HASKELL v. STATE (2026)

OPINION

Appellant Ronald Lee Haskell was indicted for capital murder for fatally shooting Katie and Stephen Stay during the same criminal transaction. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(7)(A). At trial, Appellant asserted the affirmative defense of insanity. See id. § 8.01(a) (“It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.”). A Harris County jury rejected Appellant's insanity defense and convicted him of capital murder as charged in the indictment. Based on the jury's answers to the punishment phase special issues, the trial court sentenced Appellant to death. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(b), (e), (g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Id. § 2(h).

Appellant raises seven points of error in the (1) admission of an audio recording; (2) denial of his motion for a mistrial; (3) sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's affirmative finding of future dangerousness; (4) admission of hearsay evidence; (5) admission of impeachment evidence; (6) presentation of false and misleading evidence; and (7) punishment phase jury charge. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence of death.

I — Background 1

Appellant and Melannie Lyon met as children in elementary school while living in San Marcos, California, where both of their families were active in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Appellant and his family later moved to Alaska. He and Melannie reconnected while she was in college.² After dating for approximately a year, they married in March 2002. The couple lived briefly with Appellant's parents in Alaska, then relocated to Logan, Utah, when Melannie was pregnant with the first of their four children.

Shortly into the marriage, Appellant became controlling. He would not allow Melannie to work or make any financial decisions. He determined whom she could associate with, and he isolated her from her family. Appellant also began physically abusing Melannie—often in front of their children. The abuse consisted of hitting, kicking, and choking. Appellant left marks, but typically in areas obscured by clothing so no one would know. Melannie was afraid to report Appellant to the police because he repeatedly promised that if she ever did, he would kill her family and then her.³ In addition, he threatened to take their children from her if she disclosed the abuse or attempted to leave him. Appellant also physically and verbally abused their children.

In June 2013, after more than a decade of enduring Appellant's violent behavior, Melannie left Appellant and went to a women's shelter with their children. While there, she obtained a protective order, filed for divorce, and contacted her family to tell them about the abuse. After five weeks at the shelter, Melannie and the children returned to the condominium she and Appellant shared.⁴ Shortly after her return, the police conducted a welfare check on Melannie because Appellant had threatened to kill her.

In November 2013, two of Melannie's siblings, her sister Katie Stay and her brother Kyle Lyon, traveled from Texas to Utah to help Melannie and the children move to Texas, where most of Melannie's family (the Lyons) lived. As they were packing, Appellant called their oldest son, eleven-year-old J.H. Apparently, Appellant had learned that Katie was in Utah at the condominium. He told J.H. that if Katie was helping them, he would “make her pay.” Alarmed by Appellant's threat, Melannie called friends from church to help them pack so that they could leave sooner. They left Utah that day. Once in Texas, Melannie and the children moved in with her parents, Roger and Kelly Lyon.

Appellant and Melannie's divorce became final in February 2014. Melannie was awarded their house that was under construction, which she sold because she needed the money to support herself and the children. However, the check for the proceeds of the sale was sent to their old address (the condominium) and then was forwarded to Appellant in California where he was living with his parents. Appellant deposited the check into his account.

On July 2, 2014, Melannie called Appellant's mother Karla Haskell to ask if the check was inadvertently sent to Appellant. When Karla later asked Appellant about the check, he became angry and attacked her. He pushed her down into a chair, duct-taped her to it, and told her, “The next time you see me and what happens next, it's going to be on Fox News.” Appellant then repeatedly choked his mother until she lost consciousness. He left the house, leaving Karla bound and unconscious.

After leaving his parents’ home, Appellant embarked on a six-day journey from California to Texas. Along the way, he:

• purchased duct tape, a pillow, and a pillow cover at a Walmart in Mesquite, Nevada;

• renewed his truck's vehicle registration in Logan, Utah;

• burglarized the home of a former girlfriend in Willard, Utah, and stole her Springfield XD 9mm semiautomatic handgun;5

• purchased 150 rounds of 9mm ammunition (including hollow-point rounds), an extra magazine for the stolen gun, a red laser sight, a holster, and ear plugs at a Cabela's sporting goods store in Lehi, Utah;6 and

• checked into a La Quinta Inn & Suites hotel in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he conducted online research on Melannie's family, searching for directions to Houston and contact information for her family members.

Appellant arrived north of Houston late in the morning on July 7, 2014. He checked into a Days Inn & Suites hotel located 2.7 miles from Katie and Stephen Stay's residence and resumed his online research of Melannie's family.

Two days later, on July 9, 2014, Appellant checked out of the Days Inn hotel and went to a movie. Later that afternoon, he drove to the home of Melannie's parents intending to kill them, but he reconsidered his plan because he did not want to kill Melannie's family in front of his children. Instead, he drove to Katie and Stephen's nearby home.

Shortly after 5:00 p.m., Appellant parked his truck several blocks from the Stay residence. Disguised as a delivery person, Appellant knocked on the front door of the home.⁷ The Stay children—fifteen-year-old C.S., thirteen-year-old B.S., nine-year-old E.S., seven-year-old R.S., and four-year-old Z.S.—were home alone while their parents were running an errand. C.S. opened the door. Appellant asked her if it was the Stay residence, and she confirmed that it was. Appellant then asked her if her parents were home, and C.S. said they were not. She offered to sign for the package, but Appellant informed her that her parents needed to sign for it. C.S. told him that her parents should return home around 7:00 p.m., and then he left.

Five or ten minutes later, Appellant knocked on the door again. When C.S. opened the door, he asked if her parents had returned. Confused, since only minutes had passed, C.S. told him, “No.” She then stepped back and turned around to look at the clock in the living room “just kind of for effect” because she was “pretty sure only like five or so minutes had passed.” By the time C.S. turned back to the door, Appellant had moved inside and closed the door. C.S. nervously asked Appellant, “Can I help you?” Appellant told her that he knew her parents from California; she assumed that he knew them from church. To get Appellant to leave, C.S. asked for his name and told him that she would tell her parents that he had stopped by. Appellant removed his sunglasses and informed her that he was “Ron Haskell.”

C.S. realized that Appellant was “Uncle Ronnie,” her Aunt Melannie's ex-husband. She asked him what he was doing there as her siblings, hearing someone inside their home, emerged from other parts of the house. C.S. begged Appellant not to hurt them because she “knew how awful he was.” Appellant suggested that C.S. and the other children go sit in the living room. C.S. refused, and he pulled a gun from his pocket and pointed it at her. C.S. then complied with his demand, and she and her siblings went into the living room. Appellant returned the gun to his pocket, followed the children into the living room, and sat on the brick fireplace ledge with his pretend package.

C.S. did not know what to do as they sat in the living room waiting for her parents. Appellant suggested that she turn on a movie for the younger children. She did so, hoping to keep them distracted. Appellant did not interact with the children but asked who Z.S. was. C.S. told Appellant Z.S.’s name and age. She then proceeded to name all her siblings and give their ages. C.S. hoped to appeal to Appellant's humanity; she did not think he “would hurt kids if [he] knew how old they were and what their names were.”

Around 5:40 p.m., B.S. apparently heard Stephen's car pull up and announced, “Dad's home.” Afraid that Appellant would shoot her siblings if they got up to greet their parents, C.S. suggested that they “surprise” their parents by waiting quietly for them in the living room. Her siblings agreed and remained in the living room. Appellant walked to the back door. As Stephen unlocked and opened the door, Appellant pulled it further open. He directed Stephen and Katie to come inside, but they resisted and confronted Appellant about being in their home. Appellant then pulled out his gun and pointed it at Stephen. He again commanded the Stay parents to come inside, and they complied.

Once they were inside, Appellant requested Stephen's phone, and Stephen handed it to him.⁸ Stephen and Katie then joined their children in the living room. Appellant returned the gun to his pocket. Katie asked Appellant what he was doing there, and he said that he had come to get his children. In a placating manner, Katie told Appellant that his youngest daughter would be happy to see him. Appellant then informed the Stay family that he needed to tie them up. At Katie's prompting, all seven complied with Appellant's commands and laid face down on the living room floor. Appellant then said that he would need a car, and Stephen offered his. Stephen retrieved his car keys, gave them to Appellant, and returned to the floor.

Appellant pocketed Stephen's keys and grabbed the rolled-up pillow from the fireplace ledge.⁹ He withdrew the gun from his pocket and began counting softly to himself. When Katie saw Appellant pull out the gun, she screamed, got up, and “started to just fight with [Appellant].” In the struggle, Appellant dropped the pillow but retained control of the gun. He then shot Katie at close range in her face. She fell to the floor and rolled away, curling up and raising her hand to protect herself. Appellant stepped toward her and shot her again in the back of her head, killing her.

