JOHN TUMA APPELLANT v. MORPHEUS RESEARCH APPELLEE (2026)

OPINION

John Tuma appeals following the trial court's order granting Morpheus Research LLC's special appearance in the context of a Rule 202 petition. In two issues, Tuma argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to continue the special appearance hearing and to compel jurisdictional discovery, and by granting Morpheus's special appearance.¹ We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Tuma, a Texas resident, filed a Rule 202 petition in Leon County district court seeking presuit discovery to evaluate a potential claim for defamation against Morpheus. He alleged that Morpheus, an “investigative research” company with undisclosed authors, published a defamatory article on its website, targeting Tuma and his business, Solaris Energy Infrastructure, a Texas-based publicly traded company, “as a part of a scheme to profit through short selling[.]” Tuma further contends that Morpheus intended to use the article to tank his business's stock price. According to Tuma, this article prompted a securities class action lawsuit against Solaris. Tuma sought an order compelling Morpheus to appear for deposition through a corporate representative on various topics.

Morpheus filed a special appearance supported by a declaration from one of its owners, Casey McGoff, which sets forth that it is organized in Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Virginia. McGoff states that the owners and authors do not reside in Texas and that Morpheus has no offices in Texas and is not registered to do business in Texas. He further states that Morpheus “operates a passive website used only for the purpose of publishing its investigative reports.” Thereafter, Tuma filed a motion for continuance of the hearing on special appearance and sought leave to conduct jurisdiction related discovery pursuant to Rule 120a(3).

After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for continuance and leave to conduct discovery, and granted the special appearance. This appeal followed.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

This Court sua sponte addresses its own subject matter jurisdiction given the unique posture of a special appearance arising in the context of a Rule 202 petition. In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. 2016) (“A court is duty-bound to determine its jurisdiction regardless of whether the parties have questioned it.”). An order granting or denying a Rule 202 petition for the deposition of a person against whom suit is contemplated is “considered ancillary to the subsequent suit, and thus neither final nor appealable.” In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex. 2008). No statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a deposition to perpetuate the testimony of a person against whom a suit is pending or contemplated. Thomas v. Fitzgerald, 166 S.W.3d 746, 747–748 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.). Such orders are typically challenged via petition for writ of mandamus. See, eg., In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d at 73.

Tuma filed a regular appeal from an order on special appearance. The order states that Morpheus's special appearance is granted but does not contain dismissal language. Typically, if the court sustains a special appearance, it should sign an order of dismissal as well, which can be handled as either an interlocutory appeal, or a final and appealable judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7); TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(4). The trial court made no ruling granting or denying the Rule 202 petition. In light of the record, which indicates that the trial court's order relates solely to a ruling on the special appearance, and because there is a statute which authorizes interlocutory appeal for the grant or denial of a special appearance, we construe the trial court's order granting the special appearance as an appealable interlocutory order. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7). Moreover, Tuma filed his notice of appeal within accelerated deadlines. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). We conclude that Tuma filed his challenge here in a bona fide attempt to invoke this Court's jurisdiction, and we construe his appeal as an accelerated appeal pursuant to Section 51.014(a)(7). See In re J.Z.P., 484 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. 2016) (“We have stressed that courts should acknowledge the substance of the relief sought despite the formal styling of the pleading.”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 2 (allowing appellate court on its own motion to “suspend a rule's operation in a particular case and order a different procedure”); cf., e.g., CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 453–54 (Tex. 2011) (reversing court of appeals judgment dismissing interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanding to court of appeals to consider appeal as petition for writ of mandamus when party had expressly requested in alternative mandamus treatment of its appeal).

SPECIAL APPEARANCE

In his second issue, Tuma argues that the trial court erred in granting Morpheus's special appearance.

Standard of Review

We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a special appearance. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002); Texas Bank & Tr. v. California Coast Credit Union, No. 12-24-00149-CV, 2025 WL 657280, at *10 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 28, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). A plaintiff must plead allegations that bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. BMC Software v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2002). Texas courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if: (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state due-process standards. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007). The long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who “commits a tort in whole or in part in this state.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042(2). Although allegations that a tort was committed in Texas satisfy our long-arm statute, such allegations do not necessarily satisfy the U.S. Constitution. Moncrief Oil Int'l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 149 (Tex. 2013). The Texas long-arm statute allows Texas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction “as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit.” BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795. Federal due process requires that the nonresident defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state, such that the defendant reasonably could anticipate being sued there. Curocom Energy LLC v. Young-Sub Shim, 416 S.W.3d 893, 896 (Tex. App.—Houston 2013, no pet.). The exercise of personal jurisdiction also must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.

