UMASSOR v. BANK OF AMERICA (2026)

OPINION ON REHEARING

We grant appellant's amended motion for rehearing in part; deny as moot his amended motion for en banc reconsideration; withdraw our opinion of September 1, 2026; vacate our judgment of that date; and substitute this opinion and its accompanying judgment in their stead.

Appellant Christopher Omone Umassor appealed a justice-court judgment by trial de novo to a county court at law, then appealed the county court at law's order dismissing Bank of America's case for want of prosecution. While the appeal of the dismissal order was pending in this Court, the trial court signed orders reinstating the case and rendering judgment in Bank of America's favor. Umassor briefed challenges only to that final judgment on the merits, but we conclude that the trial court lost plenary power before it signed the order reinstating the case. Thus, the reinstatement order and the subsequent final judgment on the merits are void. The trial court's actual final judgment is instead its dismissal of Bank of America's case for want of prosecution, which leaves the parties in exactly the same position they occupied before any suit was filed. Umassor does not argue that the trial court erred in dismissing the case, and because he is not aggrieved by the dismissal in any event, he lacks standing to appeal it. We accordingly declare void the trial court's orders signed after its plenary power expired, and we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

I. Proceedings in the Courts Below

Bank of America, N.A. sued appellant Christopher Omone Umassor in the justice court to collect a debt. Umassor moved to compel arbitration, but the justice court did not rule on the motion before rendering judgment for Bank of America for $12,959.33.

Umassor appealed by trial de novo to the county court at law and again moved to compel arbitration. When the county court at law notified the parties of its intent to dismiss for want of prosecution, Umassor responded, asking the court to set his motion to compel arbitration for a hearing. The county court at law dismissed the case for want of prosecution on October 22, 2025, and on the following day, Umassor filed an unverified motion to reinstate, pointing out that he was still seeking a ruling on his motion to compel arbitration. Umassor also timely filed a notice of appeal.

Bank of America did not oppose reinstatement, and the county court at law signed an order of reinstatement on December 9, 2025. On December 15, 2025, the county court at law signed a final judgment on the merits in Bank of America's favor in the same amount previously awarded by the justice court.

On appeal, Umassor reurges the same position that he has maintained throughout this case, namely, that the trial court erred in rendering judgment without first considering, and granting, his motion to compel arbitration.

II. The Original Appellate Disposition

When we originally considered this case, we dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, but for different reasons. We stated that the only order Umassor identified in his notice of appeal was the trial court's order of October 22, 2025, which dismissed the case for want of prosecution, and that the appeal of that order was rendered moot when the trial court vacated the order and reinstated the case. We further stated that we lacked jurisdiction to consider Umassor's attempt to appeal the trial court's final judgment of December 15, 2025, because the order was not identified in his notice of appeal. Umassor moved for rehearing and for en banc reconsideration, arguing that under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.3, we must treat his appeal of the dismissal order as an appeal of the final judgment that replaced it.

But as it turns out, we can express no opinion on that topic because it is not properly before us. These arguments are beside the point, because in reviewing the record in connection with Umassor's rehearing motions, we discovered something that we, and the parties, had previously overlooked and that changes the procedural posture of the case:

III. The Order Reinstating the Case is Void.

When a case is dismissed for want of prosecution, the only available remedy in the trial court is a motion for reinstatement. Jarrell v. Bergdorf, 580 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). A trial court has plenary power to reinstate a case on its own motion within thirty days after the order of dismissal is signed. Watson v. Clark, No. 14-14-00031-CV, 2015 WL 780563, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Parties, too, are authorized to move for reinstatement via a verified motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(3) (“A motion to reinstate shall set forth the grounds therefor and be verified by the movant or his attorney. It shall be filed with the clerk within 30 days after the order of dismissal is signed or within the period provided by Rule 306a.”). If the motion is both timely and verified, it extends the trial court's plenary power until the motion is overruled by a signed order or by operation of law. Id.

Umassor filed a motion to reinstate the day after dismissal, and both parties assumed that the motion extended the time for the court to reinstate the case. But the motion was unverified, and an unverified motion to reinstate does not extend a trial court's plenary power. McConnell v. May, 800 S.W.2d 194, 194 (Tex. 1990); In re Statebridge Co., LLC, No. 14-25-00146-CV, 2025 WL 2355781, at *2 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 14, 2025, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.). As a result, the trial court had plenary power to grant the motion only until November 21, 2025, thirty days after dismissing the case. Because the trial court did not grant the motion within this time, its plenary power expired, and its orders signed after that date are void. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (orders signed after trial court loses plenary power are void). Contrary to our original opinion, then, the trial court's order reinstating the case and its subsequent final judgment are void. The final judgment in the case is instead the order dismissing the case for want of prosecution.

But that order does not have the effect that the parties seem to have assumed that it does. When a justice-court judgment is appealed to a county court at law, the perfected appeal effectively vacates the justice court's judgment. Harter v. Curry, 101 Tex. 187, 188, 105 S.W. 988, 989 (1907) (explaining that “[t]he judgment of the justice court was vacated by the appeal”); In re Garza, 990 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, orig. proceeding) (“When an appeal from a justice court judgment is perfected in a county court, the judgment of the justice court is annulled.”). As a predecessor of this Court explained, “the appeal from the judgment of the justice[ ] court vacated the judgment and took the whole case for trial de novo into the county court, and the dismissal of the appeal did not reinstate nor revive the justice court judgment.” W. Union Tel. Co. v. McKee Bros., 135 S.W. 658, 659 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1911, no writ).

After Umassor perfected the appeal, the parties occupied the same positions in the trial de novo that they had occupied in the justice court: Bank of America was still the plaintiff, and Umassor was still the defendant. As the plaintiff, it was Bank of America's burden to prosecute the trial de novo to judgment or face dismissal for want of prosecution. See, e.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(1) (“A case may be dismissed for want of prosecution on failure of any party seeking affirmative relief to appear for any hearing or trial of which the party had notice.” (emphasis added)). The trial court's dismissal of the case for want of prosecution accordingly left Bank of America with no judgment at all. See Garza, 990 S.W.2d at 374 (“Any dismissal by the trial court after the appeal is perfected is a dismissal of the entire cause of action and leaves the matter standing as if no suit had been filed.”).

Bank of America neither moved for reinstatement nor appealed the judgment. Of course, Umassor did timely file a notice of appeal, but “an appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others.” Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000). Because Umassor is not aggrieved by the judgment dismissing Bank of America's claims against him, he lacks standing to appeal it. See Kenneth D. Eichner, P.C. v. Dominguez, No. 14-18-00399-CV, 2022 WL 364070, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 8, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op. on remand) (“A party generally has standing to appeal a judgment only if the party is aggrieved by the judgment.”). And indeed, he does not challenge it: although he filed an appeal of the dismissal for want of prosecution, his appellate briefs instead challenged only the purported final judgment on the merits that the trial court signed on December 15, 2025. Inasmuch as Umassor lacks standing to challenge the order of dismissal, we lack jurisdiction over his attempted appeal.

IV. Conclusion

Because no party filed a timely, verified motion to reinstate the case after the county court at law dismissed it for want of prosecution on October 22, 2025, the trial court had plenary power over the case only until November 21, 2025. We accordingly declare that the trial court's orders signed after that date are void, and we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Tracy Christopher Chief Justice