As Appellant shot Katie, Stephen grabbed Z.S. from the floor and moved toward the couch, placing Z.S. behind him. Appellant turned and shot Stephen twice on the left side of his head, killing him. Appellant then shot Z.S. once in the shoulder and again in the back of his head, killing him. Appellant next turned to the remaining children lying on the floor. He fired at R.S. twice. The first shot missed, hitting the floor by her head; the second shot struck her on the top of her head but did not immediately kill her. Appellant then shot C.S., who had covered her head with her hands for protection. The bullet hit her finger, which deflected the bullet so that it struck C.S. on the side of her head but did not penetrate her skull. C.S. had been screaming since Appellant shot her mother, but she fell silent and “just went limp,” and pretended to be dead. Appellant next shot E.S. at close range on the side of her head, killing her. Finally, Appellant shot B.S. on the upper side of his head, killing him. In total, Appellant fired thirteen rounds at the seven Stay family members. He then ran out of the house and left in Stephen's car.

When C.S. was certain Appellant was gone, she got up off the floor and called 911 from the landline phone in her father's office. Police and emergency medical services responded to the Stay residence, where they found C.S. crying, hysterical, and bleeding from her head. They also discovered that R.S. was still alive. C.S. was transported by ambulance to the hospital. R.S. was flown by helicopter to the hospital, where she ultimately died.

Meanwhile, after shooting the Stays, Appellant stopped for a drink at a Sonic fast-food restaurant. He then reloaded the gun he had used on the Stay family and drove toward Melannie's parents’ home. A Harris County deputy constable passed Appellant traveling toward the residence. Noticing that the driver and car matched the suspect and vehicle descriptions that had been broadcasted over the police radio, the deputy turned around to pursue Appellant. He caught up to Appellant and activated his emergency lights to signal Appellant to stop, but Appellant did not stop. Instead, he evaded the deputy by driving through a parking lot. The deputy then activated his siren and continued to pursue Appellant. Other police units joined the pursuit.

Appellant pulled into Melannie's parents’ driveway.¹⁰ However, when officers exited their vehicles to apprehend Appellant, he backed out of the driveway and evaded them by driving quickly in reverse. Appellant managed to turn the car around and drive off. He then led more than a dozen police units on a ten-to-twenty-minute chase. The pursuit ended when Appellant drove into a cul-de-sac and stopped outside the residence of Melannie's brother Drue Lyon. The police blocked Appellant in the cul-de-sac.

An hours-long standoff between Appellant and police ensued. Appellant refused to surrender and threatened suicide or violence if officers approached the vehicle. Officers with the Harris County Sheriff's Office High-Risk Operations Unit (hostage negotiators) were called to the scene. Multiple negotiators spoke to Appellant by phone for several hours attempting to convince him to surrender peacefully. Finally, after speaking by phone with his brother, Appellant surrendered just before 10:00 p.m. and was taken into custody. The day of the slayings, July 9, 2014, was exactly one year from the date Appellant was served with the protective order after Melannie fled to the shelter with their children.

II — Admission of Audio Recording

In point of error one, Appellant challenges the admission of an audio recording made by Lieutenant George Beck, a patrol officer with the Harris County Precinct 4 Constable's Office. According to Appellant, the recording was inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 403. See Tex. R. Evid. 403.

On the evening of the murders, Beck was on duty attending an HOA meeting a few blocks from the Stay residence. He received a call from a dispatcher about a disturbance at the Stay's, indicating that “there was possibly a female that was shot.” Beck immediately went to the location. When he arrived at the home, he turned on his pocket audio recorder and knocked on the front door.¹¹ C.S., still on the phone with 911, answered the door. Beck observed that she was crying, hysterical, and bleeding on the left side of her head.

During Beck's guilt phase testimony, the State offered State's Exhibit 24, which was a fourteen-minute audio recording of Beck's interaction with C.S. upon his arrival. The recording captures Beck's attempt to gather information from C.S.; his communications with dispatch, requesting backup and EMS; his assessment of the scene as he checked for survivors; his discovery that R.S. was still alive; and his attempts to comfort R.S. while awaiting EMS.

Appellant objected to the admission of the audio recording:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, this is a recording, obviously, from Lieutenant Beck's recorder and we suspect that [C.S.] will be on this recording as well. So we object, one, it's hearsay; and [C.S.] will testify in a certain hearing at another time. I mean, I think it may be taken out of order right now, and also the fact that it's probably cumulative to what Lieutenant Beck has already testified to.

[DEFENSE CO-COUNSEL]: Judge, I also would object to 403, it's more prejudicial than probative. She's hysterical.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And we wouldn't be able to cross-examine, I guess, on that; and maybe some Crawford issues as well.[12]

[DEFENSE CO-COUNSEL]: Yes, so confrontation.

The prosecutor responded that C.S. would testify and Appellant would have the opportunity to cross-examine her, so there was no confrontation issue. She further argued that C.S.’s statements were admissible as excited utterances, which are exceptions to the hearsay prohibition. Appellant continued urging his objection:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, it's based on Crawford. I understand the State's reply to my objection. As far as Crawford is concerned, I think Crawford addresses this specifically. This recording was made in preparation for trial. I think the Supreme Court has ruled that any kind of recordings that are made in preparation of trial [are] hearsay. I understand we'll have the opportunity to get into it with [C.S.]; but again, he's going to testify to his own conversations, at least his part of the conversation.

[DEFENSE CO-COUNSEL]: Also, it's testimonial under Crawford.

At this point, the trial court concluded the bench conference and excused the jury for lunch. The Court resumed the discussion, stating, “While they're out, let's take one more minute to discuss. We had the Crawford issue prior to the time the jury went out.” The court then suggested that delaying the presentation of the recording until C.S. testified “might avoid any Crawford issues.” The parties and the court then engaged in an extended discussion about whether C.S.’s statements—some made in response to Beck's questions—were testimonial.

The trial court ultimately ruled that it would allow the recording to be played and advised Appellant to further object if he found “something along the way to be objectionable.” The State played the audio recording for the jury. Appellant did not object further.

Appellant now contends on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting “an audio recording that captured the final moments of seven-year-old R.S.’s life” because any probative value of the recording was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 403 (providing that trial court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value “is substantially outweighed” by one of several enumerated risks, including “unfair prejudice”). He argues that the recording was more prejudicial than probative because it contained the “deeply disturbing” sounds of R.S. as she struggled to survive, Beck's descriptions of R.S. to EMS personnel arriving on the scene, and Beck's attempts to comfort R.S.

The State argues that Appellant did not preserve this complaint for appellate review. We agree.

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must timely object and state the grounds for the objection with “sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). While it is not necessary to employ “magic words” or cite to specific statutes or rules, a party must convey the substance of the complaint to the trial court. Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Laws v. State, 640 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Further, the complaint on appeal must comport with the complaint made at trial. Bekendam v. State, 441 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

At trial, Appellant objected to the admission of the audio recording on hearsay and confrontation grounds, which related to C.S.’s statements on the recording. It is true that Appellant briefly asserted a Rule 403 objection.¹³ But the basis for Appellant's Rule 403 trial objection was that “[s]he's hysterical.” He now argues that the recording was inadmissible under Rule 403 because it “capture[d] a child's last moments on Earth.” His Rule 403 appellate complaint does not comport with his Rule 403 trial objection.

“In determining whether a complaint on appeal comports with a complaint made at trial, we look to the context of the objection and the shared understanding of the parties at the time.” Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Before the recording was offered, Beck testified that C.S. was crying and hysterical. It is evident that the Rule 403 “[s]he's hysterical” objection referred to C.S. Furthermore, the entire lengthy discussion surrounding Appellant's trial objections focused on C.S. and her statements. Appellant did not once mention R.S. or reference the content of the recording capturing her last moments. Nor did he mention Beck's statements to EMS or to R.S. It is clear from the context that both the judge and the prosecutors understood Appellant's objections—including his Rule 403 objection—to be about C.S.’s statements on the recording.

We conclude that Appellant's Rule 403 complaint was not preserved for appellate review because it did not comport with the objections made at trial and it was raised for the first time on appeal. See Hallmark v. State, 541 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“Because the complaint on appeal does not comport with either of the trial objections, nothing is presented for review.”). We overrule point of error one.

III — Denial of Mistrial

In point of error two, Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial based on an allegedly inflammatory question posed by the State.

During the guilt phase, Sergeant David Johnson, a negotiator with the Harris County Sheriff's Office High-Risk Operations Unit, testified about his interaction with Appellant during the standoff. He described his observations of Appellant and recounted statements that Appellant made. Johnson opined that Appellant did not appear to be suffering from a mental health crisis.

On cross-examination, Appellant questioned Johnson about his knowledge of Appellant's mental health history, including his various hospitalizations, reported symptoms, and diagnoses. Appellant specifically asked Johnson if he was aware that Stephen Raffle, Appellant's psychiatric expert, had rendered an opinion that, at the time of the murders, Appellant was suffering from a severe mental illness and, as a result, did not know his conduct was wrong.

During the redirect examination of Johnson, the prosecutor sought to ask Johnson if he was aware of Appellant's other diagnoses:

[PROSECUTOR]: Were you aware that the first doctor that went to interview the defendant a few weeks after this happened, a guy named Dr. [Phillip] Resnick, at the Defense's request, and that he did not find the defendant was suffering from a severe mental illness?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Judge. It's assuming facts not in evidence. It's incorrect. It's a completely improper question.