When, as here, a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of a special appearance ruling, then “all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied.” BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795. But when the appellate record includes the reporter's and clerk's records, these implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency in the appropriate appellate court. Feeney v. Morfin Capital Group LLC, No. 05-22-01375-CV, 2024 WL 3880623, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 20, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Tuma contends only that Texas courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction, which “covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims” than general jurisdiction would allow. BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98, 104 (Tex. 2025). For Texas courts to do so here, the evidence must satisfy a well-established two-prong test. Id. First, Morpheus must have taken “some act by which [it] purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [Texas], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. Second, the claims must “arise out of or relate to” Morpheus's Texas-focused activities. Id. For specific jurisdiction, we must analyze the defendant's contacts “on a claim-by-claim basis” to determine whether each claim arises out of or is related to the defendant's minimum contacts. TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. 2016).

As for the first prong, we adhere to the United States Supreme Court's reiterated teaching that the jurisdictionally relevant activities must have been the defendant's “own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’ ” BRP-Rotax GmbH, 716 S.W.3d at 014. This “deliberat[e]” conduct may come in the form of “exploiting a market” in Texas. See id. But these activities, “whether they consist of direct acts within Texas or conduct outside Texas, must justify a conclusion that the [nonresident] defendant could reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court” with respect to a particular claim. Id.

Tuma is investigating a claim based upon allegedly defamatory statements and as such, analogizes his claim to a particular line of cases arising out of defamation and media broadcasts, in which numerous tests have been developed over the long history of jurisprudence, and most recently were summarized by our Texas Supreme Court in TV Azteca. 490 S.W.3d at 38–39. However, as discussed below, each of these tests, such as the “subject-and-sources” test, are but one facet of the ordinary minimum contacts analysis, to be considered as part of the full range of the defendant's contacts with the forum. See id. at 48; Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002).

Discussion

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading jurisdictional facts sufficient to bring a non-resident defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). A nonresident defendant challenging the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction through a special appearance bears the burden of negating all grounds for personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574. The defendant can negate jurisdiction on either a factual or legal basis. Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659. Factually, the defendant can present evidence that negates one or more of the requirements, controverting the plaintiff's contrary allegations. Id. Legally, the defendant can show that the plaintiff's alleged jurisdictional facts, even if true, do not meet the personal jurisdiction requirements. Id.

If the plaintiff's petition lacks sufficient allegations to bring the defendant under the long-arm statute, “the plaintiff should amend the pleading to include the necessary factual allegations.” Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 129 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.); Texas Bank & Tr., 2025 WL 657280, at *6. If the defendant, in its special appearance, presents evidence that disproves the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations, then the plaintiff should present evidence in support of the petition's allegations. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 129; Texas Bank & Tr., 2025 WL 657280, at *6. The plaintiff's response to the special appearance may contain evidence supporting the petition's jurisdictional allegations, but that evidence must be consistent with the allegations in the petition. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 129.

Pleading Specific Jurisdiction

In the instant case, we begin with the jurisdictional allegations in Tuma's pleadings, which define the scope of the lawsuit and frame Morpheus's burden of proof in its special appearance. See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658; Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 129; Texas Bank & Trust, 2025 WL 657280, at *6. As set forth previously, in its jurisdictional pleadings, Tuma alleged, in pertinent part, as follows:

This Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Morpheus because Morpheus has established minimum contacts with Texas. Morpheus has purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas, including by targeting its “deep-dive investigative research into Mr. Tuma and Solaris, interviewing Texas residents about Mr. Tuma and Solaris, and physically entering Texas to conduct a site visit to a Solaris-leased facility in early March 2025․ Morpheus also likely committed a tort when it published the [a]rticle and aimed its conduct at Texas. Accordingly, Mr. Tuma's potential claims and request for pre-suit discovery arise out of Morpheus' activities in and directed at Texas. It would be reasonable for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Morpheus consistent with principles underlying the U.S. Constitution, and the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Tuma alleged that Morpheus is a short-seller who engaged in a “short and distort” strategy to manipulate Solaris's stock prices.² Further, Tuma attached the article to his petition. The article is entitled, “Solaris Energy Infrastructure: How a Crumbling Texas Oilfield Services Company Gambled it all on a Convicted Felon and the World's Richest Man,” which Morpheus published on its website and shared twice on X through Morpheus's X account. Further, this article was covered by financial press outlets, as well as linked and repeated in numerous news stories and Tuma attached some of the articles to the petition. Also, according to the petition, Morpheus's conduct sparked a securities class action against Solaris in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas shortly after Morpheus's publication of the article, which echoed phrases from the Morpheus article.

