WILLIAMS v. STATE (2026)

OPINION

Appellant was charged with aggravated promotion of prostitution. See Tex. Penal Code § 43.04. Appellant's indictment alleged that Appellant “did then and there knowingly own, invest in, finance, control, supervise, or manage a prostitution enterprise that used at least two prostitutes.” Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to quash, which the trial court denied. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted and was sentenced to 40 years’ confinement.

On direct appeal, the court of appeals reversed. Williams v. State, 668 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022) (Williams I). The court of appeals reasoned that Appellant did not “receive[ ] pretrial notice of the State's theory against which he would have to defend.” Id. at 68. This Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review and reversed the court of appeals, holding that the State was not required to elect between different statutory manners and means alleged in the indictment. Williams v. State, 685 S.W.3d 110, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (Williams II) (“The maxim articulated by Ferguson [v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (op. on State's mot. for reh'g)] ․ can, at most, require that the State allege more detail in a charging instrument; it would never require the State to abandon a manner and means in the charging instrument. As long as the charging instrument specifies all the manner and means upon which the State is permitted to rely, there is no notice problem.”) (original emphasis). This Court then remanded the appeal “to address Appellant's remaining points of error.” Id.

On remand, the court of appeals granted Appellant permission to file a supplemental brief. Williams v. State, 720 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025) (Williams III). The supplemental brief argued that “[t]he trial court erred in denying [Appellant's] motion to quash because the indictment used undefined terms of indeterminate or variable meaning, and more specific pleading was required” under State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Id. The court of appeals agreed with Appellant and once again reversed his conviction. Id. at 465.

The State filed a petition for discretionary review which this Court granted. The first question before the Court is whether the court of appeals correctly addressed Appellant's Mays claim as unassigned error on remand. Appellant's Mays claim was preserved in the trial court and was not addressed by Williams II. Consequently, we hold that the court of appeals did not err by addressing Appellant's arguments on remand as unassigned error.

What remains are two related questions on the merits. First, did the court of appeals err when it held that Section 43.04(a)’s six statutory methods—“owns, invests in, finances, controls, supervises, or manages”—are undefined terms of indeterminate or variable meaning? Second, if the statutory methods are undefined terms of indeterminate or variable meaning, was Appellant harmed? We do not need to address the first question because we conclude that any error in Appellant's indictment was harmless under the applicable standard. Consequently, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.

I. Factual Background

Appellant was charged with aggravated promotion of prostitution. See Tex. Penal Code § 43.04. Appellant's indictment alleged that Appellant:

On or about April 5, 2019, ․ did then and there knowingly own, invest in, finance, control, supervise, or manage a prostitution enterprise that used at least two prostitutes.

(Formatting altered). The indictment also alleged a prior conviction enhancement.

On October 29, 2019, Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to quash and exception to the substance of the indictment. The trial court held a hearing on Appellant's motion and, with the benefit of argument from counsel, denied Appellant's motion. Appellant was convicted.

II. Unassigned Error

a. Applicable Law

i. Unassigned Error

In Pfeiffer v. State, 363 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), this Court held that “appellate courts may review unassigned error—a claim that was preserved in the trial court but was not raised by either party on appeal.” Id. at 599 (citing Carter v. State, 656 S.W.2d 468, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)); see also Williams II, 685 S.W.3d at 113 n.16; Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

As this Court recognized in Carter, “[a] constitutional grant of power of appellate jurisdiction treats a right of appeal in criminal cases ‘as a remedy to revise the whole case upon the laws and facts, as exhibited in the record.’ ” 656 S.W.2d at 468. “Once jurisdiction of an appellate court is invoked, exercise of its reviewing functions is limited only by its own discretion or a valid restrictive statute.” Id. at 469. In the context of a remand, “[w]hen jurisdiction over the cause is restored by remand neither statutes nor scanty prior decisions cited above dictate that the court of appeals is limited in its renewed appellate consideration of the cause to the terms of our order of remand.” Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

ii. Preservation of Error

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 provides:

(a) In General. As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that:

(1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that:

(A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context; and

(B) complied with the requirements of the Texas Rules of Evidence or the Texas Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure; and

(2) the trial court:

(A) ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly; or

(B) refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the complaining party objected to the refusal.