THE COURT: I will overrule the objection based on the fact that some of the questions that you did ask this witness previous were under the same circumstances. I'll allow you to wrap it up, though. You can continue.

But defense counsel asked to approach the bench. The following discussion occurred in the bench conference:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She's asserting something that's, No. 1, false and she has no basis in fact to say that.

THE COURT: Have her move on.

[PROSECUTOR]: With all due respect, you asked this witness based on your own expert that he was suffering severe mental illness.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Let me cut you off for a second. What is your basis of fact for asserting that Dr. Resnick didn't give that opinion?

[PROSECUTOR]: Because when you gave us the [mitigation] report, you said that your guy said he had suffered mental illness, depression, not schizophrenia, and that if he wasn't [sic] insane you would have put that in the mitigation report.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you're speculating?

[PROSECUTOR]: No, sir. Based on information you have given us.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There's no opinion in any of what I've given you from Dr. Resnick.

[PROSECUTOR]: The mitigation report that you gave the State in regards to trying to make this a non-death capital, you stated that he was suffering from major depression.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's different.

[SECOND PROSECUTOR]: It's not schizoaffective. You opened the door to the line of questioning, [Counsel]. I'm sorry. That's not my fault.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, I disagree, Judge. She's asserting in the question that Dr. Resnick formed an opinion that he was not insane, and that's absolutely false. It's evidence. It's information given that during the negotiations the whole purpose of [the] mitigation package is to try to plead to life, and so this is information that's provided to them.

[PROSECUTOR]: He opened the door to this line of questioning. I'm trying to clear up any misperception that that question left.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I move for a mistrial because she's injected false information that's unsupportable, and it's very prejudicial. I move for a mistrial.

The court asked the prosecutor if she had the information with her, and she confirmed that the mitigation packet was available. The court ruled that it “[would] allow [the State] to continue without asking that question, and we'll come back to the issue later.”

Appellant asked the court to rule on his request for a mistrial, and the court denied it. Appellant then requested an instruction for the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question. After the bench conference, the court instructed the jury, “I will ask you to disregard not only the last question but any responses. I'm not sure that there were any [responses] to it, but nonetheless disregard that question.” The State proceeded to ask Johnson if he was aware that psychiatrist Mark Moeller and psychologist Timothy Proctor, the State's experts, had both found that Appellant was not suffering from a severe mental illness and that they both believed that Appellant knew his conduct was wrong. Appellant did not object to these questions.

Later that day, outside of the jury's presence, Appellant reurged his motion for mistrial “based on prosecutorial misconduct,” arguing that the prosecutor's “fundamentally improper question” violated the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution and the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution. Appellant claimed that the State's question included an “absolutely false” statement because the mitigation packet reflected that Resnick diagnosed Appellant with a major depressive disorder with psychotic features, which is a severe mental illness. In response, the prosecutor asserted that Appellant had opened the door with comparable questions to Johnson about his awareness of Raffle's diagnosis. The prosecutor also informed the court that Appellant had objected in the middle of her question, so it was incomplete. Additionally, the prosecutor noted that Johnson did not answer the question and that the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the question and any answer. The court reserved its ruling, stating its intent to revisit the issue at the end of the day.

After testimony concluded that day, the court returned to the issue. The parties reargued their positions, each providing case law to the court. Appellant asserted that the State's improper question “[told] the jury that the defense experts in effect are saying he's not insane.” He further contended that the question was “so prejudicial” it constituted prosecutorial misconduct that violated his due process and due course of law rights. He insisted that the question was fundamental error that could not be cured by the court's instruction.

The prosecutor emphasized to the court that Appellant's objection had interrupted her question, which was intended to address the fact that Resnick's diagnosis did not include schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. She expressed that “it's just unfortunately a bit of bad timing in the way the objection went down and not being able to finish the question.” The prosecutor also argued that the court's instruction to disregard cured any error. The trial court did not rule and expressed its intent to address the matter before trial resumed the next day.

Appellant then filed a written motion for mistrial, repeating his claim that prosecutorial misconduct resulted in constitutional violations. The next day, the parties argued the motion before the court, reiterating their previous arguments. The trial court stated that it had reviewed the applicable law and the legal authorities presented by both parties and was “in agreement with the State.” The court denied Appellant's motion for mistrial.

On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial “after the State asked a question of its witness on redirect that was inflammatory and introduced false information before the jury.” He insists that the State effectively “told the jury that [A]ppellant's own paid expert found that [A]ppellant was not insane because he did not have a serious mental illness.” Appellant's allegations lack merit.

“A mistrial halts trial proceedings when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.” Bluntson v. State, 728 S.W.3d 87, 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 146 S.Ct. 1819, 224 L.Ed.2d 279 (2026) (quoting Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). It is appropriate only “in ‘extreme circumstances’ for a narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors.” Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884 (quoting Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

The denial of a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 116. “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's ruling, considering only those arguments before the court at the time of the ruling.” Id.; Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884. We review the particular facts of each case and will “uphold the ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 116.

Here, the question at issue did not actually assert, as Appellant suggests, that Appellant's first retained expert found that he was sane at the time of the offense. The question addressed the expert's diagnosis, not his opinion of Appellant's sanity. On cross-examination, Appellant had asked Johnson multiple questions about whether he was aware of various aspects of Appellant's mental health, including Raffle's diagnosis. The trial court reasonably could have concluded that Appellant opened the door to questions asking whether Johnson was aware of the first expert's diagnosis. Further, the court reasonably could have agreed with the prosecutor that the question, interrupted by Appellant's objection, was intended to address the fact that Appellant's first retained expert did not diagnose Appellant with a schizoaffective disorder. Thus, the question was not improper.

Moreover, even if we construe the State's interrupted question as an improper question, “[t]he asking of an improper question will seldom call for a mistrial, because, in most cases, any harm can be cured by an instruction to disregard.” Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). “A mistrial is required only when the improper question is clearly prejudicial to the defendant and is of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on the minds of the jurors.” Id. (quoting Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567).

Here, the interrupted question went unanswered, and the trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the question (and any answer).¹⁴ See Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (explaining that instructions to jury are usually considered sufficient to cure improprieties that occur during trial, and courts generally presume that juries will follow judge's instructions). The question at issue, in the context in which the State asked it, was not of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing any impression left in the jurors’ minds. At most, the question suggested that experts differed in their opinions of Appellant's mental illness and diagnoses. That is precisely what the evidence presented to the jury throughout trial established.

We also note that later, in cross-examining one of the State's experts, Appellant established that Resnick diagnosed Appellant with major depressive disorder with psychotic symptoms. Thus, contrary to Appellant's assertion, any potential misimpression left in the jurors’ minds was corrected.

Given the context, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the State's unanswered question was not so inflammatory as to be incurable by an instruction to disregard, which the trial court gave. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Appellant's request for a mistrial. We overrule point of error two.

IV — Sufficiency Challenge

In point of error three, Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1).

The future dangerousness issue asks “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Id. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's affirmative future dangerousness finding, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Green v. State, 713 S.W.3d 865, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 146 S.Ct. 1600, 224 L.Ed.2d 19 (2026); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from it, we ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found “beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878; Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

The jury is entitled to consider all of the evidence presented at both the guilt and punishment stages of trial. Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(d)(1). The jury may consider a variety of factors when determining whether a defendant will pose a continuing threat to society. Buntion, 482 S.W.3d at 66. These factors include but are not limited to: the circumstances of the offense and the events surrounding it; the existence of a prior criminal record, and the severity of the prior crimes; the defendant's age and personal circumstances at the time of the offense; psychiatric evidence; and character evidence. Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878; see Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

Here, the facts of the offense alone are sufficient to sustain the jury's affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue. See Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 231–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (recognizing that “the circumstances of an offense itself, if severe enough, may be sufficient to support an affirmative finding to the future dangerousness special issue”). For years during their marriage, Appellant repeatedly and consistently threatened to kill Melannie and her family if she disclosed his abuse or left him. When Melannie finally escaped with their children, Appellant acted on his threats and callously executed all but one member of the Stay family. See Rosales v. State, 841 S.W.2d 368, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (explaining that jury can consider number of people killed in assessing future dangerousness). The evidence established that the massacre was premeditated and calculated—the culmination of Appellant's long-time threats. See, e.g., Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“The calculated nature of the defendant's act and the forethought with which he coldly planned and executed his crime is probative of his propensity to commit future acts of violence.”).

And the murders were exceptionally shocking and brutal, demonstrating an utter disregard for human life. Appellant exacted vengeance on not only Katie (who helped Melannie move) but on her entire family, including five innocent children, two of which were disabled. First, he shot Katie at close range as she attempted to defend her family. Appellant then shot Stephen as he sought to shield Z.S. and Appellant shot Z.S. as he clung to his father. Finally, he shot the remaining children as they laid vulnerable on the floor. And the evidence showed that R.S.’s death was prolonged; she died about an hour after Appellant shot her.

Appellant acknowledges that this Court has held that the facts of the offense alone can be sufficient to sustain an affirmative finding on the future dangerousness issue. But, he asserts, “it is improper to view [the facts] in a vacuum.” He notes that while the issue of Appellant's sanity was contested, the parties agreed that he suffered from mental illness. He contends that, over the years, he was “forthcoming with his struggles in both his marriage and his mental health” and sought help. And, he maintains, he continued to seek treatment while in jail.