Tuma alleges the article claims to be a “deep dive” into the Texas oilfield services industry, Solaris (a Texas corporation), its acquisition of MER (a Texas limited liability company), and Tuma (a Texas resident). Tuma further alleged that Morpheus held a short position in Solaris stock at the time it published its article, and that Morpheus admitted the same in its article where it discloses that:

Certain principals of Morpheus Research hold short positions in [Solaris], and Morpheus Research may profit from short positions held by others ․

[Readers] should assume that ․ Morpheus Research (possibly along with or through our members, partners, affiliates, employees, and/or consultants) may have a position in the stock, bonds, derivatives, or securities covered herein and therefore stands to realize significant gains if the price of the securities move.

Tuma also alleged that Morpheus “warned the reader that it makes no representation, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness” of the information contained in the article. Morpheus alleges that the article quotes Texas politicians, includes photographs Morpheus took during its research trip to Texas, and mentions Texas twenty times, Houston thirteen times, and Tuma sixty-one times.

Tuma's allegations satisfy the “subject-and-sources test” as distilled by TV Azteca's analysis of Calder v. Jones, and its Fifth Circuit progeny. 490 S.W.3d at 47. This is one method to establish that a defamation defendant targeted a forum state. Id.

In Calder, Hollywood actress Shirley Jones filed suit in California asserting defamation claims based on statements in a National Enquirer article. 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984). Jones sued the Enquirer's owner, its local distributing company, the reporter who wrote the article, and the editor who revised and approved the final draft. Id. at 785–86, 104 S. Ct. 1482. The reporter and editor, who resided in Florida and prepared the article there, challenged the California court's personal jurisdiction over them. Although the Court acknowledged that the reporter and editor did not create the article in California or personally direct or control its circulation to the state, it found that several facts established that California was “the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.” Id. at 789, 104 S. Ct. 1482. Specifically, the Court noted that the article (1) targeted California because it “concerned the California activities of a California resident” and “was drawn from California sources,” and (2) caused Jones to suffer “the brunt of the harm” in California. Id. at 788–89, 104 S. Ct. 1482. Considering “the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California” and the evidence that “their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California,” the Court concluded that the reporter and editor “must ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’ to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article.” Id. at 789–90.

As TV Azteca explained, Calder gave rise to the subject-and-sources test:

The Supreme Court found that the defendants in Calder were “not charged with mere untargeted negligence,” but instead had “expressly aimed” their actions at California, because their article “concerned the California activities of a California resident” and “was drawn from California sources.” ․ [I]n Revell v. Lidov, the Fifth Circuit held that “the sources relied upon and activities described in an allegedly defamatory publication should in some way connect with the forum if Calder is to be invoked.” Then, in Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., the court relied on Revell for the proposition that “[t]his Court has held that, to exercise specific jurisdiction in a libel action, the ‘aim’ of the plaintiff under the Calder test must be demonstrated by showing that (1) the subject matter of and (2) the sources relied upon for the article were in the forum state.” Finally, in Clemens v. McNamee, the court again stated, “We read Calder as requiring the plaintiff seeking to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a defamation case to show ‘(1) the subject matter of and (2) the sources relied upon for the article were in the forum state.’ ”

TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 48–49 (citations omitted). The test determines whether the forum state was “the focal point ․ of the story,” which in turn determines whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of conducting activities in the state sufficient to establish minimum contacts. Id. at 49.

We conclude that Tuma asserted contacts which are sufficient to show that Morpheus purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas. Morpheus's article concerned the Texas activities of a Texas resident and described activities having a connection with Texas, including interviews of Texas residents and a site visit to Texas as the subject-and-sources test requires. The statements relate to people and events in Texas. Id. at 47; see Calder, 465 U.S. at 788, 104 S. Ct. 1482; Revell, 317 F.3d at 474. Thus, the evidence supports a finding of purposeful availment under the Calder subject-and-sources test sufficient to make Texas “the focal point” of the article at issue. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S. Ct. 1482. As stated by the Fifth Circuit, “if you are going to pick a fight in Texas, it is reasonable to expect that it be settled there.” Revell, 317 F.3d at 476.