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). While no “hyper-technical or formalistic use of words or phrases” is required in order to preserve error, the proffering party must “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.” Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

b. Appellant preserved his Mays claim in the trial court

Appellant's pre-trial motion to quash cited Mays for the proposition that “[t]he statutory language is not completely descriptive of the offense if it uses an undefined term of indeterminate or variable meaning.” Appellant then argued:

The term “invest in” could mean several things. Does this mean that he fronts the cash for the whole process or business? Or does it simply mean that a “John” that utilizes the services of the business are investing in the business and thereby could be charged with this offense? The next term “finance” is very closely related to the term “invest in”. If you are putting money into a business you are financing the business and also investing in said business.

Id. Appellant further argued:

Here the legislature included words “invest in” and “finance” but in the ordinary use of these words they can be interchangeable.

* * *

This same argument should be applied to the three terms “control, supervise, or manage.” Each of these terms can be and are used on a daily basis in an interchangeable manner. To “control” something means the same thing as to “supervise” it or to “manage” it. The legislature included each of these terms for a specific reason and we must define them to ensure the defendant is aware of the charges against him so that he can prepare a proper defense against those charges.

Based on these arguments—and others—Appellant moved the trial court to quash the indictment.

At the hearing on Appellant's motion to quash, Appellant's trial counsel made the same argument to the trial court: “I think that they need to have told us very specifically what it is that they mean by the terms that they claim are a manner and means.” Williams III, 720 S.W.3d at 462 n.2.

On remand from this Court, Appellant raised his Mays claim in his supplemental brief. See Appellant's Supp. Br., Williams v. State, No. 04-20-00486-CR (Apr. 22, 2024) (“Here the statutory language of the statute is not completely descriptive of an offense. Section 43.04 uses undefined terms of indeterminate or variable meaning; this demands more-specific pleading than merely quoting statutory language, to notify [Appellant] of the nature of the charges against him.”). Appellant's argument on remand comported with his argument in the trial court. Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339 (“The point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”).

Based on this record, we conclude that Appellant properly preserved his Mays claim for appellate review. See Golliday, 560 S.W.3d at 670; Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

c. The State's counterarguments

The State posits that Appellant's Mays claim should not be framed as unassigned error for two reasons. First, the State argues that Appellant raised the Mays claim in Williams II and this Court's opinion in Williams II resolved Appellant's Mays claim. State's Br. at 7 (citing Granviel v. State, 723 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“[W]here determinations as to questions of law have already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort, those determinations will be held to govern the case throughout all its subsequent stages.”)). Second, the State argues that Appellant's Mays claim “is a subsidiary question of an already addressed point of error based on the fact that Appellant had already raised an indictment notice claim.” Id. at 8 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (a point of error “will be treated as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included”)). We address each argument in turn.

i. Williams II

The State argues that Williams II resolved Appellant's Mays claim. A review of this Court's opinion in Williams II belies that assertion. This Court framed the issue in Williams II as follows:

Quoting from State v. Ross, [573 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)] the court of appeals [in Williams I] concluded that the State was required, upon timely request by the defense, to modify the indictment to allege which of the statutory methods the State sought to establish. We conclude that the court of appeals erred. The State is not required to elect between alternative statutory methods of committing an offense alleged in an indictment.

685 S.W.3d at 111 (internal footnote omitted).

In examining this issue, this Court noted:

When a statutory term or element is further defined by statute, the charging instrument does not ordinarily need to allege the definition. State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “Typically the definitions of terms and elements are regarded as evidentiary matters.” Id. But there is an exception to the general rule when the definition of the statutory term or element includes more than one manner or means of commission. That exception was articulated in Ferguson [v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (op. on State's mot. for reh'g)].

Id. at 114 (internal citations modified in text). Based on Ferguson, this Court held:

The maxim articulated by Ferguson and later recited by Ross developed as an exception to the general rule that statutory definitions do not have to be included in a charging instrument. Even in that context, it can, at most, require that the State allege more detail in a charging instrument; it would never require the State to abandon a manner and means in the charging instrument. As long as the charging instrument specifies all the manner and means upon which the State is permitted to rely, there is no notice problem.

Id. at 115.