We agree that the evidence demonstrated that Appellant had a history of mental health issues. The jury heard testimony from multiple mental health providers and experts who treated or evaluated Appellant, including:

• Psychiatrist Brian Merrill, who treated Appellant from July 2013 until October 2013, including during a three-day hospital stay in September 2013. He diagnosed Appellant with depression not otherwise specified, narcissistic personality disorder, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder traits.

• Jail psychiatrist Cira DeLeon, who treated Appellant for three months in 2014. She testified that Appellant suffered from depression and narcissistic personality disorder and had traits of borderline personality disorder.15

• Jail psychiatrist Mireya Hansen, who monitored Appellant's medications and met with Appellant in April 2016, several months after he had stopped taking his medications.16 She testified that Appellant has a personality disorder, noting he had traits of both narcissistic and antisocial personality disorders.

• Board-certified forensic psychologist Timothy Proctor, who conducted a forensic evaluation of Appellant in 2019. He diagnosed Appellant with narcissistic personality disorder with antisocial traits, major depressive disorder in partial remission, and malingering (feigning of symptoms).17

• Board-certified forensic psychiatrist Mark Moeller, who testified about his 2019 forensic evaluation of Appellant. He diagnosed Appellant with major depressive disorder and narcissistic personality disorder.18

These witnesses, along with Appellant's mental health records, established that Appellant suffered from narcissistic personality disorder and, at times, depression.

Merrill, Proctor, and Moeller explained that a component of narcissistic personality disorder is a narcissistic injury or wound. A narcissistic person feels entitled or special; a narcissistic injury occurs when a narcissistic individual does not get what he wants or believes he is entitled to. Narcissistic injuries can turn into rage, and “narcissistic rage is very dangerous.” Merrill confirmed that, within the psychiatric community, narcissistic rage and narcissistic wounds are recognized as causes of violence.

The evidence showed that, time and again, Appellant responded to a narcissistic injury with anger, aggression, and violence. As Moeller stated, “[W]e have a lot of documentation of [Appellant's] episodic behaviors which were triggered by some kind of a loss or a wound or something where he just could not tolerate [it] and explode[d].” Moeller described a narcissistic rage as an “explosive temper tantrum.” The evidence established that Appellant had such tantrums. Appellant's mother Karla confirmed that Appellant had “tantrums and outbursts” throughout his life, and that he “has a short fuse.” His brother Robert confirmed that Appellant had a temper, even as a child, and would “get into a fit, into kind of a rage” when things did not go his way. It was a common occurrence for Appellant to “ignite.”

The mental health witnesses also explained that a personality disorder does not change or go away; it is only managed. And while it is true that Appellant sought treatment, the evidence also supported the conclusion that Appellant was feigning or exaggerating symptoms and was medication-seeking. Further, the evidence demonstrated that Appellant was often non-compliant with his treatment and stopped taking his medications altogether on several occasions.

Additionally, the evidence showed that Appellant had a history of violence—beginning before he was diagnosed with or treated for any mental illness—and engaged in a pattern of threatening others. Appellant and Melannie married in 2002, and he began physically abusing her months later. Melannie described Appellant's “[n]early daily” abuse, which included hitting her (with an open flat hand) and punching her (with a closed fist) on her head, body, legs, and ribs; grabbing her by her hair and dragging her; choking her; and attempting to suffocate her under pillows. One assault resulted in Appellant's 2008 conviction for domestic violence assault. Melannie revealed that Appellant consistently told her that she was “worthless,” “a bad mother,” and “a worthless wife.” He “convinced [her] that [she] wasn't capable, that [she] wasn't strong enough, that [she] wasn't smart enough, [and] that [she] didn't have the skills to be anything but worthless.”

Melannie also testified about Appellant's abuse of their children. She described the first time Appellant assaulted their oldest son J.H., who was two-years-old at the time. Appellant repeatedly kicked J.H. as he laid crying on the ground after Appellant spanked and hit him. Appellant left multiple bruises on the child's legs. When Melannie attempted to intervene, Appellant began kicking her.

When J.H. was three, Appellant was upset about something and asked Melannie to put the children in the car so the family could go for a drive. But she only put J.H. in the car because their baby daughter was sleeping. Melannie left their daughter in the care of Appellant's parents. Appellant berated Melannie for leaving their daughter behind. Then, he stopped the car, took J.H. out, and drove off, leaving the child alone on the roadway. Appellant drove so far away that Melannie could no longer see J.H. Appellant then pulled over and asked Melannie if she had learned her lesson (“that we do not leave the children behind”). He then returned to pick J.H. up, telling the child that his mother should not have allowed that to happen.

When J.H. was ten, another incident occurred where Appellant was in bed and called for J.H. to bring him food and water. When the child approached the bedside, Appellant “just pound[ed] his finger against [J.H.’s] chest, just screaming at him.” The child “got so overwhelmed and so scared that he passed out.” When J.H. came to, Appellant resumed the attack, and J.H. passed out again.

Melannie testified about similar conduct toward their daughter. She described an incident in which Appellant grabbed the three-year-old by the front of her pajamas when she was crying and screamed in her face.

In 2005, Appellant became angry with his father Ronald Haskell Sr. for not securing the type of fishing license Appellant wanted for a family fishing trip. Appellant kicked his father, who had just had cancer surgery, put both hands on the older man's chest, and attempted to shove him down the stairs. Appellant's brother Robert prevented the fall by pushing both men away from the stairs and slamming Appellant to the ground.

In November 2013, Appellant assaulted his sister Chandra Haskell when she intervened as Appellant was verbally abusing their mother. Appellant choked his sister and threw her to the floor. He then took her cell phone so she could not call the police, but she was able to call for help on a landline. This incident precipitated one of Appellant's psychiatric hospitalizations. At the hospital, Appellant was served with a protective order on Chandra's behalf. He threatened to “kill that bitch” when he got out of the hospital.

In July 2014, one week before he massacred the Stays, Appellant brutally assaulted his mother, Karla, when she asked him about the check from the house sale. Perceiving that she was taking Melannie's side, Appellant became angry. He restrained Karla, choked her, and left her bound and unconscious. When describing the attack at trial, Karla said that she thought Appellant was going to kill her.

And, on July 9, 2014, Appellant callously murdered six members of the Stay family. Afterward, he drove to Melannie's parents’ home intending to continue his murderous rampage.

The evidence also showed that in May 2018, Appellant threatened a detention officer in the jail. The officer was talking with an inmate in the common area, and Appellant left his cell to tell them to “shut up.” In response, the officer directed Appellant to return to his cell. Appellant instead confronted the officer—standing nose-to-nose with him with his fists clenched at his side. “[I]n an aggressive manner” Appellant said, “Do you know who I am? I've been here longer than you.” The officer felt threatened but managed to de-escalate the situation and get Appellant to return to his cell. Once Appellant was inside his cell, the officer closed the door. Appellant immediately hit the intercom button to be released from his cell. Once released, he again confronted the officer nose-to-nose with clenched fists, telling him, “Don't you slam my fucking door again.” Appellant then told the officer that he was going to stab him in the ear when his back was turned. Appellant repeated the threat several times whenever the officer came near his cell. The officer believed Appellant's threat and reported it to his supervisor who, finding the threat credible, reassigned the officer to another pod.

Appellant argues that the threat to the jail officer was “only one disciplinary infraction” during almost five years of awaiting trial. Appellant's argument loses much of its potency when that “one disciplinary infraction” involved him threatening to stab an officer to death. Regardless, good behavior while incarcerated does not preclude a finding of future dangerousness. Buntion, 482 S.W.3d at 68; see Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Also, the jury was entitled to recognize the incentive for a capital murder defendant to exhibit good behavior (notwithstanding a threat to murder a guard) while awaiting trial.

Moreover, a review of Appellant's criminal and violent conduct demonstrates that his behavior escalated over the years. See Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (observing that an escalating pattern of violence supports a finding of future dangerousness); King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (explaining that an escalating pattern of disrespect of the law supports an inference of future dangerousness). Several of Appellant's co-workers testified, recounting various experiences working with Appellant. From 2008 to 2012, Appellant worked for Schreiber Foods, a dairy processing company. Ben Williams, who worked in human resources for the company, described his interactions with Appellant. For example, Williams received a complaint from an employee who felt that Appellant was sabotaging her and targeting her to be fired. When investigating the complaint, Williams met with another female employee who reported to Williams that Appellant had cornered her and attempted to kiss her. When she rebuffed his advances, physically pushing him away, he threatened to “fuck [her] up” if she said anything. According to Williams, he discovered that Appellant was lying to him about several issues, including the allegations of sexual harassment.¹⁹ Ultimately, Appellant was fired for sexually harassing his female co-workers, making threats against his co-worker, and being dishonest to management.

