COLUMBUS v. STATE (2026)

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of simple assault. Although the trial court judge said nothing about it while pronouncing sentence in open court, the judge included an affirmative finding of family violence in the written judgment. We granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review to address whether a trial court judge may enter such an affirmative finding in a judgment without first having pronounced orally that it had made such a finding at sentencing.¹

I. Background

A. Trial

Appellant was charged by information with intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to Amber Estrada by striking her with his hand. The body of the information did not state that Appellant and Estrada were family members or that they shared a household, even though the caption of the information read: “ASSAULT BODILY INJURY-MARRIED/COHAB.” Appellant testified at the guilt phase of trial that he and Estrada were sharing an apartment when the assault occurred and he suggested they were common-law married: “We were staying together. We are actually common-law.”

The trial court's charge authorized the jury to convict Appellant if it found he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” caused Estrada bodily injury. The jury's verdict form found Appellant “Guilty” without specifying the culpable mental state and without reference to the allegations in the information. And because Appellant elected to have the judge assess punishment, the trial court pronounced sentence in open court at “a $500 fine, costs of court, one year probated for a period of a year[.]”

The judge said nothing at sentencing about an affirmative finding of family violence. Even so, in a written judgment entered of record on the same day, the trial court entered an “AFFIRMATIVE FINDING OF FAMILY VIOLENCE.” And the offense was identified in the judgment as “ASSAULT BODILY INJURY-MARRIED.”

B. Appeal

In his original-submission brief to the court of appeals, Appellant argued that the trial court erred by entering the affirmative finding in the judgment when no such finding was orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, he invoked Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) and Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), for the proposition that it is the oral pronouncement that “controls.” Appellant's Original Brief in the Court of Appeals, at 20−22. That was the entire gist of his argument there.

A panel of the court of appeals rejected Appellant's argument in an unpublished opinion. The panel concluded that the rule in Madding and Taylor was inapplicable because “a finding of family violence is not a sentencing issue” under Article 42.013. Columbus v. State, No. 04-22-00619-CR, 2024 WL 2306384, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, del. May 22, 2024) (not designated for publication). Appellant then timely filed a motion for en banc reconsideration, which the court of appeals granted, withdrawing its panel opinion and issuing a published en banc opinion. Columbus v. State, 720 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025).

As with the panel, the en banc court of appeals limited itself to addressing “whether it was proper to include the affirmative finding of family violence in the judgment if it was not orally pronounced in the sentence[.]” The en banc majority opined that the answer turned on “whether an affirmative finding of family violence is a part of the sentence.” Id. at 406. The court of appeals noted that Article 42.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which says what the judgment “shall reflect[,]” describes sentencing matters in Section 1, subsections 9−10, 15, and 17−19, while discretely describing family violence affirmative findings, in Section 5. Id. at 408 & n.5 (comparing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.01, § 1(9−10), (15), & (17−19), to art. 42.01 § 5). Thus, the court of appeals en banc majority concluded, the latter was not to be regarded as a part of the sentence, and it therefore rejected Appellant's claim. Id. at 408−09.²

A dissenting justice observed that one of the collateral consequences of a family violence affirmative finding is the mandatory imposition of an additional fine of $100 “to a family violence center” if community supervision is granted. Columbus, 720 S.W.3d at 414 (Meza, J., dissenting) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.504(b)).³ She regarded this fine as punitive. Therefore, she concluded it must be a part of the sentence. Id. at 412−14 (Meza, J., dissenting).⁴

C. Discretionary Review

Appellant's petition for discretionary review raises two grounds, both of which we granted.⁵ Appellant's first ground makes an argument that he had not broached in the court of appeals until he filed his brief on en banc reconsideration, and the en banc court of appeals did not mention that argument in its opinion. The State now argues, in its brief on the merits in this Court, after we granted Appellant's petition, that Appellant has failed to preserve this new argument for appeal, much less discretionary review.