But nowhere in the Court's opinion in Williams II is any discussion of Mays or Appellant's contention that Section 43.04(a)’s six statutory methods are undefined terms of indeterminate or variable meaning. There was nothing in Williams II that prevented the court of appeals from addressing Appellant's Mays contention on remand.¹

The State cites this Court's decision in Ex parte Carter, 721 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025), for the proposition that “procedures on remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals, however, are limited by that dictated in the remand Order.” State's Br. at 7. In Williams II, this Court remanded the present appeal back to the court of appeals “to address Appellant's remaining points of error.” 685 S.W.3d at 115. But Ex parte Carter is a habeas case, which operates under a wholly distinguishable set of procedures. As we explained in Ex parte Carter, “a trial court does not have habeas jurisdiction ‘unless and until this Court has made a determination that the application satisfies an exception under Article 11.071, § 5, to the bar against subsequent applications.’ ” 721 S.W.3d at 355 (quoting In re Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 710 S.W.3d 731, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025)). In contrast, the jurisdiction of courts of appeal are broad—“limited only by its own discretion or a valid restrictive statute.” Carter, 656 S.W.2d at 469 (the other Carter, not to be confused with Ex parte Carter). And this Court has recognized that courts of appeals have the authority to consider new arguments raised in supplemental briefing even if our remand order was limited to existing points of error. See Garrett, 749 S.W.2d at 787; see also Carroll v. State, 101 S.W.3d 454, 456 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); and id. at 460 (“[W]hen this Court remands a case to the intermediate court of appeals, that court has the jurisdiction to reanalyze the relevant point of error on grounds not specifically raised by the parties, this Court, or the remand order itself.”). We decline the State's invitation to extend Ex parte Carter beyond the realm of habeas jurisprudence.

ii. Subsidiary Issue

Alternatively, the State argues that Appellant's Mays claim is a “subsidiary issue” of Appellant's indictment notice claim that this Court rejected in Williams II. Rule 38.1(f) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure states that an appellant's brief “must state concisely all issues or points presented for review. The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f).

Appellant's Mays claim is not a “subsidiary question” of Appellant's challenge to the trial court's denial of his motion to quash raised by Appellant on direct appeal and that this Court rejected in Williams II. In his pro se brief on direct appeal, Appellant argued:

In a long line of cases, Texas courts have held that when the Legislature defines the commission of an offense by more than one means, then the State is obliged to go beyond merely tracking the statutory language and specify in the charging instrument which of those means it intended to prove at trial, in order to satisfy the notice requirement. Where the State failed to specify which of the six means of committing the offense in its indictment, the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to quash.

This is the election argument that this Court rejected in Williams II. That argument is distinct from the question of whether the statutory language in Section 43.04 uses terms of indeterminate or variable meaning, the Mays claim that Appellant raised as unassigned error on remand from Williams II. Put another way, both Appellant's Mays claim and the Ferguson issue that this Court rejected in Williams II are “subsidiary question[s]” to a general defective notice claim on direct appeal. But Appellant did not raise such a claim on direct appeal. Rather, he raised a narrow claim based on the State's alleged failure to elect between different means of committing the charged offense. This Court rejected that challenge in Williams II. Nothing in this Court's ruling in Williams II prevented the court of appeals from addressing another related defective notice challenge on remand.

d. Conclusion

We conclude that the court of appeals did not err when it addressed Appellant's Mays claim as “unassigned error” on remand from this Court's decision in Williams II. Pfeiffer, 363 S.W.3d at 599.

III. Harmless Error

We assume, without deciding, that the trial court erred by declining to quash Appellant's indictment and proceed to the question of harm. In Williams III, the court of appeals concluded that Appellant was harmed by the defects in the indictment. We disagree.

Article 21.19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “An indictment shall not be held insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceedings thereon be affected, by reason of any defect of form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 21.19. This Court has previously explained the proper harm analysis under Article 21.19:

The first step is to decide whether the charging instrument failed to convey some requisite item of “notice.” If sufficient notice is given, this ends our inquiry. If not, the next step is to decide whether in the context of the case, this had an impact on the defendant's ability to prepare a defense, and, finally, how great an impact.

Sanchez v. State, 120 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). We consider the entire record in making the Adams determination. 707 S.W.2d at 903. The “due process requirement may be satisfied by means other than the language in the charging instrument. When a motion to quash is overruled, a defendant suffers no harm unless he did not, in fact, receive notice of the State's theory against which he would have to defend.” Kellar v. State, 108 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

On the question of whether the lack of notice affected Appellant's ability to prepare a defense, the court of appeals reasoned:

The record reflects that it was not until opening statement that the prosecution gave any indication how it intended to show [Appellant] committed the offense: “So you are going to hear actual conversations with [the undercover investigators] talking about him operating and managing to get these prostitutes up to our county and to bring drugs with them at a cost, okay?”