Todd Fullerton also worked with Appellant at Schreiber Foods. Initially, he considered Appellant a friend, but over time he “lost trust” in him. Fullerton testified that Appellant “had [a] way of making himself look good, while also making the ones around him look bad.” He said that Appellant took credit for work that Fullerton did. Fullerton testified about another female co-worker that Appellant “actively undermined on a daily basis, meticulously,” until eventually she left the company. Fullerton said that Appellant had an unpredictable temper. He had observed Appellant threaten to kill a co-worker who pulled a prank. Fullerton explained that Appellant did not respect people's boundaries. When asked to describe Appellant, Fullerton said, “Without a doubt, the most manipulative person I've ever dealt with in my life.”

Appellant worked at Urban Hardwoods and Woodlands Inspirations, a woodwork and cabinetry company, from 2006 to 2008. Bryce Seeholzer worked with Appellant when Appellant was the shop foreman. In April 2008, Appellant began repeatedly telling Seeholzer that the company's owner, Todd Kingsford, was unhappy with Seeholzer's work. After a company meeting, Seeholzer thought any production and performance issues had been resolved. But Appellant kept telling Seeholzer that Kingsford was dissatisfied and said that Kingsford planned to fire Seeholzer. Believing his job was in jeopardy, Seeholzer began applying for other jobs. When he felt the situation continued to deteriorate, Seeholzer went to Kingsford and proactively tendered his two-week notice. Kingsford was “taken aback” and “surprised.” He assured Seeholzer that his job was not in jeopardy. Seeholzer called Appellant and told him about the conversation with Kingsford. Appellant said, “Oh shit, Bryce. I can't go back to work now. I'm sorry.” Appellant never returned to work. Seeholzer rescinded his two-week notice and continued to work for the company for several more years. He later discovered from a fellow co-worker that Kingsford had never said anything negative about him; it was Appellant who had been saying negative things.

Kingsford testified about his experience employing Appellant. He said that Appellant took credit for others’ work. He also observed that Appellant lost his temper when things did not go his way; he would yell and curse at those around him. Kingsford testified that after Appellant's arrest for domestic violence assault, Appellant accused Kingsford of being the reason he was arrested for assaulting his wife. Kingsford also recalled the Seeholzer resignation situation. He said that after his discussion with Seeholzer, he decided to fire Appellant, but Appellant never returned to work.

The testimony of Appellant's co-workers and employer revealed that Appellant was a manipulative and deceptive person. He sabotaged and actively undermined co-workers, took credit for work he did not do, and tried to make himself look good and others look bad. He also lost his temper; yelled, cursed, and threatened other employees; sexually harassed female co-workers; and lied to management. The jury could reasonably conclude that such manipulation, deception, and aggression were concerning aspects of Appellant's character and were probative of his future conduct.

“A jury may also infer a defendant's future dangerousness from evidence showing a lack of remorse.” Buntion, 482 S.W.3d at 67; accord Green, 713 S.W.3d at 879. The evidence showed that, immediately following the murders, Appellant stopped at Sonic for a drink to assuage his thirst before traveling to Melannie's parents’ home where he intended to continue his murder spree. Further, he told his brother that he did not feel guilty because he did not think murdering the Stays was wrong.²⁰

Also, during Raffle's forensic evaluation, Appellant said that it was “easy” to kill the Stay family and that he did not feel guilty. Additionally, during Proctor's evaluation, Appellant described the children he murdered as “collateral damage,” and he expressed that they were better off dead than orphaned. He also told Proctor that he did not feel bad that C.S. had to witness her family being murdered.

To rebut the State's future dangerousness evidence, Appellant presented character witnesses. Several acquaintances who knew Appellant through church, school, or scouting when Appellant lived in Alaska testified on his behalf. The witnesses described Appellant as “fun-loving,” “helpful,” “courteous,” “kind,” “truthful,” “kindhearted,” “service oriented,” “trustworthy,” “very empathetic,” “peaceful,” “funny,” “nice,” “friendly,” and “possibly insecure.” They considered him to be a law-abiding and “very upstanding” citizen. They also expressed that they were “shocked” and “surprised” when they learned that Appellant had massacred the Stay family.

But these character witnesses had limited contact with Appellant in specific contexts many years in the past. The jury, as the sole factfinder, was not required to credit their testimony, especially given their lack of recent interaction with Appellant. Further, the jury was entitled to recognize the bias of Appellant's character witnesses and weigh their testimony accordingly.

Appellant also highlights testimony from Mark Cunningham, a clinical and forensic psychologist who conducted a violence risk assessment of Appellant. Cunningham opined, based on a logistical regression analysis, that the likelihood that Appellant would commit “serious acts of violence in prison” was “very low.” Cunningham based his opinion on multiple factors, including Appellant's age, disciplinary record while in pretrial custody, education level, employment history, and continued contact with community members (primarily his family). But the jury, as the sole factfinder, was not required to credit Cunningham's testimony. See Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“The jury acts as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented.”).

Appellant argues that he poses a low risk for future violence because he is “an older inmate,” “is educated,” “is employable,” and “has a support system outside of prison that would motivate him to obey the rules.” Yet the evidence demonstrated that Appellant's age, education, employability, and support system did not “motivate him to obey the rules” in the past—particularly when he massacred the Stays. Nor when he threatened to kill the jail detention officer. The jury was entitled to find the evidence based on statistical data less meaningful or persuasive than the evidence of Appellant's actual repeated criminal conduct and escalating violence.

Relying on Berry, Appellant argues that the evidence established that he only poses a danger to his former wife and the members of her family who helped her leave him. See Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In Berry, this Court concluded, “The evidence indicates that [Berry] has been dangerous only toward those of her own children whose existence she wanted to hide from her favored mate, that there is a very low probability that, if sentenced to life in prison, she will have any more children, and that therefore it is unlikely that she would be a danger in the future.” Id. Appellant maintains that, similar to Berry, he cannot be a future danger because “there is no situation where [he] would have access to or be a danger to any member of the public ever again, including his former in-laws or any other future romantic partner.”

Appellant's reliance on Berry is misplaced. In Berry, this Court determined that the State “did not prove that any other stimulus led to a violent or dangerous act in any other context.” Id. The opposite is true here. The State produced ample evidence that Appellant did not limit his violence to Melannie and his in-laws. The evidence showed that, throughout his life, Appellant had an explosive temper and would “ignite” when he did not get his way. His assaults against his wife, children, father, sister, and mother as well as his threats against his sister, co-workers, and the jail detention officer demonstrated that Appellant had multiple stimuli leading to violent conduct across various contexts, including incarceration. The evidence established that whenever Appellant suffers a narcissistic injury, the result is a narcissistic rage that gives rise to threats or violence against whomever he perceives precipitated that injury.

Appellant also asserts that, given TDCJ's security classifications and restrictions, there was no evidence that he “could not be controlled in a maximum-security prison.” But the future dangerousness special issue “focuses on the defendant's character for violence and his internal restraints, not merely the external restraints of incarceration.” Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878; see Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 268–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Viewing the future dangerousness evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability that Appellant would commit criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society. The circumstances of this heinous premeditated crime combined with Appellant's history of criminal conduct and escalating violence, his manipulation of others, and his apparent lack of remorse for murdering six individuals (including four innocent children) are sufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue. See, e.g., Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 359–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (evidence of premeditated and brutal murders of two women, one of which included multiple gunshot wounds at close range, was sufficient to support affirmative answer to future dangerousness special issue and the character evidence “uniformly favorable to” defendant was “alone insufficient to mitigate the premeditation and brutality of the offense”). We overrule point of error three.

V — Hearsay Evidence

In point of error four, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an email that Bryce Seeholzer, Appellant's former co-worker from Urban Hardwoods and Woodlands Inspirations, sent to Devon Anderson, the elected Harris County District Attorney, three days after Appellant's arrest.

As discussed earlier, Seeholzer testified in the punishment phase about the resignation situation Appellant provoked. Seeholzer also testified that after learning of Appellant's arrest for the Stay's murders, he emailed Anderson “to let them [sic] know about [his] interactions with [Appellant] and how negative and manipulative they were.” The prosecutor provided Seeholzer a copy of the email and allowed him to refresh his recollection before answering questions about it. The prosecutor then asked Seeholzer how he described Appellant in the email. When Seeholzer could not immediately recall, the prosecutor again provided him with the email. Then, because “[i]t might be easier” and “since these are your words, what you wrote,” the prosecutor asked Seeholzer to read his email aloud.

Appellant objected to hearsay. The prosecutor responded that it was “not hearsay” and, when the trial court asked, confirmed that the email was Seeholzer's own statement. The trial court overruled the objection. Appellant further objected, asserting that Seeholzer's testimony was the “best evidence.” In response, the prosecutor offered to submit the email as an exhibit. Appellant reurged his hearsay objection, contending that the email was an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted: “[T]he document itself is hearsay.” The prosecutor countered that it went “to his state of mind and the information he provided to the District Attorney's Office.” The trial court, stating that “the State's offer to admit it would overcome those issues,” admitted the email. Appellant then raised a bolstering objection, which the trial court overruled.