This Court has observed:

The court of appeals is not required to entertain a new argument from an appellant ․ for the first time on rehearing, and when it refuses to exercise its discretion to do so, it renders no decision on that new argument that is available for discretionary review.

State v. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Rochelle v. State, 791 S.W.2d 121, 124−25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

Because the court of appeals in this case refused to exercise its discretion to entertain Appellant's new argument, it has not decided that issue. This Court ordinarily reviews only “decisions” of the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Gilley v. State, 418 S.W.3d 114, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“As a general proposition, this Court will review only the ‘decisions’ of the courts of appeals.”). We see no compelling reason to deviate from that prudential practice today. We therefore dismiss Appellant's first ground for review as having been improvidently granted.

In his second ground for review, Appellant contests the decision that the court of appeals did render, both in its original panel opinion and on en banc reconsideration: whether the Article 42.013 family violence affirmative finding should be considered a part of the “sentence” such that it must be orally pronounced in open court before it may be “entered” in the written judgment, consistently with the rule pronounced in cases like Madding and Taylor. It is to that question, upon which the court of appeals did rule, that we now turn.

II. ANALYSIS

Article 42.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that, with limited exceptions, a defendant's sentence must be “pronounced in [his] presence.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.03, § 1(a). Even so, we think the court of appeals majority got this case exactly right. To begin with, as the court of appeals noted, there is nothing in the plain language of Article 42.013 itself to suggest that a family violence affirmative finding should be regarded as part of the “sentence.” Columbus, 720 S.W.3d at 408. Article 42.013 independently mandates that, once such an affirmative finding is made, the trial court must “enter [it] in the judgment of the case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.013. And so does Article 42.01 of the Code, which also lists, more generally, information that “[t]he judgment shall reflect[.]” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.01, § 1.

Among the items of information that must be included in a judgment, according to Section 1 of Article 42.01, is information clearly pertaining to the “sentence.” See id. § 1(9) (“that the defendant be sentenced to death, a term of confinement or community supervision, or to pay a fine, as the case may be”); § 1(10) (where “imposition of sentence is suspended[,]” “the punishment assessed, the length of community supervision, and the conditions of community supervision”); § 1(15) (“[t]he term of sentence”); § 1(17) (“[t]he date sentence is imposed”); § 1(18) (“[t]he date sentence is to commence and any credit for time served”); and § 1(19) (whether the sentence is to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentence). But affirmative findings are not mentioned in any of those provisions. Instead, affirmative findings of family violence are required in a discrete Section of Article 42.01. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.01, § 5.

An analogy may be drawn to deadly-weapon affirmative findings. Such findings, when made, must also be reflected in the judgment, under another subsection of Article 42.01, Section 1. See id. § 1(21) (“[a]ffirmative findings entered pursuant to Article 42A.054(c) or (d)”). Even though deadly-weapon affirmative findings are also listed in Section 1 of Article 42.01, albeit in a different subsection, as necessary to be “reflected” in the judgment, along with the information pertaining to “sentence” as set out above, this Court long ago declared that an affirmative deadly weapon finding “is not part of a sentence.” State v. Ross, 953 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).⁶ “To hold otherwise[,]” we explained, “defies the plain text of art. 42.02 [of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure], which defines a ‘sentence’.” Id.⁷

We later concluded, on the basis of Ross, that because an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon is not part of the sentence, the rule announced in cases such as Madding and Taylor does not apply. Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 820−21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “Thus,” the Court declared, “a trial court is not required to orally announce a deadly-weapon finding at sentencing” before it may incorporate such a finding in the judgment “if the allegation of use of a deadly weapon is clear from the face of the indictment.” Id. at 821. We draw that same conclusion here.

The part of Article 42.01 that calls for any affirmative finding of family violence to also be “reflected” in the judgment appears on its own, in a wholly different section of Article 42.01: Section 5.⁸ If a deadly-weapon affirmative finding—addressed in Subsection 21 of Section 1 of Article 42.01—is not considered part of a “sentence,” then an affirmative finding of family violence from Section 5 should not be either.

But what about the fact that, if an affirmative finding of family violence is made and the defendant is placed on community supervision, he faces a mandatory “fine” under Article 42A.504(b)? After all, this Court has said that “fines” count as part of the sentence, has it not? Burg v. State, 592 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). Does that mandatory consequence of a family violence affirmative finding not make it a part of the “sentence,” at least whenever community supervision is imposed, as it was here?

Ultimately, we think not. This Court has also long held that “community supervision is not part of the defendant's sentence.” Butler v. State, 189 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). This applies equally to conditions of community supervision. See Speth, 6 S.W.3d at 533. While restitution is ordinarily a part of a sentence, Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)—we have considered there to be an exception to that ordinary rule when it is imposed as a condition of community supervision. In that circumstance, we have said it is not part of a sentence. Burg, 592 S.W.3d at 451 (citing Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. State, 444 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)).

The same may be said of a fine; though ordinarily punitive in nature, Weir, 278 S.W.3d at 366, if it is imposed independently of Chapter 12 of the Penal Code, as a specific condition of community supervision—indeed, even as a mandatory condition of community supervision—it is not part of the sentence.⁹

For this reason, we conclude that the mandatory fine imposed under Article 42A.504(b) whenever an affirmative finding of family violence is made and community supervision is granted does not convert that affirmative finding into a part of the sentence. Thus, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the Madding/Taylor rule, that every part of the sentence must be orally pronounced in open court before it may be entered into the judgment, is not implicated here.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur with the Court's disposition. I write separately to address the majority's treatment of the procedural default issue.

According to the majority, this Court cannot consider Appellant's argument raised for the first time in his motion for en banc rehearing in the court of appeals because, by not addressing it, the court of appeals did not render a “decision” for us to review. Maj. Op. at 6–7. I have expressed my concern before that the Court needs to look at what “decision” means because it appears the Court might have been misinterpreting that term of art for decades.¹ See State v. Young, No. PD-0526-25, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 1374060, at *10–14 (Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2026) (Schenck, P.J., concurring and dissenting); see also Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 764 n.4 (Tex. 2014) (“We do not consider issues that were not raised in the courts below, but parties are free to construct new arguments in support of issues properly before the Court.”).

And this Court appears not to have meaningfully analyzed what the word means in this context. See Young, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2026 WL 1374060, at *14 (Schenck, P.J., concurring and dissenting). We seem to have just assumed that it means, essentially, “opinions”—and only insofar as they have actually reached and disposed of arguments. See Maj. Op. at 7; see also Lee v. State, 791 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Tex. Const. art. V, § 5(a)); but see Young, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2026 WL 1374060, at *13 (distinguishing “decisions” from “opinions”).

I agree that lower courts are not required to reach and address arguments that are not properly or timely presented, but they are responsible for the decisions and judgments they render. They are thus free to address any legal argument within the issue before it. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (“The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included.”). If a court of appeals believes supplementation is necessary to render a proper judgment, the rules permit it to do so at any time and on any terms the court believes are just and reasonable. See id. R. 38.7. If the court wishes to apply the correct law without supplementation, it is not compelled to seek it. Either way, the decision is what we will review. Tex. Const. art. V, § 5; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.45; see Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 651–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

Because procedural default applies to the parties, not the courts, I believe this Court should not ignore the governing law or reach the wrong result because of when or how arguments were presented to the lower court when the arguments are fairly included in the issue presented below.

With these thoughts, I concur in the Court's disposition.