Williams III, 720 S.W.3d at 465. The court of appeals further reasoned that Appellant “had no response to this accusation; his only defense was the women found in the car with him were not prostitutes.” Id.

The court of appeals’ analysis is not supported by the record. First, contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, the record supports the conclusion that the State complied with its obligations under Article 39.14 and the Michael Morton Act. The court of appeals held that “the State gave no indication of how it was alleging” Appellant's involvement in the prostitution enterprise and found “significant that the State did not file or state in open court that it had complied with article 39.14.” Williams III, 720 S.W.3d at 464. On appeal and in this Court, the State relies upon its “open-file policy” to argue that Appellant received sufficient notice. This Court has previously rejected reliance on an “open-file policy” in the context of whether a defendant received sufficient notice under Rule 404(b). See Buchanan v. State, 911 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). We need not address whether Buchanan’s underpinnings apply here because the record shows that both the State's trial prosecutor and Appellant's own trial counsel confirmed that the State complied with its discovery obligations. Prior to sentencing, Appellant filed a grievance against his trial counsel and Appellant's trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw. During the course of the trial court's hearing on counsel's motion to withdraw, Appellant himself told the trial court:

[T]here was exculpatory evidence that I asked for — specifically asked for body cam videos that Purvis on the stand said that didn't exist when Officer Tejeda and — for the sheriff's office and another officer, it's in the PSI report that there is video on body worn cameras of interviewing the girls, and they specifically told them, “We are not prostitutes. We didn't agree — we didn't engage in prostitution, and Jay never told us that we were coming out here to do prostitution.” We never got that video. We never got the dash cam video. We asked for it. State said that they —

The trial court then directly questioned the prosecutor and Appellant's trial counsel:

THE COURT: Let me stop you real quick.

Mr. Harpold, to the best of your knowledge, pursuant to 39.14, did the State receive all the discovery from law enforcement and forward the same to the Defense?

MR. HARPOLD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Ferguson, to the best of your knowledge, after the investigation that you performed, did you receive all the discovery?

MR. FERGUSON: I have, Your Honor.

Consequently, the record refutes the court of appeals’ assertion that the State's discovery obligations under the Michael Morton Act and Code of Criminal Procedure 39.14 were not complied with.

Second, the “actual conversations” that the State referred to in opening statements as evidence of Appellant's involvement in the prostitution enterprise were known to Appellant prior to trial. In fact, they were the subject of a motion to suppress hearing that was litigated the same day as the motion to quash hearing. Appellant filed a motion to suppress on October 29, 2019. In it, Appellant claimed that “statements obtained from” him “were obtained in violation of Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” The motion to suppress specifically referenced communications between investigators and Appellant:

On April 4, 2019 Kerr County Sheriff's Department (KSO) in conjunction with Fredericksburg Police Department (FPD) and Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) began investigating Mr. Williams for Promotion of Prostitution. The investigation began with KSO Investigator Jeff Purvis received information that the defendant was trafficking females and that he had brought them to Ker County in the past. Inv. Purvis contacted Inv. Hirl of FPD to work in an uncover capacity. Inv. Hirl began texting with Defendant and negotiating for him to bring some girls to Kerr County to party. Over a period of approximately two days the two made arrangements for the defendant to bring three girls and “party favors” to Kerr County on evening [sic] of April 5, 2019. On the morning of April 5,2019 Inv. Hirl communicated with Mr. Williams by telephone voice call. In this communication William allegedly confirmed he would provide the services for that evening. Inv. Hirl had numerous communications with Williams and the girls throughout the day by both text messages and voice calls. At least thirteen of the communications were by voice calls.

The trial court held a hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress on January 31, 2020, approximately three months after the motion was filed, and about one month before Appellant's trial on March 3, 2020. Consequently, the phone communications were known to Appellant before trial.

Moreover, the rest of the evidence that the State was going to use to prove its case against Appellant was also known to Appellant at the time of trial. The record on appeal contains the probable cause affidavits and supplemental reports created by Kerr County Sheriff's Office investigators in this case. Though they were not submitted as physical exhibits at Appellant's trial, the reports identify the same information contained in Appellant's motion to suppress, including the specific communications mentioned in the motion to suppress and in the State's opening arguments. The only two witnesses called by the State at trial were Investigator Hirl and Jeff Purvis, the affiant for the probable cause affidavit. Furthermore, Investigator Hill was one of the two witnesses the State called at the motion to suppress hearing. The testimony of the witnesses throughout the proceedings were consistent with the probable cause affidavits and supplemental reports. In sum, it is clear from the record that Appellant was aware of the existence of communications between him and law enforcement as well as the evidence that the State was going to present to prove its case long before opening statements of his trial.