Seeholzer read his email, in its entirety, to the jury. In the email, when describing the resignation situation, Seeholzer expressed that Appellant was “the most manipulative person [he'd] ever known,” that “[i]f his mouth is open, he is lying and trying to manipulate the people around him,” and that “[t]he level of deception he employed to [Seeholzer] and everyone involved in the situation was ridiculous.” Seeholzer also wrote, “I think [Appellant] could play the ‘I am insane card’ for the rest of his life if he thought it would benefit him.”

On appeal, Appellant asserts that Seeholzer's email was inadmissible hearsay because it was “an out-of-court statement offered by the State to prove that [A]ppellant was only claiming to be insane to benefit himself legally.” See Tex. R. Evid. 801(d) (defining hearsay), 802 (prohibiting the admission of hearsay unless an exception applies). It is unclear whether Appellant challenges the admission of the email exhibit, Seeholzer's testimony about the email's content, or both.

The State contends that the email was admissible because it was offered “to show Seeholzer's opinion that Appellant is a liar and manipulator—i.e., to show what Seeholzer said in his email—rather than to prove the actual truth of the matter asserted in the email.” See Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 347 (“An extrajudicial statement or writing which is offered for the purpose of showing what was said rather than for the truth of the matter stated therein does not constitute hearsay.”). The State suggests that “the relevancy of the email was simply to demonstrate Seeholzer's opinion as to Appellant's character, which did not hinge on whether Seeholzer's statements in the correspondence were actually true.”

Assuming that the email constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence, we conclude that the error was harmless. Ordinarily, the erroneous admission of evidence is non-constitutional error. Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 113; Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Non-constitutional error must be disregarded unless it affects the defendant's substantial rights. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 113 (quoting King, 953 S.W.2d at 271). Based on a review of the record, if we are fairly assured that the error did not influence the jury, or had only but a slight effect, we will affirm the conviction. Id.; Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. “In making this determination, we consider: the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence; the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; the existence and degree of additional evidence supporting the verdict; and whether the State emphasized the error.” Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 113; Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

Here, Seeholzer's email, for the most part, simply repeated his testimony about Appellant's manipulation and deception during the resignation situation. Seeholzer had already testified about how Appellant lied to him—and about him to others—when he described the situation. Seeholzer's email comments simply reiterated his belief that Appellant was manipulative and deceptive, which Seeholzer had already articulated when he explained why he wrote the email. Also, Seeholzer's email comment about Appellant “play[ing] the ‘I am insane card’ ” came after the jury had already rejected Appellant's insanity defense in the guilt phase. Thus, this comment could not materially weaken Appellant's affirmative defense of insanity. Moreover, other co-workers testified about Appellant's manipulative and dishonest character. Specifically, Fullerton described Appellant as “the most manipulative person [he'd] ever dealt with in [his] life.”

In closing argument, the State referenced Seeholzer's testimony and mentioned that he contacted the District Attorney's Office “so he could tell you this was the most manipulative person he had ever met in his life.” While this statement perhaps alluded to one of Seeholzer's email comments, the State's remark emphasized the fact that Seeholzer felt strongly enough about Appellant that he felt compelled to contact the local authorities. The State did not otherwise refer to Seeholzer's email comments or emphasize the email's content.

Finally, there was abundant evidence apart from Seeholzer's email showing that there was a probability that Appellant would commit future acts of violence. As we explained, the circumstances of this brutal premediated crime combined with Appellant's history of criminal conduct and escalating violence, his manipulation of others (as shown by evidence other than Seeholzer's email), and his apparent lack of remorse for murdering six individuals amply supported the jury's affirmative future dangerousness finding.

In short, under these circumstances, we have fair assurance that the admission of this evidence did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's punishment verdict. We conclude that the error resulting from the trial court's admission of this evidence was harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We overrule point of error four.

VI — Impeachment Evidence

In point of error five, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach Stephen Raffle, the psychiatric expert who testified in support of Appellant's insanity defense, with specific instances of Raffle's conduct that were not offered to demonstrate bias or interest.

Before cross-examining Raffle, at a bench conference outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor sought the trial court's permission to “go into two areas regarding this expert's credibility.” The first involved a 2012 disciplinary action in which the California Medical Board publicly reprimanded Raffle. The other involved Raffle's prior expert testimony where he “ha[d] been paid by the tobacco companies to say that nicotine isn't addictive.” The prosecutor explained, “That goes to his credibility and the weight of his [testimony] before the jury.”

Appellant responded that the disciplinary action concerned Raffle's failure to maintain patient records “and had nothing to do with lying, nothing to do with truthfulness.” He argued that it was not “a proper issue to go into any kind of impeachment because it doesn't go to his truthfulness and whether or not he's a credible witness” and “doesn't go to his credibility as an expert.” The trial court ruled that the State could question Raffle about the disciplinary action “[c]onsidering that he's an expert.”

Regarding Raffle's prior expert testimony for the tobacco companies, Appellant explained that Raffle was one of several experts who rendered an opinion. Appellant maintained that it “would be incredibly prejudicial as to what [Raffle's] opinion is because everybody has an opinion about the tobacco companies.” Appellant further argued that Raffle's tobacco-related testimony was “not relevant to his testimony here as a psychiatrist.” The trial court ruled that the State could question Raffle about his prior expert testimony “in regards to his credibility, since he is an expert.”

The trial judge concluded the bench conference stating, “I believe because he is an expert and [the defense is] relying on his opinion, and as to the records, too, I will allow you to go into that.”

When the prosecutor began questioning Raffle about his tobacco-related testimony, Appellant objected, asserting, “Same objection.” The trial court again overruled the objection. As the questioning proceeded, the prosecutor asked Raffle about a newspaper article that referred to him as part of the tobacco “dream team.” Appellant objected. The prosecutor responded, “It would be my same argument to the credibility.” At the ensuing bench conference, Appellant acknowledged the trial court's ruling allowing questions about Raffle's prior testimony but argued that the State was trying to impeach Raffle with “outside evidence.” He further complained that “dream team ․ may have a pejorative connotation to some members of the jury relating to the OJ [Simpson] trial.” The State responded that “it goes to his credibility.” The trial court agreed, stating, “He's got, you know, many different indicators that he's a qualified as an expert. So the State would be allowed to go into anything that might contradict that.” During the State's later questioning about Raffle's disciplinary action, Appellant did not object further.

On appeal, Appellant contends that allowing the State to impeach Raffle with his disciplinary action and prior expert testimony was improper under Rule of Evidence 613(b). See Tex. R. Evid. 613(b) (permitting impeachment of witness by “proof of circumstances or statements showing bias or interest” on part of witness). He argues that “[n]either of these establish a bias or interest on behalf of the doctor to testify favorably for the defense.”

The State contends that Appellant failed to preserve this complaint for appellate review. The State asserts that it offered the evidence at issue under Rule 608 as an attack on Raffle's credibility. See Tex. R. Evid. 608 (allowing a witness's credibility to be attacked due to his truthfulness, or rather untruthfulness). It argues that Appellant's trial objections encompassed relevancy (Rules 401 and 402), unfair prejudice (Rule 403), and impeachment related to general credibility or character for truthfulness (Rule 608), but not impeachment to show bias or interest (Rule 613(b)). We agree that Appellant did not assert a Rule 613(b) objection at trial.²¹ Rule 613(b) addresses a witness's trustworthiness because of some bias or interest. Impeachment under Rule 613(b) is designed to show the witness's partiality in the particular case. See Dixon, 2 S.W.3d at 272–73 (explaining that Rule 613(b) addresses impeachment of witness who “for some unique, special reason ․ might have a particular reason to slant his testimony, unconsciously or consciously, for or against one party” in the current instance).

Appellant never communicated to the trial court that the challenged evidence was improper impeachment because it failed to demonstrate Raffle's bias or interest specific to Appellant's case. Further, his appellate complaint that the evidence did not establish Raffle's bias or interest does not comport with his trial complaints that the evidence “had nothing to do with lying, nothing to do with truthfulness,” “[didn't] go to his truthfulness and whether or not he's a credible witness,” “[didn't] go to his credibility as an expert,” “would be incredibly prejudicial,” “[was] not relevant to his testimony here as a psychiatrist,” or was using “outside evidence” that “may have a pejorative connotation.”

Again, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must timely object and state the grounds for the objection with enough specificity to make the trial judge aware of the complaint. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). The party must convey the substance of the complaint to the trial court. Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 807. And the complaint raised on appeal must comport with the complaint made at trial. Bekendam, 441 S.W.3d at 300.

We conclude that Appellant's Rule 613(b) complaint was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at trial and does not comport with his trial objections. See Hallmark, 541 S.W.3d at 171. We overrule point of error five.

VII— False Evidence

In point of error six, Appellant contends that the State presented false and misleading evidence in the punishment phase, which deprived him of due process.

During the punishment phase, the State offered evidence of phone calls Appellant made in jail while awaiting trial. Through Pete Galvan, a Harris County Sheriff's Office deputy and the custodian of records for all inmate phone calls, the State offered State's Exhibit 651, a disk containing recordings of eight of Appellant's jail calls. When the State offered the exhibit, Appellant stated, “No objections, Your Honor.” The State clarified with Galvan that while only eight calls were on the disk, Appellant made “a lot of other calls.” On cross-examination, Galvan testified that Appellant made 202 calls between his 2014 arrest and his 2019 trial.