CONCURRING OPINION

One of Appellant's grounds was raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing en banc and was not addressed by the court of appeals. The Court does not say today that it “cannot” consider that ground. Rather, the Court merely declines to consider that ground. That declination rests firmly on this Court's general prudential practice of not addressing issues that were not resolved by the court of appeals.¹ We deviate from that general rule only in exceptional situations.² “We are a discretionary review court. It is not our practice to conduct an ‘appeal de novo’ and review appellate issues from scratch.”³ With these comments, I join the Court's opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

Does a trial court have to orally pronounce an affirmative finding of family violence during sentencing? Yes. An affirmative finding of family violence requires that the trial court impose a nondiscretionary fine. This Court has previously explained that a “fine is punitive in nature and is part of a defendant's sentence.” Anastassov v. State, 664 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Accordingly, a trial court is required to orally pronounce an affirmative finding of family violence during sentencing. I respectfully dissent from the Court's contrary disposition.

I. Background

Appellant was charged by information with assault causing bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01. The caption for the information labeled the offense as “ASSAULT BODILY INJURY-MARRIED/COHAB.” However, the information alleged that Appellant, on or about May 14, 2020,

did then and there intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly cause bodily injury to another, namely: Amber Estrada, hereinafter referred to as complainant, by STRIKING THE COMPLAINANT WITH THE HAND OF THE DEFENDANT[.]

Appellant's case proceeded to a jury trial. The evidence at trial established that Appellant and Estrada had a current or prior dating relationship. The jury convicted Appellant.

During sentencing, the trial court stated:

I will accept the state's recommendation of a $500 fine, costs of court, one year probated for a period of a year, the BIPP program. I will ask that he participate in 40 hours of community service. Parenting class.

The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. The judgment reflected that Appellant had been convicted of the offense of “ASSAULT BODILY INJURY MARRIED/.” Sentence was imposed at: “A FINE OF $500.00 AND COURT COST OF $450.00 AND 12 MTHS IN JAIL.” But this sentence was suspended and Appellant was placed on probation “FOR A TERM OF 12 MTHS.”

At the top of the trial court's judgment was written “AFFIRMATIVE FINDING OF FAMILY VIOLENCE.” It is undisputed that the trial court did not orally say anything during sentencing regarding the finding. The “Terms and Conditions of Community Supervision” attached to Appellant's judgment reflected the trial court's orally stated terms of probation but curiously did not impose the family violence shelter fee.

Appellant timely appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. Columbus v. State, No. 04-22-00619-CR, 2024 WL 2306384, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 22, 2024). Appellant moved for en banc reconsideration, which was granted, and the en banc court of appeals affirmed once more. Columbus v. State, 720 S.W.3d 400, 409 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025). We granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review.

II. Applicable Law

a. “Sentence”

“The sentence is that part of the judgment, or order revoking a suspension of the imposition of a sentence, that orders that the punishment be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.02. “A sentence must be pronounced in every felony case and in every misdemeanor case except where the maximum possible punishment is by fine only.” Williams v. State, 478 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); see also Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“A defendant's sentence must be pronounced orally in his presence.”). “When there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the sentence in the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500. A sentence “consists of the facts of the punishment itself, including the date of commencement of the sentence, its duration, and the concurrent or cumulative nature of the term of confinement and the amount of the fine, if any.” Burg v. State, 592 S.W.3d 444, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting State v. Kersh, 127 S.W.3d 775, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). Relevant here, as we explained in Burg, a “fine” is one of the “things” that “are clearly ‘in’ the closed curve of things that can make a ‘sentence’ legal or illegal.” Id. at 451 (first citing State v. Ross, 953 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); then citing Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)); see also Anastassov, 664 S.W.3d at 820.

b. Affirmative finding of family violence

Article 42.013 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:

In the trial of an offense under Title 5, Penal Code, if the court determines that the offense involved family violence, as defined by Section 71.004, Family Code, the court shall make an affirmative finding of that fact and enter the affirmative finding in the judgment of the case.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.013 (internal footnote omitted). “The Texas Code Construction Act provides that the word shall ‘imposes a duty.’ ” Cockrell v. State, 721 S.W.3d 448, 455 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.016(2)) (original emphasis).

c. Family Violence Community Supervision

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, trial courts in Texas may order community supervision for eligible defendants:

(a) A judge, in the best interest of justice, the public, and the defendant, after conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, may:

(1) suspend the imposition of the sentence and place the defendant on community supervision; or

(2) impose a fine applicable to the offense and place the defendant on community supervision.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.053.