Lastly, even with all of this evidence provided to him, Appellant chose to deny the existence of prostitution enterprise rather than dispute his participation in the prostitution enterprise. Appellant's notice claim that the court of appeals addressed on remand in Williams III centered on whether the statutory terms in the indictment sufficiently defined the possible actions by which Appellant was involved in the prostitution enterprise. Had Appellant admitted the existence of such an enterprise and instead attacked how he was involved in the enterprise as a defensive theory, this case may very well be different. But by disavowing the existence of prostitution enterprise entirely, any inadequacies in defining the statutory terms did not harm Appellant.

On this record, assuming without deciding that the indictment failed to convey adequate notice, we conclude that Appellant was not harmed. Sanchez, 120 S.W.3d at 367; Adams, 707 S.W.2d at 903.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION

A person commits aggravated promotion of prostitution “if he knowingly owns, invests in, finances, controls, supervises, or manages a prostitution enterprise that uses two or more prostitutes.”¹ The indictment in this case tracked the statutory language, disjunctively alleging all six methods of promoting prostitution without further description. When the case was first before it, this Court held that alleging all six methods was permissible.² Now we are asked to decide whether some or all of these six methods must be further described to convey adequate notice.

The Court correctly holds that the failure to describe some or all of these six methods—even if error—was harmless. The Court correctly explains that, due to his receipt of pretrial discovery, Appellant was fully aware of the State's theories of the case and yet chose to rely solely on a defensive theory that had nothing to do with any uncertainty regarding the six methods of promoting a prostitution enterprise—that there was in fact no prostitution enterprise. Having found no harm, the Court can legitimately decline to address the issue of error.³

But this is a case where an appealing party's claim lacks merit for multiple independent reasons, and while the Court need only rely on one such reason, I choose to address other reasons why—in my estimation—Appellant's notice claim fails. First, the sole reason articulated by defense counsel at the motion-to-quash hearing for saying that each of the six methods were insufficiently specific was that they overlap with each other. That reason is foreclosed by our earlier holding that the State can pursue all six methods and by the fact that the State did pursue all six methods. Because Appellant knew that all six methods were in play, any overlap between them was inconsequential. Second, even if Appellant's claim were broader than an “overlap claim,” it would still lack merit because the words codifying the six methods are reasonably specific in the context in which they appear—describing actions toward a business. And finally, the ways in which a defendant promotes the prostitution enterprise are merely different means of committing a single offense. So, when Appellant found out what evidence the State had against him through discovery, he knew he had to defend against everything that conformed to the indictment allegations.

A. Overlap challenge is foreclosed.

In its prior decision in this case, the Court held, “The State is not required to elect between alternative statutory methods of committing an offense alleged in an indictment.”⁴ The Court specifically pointed out that Appellant's claim at trial treated the six methods of promoting prostitution as alternative means of committing the same offense and that he did not raise a claim that the different methods codified separate offenses.⁵ Consequently, Appellant forfeited any claim that the six methods codified separate offenses.⁶ So, this Court operated under the assumption that the six methods are merely alternative means of committing the same offense.⁷ Under that assumption, the indictment did not err to allege all six methods.⁸

So on remand, Appellant advanced a claim that each of the six methods of committing the offense needed to be further defined. And the court of appeals agreed that at least some of them did, having a variety of meanings in standard dictionaries.⁹

But defense counsel's argument at the motion-to-quash hearing was based solely on the different methods overlapping each other. Initially, defense counsel focused on the natural overlap in the meaning of the six words to claim there was a notice problem:

The legislature includes words in the statute with intent, with a specific intent intended, okay, and if there was not in their mind when they wrote this statute a different definition for “invests in” and “finances,” they wouldn't have used both of those words. That would have been redundant, or “controls” or “supervises” or “manages.” Those three words could be used interchangeably, as well, but the legislature, in their great wisdom, used those three words, for some reason or other, and we have to give the fact that they put those in there for a purpose. What that purpose was, was that each one of those have a different meaning. Otherwise, once again, it would have been redundant to do so.