Next, Mike Mauldin, a Harris County District Attorney's Office investigator, testified about the content of those eight calls. He said that some of the conversations concerned him.²² Mauldin opined that other phone conversations reflected Appellant's lack of remorse, inability to accept responsibility for his actions, and blame-shifting.

During cross-examination, Appellant established that Mauldin did not listen to all 202 phone calls. Mauldin confirmed that the “basic point ․ all throughout these phone calls” was that Appellant “still has a lot of resentment towards Melannie.” Appellant did not offer recordings of any of the remaining 194 phone calls but elicited from Mauldin that “in the hundred-plus or almost 200 phone calls,” Appellant never directed any family member to “do something” to Melannie. Mauldin also agreed that “there's no indication in letters or jail [calls] that he's making any threats to Melannie or her family.” Further, Appellant elicited from Mauldin that, in several phone calls, Appellant's brother Robert encouraged Appellant to redeem himself and accept responsibility. Additionally, through his questioning of Mauldin, Appellant suggested that his lack of remorse “may have something to do with his mental illness.”

During Appellant's mitigation case, he recalled his brother Robert to testify. When questioned about Appellant's remorse, Robert acknowledged that in at least one of their phone conversations, Appellant conveyed that he “struggled with the idea [that] what he did was wrong.” On cross-examination, Robert said that in several phone calls, Appellant expressed remorse for how he treated Melannie. When pressed, Robert could not specify when the conversations occurred, though he recalled at least two conversations.

After trial, Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial. In the motion, based on the admission of the phone call evidence, he asserted claims of a Brady violation,²³ prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant attached a disk containing recordings of additional jail phone calls he made while awaiting trial. And, in the motion, he quoted some of his remarks from those additional calls that, according to Appellant, showed his remorsefulness. After reviewing all the evidence submitted in support of Applicant's motion for new trial, including the exhibit of Appellant's additional jail phone calls, the trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, Appellant contends that “the evidence presented by the State was incomplete and misleading.” It is unclear whether Appellant asserts that the exhibit of selected recordings of the phone calls, Mauldin's testimony about the calls, or both constituted false evidence. In any event, to support his claim of false evidence, Appellant relies on comments he made in the additional jail phone calls he presented in his motion for new trial. He argues that these comments “contradict the State's portrayal of [A]ppellant's feelings of remorse or sorrow presented during trial.”

The State's use of material false evidence to secure a conviction violates a defendant's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Ukwuachu v. State, 613 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269–70, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). Similarly, the State's use of material false evidence at the punishment phase violates due process. Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

However, a false evidence claim is subject to the traditional rules of error preservation. See Ukwuachu, 613 S.W.3d at 155 n.10 (noting that court of appeals failed to consider “whether Appellant's false evidence complaint was preserved with a timely objection at trial”); cf. Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (excusing defendant's failure to object at trial since he “had no duty to object because he could not reasonably be expected to have known that the testimony was false at the time that it was made”).

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection to the trial court and obtain an adverse ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). A complaint is timely if it is made as soon as the ground of objection becomes apparent. Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 807. “[T]he failure to object in a timely and specific manner” to the admission of evidence during the trial forfeits complaints about the admission of that evidence on appeal, even when error in its admission concerns a constitutional right. See Fuller, 253 S.W.3d at 232; Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Here, Appellant had a duty to object to the allegedly false evidence at trial unless he could not have reasonably been expected to know that the evidence was “incomplete and misleading” at the time that it was presented. See Estrada, 313 S.W.3d at 288. But nothing in the record suggests that Appellant did not know or could not have been reasonably expected to know that the phone call evidence presented was “incomplete and misleading” (if it was) when it was admitted at trial. The record shows that the State provided Appellant with copies of the phone call recordings months before trial; Appellant acknowledged in his motion for new trial that he had received the recordings in pretrial discovery. Further, before trial, in response to Appellant's request that the State provide a list of the calls it intended to use at trial, the prosecutor provided Appellant with email notice of the State's intent to use fifteen calls, which the State specified by date. Moreover, Appellant participated in the recorded phone conversations and, therefore, had personal knowledge of the contents.

Thus, before trial, Appellant was aware or should have been aware—that is, he could have reasonably been expected to know—that the admission of only fifteen of his 202 jail phone calls could present an incomplete or potentially misleading picture.²⁴ But Appellant did not object or otherwise complain that the phone call evidence was false, misleading, or incomplete. Instead, he told the court he had no objection to the admission of the exhibit containing the selected recordings. And although he objected a few times during Mauldin's testimony, these objections did not assert that Mauldin's testimony was false, misleading, or incomplete.

Furthermore, Appellant's questioning of witnesses demonstrated that Appellant was aware of the contents of the phone calls the State did not offer. Appellant cross-examined Mauldin and questioned his brother Robert about the contents of other jail phone calls.

Appellant was obligated to object in the trial court to the allegedly false and misleading phone call evidence to preserve this due process complaint for appellate review, but he did not. Therefore, we hold that Appellant did not preserve this complaint for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Fuller, 253 S.W.3d at 232. We overrule point of error six.

VIII — Jury Charge Error

In point of error seven, Appellant complains of error in the punishment phase jury charge. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court submitted erroneous special issue instructions to the jury.

A trial court is statutorily obligated to instruct the jury on the “law applicable to the case.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. That duty exists even when defense counsel fails to object to inclusions or exclusions in the court's charge. Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 142. The trial court is “ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the jury charge and accompanying instructions.” Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

We review alleged jury charge error in two steps: first, we determine whether error exists; if so, we then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal. Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 142; Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether the jury charge error was brought to the trial court's attention. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g) (setting forth standards of appellate review for jury charge error). If the alleged error was raised by an objection or request for an instruction, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 36.14, 36.15, the record need only show “some harm” to obtain relief; if the alleged error was not raised, reversal is required only if the appellant suffered “egregious harm.” Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 142; see Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

Article 37.071 requires the submission of two special issues to the jury—the future dangerousness issue and the mitigation issue—along with mandatory instructions on answering those issues.²⁵ See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1), (e)(1). For each special issue, the trial court must instruct the jury about agreement (or lack thereof) on the particular evidence supporting the jury's answer.²⁶ See id. § 2(d)(3), (f)(3).

Here, the trial court provided the requisite statutory instructions. However, for each special issue, the trial court included additional language in the instruction. For the future dangerousness issue, the court instructed the jury: “Members of the jury need not agree on what particular evidence supports a negative answer, that is a ‘NO’, or affirmative answer, that is a ‘YES’, to Special Issue No. 1.” (Emphasis added). For the mitigation issue, the court instructed the jury: “Members of the jury need not agree on what particular evidence supports an affirmative answer, that is a ‘YES’, or a negative answer, that is a ‘NO’, to Special Issue No. 2.” (Emphasis added).

Appellant did not object to the additional language added to the statutorily required instruction for either special issue. He now argues on appeal that the additional language constituted error that egregiously harmed him. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court's inclusion of the non-statutory instructions was error, the error did not cause Appellant egregious harm.

When alleged jury charge error was not brought to the trial court's attention, as is the case here, reversal is required only if the appellant suffered “egregious harm.” See Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 147; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Egregious harm exists if the error “affects the very basis of the case, deprives the accused of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.” Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). “A finding of egregious harm must be based on ‘actual harm rather than theoretical harm.’ ” Id. (quoting Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). “Egregious harm is a difficult standard to meet,” and the analysis is fact specific. Id. In assessing harm, we review the entire record and consider the entirety of jury charge, the state of the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the record. Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 147.

Appellant points to the enactment of Article 37.071(d)(3) and (f)(3) in response to Penry v. Lynaugh.²⁷ Subsection (d)(3) provides that the jury need not agree on what particular evidence supports an answer of no to the future danger special issue. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(d)(3). Subsection (f)(3) provides that the jury need not agree on what particular evidence supports an answer of yes to the mitigation special issue. Id. art. 37.071(f)(3). While the Legislature was explicit regarding “no on future danger” and “yes on mitigation,” it was silent about “yes on future danger” and “no on mitigation.” From the statute's silence, Appellant concludes that “the Legislature intended for a jury to agree on what particular evidence supported its answers of yes to the future danger issue and no [to] the mitigation issue.” He asserts that the additional language in the jury charge contradicted the Legislature's intent and that no other language in the charge “corrected the incorrect statement of law provided by the court.”

Appellant reads too much into what the statute does not say. It is true, as Appellant notes, that had the Legislature intended for the jurors to be told that they need not agree on what particular evidence supports special issue answers that result in the death penalty, the Legislature could have included that language in the statute (as it did for the answers that result in a life sentence). But likewise, had the Legislature intended for the jury to be instructed as to the opposite—that is, to be instructed that the jurors must agree on what particular evidence supports special issue answers that result in the death penalty—the Legislature could have included that instruction as part of the requisite instructions.

