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Lawrence Earl THOMAS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas
Petition for discretionary review refused
DISSENTING OPINION
Appellant was charged with engaging in organized criminal activity. See Tex. Penal Code § 71.02(a). Appellant's indictment alleged two prior felony convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellant was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to fifty years’ confinement in prison. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the continuity requirement of the offense. The court of appeals found the evidence insufficient and reversed, modified Appellant's conviction to the lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and ordered a new punishment trial. Thomas v. State, No. 14-24-00545-CR, 2026 WL 1030517, at *8 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 16, 2026) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Under the appropriate Jackson 1 standard, I would conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction. Consequently, I would grant the State's petition for discretionary review and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. I respectfully dissent from this Court's refusal to do so.
I. Factual Background
Around 10:00 a.m. on September 23, 2021, Martha Medina, the complainant in this case, arrived at a drive-through banking lane at a Chase Bank near Interstate 10 and Uvalde Road in Harris County. When she finished her business at the bank, she drove to a nearby McDonald's on Uvalde Road. Appellant, along with Andrew Williams and Felton Ford, had arrived at the McDonald's a few minutes earlier. Williams drove a black Chevrolet Malibu, with Appellant as his passenger, and Ford drove a black Chevrolet Impala. Medina carried her purse into the McDonald's and placed an order. While she waited inside, Ford entered the McDonald's, looked in her direction, and eventually walked back out.
As Medina left the McDonald's, Williams moved his vehicle to the parking spot next to Medina's vehicle. As Medina tried to enter her vehicle, the three men snatched her purse. Medina ended up on the ground after the confrontation. Williams then reversed his vehicle, running over her.2 Medina's purse was never recovered.
Through surveillance videos, GPS records, and call-detail records, the State introduced the following timeline of the movements and activities of Appellant, Williams, and Ford before, during, and after the aggravated robbery:
7:15 a.m.: Williams parked the Malibu in a parking lot adjacent to the Queen Saver convenience store—which sat at the corner of Cavalcade and Hoffman Streets—and entered the store.
7:50 a.m.: Appellant parked a white car in front of the Queen Saver's entrance, entered the store, and hugged Williams.
7:51 a.m.: Williams and Appellant walked to the Malibu. Until the time Williams and Appellant left the Queen Saver, they generally stayed in the Malibu—with Appellant in the front passenger seat—but there were also times where one or both of them were elsewhere in the parking lot or inside the store.
8:09 a.m.: Appellant moved his car to the back parking lot next to the Malibu. He then got back into the Malibu.
8:14 a.m.: Appellant changed shoes and put on a hoodie.
8:54 a.m.: Ford arrived at the Queen Saver in the Impala and Williams greeted him. From the surveillance videos, it appeared that Williams and Appellant waited for Ford to arrive. Ford and Williams entered the store together and walked back out to Ford's car. At one point, Ford took a mask and gloves from the Impala and walked towards Williams's vehicle to show Williams and Appellant the mask and gloves.
8:58 a.m.: Appellant got into the back passenger side of the Malibu, and Williams drove it away from the Queen Saver, following behind Ford in the Impala.
8:59 a.m.: Williams's phone called Ford's phone, and the call lasted an hour and 40 minutes.
9:09 a.m.: Williams arrived at a Bank of America on FM 526 and stayed there for approximately 15 minutes. The Impala also arrived at the Bank of America while Williams was there.
9:23 a.m.: Williams left the Bank of America.
9:47 a.m.: Williams and the Impala arrived at a PNC Bank on McCarty Street and stayed there for approximately five minutes.
9:59 a.m.: Williams arrived at the Chase Bank. The Impala also arrived at the Chase Bank. At one point, Ford went into the bank's ATM vestibule and appeared to conduct a transaction, though no transaction actually occurred.
10:03 a.m.: The complainant arrived at a drive-through lane of the Chase Bank, where she stayed for several minutes. The Impala pulled up in an open lane alongside the complainant's vehicle and left before she did. The Impala then went to the parking lot of a Frost Bank across the street from the Chase Bank, and Ford “basically stage[d] there.”
10:08 a.m.: Williams and the Impala left the Chase Bank after the complainant left. The Malibu and the Impala split briefly but followed the complainant's vehicle.
10:15 a.m.: The complainant arrived at the McDonald's parking lot. Williams arrived at the McDonald's and parked on the far side of the lot. The Impala also arrived at the parking lot and parked alongside the restaurant. Several minutes later, Ford entered the McDonald's while the complainant waited inside for her order, and he returned to the Impala before she left the restaurant. As the complainant exited the restaurant, Williams moved the Malibu from the far side of the parking lot to the space next to her vehicle when the space became available.