When the trial judge asked, “Do you have any authority for doing this?” defense counsel specifically claimed that the overlapping meanings of these words in common parlance was why they needed to be individually defined:

[T]he fact that they were not defined, Your Honor, by statute is important, and the fact that they included six different manner and means that are very closely related to each other tells me that the intent of the legislature was that each one of those had their own separate individual definition, because it would be absurd for them to include three words that meant the exact same thing such as the control, supervises or manages. Those are very similar and could be used interchangeably, and it would be absurd for us to read the statute to be a person commits an offense if he knowingly owns, invests in, invests in, controls, controls or controls a prostitution enterprise that uses two or more prostitutes, and for us to read it that they are -- to read it in any other way, that's the way it would sound. Because they are so closely interchangeable, they have to have their own meaning, and I think that Mr. Williams is entitled to a definition to each one of those or which one they choose to proceed forward on. That way we are not reading it in an absurd way, which is the way I just read it. It would be absurd to read the statute that way, but that's the way you have to read it without definitions.

All the trial participants understood that tracking the language of the statute was the general rule for conveying notice.¹⁰ The only reason defense counsel gave at the hearing for deviating from that rule was that the words codifying the six methods in the statute had overlapping meanings in common parlance.¹¹

The problem with defense counsel's reasoning is that the State alleged all six methods. Because all six methods were in play, any variability in meaning due solely to an overlap could not affect the degree of notice conveyed by the State. Whether the meanings overlapped or not, Appellant knew that he needed to defend against all the conduct that those six methods covered. And under the trial participants’ assumption that the six methods were merely alternative methods of committing a single offense, a jury would not need to unanimously agree on any one method.¹² Consequently, if the trial court was correct that the indictment could validly allege all six methods of the offense, then it was also correct that any overlap between the methods had no effect on the notice the indictment provided to Appellant. Appellant failed to provide the trial court with a valid reason to quash the indictment.

The suggestion on appeal that the six methods needed to be further defined because the words each had very different possible meanings—apart from their redundancy with each other—was not a reason that was conveyed to the trial court. To preserve error, a party must “state[ ] grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.”¹³ While Appellant preserved a Mays claim,¹⁴ the only reason he gave for finding notice insufficient under Mays was that some of the words in the indictment overlapped. The trial court should not be faulted for finding that reason to be insufficient to quash the indictment.

B. The methods of commission are reasonably specific.

An indictment must state “[e]verything ․ which is necessary to be proved.”¹⁵ An indictment is sufficient if it

charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged, and enable the court, on conviction to pronounce the proper judgment.16

Ordinarily, an indictment sufficiently alleges an offense if it tracks the statutory language.¹⁷ An indictment does not have to plead evidentiary matters.¹⁸ But when a statute “uses an undefined term of indeterminate or variable meaning,” a “more specific pleading” can be required “in order to notify the defendant of the nature of the charges against him.”¹⁹

When a word is not defined, it may have “any meaning which is acceptable in common parlance.”²⁰ But while dictionary definitions are relevant to the meaning of an undefined word, a word must also be construed in context, according to the rules of grammar and common usage.²¹

In concluding that the six methods of promoting a prostitution enterprise are “terms of indeterminate and variable meaning,” the court of appeals cited a number of definitions that simply do not fit the statutory context in which the defined word appears. For example, one of the court of appeals's definitions of “control” is “to reduce the incidence or severity of especially to innocuous levels.”²² That definition applies to something like a fire or disease. No one would think that someone “controls” a prostitution enterprise by trying to reduce the enterprise to an innocuous level. And several of the court of appeals's definitions of “manage” are patently inapplicable.²³ To “make and keep compliant,” applies to a living creature, not a business entity.²⁴ And one can “direct the professional career of” a person, not a business entity.²⁵ And the “succeed in accomplishing” definition applies to a task, not a business.²⁶

In other instances, the court of appeals cited definitions that—at least in the “prostitution enterprise” context—are not that different from each other. The three monetary definitions of “invest” and the three definitions of “finance” given by that court all involve causing money or something of monetary value to flow to the organization.²⁷ And various definitions of control—exercising influence over, having power over, incorporating controls in—all amount to the same thing in a prostitution enterprise.²⁸ And while one might point to a theoretical difference between having power and exercising that power, a person who has power in a criminal organization is inevitably going to exercise it, eliminating any practical distinction. And “manage” really has one business-oriented definition: “to exercise executive, administrative, and supervisory direction of.”²⁹ To the extent other definitions of that term could be shoehorned into the business context—such as “treat with care” or “to work upon or try to alter for a purpose”³⁰ —they would at worst be subsets of the business definition and subsumed by it.

