LIVESAY PC v. KASTER LYNCH FARRAR BALL LLP LLP (2026)

OPINION

Appellants R. Kent Livesay, a disbarred attorney, and his law firm, the Law Office of R. Kent Livesay, PC (Livesay and his law firm will be referred to singularly in this opinion as “Livesay”) sued appellees Kaster, Lynch, Farrar & Ball, LLP, Farrar & Ball, LLP, Kyle Farrar and Wesley Todd Ball (appellees are referred to collectively herein as the law firms) to recover attorney's fees and expenses that Livesay alleges were owed to him under a fee-sharing agreement and that were earned before his law license was revoked. The law firms moved for summary judgment on all Livesay's claims asserting that paying Livesay any attorney's fees would be illegal and that Livesay did not complete his work on the client matters before his license was revoked. The trial court granted that motion and ultimately rendered a final judgment in favor of the law firms.

On appeal, Livesay argues in a single issue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment and advances eight different arguments to support his position. We conclude that Livesay raised and preserved his objection to one of the summary-judgment affidavits, and that the trial court erred by not sustaining that objection and excluding the affidavit from evidence. We further conclude that although the law firms filed a summary judgment motion on all of Livesay's claims and causes of action that there was no competent summary judgment evidence establishing the date on which the client matters at issue were concluded. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's final judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

R. Kent Livesay was a Texas attorney until the Texas Supreme Court revoked his law license on July 6, 2018. Appellees Kaster, Lynch, Farrar & Ball and Farrar & Ball are law firms that practice plaintiff-side personal-injury law. Farrar & Ball is based in Houston, Texas, and Kaster, Lynch, Farrar & Ball is based in Ocala, Florida. When he was actively working as an attorney, Livesay referred client matters to the law firms over the course of many years pursuant to fee agreements and subject to which Livesay admits that he agreed to “assume joint responsibility for the representation of the clients.”

Livesay's law license was first suspended as of January 2017, and remained suspended until his license was revoked in 2018. In December 2016, he wrote to the law firms advising that his license was suspended and he could no longer represent any clients. After receiving his letters, the law firms signed new representation agreements with the affected clients that removed Livesay from their representation.

In 2022, Livesay filed suit against the law firms asserting breach of contract, quantum meruit, money had and received, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and breach of fiduciary duty because he was not paid by the law firms for attorneys' fees and expenses that he alleges he earned under his fee agreements with the law firms. Livesay also asserted a declaratory judgment relating to his right to collect fees or expenses pursuant to the fee agreements. Specifically, Livesay identified seven client matters which he alleges were referred to the law firms and for which he should have received payment.

In October 2024, the law firms filed a traditional summary-judgment motion arguing that they were entitled to summary judgment on all Livesay's claims. In April 2025, the trial court heard the summary judgment motion on submission and granted the motion. After this court requested clarification as to whether the summary judgment ruling was interlocutory or final, the trial court rendered a final summary judgment in December 2025. Livesay timely appealed the judgment.

II. Analysis

In his sole issue on appeal, Livesay argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the law firms. Livesay advances the following arguments to support his claim that the trial court erred: (1) the law firms failed to present any competent summary judgment evidence; (2) Livesay was entitled to recover attorney's fees; (3) conflicting summary judgment evidence precludes summary judgment; (4) the Texas Supreme Court order revoking his license does not bar his recovery; (5) the trial court granted more relief than requested, denying expenses and granting full summary judgment on a motion for partial summary judgment; (6) summary judgment is improper because all causes of action were not negated; (7) Livesay was denied adequate opportunity for discovery; (8) granting summary judgment creates a windfall, would damage contract rights and acts as retroactive punishment.

A. The law firms' motion and Livesay's response

In their traditional motion for summary judgment, the law firms ask that all Livesay's claims against them be dismissed because payment to Livesay of any fees or expenses would violate the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. They also argue that payment would violate a Texas Supreme Court order, which precludes Livesay from “accepting any fee directly or indirectly for legal services.” The law firms acknowledge that this court's precedent allows a disbarred attorney to recover fees that were earned, in their entirety, before the attorney was disbarred; nevertheless, the law firms argue that once Livesay was disbarred that he could no longer receive any fee for legal services on cases that were in progress at the time of his disbarment. The law firms' motion includes an affidavit from a partner at the law firms, who averred that none of the settlement checks for the client matters at issue were issued until after Livesay's license was suspended or revoked. The law firms do not attempt to disprove any element of Livesay's causes of action. Instead, they move on their affirmative defenses asserting Livesay is trying to enforce illegal contracts and/or that any payment to Livesay would be illegal or against the public policy of Texas. None of the applicable contracts were included in the summary-judgment record.