Negating all Bases of Personal Jurisdiction

Once Tuma satisfied his initial burden to plead allegations sufficient to bring Morpheus within the reach of Texas's long-arm statute, the burden flipped to Morpheus to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction in Tuma's pleading. State v. Yelp, Inc., 725 S.W.3d 170, 182 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, pet. denied). In Morpheus's special appearance, Morpheus conceded that it:

(i) “target[ed] its ‘deep-dive investigative research’ into Mr. Tuma and Solaris”;

(ii) “interview[ed] Texas residents about Mr. Tuma and Solaris”;

(iii) “physically enter[ed] Texas to conduct a site visit to a Solaris-leased facility in early March 2025”; and

(iv) “likely committed a tort when it published the article and aimed its conduct at Texas.”

Morpheus does not refute that its sources, research, interviews, quotes, site visits, or photographs are drawn from Texas.

Instead, Morpheus argued that there was no basis for exercising personal jurisdiction because it is a Delaware company based in Virginia with a passive website and no offices in Texas. Morpheus hangs its hat on the argument that because “Morpheus's website is non-interactive ․ it could not have purposely availed itself of the Texas forum,” stopping all jurisdictional inquiry. In support of its special appearance, Morpheus attached the declaration of McGoff, which states, in pertinent part, as follows:

․ Morpheus researches and investigates financial vulnerabilities in publicly traded companies that it believes to be fundamentally misunderstood by the market, and publishes deep-dive reports detailing its findings.

Morpheus does not sell any products, services, advertisements, or subscriptions, and Morpheus does not receive any revenue or income in the form of marketing or advertising. As disclosed in each of Morpheus's reports, Morpheus and others affiliated with it may hold positions in the publicly traded stocks, bonds, derivatives, or other securities covered by its reports, including short positions.

Morpheus's target audience for its reports is the international public engaged in trading stocks, and particularly those investors who may hold stocks in the companies profiled in Morpheus's reports. Morpheus does not target its reports at particular states, countries, or jurisdictions.

․

Morpheus operates a passive website used only for the purpose of publishing its investigative reports. Morpheus's website cannot be used for business transactions or to enter into contracts, as Morpheus does not offer any products or services for purchase. The website does not publish third-party advertisements, and Morpheus neither seeks nor accepts advertisements.

The “sliding scale” test, enunciated in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), looks to the level of interactivity of a website to determine whether it supports the exercise of jurisdiction. See ShopStyle, Inc. v. RewardStyle, Inc., No. 05-19-00736-CV, 2020 WL 4187937 at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Zippo, the district court held that “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. At one end of Zippo's sliding scale are passive websites where the nonresident defendant simply posts information on the website that can be viewed in other jurisdictions—these websites do not support personal jurisdiction. Id. On the other end of the scale are cases where the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transfer of computer files over the internet—personal jurisdiction is proper in these cases because the defendant “clearly does business over the internet.” Id. In the middle are cases involving interactive websites that allow an exchange of information with the host computer, and in these cases jurisdiction is determined by “examining the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs.” Id. However, as the Fifth Circuit observed:

Although interactivity along the Zippo sliding scale can be an important factor in an internet-based personal jurisdiction analysis because it can provide evidence of purposeful conduct ․ internet-based jurisdictional claims must continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the nature and quality of online and offline contacts to demonstrate the requisite purposeful conduct that establishes personal jurisdiction.

Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 227 n. 7 (5th Cir. 2012). While we consider evidence of a website's interactivity, this is not per se dispositive of whether jurisdiction is proper. See Publicaciones E. Impresos Paso del Norte, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Corral, 663 S.W.3d 286, 319–20 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied); ShopStyle, 2020 WL 4187937, at *8. We consider website interactivity alongside the nature and quality of a defendant's online and offline contacts to determine whether it established the requisite purposeful conduct to support personal jurisdiction. See Publicaciones, 663 S.W.3d at 319–20.

In response to Morpheus's special appearance, Tuma does not contest that Morpheus's website is passive. Tuma instead reiterated its same arguments and evidence used in the petition. Further, Tuma argues that because Morpheus made the four key concessions, including the concession that it “likely committed a tort when it published the short-seller report and aimed its conduct at Texas,” Morpheus has thus admitted to minimum contacts with Texas.