And in some instances, the multiplicity of definitions for a particular term merely shows overlap with another term in the statute. Various definitions of “control,” “supervise,” and “manage” reveal overlap between those words. And the non-monetary definitions of “invest”—investing time, effort, or emotion”³¹ —if they have any applicability at all, would simply cause that term to overlap with the aforementioned overlapping terms. And the monetary definitions of “invest” cause it to overlap to some degree with “finance.” But as I have previously explained, our earlier decision in Williams already settled that matter.³² The indictment includes all six of the different methods of promoting a prostitution enterprise, and under our prior decision in Williams, that is allowed. Any variability in meaning that is due solely to an overlap does not affect the degree of notice conveyed by the State.

Ultimately, the aggravated-promotion-of-prostitution statute covers people, other than mere prostitutes or customers, who are entitled to proceeds from the prostitution business or who make the business operate through personal effort or financial support. A “person of common understanding” would have no trouble understanding this.

C. Everything Appellant did with the prostitution enterprise was all one offense anyway.

An analysis of the aggravated-promotion-of-prostitution statute shows that all the methods of promoting a prostitution enterprise, between or within the six terms codifying those methods, constitutes but a single offense. “[T]he focus or ‘gravamen’ of a penal provision should be regarded as the ‘best indicator’ when it comes to determining whether the Legislature intended to define more than one offense.”³³ In determining focus, “three overarching types of gravamen” exist: “(1) the result of conduct, (2) the nature of conduct, or (3) the circumstances surrounding the conduct.”³⁴ If an offense has both a nature and a circumstance element, we must determine which conduct is the statute's focus.³⁵ “A circumstance element can prescribe the gravamen of the offense if it makes otherwise innocent conduct criminal.”³⁶

In the present case, the statute contains a “circumstance” that ties all the different methods of commission together: the existence of a “prostitution enterprise.” This is similar to the offense of failure to stop and render aid, in which the different methods of commission—the failure to do a number of different things—are tied together by the existence of an “accident.”³⁷ And there is nothing inherently criminal in “owning, investing in, financing, controlling, supervising, or managing” something. What makes the activity criminal is that the “something” is a “prostitution enterprise.” Under that reasoning, the offense of aggravated promotion of prostitution has a circumstance focus, and that circumstance defines the number of offenses. So, a single “prostitution enterprise” gives rise to a single offense, and the acts of owning, investing, financing, controlling, supervising, and managing are all alternative means of commission.³⁸

Also, the fact that the six words codifying these acts have overlapping definitions suggest that the acts are alternative means rather than separate offenses.³⁹ This contrasts with sex offenses, where the touching of separate body parts—sexual organ, anus, and breast—are completely independent acts.⁴⁰

And if these different methods of commission are part of the same offense, it would seem to follow that different acts that fall within the individual methods are part the same offense. If, for example, both “investing” and “managing” a prostitution enterprise are part of a single offense, how can one say that different instances of investing or managing create separate offenses? Even if that were possible, various terms suggest continuous operation rather than a single discrete event. One “owns” a prostitution enterprise over a period of time. Likewise, “managing” and “controlling” suggest more than a single event. Even if investing, financing, and supervising might be ambiguous, they take—under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis—the character of these other words in the series.⁴¹

And if all the different acts of promoting a prostitution enterprise are part of a single offense, then the defendant knows he has to defend against all of them. And he would know what those were from the discovery provided by the State (which defense counsel acknowledged was complete).

D. Conclusion

As the Court has held, Appellant has suffered no harm because he knew the State's theories of the case and advanced a defense that had nothing to do with any ambiguity in the indictment. But Appellant's claim would fail for other reasons that I have explored: (1) his narrow “overlap” claim lacks merit under Williams II, (2) a broader Mays claim also lacks merit because the words codifying the different methods of commission were reasonably specific, and (3) any uncertainty in the terms was of no consequence because all conduct promoting a prostitution enterprise was part of a single offense, requiring him to defend against all the conduct the State knew about that conformed to the indictment's allegations.