In his response, Livesay argued that the law firms had no competent summary-judgment evidence to meet their summary-judgment burden and that lack of evidence precluded summary judgment. Livesay argued that he had completed all his work on the client matters before his disbarment. In a detailed affidavit, he identified the duties he claims he was obliged to perform with respect to each client matter and stated that those duties were completed. He further argued that the law firms misconstrued statements in the Texas Supreme Court order to suggest that Livesay was precluded from recovering attorney's fees for services performed before his law license was revoked. He further asserted that the law firms' contention that legal services were required up until the time settlement checks were distributed was flawed. Finally, Livesay argued, alternatively, that even if he is not entitled to attorney's fees, he is entitled to recover his expenses incurred on the cases.

B. Standard of review

A movant seeking traditional summary judgment must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(h)(2); Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. 2017). When a party moves for summary judgment on an affirmative claim, it must conclusively prove all elements of its cause of action as a matter of law. Universal MRI & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Med. Lien Mgmt. Inc., 497 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Because the law firms sought judgment in their favor on all of Livesay's claims on the basis of an affirmative defense, it was their burden to conclusively prove that paying Livesay under his contract was illegal and/or against public policy in Texas. In reviewing summary judgments, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could do so and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

C. Livesay did not establish a lack of discovery

One of Livesay's arguments against summary judgment was that discovery was incomplete and he did not receive adequate discovery before the trial court ruled on the summary-judgment motion. A nonmovant who needs more time for discovery in the face of a summary-judgment motion must file either an affidavit or a verified motion for continuance explaining that need. See Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004); see former Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g).¹ Under Rule 166a(g), which was in effect at the time of the trial court's consideration of the summary-judgment motion, the trial court could deny the request for summary judgment or order a continuance of a summary-judgment hearing “to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had” if it appears “from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition.” Former Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g); see Rodriguez v. Acad., Ltd., 694 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied). However, Livesay did not call attention to his claimed lack of evidence or affidavits in responding to the law firms' summary-judgment motion. Instead, Livesay attached several volumes of evidence to his response. Neither his summary-judgment response nor his affidavit identify any discovery necessary to raise a fact issue.

Livesay further attempts to tie the trial court's failure to rule on a motion to compel he filed into his argument that he was denied necessary discovery. However, there is no indication in the record that the motion to compel was set for hearing or consideration. Nor does the record reflect that Livesay made it known to the court that he needed a ruling on his motion to compel to properly oppose summary judgment. Therefore, Livesay's alleged lack of discovery does not a form a basis for reversing the summary judgment.

D. Livesay's objections to summary-judgment evidence

To support their summary-judgment motion, the law firms include fourteen exhibits intended to show that the payment of attorney's fees to Livesay was prohibited by law or public policy and that none of the client matters raised by Livesay in the underlying lawsuit were completed when Livesay's law license was revoked. On appeal, Livesay argues that the law firms had no competent summary judgment evidence.

1. Preservation of evidentiary complaints

In the trial court, Livesay only objected to one of the affidavits provided by the law firms, exhibit 4. Livesay did not object to any of the other exhibits on any other basis.² To preserve a complaint for appellate review, there must be a timely, specific objection and a ruling by the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). The same is true in the context of summary-judgment proceedings. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(h)(1). Therefore, Livesay waived any challenge to summary-judgment exhibits 1-3, 5-14 by failing to present those arguments to the trial court below. See Haase v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrells, Agosto & Friend, L.L.P., 499 S.W.3d 169, 176 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“Generally, a party forfeits an objection when the party fails to object to summary-judgment evidence or fails to obtain a ruling on any objection to summary-judgment evidence.”); In Estate of Guerrero, 465 S.W.3d 693, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“Defects in the form of authentication of attachments in support of a motion for summary judgment are waived without a proper objection in the trial court.”). Livesay did repeatedly seek a ruling on his evidentiary objections to exhibit 4, and the trial court did not rule on those objections. The trial court did sign an order denying Livesay's Motion to Rule on Objections, although this was not a ruling on the objections. Whether the trial court's actions are better characterized as an implied ruling or a failure to rule, we conclude Livesay sufficiently requested and sought a ruling to preserve error as to exhibit 4. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

2. Farrar's affidavit was not competent summary-judgment evidence

We therefore consider only Livesay's objections to exhibit 4. In exhibit 4, Farrar provided information about when settlement checks were issued in the client matters contested by Livesay. Livesay objected that Farrar's affidavit did not explain how Farrar possessed knowledge of the facts in his affidavit. Although Farrar's affidavit stated that he is a founding partner of the law firms, Livesay correctly challenged that Farrar does not state how he is familiar with the information on the client matters.