Due to its research investigation business model and internet-based publication, Morpheus does not need a physical presence in Texas—or in most other states for that matter. The fact that it broadcasts its article on a website designed to be passive is but one contact in the evaluation of many, both on and offline contacts. As stated by our sister court, the internet cannot be used as “an invisibility cloak that prevents an actor from being haled into court in a given state simply because the actor used the internet in the course of targeting its activity at Texas.” Yelp, 725 S.W.3d at 186.

We conclude Tuma's allegations coupled with the evidence attached to his response are sufficient to establish that Morpheus purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Texas, and that Morpheus did not negate Tuma's allegations. Morpheus's business contacts with Texas are not the kinds of “random, isolated, or fortuitous” contacts that will save a company from personal jurisdiction in a State notwithstanding its contacts with it. Id. at 184. Rather, Morpheus “deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home” by committing a tort and aiming its conduct at Texas.

Relatedness

Tuma is investigating a claim based upon allegedly defamatory statements. This is premised on allegations that in researching its allegedly defamatory article, Morpheus came to Texas, interviewed Texas residents, visited a Solaris site in Texas, and took photographs in Texas. Further, Morpheus's article mentioned Texas, Houston, Tuma, and Tuma's business, quoted the Texas sources, and included photographs taken in Texas at Solaris's site. Finally, Tuma alleged that Morpheus's actions in preparing and publishing the defamatory article were designed to advance Morpheus's “short and distort” strategy to manipulate the market by (1) shorting a stock and (2) engaging in a campaign to spread unverified bad news about the stock with the objective of panicking other investors into selling their stock in order to drive the price down. In response, Morpheus conceded that it targeted its deep-dive investigative research into Tuma and Solaris, interviewed Texas residents about Tuma and Solaris, physically entered Texas to conduct a site visit to a Solaris-leased facility, and “likely committed a tort when it published the article and aimed its conduct at Texas.” The relatedness inquiry requires only that the suit arise out of or relate to the defendant's contact with the forum. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 362, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 (2021); see State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 431 (Tex. 2023) (determining that “[r]elationships may support jurisdiction without a causal showing even when the litigation merely relates to the defendant's forum contacts.”); Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2021) (refusing to condition specific jurisdiction on a “strict causal connection”). We conclude that this is sufficient to establish the relatedness prong.

Fair Play and Substantial Justice

Once minimum contacts have been established, we must consider whether, for other reasons, exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Yelp, 725 S.W.3d at 170. Rarely will properly exercised jurisdiction be found to impair fair play and substantial justice. See Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 18. We consider Morpheus's contacts with Texas in light of (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Id. at 18–19.

Morpheus makes no argument and cites no legal authorities contending that it would be burdensome for it to litigate this case in Texas. Morpheus enjoys benefits and privileges when conducting business in Texas, which are accompanied by the corresponding obligation to answer suits that may arise from that business. Id. at 19 (“[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state.”); Yelp, 725 S.W.3d at 170. The burden to litigate in Texas is lessened by modern travel and technology. See Moncrief, 414 S.W.3d at 155 (“Distance alone cannot ordinarily defeat jurisdiction.”); Yelp, 725 S.W.3d at 170. We conclude exercising jurisdiction over Morpheus does not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, we sustain Tuma's second issue.

Because we resolved Tuma's second issue and determined that Texas courts may assert personal jurisdiction over Morpheus based upon the pleadings and evidence already in the record, we do not reach Tuma's first issue, in which he challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to continue the special appearance hearing and to compel jurisdictional discovery. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

DISPOSITION

Having sustained Tuma's second issue, we reverse the trial court's order granting defendant's special appearance and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record, briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, because it is the opinion of this court that there was error in the order of the trial court below, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED by this court that the trial court's order granting defendant's special appearance be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, and that all costs of this appeal are hereby adjudged against the Appellee, MORPHEUS RESEARCH, LLC, for which execution may issue; and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This case was transferred to this Court from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco, Texas, pursuant to a docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Accordingly, we must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if our decision otherwise would be inconsistent with that court's precedent. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2.   “The goal of a ‘short and distort’ strategy is to manipulate the market by first shorting a stock and then engaging in a campaign to spread unverified bad news about the stock with the objective of panicking other investors into selling their stock in order to drive the price down.” Nat'l Ass'n of Priv. Fund Managers v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 1551 F.4th 252, 258 n.1 (5th Cir. 2025).

JAMES T. WORTHEN Chief Justice