With these comments, I join the Court's opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   That Appellant's motion for rehearing in Williams II relied upon Judge Newell's dissenting opinion does not change the outcome of the case here. As the motion for rehearing itself conceded, there are two exceptions to the general rule that an indictment that tracks the elements of the statute is sufficient, and this Court in Williams II only addressed one of them—the election exception. And with good reason: The court of appeals in Williams I only addressed that exception as well. In any event, the State does not raise an argument relying on Appellant's motion for rehearing in Williams II, and we are under no obligation to make the State's arguments for it. Parker v. State, 727 S.W.3d 38, 67 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).

1.   Tex. Penal Code § 43.04(a) (West 2018).

2.   Williams v. State, 685 S.W.3d 110, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

3.   State v. Plambeck, 182 S.W.3d 365, 367 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“A court is not required to address issues that become moot because of the resolution of other issues.”).

4.   Williams, 685 S.W.3d at 111.

5.   Id. at 114.

6.   Id.

7.   Id.

8.   Id. at 114-15.

9.   Williams v. State, 720 S.W.3d 454, 463-64 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025).

10.   Defense counsel himself acknowledged, “But an indictment must go beyond statutory language only when the statute is not completely descriptive of the offense.” He also acknowledged this in his written motion to quash.

11.   Similarly, defense counsel's written motion to quash focused on the “interchangeable” meanings of the various words. The one exception is that the motion asked if “invest” could cover a “John” (a customer) that pays money to utilize the services of the business. But when given the opportunity, defense counsel did not raise this argument at the hearing, so he forfeited it. Moreover, that argument was a nonstarter, because no “person of common understanding,” see infra at n.16 and associated text, would think that a person invests in a business by merely purchasing its services as a customer and because a separate prostitution statute at the time of Appellant's conduct proscribed the hiring of a prostitute. See Tex. Penal Code § 43.02(b) (West 2018).

12.   See Floyd v. State, 714 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (“The robbery by threat to place Diane Porter in fear of imminent bodily injury or death or the robbery causing bodily injury to Diane Porter were simply alternative methods of committing the same robbery offense. Hence, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that it was required to be unanimous as to whether Appellant was guilty of aggravated robbery by threat or bodily- injury aggravated robbery as no such unanimity was required.”).

13.   Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

14.   State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

15.   Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 21.03.

16.   Id. art. 21.11.

17.   Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 407.

18.   Curry, supra.

19.   Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 407.

20.   Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

21.   Milton v. State, 721 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). And the context of the entire statutory scheme might also be relevant. See Becerra v. State, 685 S.W.3d 120, 134 & n.66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). See also supra at n.11 (mere customer not an investor in light of separate prostitution statute).

22.   Williams v. State, 720 S.W.3d at 463.

23.   See id. for definitions.

24.   See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manage (entry 1c, ex. “can't manage their child”) (viewed on May 27, 2026).

25.   See id. (entry 2, ex. “an agency that manages entertainers”).

26.   See id. (entry 3, ex. “managed to escape from prison”).

27.   See Williams, 720 S.W.3d at 463, for definitions.

28.   See id. for definitions.

29.   https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manage (entry 1a, first ex. “manage a business”) (viewed on May 27, 2026).

30.   See Williams, 720 S.W.3d at 463, for definitions.

31.   See id. for definitions.

32.   Williams, 685 S.W.3d at 111.

33.   Floyd, 714 S.W.3d at 13.

34.   Ex parte Cook, 630 S.W.3d 65, 66-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

35.   Id. at 67.

36.   Id.

37.   See Huffman v. State, 267 S.W.3d 902, 908-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

38.   See id. at 909 (Failure to do various things is part of one offense of failure to stop and render aid when there is one accident and one victim.).

39.   Cf. id. at 909 (“Unlike the touching of various body parts found in sex offenses, which are independent acts, the ‘stop,’ ‘return,’ and ‘remain’ requirements are not independent of each other. Rather, they are serial requirements that all relate, step-by-step, to what an actor must do with respect to the scene of an accident.”).

40.   See id.

41.   See McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 568-69, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 195 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016) (“Under the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’ While ‘not an inescapable rule,’ this canon ‘is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth’ ” to a statute.). Of course, there is a point at which one would want to say that a defendant has committed aggravated promotion of prostitution more than once—at the very least, when the defendant engages in the proscribed conduct after a previous conviction of the offense. But one can simply view that situation as activity relating to a new, and thus different, “prostitution enterprise.”

Finley, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keel, Walker, and Parker, JJ., joined.

Parker, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Keel, J., joined. Schenck, P.J., Richardson, and Yeary, JJ., concurred. Newell and McClure, JJ., dissented.