COREY LEWIS CAMPBELL v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2026)

This case involves an extremely important matter: the Texas clergy-communicant privilege. Many citizens of our state might wonder whether they have a privilege to keep communications they have had with their clergy members private. We have a Rule of Evidence addressing that issue. Tex. R. Evid. 505. But citizens might be surprised to learn that, even though our rule says nothing about whether a different rule should apply when the communication occurs in a different state, this Court nevertheless applies a different rule—found only in an opinion of this Court—in such cases.

The Court today refuses discretionary review. But I would grant review of this case, if on our own motion, to reconsider the very important question of whether North Carolina's clergy-communicant privilege or Texas's clergy-communicant privilege applies in this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 66 & 67. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged, in Harris County, Texas, with murdering his girlfriend. His girlfriend was killed in Texas. And then Appellant went to his mother's home in North Carolina.

While he was in North Carolina, Appellant's mother urged Appellant to speak with a bishop on the telephone. While he was on the phone with the bishop, and allegedly with his mother still in the room, Appellant made a statement admitting that he killed his girlfriend. During trial, the bishop was called to testify as a witness about the contents of Appellant's statement.

Appellant had asked the trial court to suppress the statements he made to the bishop in accordance with our Texas Rule of Evidence addressing the clergy-communicant privilege. But the trial court overruled his motion. The bishop's testimony about Appellant's statements was admitted into evidence at Appellant's trial and he was ultimately convicted. The First Court of Appeals then affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the bishop's testimony, concluding that the North Carolina clergy-communicant privilege applies, rather than the Texas rule.

II. ANALYSIS

In this case, I believe the Court should re-examine whether the Texas or North Carolina clergy-communicant privilege applies under circumstances like these. The court of appeals relied on an opinion from this Court, in Gonzalez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), to determine that the North Carolina clergy-communicant privilege applies, and not the Texas Rule. In Gonzalez this Court appears to have adopted the Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws to decide which clergy-communicant privilege applies. See id. at 107 (“We hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in its application of the [Restatement's] ‘most significant relationship’ test to the conflict of laws question presented in this case[.]”). We should reconsider that opinion and decide whether it should be overruled.

The Restatement urges state courts to use the “most significant relationship test” when determining which state's law applies. However, the Restatement is not the law of this state. When our Texas Rules of Evidence were adopted, this state did not incorporate language from the Restatement demanding that a different rule should apply when a clergy-communicant statement is made outside of our state's borders.

There is also no textual basis for any argument that any conflict between the laws of another state and our state's Rules of Evidence should be considered. Our state's rule on clergy-communications contains no exception for circumstances in which such a communication occurs in a different state. There appears to be no true legal reason to even dwell on such a question, unless perhaps a court just does not like our rule of evidence!

We are not bound by the Restatements of the Laws. We should not consider ourselves to be controlled by them in any regard. We should also not consider ourselves, or our lower courts, to be at liberty to simply adopt any Restatement as the law of this state, even if we think it has expressed a good idea. Judges are not elected to play the role of policy makers. If anyone in this state thinks we should change a rule or a policy expressed in a rule, then that person should raise the matter as a proposed change to our Texas Rules of Evidence. In that way, the matter could be considered by a rules committee, and the committee could then consider public input before deciding whether to amend our rule.

We have rules of evidence that are written down, with pesky little things called words—that mean things. Presumably, the people who adopted our Texas Rules of Evidence fully considered them, and the words in them, before adopting them. We should consider whether the words in our actual rules are enough.

Rule 505 (b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence sets forth the rule establishing the privilege for communications between a person and a member of the clergy. Tex. R. Evid. 505 (b). The Rule states clearly: “A communicant has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication by the communicant to a clergy member in the clergy member's professional capacity as a spiritual advisor.” Id. Rule 505 (a) defines a communication as “ ‘confidential’ if made privately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present to further the purpose of the communication.” Tex. R. Evid. 505(a)(3).

On its own terms, the rule is quite clear. It does not contemplate the situation in which the statement is made to clergy when the communicant is out of state. When our courts, and when we, pretend that our rule of evidence demands a different set of rules for when a communication occurs in another state, we destroy our own credibility as an equal arbiter of the law. Our courts should simply follow the language of our own Rules. And we should lead the lower courts in that direction by granting review in this case to show them the way.

Applying a different state's law or rule can have a massive impact on the outcome of cases. For example, our Texas rule for clergy communications contemplates a situation in which another person may be “present to further the purpose of the communication[,]” but North Carolina law does not. Tex. R. Evid. 505(a)(3).¹ In this case, Appellant's mother appears to have been present during the call between Appellant and the bishop when Appellant made the statements at issue. Under Texas Rule of Evidence Rule 505(a)(3), Appellant's mother's presence might not serve to preclude Appellant from asserting the clergy-communicant privilege. It is therefore conceivable that, if the Texas Rule had been applied, Appellant might have been able to prevent the bishop from testifying.  ²

III. CONCLUSION

This case presents an important question that warrants review. It is a question of profound significance to the religious people in our state. I do not strenuously object to the Court's refusal of Appellant's own grounds for discretionary review, but I do dissent to the Court's refusal to grant review to consider whose law should properly apply in the circumstances presented in this case, and I also dissent to the Court's refusal to reconsider its own—likely erroneous—decision in Gonzalez.

FOOTNOTES

1.   North Carolina's clergy-communicant privilege rule states:No priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, or a clergyman or ordained minister of an established church shall be competent to testify in any action, suit or proceeding concerning any information which was communicated to him and entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the usual course of his practice or discipline, wherein such person so communicating such information about himself or another is seeking spiritual counsel and advice relative to and growing out of the information so imparted, provided, however, that this section shall not apply where communicant in open court waives the privilege conferred.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2

2.   Gonzalez relied on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to decide that a non-forum state's law controlled a court's application of the clergy-communicant privilege. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 139 (1) (1971); Gonzalez, 45 S.W.3d at 103. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 139 (1) states: “(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the communication will be admitted, even though it would be privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the admission of such evidence would be contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.”(emphasis added). It is seems to me that there exist strong arguments that allowing the admission of the communication at issue in this case is against the strong public policy of Texas. By its own terms, Texas's clergy-communicant privilege can even apply when made in the presence of a third person; and Texas rule makers certainly added this section intentionally. Tex. R. Evid. 505(a)(3) (“A communication is ‘confidential’ if made privately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present to further the purpose of the communication.”) (emphasis added). We should look for the “strong public policy” of the state in the plain text of the rule.On a final note, I will say, the Court in Gonzalez also relied on the argument that because the clergy-communicant privilege is a “privilege” and not another kind of rule of evidence, we must compare laws of other states when statements are made in those other jurisdictions instead of using our own rule. It is true that the Restatement seems to treat the attorney-client privilege differently than the clergy-communicant privilege. But the same logic provided by this Court in Gonzalez would also favor us refusing to apply the attorney-client privilege in a situation where the communicant made the statement in a jurisdiction that did not recognize that privilege. Something tells me that the Court would find a way to treat attorney communications differently than clergy communications, similar to the way the Restatement does. But such a distinction, in my view, would be highly questionable. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993) (“The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.”). And it could lead to situations where the attorney client privilege might be weakened. We should be wary of that!

Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion.