Paul David Mason, Appellant v. The State of Texas (2026)

OPINION

Appellant entered open pleas of guilty to two felony drug charges. He signed waivers of appeal on November 25, 2024. On February 5, 2025, the trial court held a punishment hearing and assessed sentences in both cases.

The trial court filed certifications of appeal in each case stating that appellant had waived the right to appeal.

Appellant filed notices of appeal.

Based upon the trial court's certifications of appeal indicating that appellant waived his right to appeal, and the waivers of appeal signed by appellant, the court of appeals dismissed the appeals. Mason v. State, Nos. 10-25-00053-CR, 10-25-00054-CR, 2025 WL 2253999 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 7, 2025) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tex. R. App. P.25.2(d); Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d. 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).

Appellant has now filed petitions for discretionary review, contending that the court of appeals’ dismissals conflict with precedent that holds that pre-sentencing waivers of appeal in open plea cases are invalid. See Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d. 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). He says that the court appeals erred by relying solely on the trial court's certification documents rather than considering the timing and circumstances of the waiver. We agree.

When a waiver of appeal is non-negotiated and is executed before the trial court assesses the sentence, it is not valid, at least as it pertains to the punishment phase, because it was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Delaney, 207 S.W.3d at 798. The defendant could not know of any potential errors that might occur at sentencing or what his sentence would be, so he could not fully appreciate the consequences of the waiver. Id. The court of appeals erred in relying on Monreal, in which the unbargained-for waiver of appeal was signed after punishment was assessed, alleviating these concerns.

Appellant's unbargained-for waivers of appeal, signed before the trial court assessed his sentences, were “not knowing and intelligent concerning the punishment phase of trial” and “do[ ] not bar him from appealing form the punishment phase of trial.” See id. at 799. We therefore vacate the judgement of the court of appeals and remand these causes to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Per Curiam.