The Legislature has created specific requirements for community supervision in cases involving family violence. As relevant here, the Legislature has required that:

(b) If a judge grants community supervision to a defendant convicted of an offense under Title 5, Penal Code, that the court determines involves family violence, the judge shall require the defendant to pay a fine of $100 to a family violence center that:

(1) receives state or federal funds; and

(2) serves the county in which the court is located.

Id. art. 42A.054(b)(1), (2) (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

III. Discussion

a. Oral pronouncement is required

There are a few propositions that are not in question. The evidence at Appellant's trial established a dating relationship between Appellant and Estrada that met the definition of “dating violence,” Tex. Fam. Code § 71.0021, making this offense a “family violence” offense, id. § 71.004(3). And the trial court found that evidence to be true.

At that point, the trial court had a duty to “make” an affirmative finding of family violence and “enter” that finding in Appellant's judgment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.013 (using the word “shall” to describe the trial court's actions). This affirmative finding of family violence contemporaneously triggered the trial court's duty to require Appellant to pay the $100 family violence center fine. See id. art. 42A.054(b) (also using “shall”).

Trial courts are required to orally pronounce fines. Burg, 592 S.W.3d at 450; Ross, 953 S.W.2d at 750; Weir, 278 S.W.3d at 366; Anastassov, 664 S.W.3d at 820. Plainly put, the trial court—having found a dating relationship and having a duty to “make” and “enter” an affirmative finding of family of violence which triggered a nondiscretionary fine—was required to orally pronounce that fine during sentencing. It follows that the affirmative finding of family violence—the basis for the nondiscretionary fine—must also be orally pronounced.

b. Two responses to the Court's Opinion

First, the Court's analogizing affirmative findings of family violence to affirmative findings of deadly weapons is unavailing. Ante at –––– – –––– (Court's Op.). Not all affirmative findings operate the same way. In Ross, this Court held that “a deadly weapon finding is not part of a sentence.” 953 S.W.2d at 752. This is because deadly weapon findings do not actually constitute a trial court's sentence. Rather, a deadly weapon finding affects things related to the sentence—for example, a defendant's eligibility for parole. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.145. But an affirmative finding of family violence is readily distinguishable because it requires that a nondiscretionary fine be imposed. And, as this Court has firmly established, fines are a required part of a defendant's sentence.

To the extent that one could argue that the fine itself appears to operate more in the nature of a court cost than a typical fine, this argument is contradicted by (1) the plain text of the statute and (2) the legislative history undergirding the creation of the fine itself. To start, Article 42A.054(b) plainly states that “the judge shall require the defendant to pay a fine of $100 to a family violence center.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054(b). The statute does not say that “the judge shall require the defendant to pay court costs of $100 to a family violence center.” As this Court set out in Cockrell:

When construing statutes, we begin with the language of the statute itself. State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Generally, when “the plain language is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends[.]” Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d 511, 520–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

721 S.W.3d at 455. The Legislature used the word “fine,” and not “court costs,” to describe the nature of the nondiscretionary punishment assessed when an affirmative finding of family violence is “made” and “entered.”

Moreover, the legislative history supports this conclusion. Article 42A.054 was preceded by Article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In 1999, the Legislature amended Article 42.12 to include the following language:

If a judge grants community supervision to a person convicted of an offense under Title 5, Penal Code, that the court determines involves family violence, the judge may require the person to make one payment in an amount not to exceed $100 to a family violence shelter center.

Act of April 21, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 27, § 1, sec. 42.12, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 42, 42 (repealed 2017). In 2009, the Legislature amended Article 42.12 by removing the discretionary “may” and replaced it with the nondiscretionary “shall.” See Tex. S.B. 82, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009). The language now read:

If a judge grants community supervision to a person convicted of an offense under Title 5, Penal Code, that the court determines involves family violence, the judge shall require the person to pay $100 to a family violence shelter center.

