KING v. STATE (2026)

OPINION

Appellant Brandon King appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, one gram or more but less than four grams.¹ By his two issues, he complains: (1) the jury convicted him with insufficient evidence; and (2) the trial court improperly curtailed his cross-examination of a witness. We affirm.

Background

On May 3, 2025, Hardeman County Sheriff's Deputy Hannah Rutledge located Appellant outside a gas station in Quanah, Texas. Deputy Danny Morgan joined her and arrested Appellant on an outstanding warrant. Upon searching Appellant, Deputy Morgan found drug paraphernalia in his waistline and two small plastic bags, each containing a different substance, in Appellant's socks. Morgan transferred the physical evidence to the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Crime Laboratory. DPS performed the analysis to determine the presence of a controlled substance.

Appellant was indicted for possession of a controlled substance on July 14, 2025. In accordance with the statutory timeline, on September 18, 2025, the State filed with the clerk of the court a certificate of analysis signed by the analyst from the DPS crime lab and an attached two-page laboratory report. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.41 § 4. The certificate of analysis did not include the analyst's “educational background, training, and experience,” and while it listed the testing methods utilized, it did not describe “the tests or procedures conducted by the analyst.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.41 § 3. Appellant did not file a written objection to the certificate of analysis before trial.

During the single-day trial on October 21, 2025, the State called both Rutledge and Morgan to testify. At the time of trial, Morgan was no longer working for the Hardeman County Sheriff's Office, and the trial court conducted a hearing outside of the presence of the jury on the admissibility of this information. The trial court sustained the State's relevancy and improper impeachment objections to the cross-examination of Morgan based on his change in employment status. After examining Rutledge and Morgan, the State introduced the certificate of analysis and lab report in lieu of testimony from the crime lab analyst. The certificate of analysis indicated that one of the small bags found on Appellant contained 1.6 grams of Methamphetamine HCl, a salt form of Methamphetamine. The report was admitted without objection from Appellant's counsel.

The State rested after publishing the certificate and lab report to the jury. Appellant then rested without introducing any evidence. The jury convicted Appellant, and, due to enhancements from prior convictions, the judge sentenced Appellant to sixty years' imprisonment. Appellant moved for a new trial, which was overruled by operation of law on January 5, 2026. This appeal timely followed.

Issue 1 – Sufficiency of Evidence

By his first issue, Appellant complains the evidence was legally insufficient to support the judgment and sentence because the certificate of analysis was deficient. He also attacks the credibility and reliability of the expert testimony provided in the certificate and the report. As the certificate of analysis and the attached lab report were the only proof that the substance was in fact methamphetamine, Appellant claims the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citations omitted). A proper review of evidentiary sufficiency considers the cumulative force of the evidence. Garcia, 667 S.W.3d. at 761–62. In a legal sufficiency analysis, we consider all of the evidence admitted, whether proper or improper. Solis v. State, 726 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quotations and citations omitted). Further, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id.

Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the complaining party must first raise the issue in the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). However, if an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on direct appeal, we always have a duty to address that issue, regardless of whether it was raised in the trial court. Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Even though evidentiary issues are incorporated into Appellant's sufficiency arguments, he has not forfeited his due process rights to insist on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Legal sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Under the Texas Health & Safety Code, a person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1 or 1-B, which includes methamphetamine and its salts. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.115, 481.102(6). Criminal statutes outside the Penal Code must be strictly construed. Carter v. State, 575 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019), aff'd, 620 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Thus, securing a conviction under this statute obligates the State to prove that the substance in question was within Penalty Group 1. § 481.102(6); Carter, 575 S.W.3d at 900–04.