The law firms argue Farrar is a founding partner of both law firms, and a person with firsthand knowledge of the cases his firm handled, settled, and disbursed. However, Farrar's affidavit stated only that he was a founding partner. Although a person's position or job responsibilities can peculiarly qualify him to have personal knowledge of facts and establish how he learned of the facts, Farrar's affidavit did not provide any explanation for how a “founding partner” might have particular knowledge of the settlement checks or information at issue in the client matters. See Southtex 66 Pipeline Co., Ltd. v. Spoor, 238 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). There are several ways that Farrar could have established his knowledge without disclosing privileged information. For example, had Farrar explained that he had responsibility for the firms' client accounts or that he personally signed all checks, his personal knowledge would have been established. We cannot assume that every founding partner of a law firm has personal knowledge of settlement information for every case handled by that firm. The affidavit is, therefore, incompetent to prove the facts about which Farrar testifies. See Valenzuela v. State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 317 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (although affiant stated her job title was claims manager, she did not identify her responsibilities or familiarity with claim made the basis of the lawsuit); Spoor, 238 S.W.3d at 543 (“Statements made in the affidavit need factual specificity such as time, place, and the exact nature of the alleged facts.”).

Therefore, Farrar's affidavit is not proper summary-judgment evidence. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address Livesay's other objections to the affidavit. We agree with Livesay that the trial court erred by not sustaining his objections to exhibit 4 and must now consider whether the remaining evidence in the record supports the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

E. Trial court erred in granting summary judgment

The law firms had the burden to establish that paying Livesay on any of the fee-sharing agreements at issue was illegal or against public policy.

1. Disbarred attorneys may recover attorney's fees for work completed before their license was revoked

On appeal, Livesay argues that he can recover attorney's fees for the client matters at issue in his lawsuit. Rule 5.04(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct states that “a lawyer or law firm shall not share or promise to share legal fees with a non-lawyer.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 5.04(a), reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9). The rationale behind this rule is to prevent solicitation by lay persons of clients for lawyers and to avoid encouraging or assisting nonlawyers in the practice of law. See id. at cmt. 1.

In interpreting Rule 5.04, this court held in Lee v. Cherry that a disbarred attorney may receive referral fees as long as the attorney has completed the legal work on the case prior to his disbarment. 812 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Lee, while licensed, referred a case to Cherry. See id. at 361. There was a signed agreement to pay Lee a referral fee. See id. Lee subsequently resigned his law license. See id. at 362. Thereafter, Cherry settled the referred case but refused to pay Lee the referral fee asserting that the agreement was void and unenforceable based on Rule 5.04. See id. Lee sued Cherry on the referral contract, and Cherry asserted the affirmative defense that the contract was void, and that Lee had waived any claim to attorney's fees by resigning his license. See id. The trial court granted Cherry's summary judgment motion. See id.

On appeal, Cherry relied on Rule 5.04 and the concept that disbarment was tantamount to abandonment based on the holding in Royden v. Ardoin, 331 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. 1960). In Royden, the Texas Supreme Court held that where an attorney is disbarred or suspended before the completion of a contingent fee contract, the attorney is not entitled to collect fees for services that had been rendered. See id. at 209. The attorney in Royden contracted to represent a client, agreeing to assist her in recovering property from her deceased son's estate. Id. at 207. He was to be paid a portion of that recovery, but he was disbarred before he completed the work. See id. The disbarred attorney then sued the client to recover in quantum meruit. Id. The Texas Supreme Court held that his disbarment before completing the work was tantamount to a voluntary abandonment of the client. See id. at 209. Thus, the disbarred attorney was not entitled to recover for any services rendered. See id.

The Lee court, however, did not extend the Royden holding to the particular referral fee contract at issue in that case, holding that voluntary abandonment only applies to those situations where the attorney has not completed all legal services prior to disbarment. See Lee, 812 S.W.2d at 363. And, in Lee, this court noted that there was no dispute between the parties that Lee had performed all that was required of him under a client-approved referral fee contract before his resignation. Therefore, this court reversed the summary judgment granted on Cherry's affirmative defense. See id at 364.