Id. The Bill Analysis to Senate Bill 82 stated that “[p]ayment of the fee also would force offenders to take responsibility for their crimes, as the fee would go directly to remediating damage that domestic-violence perpetrators inflict on individuals and society.” House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 82, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009). In 2015, the Legislature recodified Article 42.12 as Article 42A.053. Act of May 29, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, § 1.01, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2350 (amended 2020).

Finally, and most importantly, in 2019, the Legislature reclassified the $100 payment as a “fine.” See Act of May 25, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 2.14, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 3996–97. The Legislature has had twenty-seven years since the creation of the original fine in Article 42.12 to embrace the Court's position that this fine is actually “court costs.” It has yet to do so and, in fact, in the latest amendments, explicitly chose the word “fine.”

Second, so far as the Court argues that this “fine” is a condition of probation rather than a part of the defendant's sentence, that argument is unpersuasive. Ante at –––– – –––– (Court's Op.). That the “fine” is located in Article 42A.504 is of no import. “The heading of a title, subtitle, chapter, subchapter, or section does not limit or expand the meaning of a statute.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.024. Additionally, that the “fine” is not in Chapter 12 of the Penal Code does not change the fact that the family violence fine remains punitive in nature, which requires oral pronouncement. See Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). If that were the case, other nondiscretionary fines would also not need to be orally pronounced if community supervision was ordered. For example, a person convicted of certain child sexual assault offenses “shall pay a fine of $100 on conviction of the offense,” and the fine “is imposed without regard to whether the defendant is placed on community supervision after being convicted of the offense or receives deferred adjudication for the offense.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.0186(a), (b). Would the Court say that this nondiscretionary fine need not be orally pronounced if a defendant is placed on community supervision?

Moreover, there is no language in Article 42A.504 that cabins the “fine” as a “condition of” the imposition of community supervision. The Legislature knows how to include language that creates conditions of community supervision; it did so in numerous other sections in Article 42A. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.302 (“If a judge having jurisdiction of a case requires as a condition of community supervision that the defendant submit to a term of confinement in a county jail․”); id. art. 42A.303 (“the judge may require as a condition of community supervision that the defendant serve a term of confinement and treatment in a substance abuse felony punishment facility․”); id. art. 42A.304 (“A judge may require as a condition of community supervision that the defendant work a specified number of hours at one or more community service projects․”); id. art. 42A.352 (“A judge granting community supervision to a defendant convicted of a felony shall require as a condition of community supervision that the defendant provide a DNA sample․”); id. art. 42A.401 (confinement as a condition of supervision for certain intoxication offenses); id. art. 42A.408 (“The court may require as a condition of community supervision that a defendant ․ have an ignition interlock device installed․”); id. art. 42A.451 (“A judge granting community supervision to a defendant required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 shall require that the defendant, as a condition of community supervision ․ register under that chapter․”); id. art. 42A.503 (“the court may require as a condition of community supervision that the defendant not ․ directly communicate with the victim of the offense․”). But Article 42A.504 does not contain similar language. It does not say that the trial court shall require “as a condition of community supervision” the defendant to pay a fine of $100 to a family violence center. Instead, Article 42A.504 simply says that if community supervision is ordered, the defendant shall pay a fine. The plain text of Article 42A.504 supports the conclusion that the $100 fine operates outside of the conditions of a defendant's community supervision and instead as part of the defendant's sentence.

IV. Conclusion

The trial court was required to orally pronounce the affirmative finding of family violence because it was required to impose a nondiscretionary $100 family violence center fine upon making the finding. The trial court in this case did not do so. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and order a new punishment trial to allow the trial court to orally pronounce the affirmative finding of family violence and impose the $100 fine. I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Article 42.013 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, captioned “Finding of family violence,” provides:In the trial of an offense under Title 5, Penal Code, if the court determines that the offense involved family violence, as defined by Section 71.004, Family Code, the court shall make an affirmative finding of that fact and enter the affirmative finding in the judgment of the case.Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.013. Simple assault (Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1)) is a Title 5 offense. Section 71.004 of the Texas Family Code defines “family violence” to include “an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault[.]” Tex. Fam. Code § 71.004(1).