10:24 a.m.: The aggravated robbery occurred. Williams and the Impala then left the scene, travelling in different directions.
10:36 a.m.: Williams arrived at a location on Pickfair Street. The Impala arrived at the Pickfair Street location at 10:39 a.m. While Williams and the Impala were there, the call between Williams's and Ford's phones ended. The Pickfair Street location consisted of housing units with long, narrow driveways and was a common place to hide vehicles.
10:45 a.m.: While they were still in the vicinity of the Pickfair Street location, Williams's phone made a call to Ford's phone, which lasted less than half a minute.
10:54 a.m.: Williams left the Pickfair Street location.
10:58 a.m.: The Impala dropped off Williams and Appellant near the Queen Saver and left. Appellant took off his hoodie and cap and put them on the hood of his car.
10:59 a.m.: Williams entered the Queen Saver and Appellant followed him inside soon afterwards. Appellant left the store after Williams handed him the keys to the Malibu.
11:16 a.m.: Appellant walked inside the store and exited soon afterwards. At various times over the next 20 minutes, Appellant walked in front of the store, entered and exited the store, walked into the parking lot, and, at one point, put his hoodie and cap into his car. Appellant's car remained in the parking lot for the remainder of the surveillance time-frame, which ended at 11:50 a.m.
Appellant eventually left the Queen Saver in his own vehicle. Williams remained at the Queen Saver until around 1:00 p.m. About two weeks later, police arrested Williams at the Queen Saver. He had the keys to the Malibu on his person, and the Malibu had a new decal on the upper part of the windshield as well as a different buyer's tag.
Through Harris County Sheriff's Office Deputy David Crain, the State introduced evidence about “bank jugging.” Deputy Crain testified that “bank jugging” is a crime where an individual—or usually a group of individuals—surveils banks, ATMs, or financial institutions and then follows potential victims away to commit various crimes to obtain the bank-withdrawal proceeds. Such crimes could include robbery, purse snatching, and burglary of a vehicle. Deputy Crain testified that bank jugging is a common criminal pattern and that perpetrators look for “soft victims,” like females or the elderly, who are less likely to fight or have weapons. The perpetrators then learn what the proceeds are contained in and attempt to locate the victim at a “soft location” to get the container. Deputy Crain believed Ford was the “surveillance guy” or scout who drove ahead looking for potential victims while communicating with Williams, who drove the primary car. Deputy Crain then identified Appellant as the “jump out,” whose role was to jump out and grab the money. Deputy Crain testified that the travel of Appellant, Williams, and Ford to multiple banks was consistent with a jugging scheme. Ford's conduct of going to the ATM vestibule to give the appearance of conducting a transaction was consistent with watching people enter and exit the bank. Deputy Crain also testified that Appellant's acts of (1) changing out of slide- or slipper-style shoes and into tennis shoes; (2) putting on a hoodie; and (3) entering the rear passenger side of the Malibu before leaving the Queen Saver, were consistent with jugging.
II. Applicable Law
a. Sufficiency
When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, reviewing courts consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found that the State has proven the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). When drawing inferences, the trier of fact may use common sense, common knowledge, personal experiences, and observations from life. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When the record supports conflicting reasonable inferences, we presume that the trier of fact resolved those conflicts in favor of the conviction, and we defer to those resolutions. Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
This standard applies whether the case was proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 520–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This standard gives full responsibility to the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Id. at 522. A factfinder may believe all, some, or none of a witness's testimony. Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). As the reviewing court, we do not sit as the metaphorical “thirteenth juror.” See McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. We must affirm the conviction if the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the “cumulative force” of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
“Theorizing or guessing as to the meaning of evidence is never adequate to uphold a conviction.” Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Correct application of the Jackson standard depends on understanding “the difference between a reasonable inference supported by the evidence at trial” and mere speculation. Id. at 16 (referencing Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560). However, the State is not required to prove an element with direct evidence. See Carroll v. State, 701 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Circumstantial evidence may suffice to establish the elements necessary to sustain a conviction. See id.
A determination of evidentiary sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Reviewing courts measure sufficiency by comparing the evidence produced at trial to the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Id. A hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. The law authorized by the indictment consists of the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the indictment allegations. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
b. Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity
“(a) A person commits an offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination ․, the person commits or conspires to commit one or more of” a list of enumerated felonies, in this case, aggravated robbery. Tex. Penal Code § 71.02(a)(1). “Combination” means “three or more persons who collaborate in carrying on criminal activities, although: (1) participants may not know each other's identity; (2) membership in the combination may change from time to time; and (3) participants may stand in a wholesaler-retailer or other arm's-length relationship in illicit distribution operations.” Id. at § 71.01(a).
