cir. 2015)). After reviewing the record and considering the error in context, we conclude that the government met its burden to show that this error did not have a substantial effect on the outcome at trial.
F.
Defendant finally argues that the district court erred because it did not vacate his plainly multiplicitous counts in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. “Multiplicity refers to multiple counts of an indictment which cover the same criminal behavior.” United States v. Aguilar, 168 F.4th 1319, 1326 (10th Cir. 2026) (quoting United States v. McCullough, 457 F.3d 1150, 1162 (10th Cir. 2006)). Multiplicitous convictions are “improper because they allow multiple punishments for a single criminal offense,” McCullough, 457 F.3d at 1162 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 557 (10th Cir. 2002)), in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. (quoting United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1083 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001)).
For allegations of multiplicity, “the question is whether the facts underlying each count were intended by Congress to constitute separate ‘units’ of prosecution.” United States v. Elliott, 937 F.3d 1310, 1313 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2009)). A “unit of prosecution” is “the minimum amount of activity a defendant must undertake, what he must do, to commit each new and independent violation of a criminal statute.” Id. (quoting United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2015)). “Determining the unit of prosecution is ‘a matter of statutory interpretation.’ ” Id. (quoting Rentz, 777 F.3d at 1109 n.4).
“ ‘We ordinarily review claims of multiplicity de novo, but where,’ as here, ‘a defendant fails to raise the issue in a pre-trial motion,’ we ‘review only for plain error.’ ” McCullough, 457 F.3d at 1162 (quoting United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094, 1100 (10th Cir. 2002)). To be plain, an error must be “clear or obvious under current, well-settled law.” United States v. Egli, 13 F.4th 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Ibarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d 908, 929 (10th Cir. 2015)). This means “precedent directly on point from the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit, or ․ a consensus in the other circuits” exists. Id. (citing United States v. Piper, 839 F.3d 1261, 1268 (10th Cir. 2016)). An error may also be plain if “it violates clear statutory language.” United States v. Miller, 978 F.3d 746, 764 (10th Cir. 2020).
The government charged, the jury convicted, and the district court sentenced Defendant for multiple counts based on the number of victims filmed or photographed in each visual depiction that he created.9 He argues that this constituted clear and obvious error under United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1987). In Esch, the government charged the defendants with sixteen counts under § 2251(a) based on sixteen photographs “depicting [a co-defendant], the defendants and their two children.” 832 F.2d at 533–34. The defendants argued that the indictment was multiplicitous because each photograph “depicted the same two children” and “were produced in the same photographing session ․” Id. at 541.
We rejected this multiplicity argument. Although the defendants viewed the “use” of the children as continuous because it occurred in the “same photographing session,” we explained that this was irrelevant because “[e]ach photograph depended upon a separate and distinct use of the children.” Id. at 542 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302–03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); United States v. Williams, 685 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1982)). Thus, the “correct unit of prosecution” under § 2251 is “each use of a minor to create a visual depiction,” which “constitutes a separate and distinct violation ․” Id. at 541.
Esch did not address the question here because the government did not charge the defendants separately for each child depicted in the photographs. Esch instead held, consistent with our subsequent case law, that each photograph constituted a “separate and distinct use” of the minor children. Id. at 542. Esch’s holding is consistent with the government's charging decisions in this case. Esch is neither an explicit nor an implicit holding in support of Defendant's reading of the statute.
Lacking any clear and obvious precedential support, Defendant urges that the government's interpretation violates clear statutory language. He contends that the key element of the offense is not “the ‘use’ of a minor in the abstract,” but the use of a minor to produce a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct. See Esch, 832 F.2d at 541. According to Defendant, this must mean that “a visual depiction” can only lead to a single offense under § 2251(a) no matter how many minors it depicts.
We disagree with Defendant that this result is clear from the statutory language. The statute criminalizes “[a]ny person who ․ uses ․ any minor to engage in ․ any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct ․” § 2251(a) (emphasis added). Just as Defendant argues that the statute does not criminalize the use of a minor in the abstract, neither does it criminalize the abstract production of a visual depiction. It criminalizes visual depictions of any minor's sexually explicit conduct. A plausible reading of the statute is that, when a depiction includes two children, a defendant would commit two offenses if, and only if, he depicted both minors’ sexually explicit conduct. That each offense would require proof of a fact separate from the other supports this interpretation. See United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 314 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the Blockburger test of “whether each [offense] requires proof of a fact which the other does not” can assist in the multiplicity analysis).
We need not decide whether § 2251 contemplates separate offenses for visual depictions of multiple minors’ sexually explicit conduct. We conclude that Defendant failed to show that such a result is plainly multiplicitous.10
G.
Lastly, we decline to consider whether trial errors cumulatively prejudiced Defendant because “[w]e cannot engage in a cumulative error analysis absent at least two errors.” Hanson v. Sherrod, 797 F.3d 810, 853 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc)). We identified one preserved trial error. We do not consider unpreserved errors under the cumulative error analysis unless they are plain. See United States v. Lopez, 131 F.4th 1114, 1136 (10th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Kepler, 74 F.4th 1292, 1320–21 (10th Cir. 2023)). And we identify no plain, unpreserved trial errors. We thus do not have two errors to cumulate.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
1. Defendant's conviction for possessing child pornography required the government to prove that he knowingly possessed child pornography. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Child pornography includes “visual depiction[s] involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” § 2256(8)(A). Like the production and attempted production counts, the relevant sexually explicit conduct is the “actual or simulated” “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.” § 2256(2)(A)(v).