This court had another opportunity to review a similar set of facts in A.W. Wright & Associates, P.C. v. Glover, Anderson, Chandler & Uzick, L.L.P., 993 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). In A.W. Wright & Associates, the referring attorney, Joseh Weiss, was licensed when he made referrals to the Glover law firm. He later lost his license but sought payment for certain referrals he made to the Glover law firm while he was licensed. Weiss argued that his work on the files was complete at the time the referral was made. But the Glover law firm argued that although its attorneys were responsible for “day to day handling,” Weiss had not yet finished his legal work for the clients. Id. at 470. This court concluded that the referral contracts at issue were ambiguous and that summary judgment in favor of the Glover law firm was improper.

Following Texas Supreme Court precedent, this court has repeatedly held that payment of attorney's fees to a disbarred attorney is not illegal so long as the disbarred attorney completed all of his or her duties on the client matter while working as a licensed attorney. But, if the work was not completed, the disbarred attorney is determined to have voluntarily abandoned the client. Royden, 331 S.W.2d at 209.

2. Current rule for division of fees

Before 2005, lawyers could receive attorney's fees solely by acting as a forwarding or referring lawyer. After 2005, such a relationship is no longer permitted. See Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 568 (Apr. 2006) (“Under the amended rule, a referring lawyer's duties cannot end with the referral.”). The current rules allow attorneys, not in the same firm, to make a contractual division of attorney's fees only if: (1) the division is (i) in proportion to the professional services performed by each lawyer; or (ii) made between lawyers who assume joint responsibility for the representation; and (2) the client consents in writing to the terms of the arrangement between the lawyers. Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.04(f). This court has held that the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct are consistent with Texas law, as expressed in Royden and Lee, and that they are an expression of public policy. Cruse v. O'Quinn, 273 S.W.3d 766, 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

Although the applicable fee agreements between Livesay and the law firms are not in evidence, Livesay states in his petition that he agreed to “assume joint responsibility for the representation of the clients.” We consider this statement a judicial admission. See City of Webster v. Hunnicutt, 650 S.W.3d 792, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (A “true” judicial admission is a formal waiver of proof usually found in pleadings or the stipulations of the parties.). As a general proposition, pleadings are not competent summary-judgment evidence, even if they are sworn or verified. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dall.), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660–61 (Tex. 1995). However, a summary-judgment movant may rely on allegations in a petition as truthful judicial admissions. Weekley Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. 2022). A judicial admission negates the existence of a material fact regarding the ultimate issue. See Galvan v. Pub. Utilities Bd., 778 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1989, no writ). We consider the trial court's ruling in light of the fact that Livesay agreed to assume joint responsibility for the client matters with the law firms.³

An assumption of joint responsibility “entail[s] ethical and perhaps financial responsibility for the representation.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.04, cmt. 13. “The ethical responsibility assumed requires that a referring or associating lawyer make reasonable efforts to assure adequacy of representation and to provide adequate client communication.” Id. Adequate attorney-client communication requires that a referring or associating lawyer “monitor the matter throughout the representation and ensure that the client is informed of those matters that come to that lawyer's attention and that a reasonable lawyer would believe the client should be aware.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.04, cmt. 13. Livesay could not have fulfilled his duties to monitor the matter throughout representation and ensure the client was informed of important matters if he voluntarily abandoned the client matters while they were pending. Although Livesay argues that he completed his duties before disbarment, he could not have completed his duties based on an assumption of joint responsibility if he withdrew before the client matters were resolved.

3. Texas Supreme Court order

Livesay argues that the Texas Supreme Court Order does not bar his recovery. In this argument, Livesay seeks to address one of the bases of the law firms' summary-judgment motion: that the Texas Supreme Court order made any payments to Livesay illegal. The law firms rely on the following language in the order issued by the Texas Supreme Court revoking Livesay's license:

Richard Kent Livesay is prohibited from practicing law in the State of Texas. He is prohibited from holding himself out as an attorney at law, performing legal services for others, giving legal advice to others, accepting any fee directly or indirectly for legal services, appearing as counsel or in any representative capacity in any proceeding in any Texas court or before any Texas administrative body (whether state, county, municipal, or other), or holding himself out to others or using his name in any manner in conjunction with the words “Attorney at Law,” “Counselor at Law,” or “Lawyer.”

