EX PARTE SHERRILL v. << (2026)

OPINION

Applicants were convicted in separate trials of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping arising from the same complainant's allegations. James Sherrill and Mark Huffman were sentenced to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment on each count. Dustin Huffman was sentenced to life on each count. The appellate court affirmed the convictions. James Wesley Sherrill v. State, No. 12-11-00156-CR (Tex. App.—Tyler May 31, 2012) (not designated for publication); Howard Mark Huffman v. State, No. 12-12-00021-CR (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 20, 2013) (not designated for publication); and Dustin Matthew Huffman v. State, No. 12-11-00105-CR (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 30, 2012) (not designated for publication).

Applicants filed these applications for writs of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the convicting court forwarded them to this Court with agreed findings recommending relief on the false evidence claims but without findings on the remaining claims that alleged actual innocence, Brady, and ineffective assistance of counsel. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07; Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). We remanded for findings on all claims. See Ex parte Roark, 662 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). After an evidentiary hearing, the convicting court entered supplemental findings and recommended that relief be granted on several grounds.

We have independently reviewed the record. This Court is the ultimate fact finder in habeas corpus proceedings. We defer to the convicting court's findings when the record supports them, but when it does not, we may exercise our own judgment and enter contrary findings. Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

The complainant's testimony was the essential evidence for the State at each trial. She has since recanted, and the convicting court found the recantation credible. The convicting court found that the complainant testified falsely at trial in denying prior intravenous drug use and in denying that she had ever told anyone the allegations were untrue. The convicting court found that the State misrepresented the complainant's custody status to the trial court and failed to correct that misrepresentation.

The convicting court's findings on Applicants’ false evidence claims are supported, and the State does not oppose relief on this ground. The State's unknowing use of materially false testimony violates due process. Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The complainant's trial testimony was false in material respects—specifically, her denial of prior intravenous drug use and her denial of having previously told others the allegations were untrue—and because her testimony was the essential evidence against Applicants, there is a reasonable likelihood that the falsity affected each judgment. Ex parte Weinstein, supra. Further, we agree with the trial court's findings that the State's misrepresentation to the trial court independently violated its duty of candor to the tribunal and contributed to the reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. Relief is granted on the false testimony claim.

Applicants also allege that the State suppressed favorable evidence in four categories: a sheriff's deputy's report and photographs documenting the complainant's bruises a week before the offense; the lead investigator's inappropriate sexual relationship with the complainant; the complainant's written pretrial request that the charges against all five accused be dropped; and the recall of a capias issued for the complainant's arrest. The convicting court's findings that each was suppressed, favorable, and material are supported by the record. Materiality is assessed cumulatively. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). Because the complainant's credibility was essential to the State's case, our confidence in the outcome of each trial is undermined. Brady v. Maryland, supra. Relief is granted. We disagree that Applicants have shown that they are actually innocent. A recantation that undermines confidence in a verdict does not necessarily establish actual innocence. Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d 558, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“Although the matter of a recanting witness's credibility may be highly relevant to determining whether an applicant has met his burden of proof under Elizondo, it is not necessarily dispositive of the legal question of whether the newly discovered evidence would have convinced the jury of applicant's innocence.”).The complainant's two accounts are irreconcilable. On this particular record, we cannot say which version is true. Applicants have not established by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted. Ex parte Elizondo, supra; Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Actual innocence relief is denied.

We disagree that Applicant Dustin Huffman has shown that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The record does not support findings of both deficient performance and prejudice. Relief is denied on those grounds. Strickland v. Washington, supra.

The judgments in cause numbers 30046 (State v. James Wesley Sherrill), 30043 (State v. Howard Mark Huffman), and 30044 (State v. Dustin Matthew Huffman), in the Third District Court of Anderson County, are set aside, and Applicants shall answer the charges as set out in the indictments. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within ten days from the date of this Court's mandate.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Per curiam.

Finley, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Yeary, J., dissented.