To suggest that the failure to include this language means that the Legislature intended to require the jury to agree on the evidence underlying a death sentence stretches the statute's language and the Legislature's omission too far. Appellant cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that requires a jury to agree on what particular evidence supports a fact finding or verdict—that is, that requires unanimity on evidentiary support. We are not persuaded that the Legislature intended to create such a requirement here with its silence.

Nothing in Texas law requires the jury to agree on what particular evidence supports answers underlying the death penalty (an affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue and a negative answer to the mitigation special issue). Thus, the additional instructions did not incorrectly state the law. The lack of an instruction in the statute concerning agreement on what specific evidence underlies answers supporting a death sentence simply means that the Legislature did not intend for capital juries to be so instructed. But it does not demonstrate that the Legislature intended to require the jury to reach such an evidentiary agreement.

Appellant does not claim that the remainder of the jury charge failed to correctly instruct the jury with respect to the special issues. Our review of the jury charge reveals that the trial court properly instructed the jurors as to what evidence they should consider in their deliberations and what the law required them to agree on. The jury charge as a whole does not support a finding of harm.

Likewise, the state of the evidence does not support a finding of harm. Appellant acknowledges that the Stay murders were “tragic and heart wrenching.” But he contends that the remaining evidence was “not overwhelming.” We disagree. Besides establishing the circumstances of this horrifying and shocking crime, the evidence demonstrated Appellant's history of escalating violence, manipulation of others, and apparent lack of remorse.

And Appellant's punishment evidence was weak. Most of his character witnesses had no recent contact with him, and their opinions were based on limited contact with him in specific contexts (school, church, and scouting) almost two decades before. Appellant's family members, unsurprisingly, viewed his conduct as a consequence of his mental illness. And Cunningham, who conducted a violence risk assessment and concluded that Appellant posed a low risk, based his opinion on group statistics and certain characteristics that Appellant possessed. That assessment did not appear to factor in Appellant's personality disorders, his specific history of escalating violence, or the horrific and brutal nature of Appellant's callous and premeditated massacre of the Stay family.

Further, the record is nearly void of mitigating evidence. The record showed that Appellant was raised in a loving and supportive family. Although he was diagnosed with a learning disability (ADHD), the evidence showed that it did not adversely affect his education or employment. To the extent that Appellant relies on evidence of his mental illness (as he primarily did at trial), the jury was equally likely to consider such evidence as warranting a death sentence. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (recognizing that mental health evidence is “a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future”).

Neither the State nor Appellant's counsel referenced or emphasized the non-statutory instructions during argument. Neither party identifies any other relevant information in the record, and we find none.

On this record, we conclude that Appellant was not egregiously harmed by any alleged error in jury charge. We overrule point of error seven.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence of death.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Since several individuals referenced in this opinion share the same surname, we refer to individuals by their first names after introducing them by their full names.

3.   Appellant typically took Melannie's phone when he assaulted her so she could not call for help. However, Melannie described one occasion in 2008 when Appellant “slipped up and left a phone where [she] could get to it,” and she called the police. Appellant was arrested and later convicted of domestic violence assault. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, 76-5-114(2), 77-36-1(4)(b)(iii) (Appellant was convicted of both domestic violence assault and “Commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child.” Section 76-5-114(2) is a renumbered version of the statute Appellant was convicted under, formerly § 76-5-109.1(2)(c).).

4.   When Melannie fled to the shelter, she and Appellant were living in a condominium and building a house. Appellant was not living in the condominium when Melannie returned from the shelter. The record is unclear about where he was living, but it reflects that, at various times, he lived with his older brother and his parents.

5.   Appellant later disclosed that he stole the gun because he knew he could not legally purchase a firearm due to his domestic violence assault conviction.

6.   While in Lehi, Appellant received an alert on his phone revealing that his brother, who was paying for the phone, had activated the family location tracking feature. Appellant turned his phone off and did not use it again.

7.   Appellant wore sunglasses and his FedEx shirt and cap from his former employment with the company. He also carried a “package” that he created by rolling up a pillow and wrapping it with duct tape, both of which he had purchased on his journey to Texas.

8.   Katie had thrown her phone into the backyard before entering the home.

9.   The State theorized that besides using the rolled-up pillow as a pretend package, Appellant intended to use it as a homemade silencer.

10.   The occupants of the Lyon house (Melannie's parents, Melannie, her children, her sister Aurielle Lyon, and Aurielle's son) had already left the residence after receiving a call about the shooting at the Stay's.

11.   Beck testified that activating the audio recorder was his normal routine on all scenes. Precinct 4 officers did not have body cameras at that time.

12.   See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (holding that Confrontation Clause bars admission of out-of-court testimonial statements of witnesses unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine witness).

13.   We do not find in the record where the trial court addressed or ruled on that objection. We will assume that the court's admission of the recording implicitly denied Appellant's Rule 403 objection.

14.   Appellant criticizes the trial court's instruction to disregard, complaining that it “reads far more like an optional request than a mandatory court order.” But Appellant did not object to the court's instruction when it was given. Therefore, he did not preserve any complaint about the court's instruction for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

15.   DeLeon also testified about her first encounter with Appellant two days after his arrest. She noted that when officers were escorting Appellant, he was alert and walking fine. But as soon as Appellant sat down in the interview room, he closed his eyes and started talking in a childlike manner. DeLeon confronted Appellant and told him to stop playing games as she was there to help him. Appellant looked at her with “very angry fury in his eyes.” She realized that Appellant was “somebody with a tremendous amount of anger inside.”

16.   Hansen noted a decrease in Appellant's reported symptoms when he had not been taking his medications, which suggested to her that he might not need any medications. Hansen asked Appellant to sign a release so she could access his free-world medical records to review his presentation outside of jail. He refused, which made Hansen suspect that “there was a secondary gain of appearing ill.”

17.   Proctor explained that Appellant had “really all” of the traits of antisocial personality disorder but did not technically meet the criteria for the disorder because there was no evidence that Appellant had “acting-out” behavior before age fifteen.

18.   Like Proctor, Moeller said that Appellant had a number of antisocial personality traits, but he did not diagnose Appellant with antisocial personality disorder because he did not have any documented symptoms of conduct disorder before the age of fifteen.

19.   Employment records and Williams's testimony reflected that Appellant's conduct at work made several female co-workers uncomfortable: he acted like he was going to kiss them, tried to hold their hands, and made demeaning comments about their breasts or their weight.

20.   Specifically, in a February 2015 jail phone call, Appellant told his brother Robert, who was encouraging Appellant to repent and make amends, “It's tough. I know what my mindset was before and the stuff before, and I don't feel guilty yet. You know, it's hard to repent for stuff you don't feel guilty [about] because you don't think it was wrong, which is hard for people to understand, I guess.”

21.   We disagree that the State offered the evidence to impeach Raffle's credibility under Rule 608. Rule 608 addresses a witness's general character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See id. (titled “A Witness's Character for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness”). Impeachment under Rule 608(a) is designed to show the witness's general untruthful character. See Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“One of those means is by demonstrating that the witness, as a general proposition ․ is not a truth teller. He should not be believed whenever he opens his mouth.”).But the record reflects that the State was not attempting to attack Raffle's character for truth telling—that is, to show that, as a general proposition, Raffle is an untruthful person. The prosecutor expressed that she wanted to question Raffle about “two areas regarding this expert's credibility” and explained that the evidence “goes to his credibility and the weight of his [testimony] before the jury.” The context demonstrates that the State offered the evidence not to impeach Raffle under Rule 608 by showing his general character for untruthfulness but to challenge his credibility as an expert.

22.   For example, Mauldin noted a December 2014 phone conversation in which Appellant shared information about Melannie (where she was living and what vehicle she was driving) with his mother. Mauldin testified that he knew Melannie had been trying to limit the information Appellant had about her. Mauldin was concerned that Appellant had obtained this information and was sharing it with others. Also, in conversations in January 2015, August 2016, and March 2017, Appellant exhibited ongoing anger with Melannie even months and years after their divorce and the murders.

23.   See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that the State has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to defendant if it is material to either guilt or punishment).

24.   The record shows that eighteen days after appellate counsel was appointed to represent Appellant on appeal, he filed Appellant's motion for new trial. The motion described the additional jail phone calls and included an exhibit containing recordings of those additional calls. Thus, in less than three weeks, appellate counsel was able to discover what he concluded was contradictory evidence in the phone calls.

25.   Where the guilt phase jury charge allows the jury to convict a defendant as a party, the trial court must also submit the “anti-parties” issue. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(2). That special issue did not apply in this case.

26.   For the future dangerousness issue, the court must instruct the jury that “members of the jury need not agree on what particular evidence supports a negative answer[.]” Id. § 2(d)(3). For the mitigation issue, the court must instruct the jury that the jurors “need not agree on what particular evidence supports an affirmative finding on the issue[.]” Id. § 2(f)(3).

27.   In Penry, the United State Supreme Court held that a new punishment trial was warranted because the jury instructions failed to provide the jury with an adequate vehicle for considering and giving effect to mitigating evidence in answering the special issues. See 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).

Walker, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Schenck, P.J., and Richardson, Yeary, Newell, Keel, Finley, and Parker, JJ., joined.

McClure, J., did not participate.