EX PARTE ALEJANDREZ v. << (2026)

OPINION

Applicant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery and sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Alejandres v. State, No. 01-02-01029-CR, 2004 WL 36772 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 8, 2004) (not designated for publication). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.

Applicant contends that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel gave incorrect advice with respect to punishment election. Specifically, trial counsel advised Applicant that he could receive community supervision from the judge at punishment when, in fact, only the jury could award community supervision for the charged offense under the version of Article 42.12 § 3(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time. This advice caused Applicant to elect the judge for punishment, despite Applicant's desire to obtain community supervision. Based on the record, the trial court has determined that counsel's performance was deficient and that Applicant was prejudiced.

Relief is granted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The sentence in cause number 916298 in the 339th District Court of Harris County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Harris County for a new punishment hearing. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within ten days from the date of this Court's mandate.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Twenty-two years after the judgment of the trial court in this case, and eight years after he completed his sentence, Applicant seeks the assistance of the writ of habeas corpus from this Court. Specifically, he hopes to secure relief from his sentence in this case on the ground that his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. He seeks the aid of this Court in the hope of mitigating his impending punishment in a more recent criminal case brought against him in federal court.

The equities do not favor Applicant's request. His application for habeas relief should be denied under the doctrine of laches. Because the Court, instead, grants him relief, I respectfully dissent.

I. Background

On July 11, 2002, Applicant was found guilty of aggravated robbery by a jury. At trial, Applicant submitted a motion for probation and a sworn application for community supervision. He also sought to be sentenced by the trial court instead of by the jury. Applicant now claims to have waived jury punishment in this case based on his trial counsel's erroneous belief that a judge could grant probation or community supervision.¹ At the punishment phase, the trial judge sentenced Applicant to a term of confinement for sixteen years.

Applicant timely pursued a direct appeal. Alejandres v. State, No. 01-02-01029-CR, 2004 WL 36772 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 8, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court of appeals overruled his single point of error, complaining about the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. It then affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at *5.

Now, all these years later, and after his sentence of imprisonment in this case has discharged, Applicant is seeking habeas relief from this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. In an unrelated and more recent federal criminal case filed against him, Applicant has now received a federal presentencing investigation report that revealed it was legally impermissible for the trial judge who sentenced him in this case to have placed him on probation or community supervision in 2002.² Applicant is not complaining about the process that led to his judgment of guilt in this case. He seeks only a new opportunity to face punishment from a jury instead of the trial court judge.

Applicant has apparently become concerned about his sentence only now that he has learned that his 2002 sentence that has already discharged will result in his receiving three points added for purposes of sentencing in the more recent criminal case brought against him in federal court.³ Applicant seeks our aid in attempting to create a more favorable set of circumstances in which to face sentencing in his new federal case. But he has waited a very long time to do so, and the circumstances have now changed in ways that have compromised the State's ability to obtain a just punishment in this case.

II. Laches Bars Relief

In the past, we have found it appropriate to apply the doctrine of laches in the post-conviction context because “equity aids the diligent and not those who slumber on their rights.” Ex parte Moreno, 245 S.W.3d 419, 428–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486, 487 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When determining whether to apply laches to a particular case, factors such as the length of the applicant's delay in filing the application, the reasons for the delay, and the degree and type of prejudice resulting from the delay are relevant. Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Because we are determining whether fairness and equity weigh in favor of granting relief, no single factor is dispositive. Id.

This Court has adopted a “sliding scale” approach when weighing delay against prejudice suffered by the State. Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). This means the longer an applicant delays in filing his habeas corpus application, the less evidence the State must put forth to demonstrate that it has been prejudiced. Id.

A. Unreasonable Delay

The doctrine of laches becomes relevant when an application for writ of habeas corpus is filed five or more years after judgment is entered in a criminal case. Perez, 398 S.W.3d at 216 & n.12 (generally accepting that an unexplained five-year delay will usually be considered unreasonable). This is because applicants have a duty to pursue their claims with diligence. Id. at 217.

Applicant argues that laches should not prevent his twenty-two-year late application because he only recently discovered the ineffective assistance of his counsel in his 2002 trial. He argues that his prompt filing of the writ upon discovery makes laches inapplicable. However, this Court has, in other cases, determined that delays of durations similar to Applicant's were unreasonable. Ex parte Hill, 711 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (holding that laches applied in a twenty-three-year delay); Ex parte Wells, 730 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2026) (holding that laches applied for an unexplained fourteen-year delay).

