PAIGE TERRELL LAWYER v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2026)

CONCURRING OPINION

Not included in the Court's observes factual summary of Appellant's Fourth Amendment claim is the fact that, at the time of the murders, a bond condition prohibited Appellant from contacting O'Tishae. As a consequence of this bond condition, he would not have been permitted to live, or even stay overnight, in her home—much less kill her in her home. Even if the warrant to search O'Tishae’s home were invalid, that would not matter because the prohibition in the bond condition meant that Appellant had no expectation of privacy in that home. As the Ninth Circuit said in United States v. Schram:

Like a burglar, trespasser, or squatter, an individual violating a court no-contact order is on property that the law prevents him from entering. We therefore hold that such an individual lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in that place and may not challenge its search on Fourth Amendment grounds. In doing so, we join not only the Third Circuit, but every other court that has considered the matter.1

More recently, the Tenth Circuit has also recognized this principle:

The Supreme Court has held a person lacks an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a place in which his presence is “wrongful.” This principle applies to a variety of situations. For example, it includes squatters and trespassers. It also extends to individuals whose presence is otherwise wrongful despite the owner's consent, such as those in violation of supervised release terms, or subject to a no-contact order, or guests of evicted tenants.2

And it is no answer to claim that any prohibition against staying in the victim's home lapsed with the victim's death. “The principle that no person shall be permitted to benefit from the consequences of his or her wrongdoing has long been applied to disqualify murderers from inheriting from their victims.”³ If a murder disqualifies the murderer from inheriting from the victim, it should also disqualify the murderer from obtaining a privacy interest in a dwelling that he would otherwise lack if the victim were still alive. We have recognized the doctrine of “forfeiture by wrongdoing” when a defendant who murders a victim attempts to raise a confrontation claim against prior hearsay statements made by the victim.⁴ Similar considerations apply to any claim that a privacy interest in a home that was extinguished by a no-contact order revived upon the murdered victim's death.

While the Court's analysis of the Franks issue is unobjectionable, and the Court is free to dispose of Appellant's claim on any basis supported by the law, the circumstances here cry out for recognition—even if only in a side opinion—that Appellant's claim fails for a more basic reason than a validly supported warrant—that he possessed no valid expectation of privacy in the home of the person he killed. With these comments, I join the Court's opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   901 F.3d 1042, 1046 & n.3 citing cases (9th Cir. 2018).

2.   United States v. Guzman, 149 F.4th 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2025).

3.   Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 1999).

4.   See Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).