2.   At least one other court of appeals has concluded, similarly, that because an affirmative finding of family violence “is not a sentencing issue,” a trial court need not orally pronounce that finding at sentencing before it may enter the finding in the judgment under Article 42.013—albeit in an unpublished opinion. Meinzer v. State, No. 02-23-00005-CR, 2024 WL 1100478, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth del. Mar. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

3.   Article 42A.504(b) reads:(b) If a judge grants community supervision to a defendant convicted of an offense under Title 5, Penal Code, that the court determines involves family violence, the judge shall require the defendant to pay a fine of $100 to a family center that:(1) receives state or federal funds; and(2) serves the county in which the court is located.Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.504(b).

4.   Although Appellant was placed on community supervision, the box on his form judgment for “Terms and Conditions of Community Supervision” that would have imposed this mandatory $100 “fine” to be paid to “the BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTER” was not checked. The dissenting justice believed that this omission rendered Appellant's sentence void as illegal, since it omitted a required punishment. Columbus, 720 S.W.3d at 412−14 (Meza, J. dissenting).

5.   Those two grounds for review are:[1] Given the distinct “make” and “enter” textual requirements of Article 42.013, and the due process functions they serve, did the court of appeals err in deciding that an affirmative finding of family-violence [AFFV] may appear for the first time in a written judgment even if a defendant receives no opportunity to object before the finding is entered on a judgment?[2] Given the largely irrevocable and decidedly harmful consequences that flow directly from the entry of an AFFV, did the court of appeals err in deciding that such a finding is not part of a defendant's sentence?Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review at 11.

6.   See also Burg v. State, 592 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Ross for the proposition that deadly weapon affirmative findings are not among those things the absence of which in a judgment may render a “sentence” illegal).

7.   Article 42.02 says: “The sentence is that part of the judgment, or order revoking a suspension of the imposition of a sentence, that orders that the punishment be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.02.

8.   Section 5 of Article 42.01 reads: “In addition to the information described by Section 1 of this article, the judgment should reflect affirmative findings entered pursuant to Article 42.013 of this code.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.01, § 5.

9.   Because we have concluded that the mandatory fine imposed by Article 42A.504(b) is not a part of the sentence, we also conclude that the fact that the trial court in Appellant's case neglected to impose it does not render his sentence “void.” Instead, Appellant has at least procedurally defaulted any complaint he might have made to the absence of the fine. Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 444 S.W.3d at 24; Steele v. State, 713 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). Indeed, because its absence was beneficial to him, he might even be barred by estoppel by judgment from challenging it on appeal. Cf. Deen v. State, 509 S.W.3d 345, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“[A]n estoppel by judgment arises not when the person voluntarily agrees to the judgment, but when the person voluntarily accepts its benefits after the judgment issues.”). We need not resolve these questions today because Appellant has not properly raised them.

1.   I have also explained that this Court should revisit its application of the party presentation principle, a closely related issue. See State v. Barber, No. PD-0510-25, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 1073627, at *17 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2026) (Schenck, P.J., dissenting).

1.   State v. Young, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, No. PD-0526-25, 2026 WL 1374060, *8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2026) (discussing Supreme Court's prudential rule and concluding that it “meshes comfortably with this Court's own practice”).

2.   Id. at *6, 8.

3.   Id. at *10; see also State v. Barber, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, No. PD-0510-25, 2026 WL 1073627, *2 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. April 16, 2026).

Yeary, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Schenck, P.J., and Richardson, Keel, and Parker, JJ., joined.

Schenck, P.J., filed a concurring opinion. Parker, J., filed a concurring opinion. McClure, J., concurred. Finley, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Newell and Walker, JJ., dissented.