The State may, without offending the Confrontation Clause, adopt “procedural rules,” e.g., a notice-and-demand statute, governing confrontation-based objections. Williams v. State, 585 S.W.3d 478, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Article 38.41 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is an example of a constitutionally permissible notice-and-demand provision, permitting the State to introduce an affidavit and analyst's report as evidence, without the need for the analyst's live appearance at trial. Id. at 481–82. A certificate of analysis under Article 38.41 does not need to be of a certain form, but it must, at a bare minimum, “substantially” comply with all the substantive requirements of Article 38.41. Id. at 485. Generally, should a defendant fail to object to a certificate of analysis within the statutory timeframe, he waives his Confrontation Clause arguments. Id. Other courts of appeals have held that a defendant waives any objection to the certificate by failing to make a timely objection under the statute. See e.g., Lopez v. State, No. 08-10-00285-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3676, at *12–13 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 9, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Deener v. State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 527–28 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref'd).

Analysis

While the applications of the Article 38.41 framework as related to the Confrontation Clause and other admissibility issues have been previously litigated and decided, arguing the sufficiency of evidence introduced under the umbrella of Article 38.41 is a novel approach, and one this Court has not yet encountered.

Appellant concedes he did not object to the certificate within the statutorily required timeframe. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.41 § 4 (defendant is required to object to the admission of the certificate “not later than the 10th day before the trial begins[.]”). Nor did he raise an evidentiary objection to the admission of the certificate at the time of trial. Despite his failure to object on these other grounds, Appellant now argues he did not forfeit a sufficiency challenge to the evidence itself.² Appellant claims because the certificate omits the analyst's “educational background, training, and experience,” the analyst was not an expert witness. Thus, Appellant argues the certificate is conclusory, and no credible or reliable evidence established the chemical nature and identification of the controlled substance. We disagree.

Because Appellant has raised a sufficiency challenge, our review necessarily encompasses all the evidence introduced in the case. See supra Solis, 726 S.W.3d at 406. And, because the certificate of analysis was admitted as evidence, the entirety of the certificate and the laboratory report are subject to our review.³

Whether a material is a controlled substance is not a matter of ordinary perception; it is a conclusion of chemistry. Even an experienced officer's testimony is insufficient to establish the identity of a powdery substance recovered from the accused as a controlled substance. See Curtis v. State, 548 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Steele v. State, 681 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd) (“When identification of property is necessary to support a conviction, the identification must be made by competent and sufficient evidence.”). For an opinion of this nature, an expert's knowledge and experience are not mere credentials, they are the link between whatever the analyst did and the conclusion she announced. See Tex. R. Evid. 702.

However, the probative value of an opinion derives from its basis, not the witness's qualifications. Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232–33 (Tex. 2004); see Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (unrebutted opinion testimony unaccompanied by any factual basis is legally insufficient to establish an element of the offense). In the context of an appellate review, the inquiry into the basis for an opinion is confined to the face of the record. A conclusory opinion supplies nothing for the factfinder to consider. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (juries may not reach conclusions based on speculation).

The certificate here is not conclusory on its face. It identifies the analyst as a forensic scientist employed by an accredited crime laboratory. It lists the two methods by which she tested the substance: Instrumental Analysis by Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy and Chemical Testing by Color Tests. It reports the result of that testing: the substance contained “Methamphetamine HCl.” According to the certificate and analysis report, the analyst's opinion rests on identified scientific testing performed by a her in the course of her duties at an accredited laboratory.

The analyst's missing qualifications do not render the opinion baseless. The lack of this information would fall under a Rule 702 objection. See Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Article 38.41 likewise gave Appellant the means to test those matters before trial by objecting and requiring the analyst to appear. Having invoked neither, Appellant cannot obtain through a sufficiency challenge the exclusion he never sought. Once admitted, the weight to be given the analyst's opinion, including any doubts about the thoroughness of the certificate, was for the jury. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

Viewing all the evidence admitted in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance Appellant possessed was in fact a controlled substance. We overrule Appellant's first issue.

Issue 2 – Limitation of Cross-Examination

By his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of former Hardeman County Deputy Danny Morgan. We disagree.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court's decision to limit cross-examination under an abuse of discretion standard. Love v. State, 861 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles or when its ruling falls outside the zone within which reasonable persons might disagree. Ali Awad Mahmoud Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (citations omitted).

A primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution is the right to cross-examine witnesses. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974)). This right allows a party to attack the general credibility of that witness or to show their possible bias, self-interest, or motives in testifying. Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A defendant may cross-examination a witness to elicit facts demonstrating a witness's vulnerable relationship with the State or to show a witness's bias. Tex. R. Evid. 613(b); Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Parties are allowed great latitude to show “any fact which would or might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive and animus on the part of the witness.” Carpenter v. State, 979 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting London v. State, 739 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). However, to demonstrate that the proffered testimony is relevant to the issue of bias or prejudice, “what first must be established is a specific connection between the witness' testimony and the cause, disclosing an actual bias or motive.” Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

The right to cross-examine witnesses is not unlimited. The trial court maintains broad discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, endangering the witness, and the injection of cumulative or collateral evidence. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986)). Each Confrontation Clause issue must be weighed on a case-by-case basis, carefully considering the defendant's right to cross-examine and the risk factors associated with admission of the evidence. Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 222.

Analysis

Here, on cross-examination of both Rutledge and Morgan, Appellant sought to elicit the circumstances of Morgan's resignation from the Hardeman County Sheriff's Office. His aim was to challenge Morgan's credibility as the arresting and searching officer. Outside the jury's presence, Morgan testified that he was asked to resign for “horseplay.” Specifically, he had unholstered his firearm and said he was going to shoot while “playing” with the other deputies in the office. He also testified that he joked about a female deputy being pregnant. Morgan stated he had no other disciplinary issues or “writeups.” He also testified that he was not asked to resign from his previous position with the Vernon police department. Appellant argued to the trial court that this information was relevant as to the former officer's credibility. He did not explain how the circumstances of the resignation revealed any bias, interest, or motive on Morgan's part to testify falsely against him.

On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. As Appellant offered it, the evidence was an attack on Morgan's general credibility through specific instances of conduct. That is precisely the use Rule 608(b) prohibits. See Tex. R. Evid. 608(b); Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 563. Neither workplace horseplay nor an inappropriate joke bears on a witness's character for truthfulness. Nor did Appellant establish the causal connection or logical relationship necessary to make the evidence admissible to show bias. Nothing in the record suggests that Morgan's resignation was connected to Appellant or to this case. Nor does it show that Morgan faced any pending discipline, investigation, or charge when he testified, or that he had any reason to seek favor from the State with his testimony. Morgan was no longer employed by the Sheriff's Office at the time of trial, so his resignation created no vulnerable relationship with the State. Additionally, the proffered evidence carried a real risk of confusing the issues and injecting collateral matters. It invited the jury to evaluate Morgan's workplace conduct rather than the arrest and search at issue. Weighing the minimal probative value of the evidence against those risks, the trial court's ruling fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement. We overrule Appellant's second issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant's issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.115(c) and § 481.102(6).

2.   On the surface, this case appears to force an examination of the procedural-default consequences of a defendant's failure to timely object to a certificate of analysis that does not substantially comply with Article 38.41. This question was “[left] for another day” by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Williams v. State, 585 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Here, Appellant never raised a constitutional challenge. Even constitutional challenges may be waived if not properly preserved, and the requirement for error preservation applies to both challenges that a statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the appellant. Sikalasinh v. State, No. 07-24-00018-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7603, at *9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 24, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citations omitted). Appellant, having failed to object at trial, has waived any constitutional challenge and prevented us from considering this issue further.

3.   The attached lab report included links to both the analyst's Statement of Qualifications and the laboratory's current methods and procedures. However, such information does not meet Texas standards for criminal exhibits. Texas Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires a proponent of evidence to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. A hyperlinked document cannot satisfy this authentication requirement. Additionally, as non-record material in criminal proceedings, it cannot be considered on appeal. See Ex parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Laura A. W. Pratt, Justice