Applicant also does not present a reasonable excuse for his delay. There is nothing in the record to indicate, nor did the trial court find, that Applicant could not have pursued this claim earlier had he more timely examined the record. Applicant has already completed serving his original sentence in this case. And the circumstances affecting the State's ability to seek a just sentence in this case have changed dramatically.

Applicant's delay is not automatically justified by the fact that his trial counsel's error was only made known to him after the federal government prepared a presentencing investigation report in a more recent criminal case. Neither does Applicant make any good argument or cite any compelling authority as to why we should ignore his lack of diligence in pursuing post-conviction relief.

B. Prejudice to the State

Applying the sliding-scale approach, it is clear to me that the State's prejudice weighs in favor of denying Applicant's writ application. The longer the delay of an applicant in filing a writ, the less prejudice the State must show. Since Applicant waited twenty-two years to apply for a writ, the State's burden to show prejudice is low. See Hill, 711 S.W.3d at 225 (explaining that a twenty-three-year delay resulted in the State's burden of prejudice being low).

Based on the record in this case, the State meets its burden. The complainant in this case is incarcerated in another state and is potentially unavailable to testify. The State argues that the complainant's incarceration could impact the jury's perception of his credibility. Also, the State is concerned that the new jury's perceptions of the crime and the victim would not be the same as they were over twenty years ago, as the complainant is no longer a young teen. Furthermore, other witnesses have been impacted by the passage of time. One of the eyewitnesses is now deceased. The investigator, who originally interviewed the complainant after he was shot by Applicant, has not been located by the State.

While it is true, as the trial court stated in its findings, that the State has access to the transcripts of the witnesses’ previous testimony, transcripts are not the same as in-person testimony given directly by witnesses. As observed in another case, the availability of transcripts does not eliminate all prejudice suffered by the State. Wells, 730 S.W.3d at 421 (Parker, J., concurring). This is because a jury will not be able to observe a witness's demeanor and tone. Id. at 422.

Finally, there is an increased chance that anyone called upon to impose a new sentence against Applicant now, at least twenty-two years after the crime and judgment of guilt in this case, will consider probation to be a more reasonable option than they may have believed nearer in time to the crime and his trial. This risk, due to Applicant's long-time delay, is not insubstantial. Even if the sentencer is not made aware of the full sentence of incarceration that Applicant has already served for his crime in this case, there may be a tendency in any new sentencer to think that, if no sentence has been imposed for the crime until now, there might be little risk in granting him probation.

C. Interest in Finality

The State also has a legitimate interest in finality. Perez, 398 S.W.3d at 208. This is especially true in cases like this where an applicant is seeking to undo a sentence only to leverage a potentially new sentencing outcome in his case against his yet-to-be-determined sentence in a new criminal case pending against him. Hill, 711 S.W.3d at 226–27. Here, Applicant has completed his sentence and only now pursues a remedy because he faces heightened punishment from the federal government in a more recent criminal case. In these circumstances, equity does not favor Applicant's late request for relief.

III. Conclusion

Laches is an equitable doctrine that exists to prevent individuals from sleeping on their rights, to prevent prejudice to a party, and to encourage finality. An applicant should not be permitted to sleep on his rights for years and years and then ask this Court to allow him to relitigate an issue—in this case fully two-decades later—once time fades the memory of witnesses and creates the potential for a new sentencer to draw a conclusion that Applicant presents no risks if probation is granted.⁴ The doctrine of laches should bar the application for writ of habeas corpus relief in this case.

The Court should deny relief. Because it refuses to do so and instead grants Applicant the relief he requests where equity clearly favors denial, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, repealed by, Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 770 (H.B. 2299), § 3.01, effective January 1, 2017.

2.   A Presentencing Report follows an investigation and summarizes information such as criminal history, social history, and applicable Federal Sentencing Guidelines. United States Courts, Presentencing Investigations, The Presentence Report, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/probation-and-pretrial-services/presentence-investigations (last visited September 1, 2026); see 18 U.S. Code § 3552.

3.   Three points are added for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month (13 months). 8 USCS Appx § 4A1.1(a). Had Applicant received probation or community supervision, he would not have received the three points for purposes of federal sentencing.

4.   When adopting the doctrine of laches in Carrio, we reasoned that when “claims are asserted after the passage of many years, attorneys for the defendant ․ [have] little or no recollection about what took place[.]” 992 S.W.2d at 487. Here, trial counsel for Applicant explained while testifying as a witness at the habeas hearing that he does not have any independent recollection of the trial, trial strategy, or client.

Per curiam.

Yeary, J. filed a dissenting opinion in which Finley and Parker, JJ., joined.