(emphasis added). However, the language of the quoted order is general and reflects a prospective intent. Nothing in the language of the order suggests that it is intended to supersede existing law that allows a disbarred attorney to recover fees that were earned on completed client matters while the attorney was licensed. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas Supreme Court order does not support the trial court's rendition of summary judgment. We agree with Livesay that the Texas Supreme Court order does not bar his recovery of attorney's fees and expenses, if and only if, he completed his joint responsibility on the client matters before his suspension and subsequent loss of his law license.

4. Remaining summary-judgment evidence

The critical question raised in this appeal, then, is whether the law firms proved as a matter of law that Livesay had not completed his duties to the clients at the time that he was suspended or disbarred. Our high court has held on multiple occasions that “when a lawyer has contracted for a contingent fee, the lawyer is entitled to receive the specified fee only when and to the extent the client receives payment.” Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 35 (1998)). Livesay, therefore, was not entitled to recover any fees until his clients received their payments.

The summary-judgment record includes letters sent by Livesay to the law firms regarding the client matters at issue in the lawsuit. In the letters, all dated December 30, 2016, Livesay stated that he could “no longer represent the above reference [sic] client because my license to practice law has been suspended.” Livesay further stated that he was required to return any unearned monies. The letters do not suggest that his work on any of the client matters was complete. From that date forward, Livesay was unable to represent clients or work on cases. Therefore, December 30, 2016 is the date on which Livesay voluntarily abandoned any ongoing joint responsibility with the law firms.

The law firms had to establish that all of the client matters in which they agreed to joint responsibility with Livesay concluded after December 30, 2016. Kyle Farrar's affidavit was an attempt to establish the date that the clients received their settlement proceeds; however, his affidavit as discussed above was not competent summary-judgment evidence and should not have been considered by the trial court. Levine, 40 S.W.3d at 94. Therefore, there is no summary-judgment evidence conclusively establishing the date on which the clients received their payments, allowing attorney's fees to be paid to the lawyers.

We sustain Livesay's sole issue on appeal.

5. Livesay's expenses under the contingent-fee contracts

Livesay also sought the reimbursement of his expenses on the challenged client matters in addition to his attorney's fees. He argues on appeal that his expenses reflect his extensive work on those client matters and asserts that the law firms did not address his claim for his expenses in their summary-judgment motion. However, the law firms did argue that all of Livesay's claims and causes of action were barred. They broadly argued that payment to Livesay, of any kind, for his work on the client matters could not be supported. We conclude the law firms did seek summary judgment on all Livesay's claims and causes of action.

Livesay's claims to recovery of attorney's fees and expenses are premised on contracts with the clients that allowed for payment of attorney's fees and expenses, if recovery was had on behalf of the client. The Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct make clear that the right of the attorney to recover expenses is controlled by the agreement made with the client and the other attorney(s) or law firm(s). Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.04(d) (“the agreement shall state the litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated”). Therefore, if Livesay voluntarily abandoned his clients as part of his suspension and then later, disbarment, before the completion of his joint representation, then his ability to recover expenses on those matters is also precluded. We further note that Livesay cites no legal authority for the proposition that his entitlement to recover expenses is distinct from his entitlement to recover attorney's fees under a contingent-fee contract. We disagree with Livesay's argument that the law firms filed only a partial summary-judgment motion.

III. Conclusion

We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This opinion generally cites the current Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment practice. However, the trial court considered and ruled on the summary judgment motion before the current version of the rules took effect. Therefore, we quote the former version of the rule with respect to this argument because the options for the trial court vary slightly between the two versions of the rule. The current version of the rule does not allow a hearing on the summary-judgment motion to be continued. A trial court now may “extend the time to file the response, deny the motion without prejudice to permit additional discovery, or issue another appropriate order.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(d)(3). However, this is not a substantive change as it still effectively provides same relief to a nonmovant. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a, cmt. to 2026 change (the rewrite of Rule 166a did not change the substantive law, only the deadlines involved).

2.   Livesay also generally objected in his response to the summary-judgment motion to the use of non-verified pleadings by the law firms. However, Livesay does not identify which pleadings or exhibits that this objection was intended to address. Further, in the orders submitted to the trial court, Livesay asks the trial court for a ruling on his objection to “Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion considered as Summary Judgment Proof herein.” It is unclear what evidence or purported evidence that Livesay sought to exclude. Therefore, these objections were not specific enough to preserve any alleged error.

3.   We note that the expert affidavit provided by Livesay to oppose the law firms' summary-judgment motion was also premised on Livesay's assumption of joint responsibility.

Tonya McLaughlin, Justice