2. Defendant agrees that the minor “engaged in” sexually explicit conduct in Wolf. But he argues that the defendant caused her to do so by manipulating her clothes and legs before photographing her. Neither we nor the district court made this finding. Wolf, 890 F.2d at 246 (quoting the district court as noting that the child's clothes had been elevated “by some means”). And we did not suggest that any pre-photo conduct by the defendant, rather than his conduct in creating the overall depiction, was necessary for “the photograph to be a ‘lascivious exhibition’ in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2256.” Wolf, 890 F.2d at 246.
3. We are not the only circuit to reach this conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 440 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that lasciviousness “need not necessarily be ‘the work of the child, whose innocence is not in question, but of the producer or editor of the video’ ” (quoting United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999))); United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2016) (joining the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in concluding that “depictions of otherwise innocent conduct may in fact constitute a ‘lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area’ of a minor based on the actions of the individual creating the depiction”); United States v. Donoho, 76 F.4th 588, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2023) (noting that whether “otherwise nonsexual” or “otherwise innocent” conduct is lascivious depends on context including “the manner in which the depiction is framed”); United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 234, 263–64 (4th Cir. 2024) (explaining that “a lascivious exhibition exists without any depiction of the minor engaging in sexual conduct or conduct connoting a sex act”).
4. Defendant's bathroom connects to his bedroom, and a partial wall with cutouts separates the two rooms. Some of the nudity captured by Defendant takes place in his bedroom. A rational jury could also conclude that Defendant's bedroom was a sexually suggestive location. See Wells, 843 F.3d at 1256 (adopting the Third Circuit's statement that a bathroom “is potentially as much of a setting for fantasy sexual activity as is an adult's bedroom.” (quoting United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)).
5. In reaching this conclusion, we heed the Supreme Court's admonition that the “child-protection rationale for speech restriction[s]” on child pornography “does not apply to materials produced without children.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 289, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) (citing Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249–251, 122 S.Ct. 1389). Thus, we emphasize that a defendant violates § 2251 where, as here, he adapts, modifies, or arrays a picture of a real child to lasciviously exhibit that child's genitals.
6. We recently approved of the use of the Dost factors in jury instructions in a case involving the receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2242A(a)(5)(B). United States v. Kroeker, No. 24-3060, 2025 WL 1878790, at *1, *3–*4 (10th Cir. July 8, 2025) (unpublished). Although Kroeker is unpublished and does not constitute binding precedent, we may rely on it as persuasive authority. United States v. Freeman, 70 F.4th 1265, 1274 n.5 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005)).
7. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth circuits have published decisions approving the use of the Dost factors in some capacity in jury instructions. See Rivera, 546 F.3d at 252–53; United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989); Sanders, 107 F.4th at 263 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Wilkerson, 124 F.4th 361, 372–73 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Ward, 686 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1990). We have done the same in an unpublished decision, Kroeker, No. 24-3060, 2025 WL 1878790, at *3–*4, as has the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Guy, 708 F. App'x 249, 261–62 (6th Cir. 2017). The First Circuit considers the Dost factors relevant to the inquiry but has not specifically approved their use in jury instructions. See United States v. Charriez-Rolón, 923 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2019). The Eleventh Circuit includes the Dost factors in its pattern jury instructions but has never decided whether it applies the Dost factors. United States v. Hunter, 720 F. App'x 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2017). The Seventh Circuit previously affirmed the use of the Dost factors to instruct juries on plain-error review but “discourage[s] their routine use.” United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828, 839–40 (7th Cir. 2014). The D.C. Circuit is the only circuit to expressly “reject[ ] the practice of instructing the jury on the Dost factors ․” United States v. Hillie, 39 F.4th 674, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
8. This approach differs from some other circuits, which have limited the inquiry under the sixth factor to objective considerations only. See Heinrich, 57 F.4th at 161; see also United States v. Spoor, 904 F.3d 141, 150–51 (2d Cir. 2018). Other circuits agree with our approach and treat subjective intent as at least relevant in evaluating whether a depiction is lascivious under the sixth Dost factor. See, e.g., Donoho, 76 F.4th at 597; Wilkerson, 124 F.4th at 371; United States v. McCoy, 108 F.4th 639, 646 (8th Cir. 2024); United States v. Boam, 69 F.4th 601, 610 (9th Cir. 2023).
9. The only exception is Count 6, for which the government charged Defendant with one count of attempted production of child pornography although the photograph featured two minor victims.
10. The government also contends that Defendant waived his multiplicity argument by failing to timely raise this argument under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(ii). This provision requires the defendant to raise pretrial motions addressing multiplicity if “the motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(ii). Defendant argues that the district court could not have addressed his arguments “without a trial on the merits” because he challenges his convictions on multiplicitous counts rather than the government's prosecution on these counts. Because we conclude no plain error exists, we need not decide whether Defendant waived these arguments under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(ii).
CARSON, Circuit Judge.
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Docket No: No. 24-3186
Decided: November 05, 2026
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
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