This Court has interpreted “collaborate in carrying on criminal activities” to require that the State “prove more than that the Appellant committed or conspired to commit one of the enumerated offenses with two or more people.” Nguyen v. State, 1 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In other words, the element involves more than the intent to merely commit an enumerated offense, a plan to commit a single act, or proof of working jointly to commit a crime—it requires proof of “intended continuity.” Id. at 696–97; Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 63–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The activities do not have to individually be criminal offenses to satisfy the statutory requirement, and a single criminal offense can be sufficient. Nguyen, 1 S.W.3d at 697; see also Dowdle v. State, 11 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (sufficient activities included fleeing, re-grouping, discussing a plan of action, and traveling to another country with stolen goods).
Conduct that is otherwise legal can illustrate an intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in its profits. Nguyen, 1 S.W.3d at 697 (citing Barber v. State, 764 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). Additionally, the State is not required to prove that a combination's members committed more than one criminal offense. Id. The predicate offense may be the first crime committed by a member of the combination. Id.; see O'Brien v. State, 544 S.W.3d 376, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“Engaging by commission simply punishes a conspiracy involving three or more people that results in the completion of at least one of the conspired crimes.”).
III. Analysis
This Court's decision in Dowdle is particularly instructive today. There, the appellant was convicted of engaging in organized criminal activity. Dowdle, 11 S.W.3d at 234. This Court held that
[t]he “continuing course of criminal activities” engaged in by appellant and the co-conspirators did not end with the shooting. The co-conspirators fled the scene, re-grouped to discuss what their plan of action would be, combined the separate loads of stolen property and traveled to another county to secrete the stolen property and the officer's gun.
Id. at 236. This Court emphasized the appellant's judicial confession, which included admissions about the appellant and his co-conspirators discussing what to do with the firearm and eventually secreting it. See id. at 236–37.
The same is equally true in this case. The State's evidence—both through Deputy Crain and the extremely detailed timeline of events—showed Appellant's role as the “jump out” in the group's highly organized “bank jugging” scheme. The trio traveled to multiple banks and continued to interact even after the robbery. This included a phone call after the robbery between Williams and Ford, and Williams giving Appellant the keys to the Malibu when they returned to the Queen Saver. After loitering at the Queen Saver for some time, Appellant left in his own vehicle. Importantly, the Malibu was not at the Queen Saver at the time, and when Williams was arrested at the Queen Saver two weeks later, he had the keys to the Malibu on his person. The Malibu truck also had a new decal on the upper part of the windshield as well as a different buyer's tag. Additionally, while Appellant was responsible for snatching Medina's purse, law enforcement never recovered it.
As we explained in Hart,
A jury may infer intent from any facts which tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused, and the method of committing the crime and from the nature of wounds inflicted on the victims. A jury may also infer knowledge from such evidence. This has been the rule in Texas for over 100 years.
89 S.W.3d at 64 (quoting Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). The evidence admitted at Appellant's trial permitted a reasonable jury to infer two important facts that support their finding on the continuity element. First, the fact that Williams handed Appellant the keys to the Malibu at the Queen Saver after the aggravated robbery and then later had the keys to the Malibu on his person when he was arrested two weeks later shows that Appellant and Williams interacted at some point after the offense. Additionally, the evidence admitted at trial showed that the Malibu had been modified—a new decal on the upper part of the windshield as well as a different buyer's tag—in an attempt to conceal the vehicle's involvement in the aggravated robbery offense. A jury could infer continued intent from the concealment efforts related to the Malibu. Second, the fact that the purse was never recovered after the offense—particularly after Appellant took the purse—supports the reasonable inference that Appellant was involved in the concealment of the purse at some point after the offense, like the concealment of the firearm that this Court credited in Dowdle. Much like the Malibu itself, the jury could infer from the concealment of the handbag—either by Appellant or one of his co-conspirators— continued intent to engage in the combination.
IV. Conclusion
The evidence presented by the State at Appellant's trial was more than sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity. Consequently, I would grant review and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.
FOOTNOTES
1. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Curiously, the court of appeals does not even cite Jackson.
2. The jury learned that the complainant was deceased at the time of trial, but the State did not inform the jury that the complainant died from the injuries she suffered when the car ran over her.
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Docket No: NO. PD-0382-26
Decided: October 29, 2026
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
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