IN RE: T.R. (2026)

OPINION

The State alleged by determinate petition that T.R., a juvenile, engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the murder of J.M. T.R. stipulated without an agreed disposition that the conduct alleged was true, and his case proceeded to a jury trial for the determination of a disposition. The jury found that disposition was necessary and assessed a determinate sentence of 6 years in the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD), with possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division (TDCJ). The trial court then entered a judgment that reflected the jury's findings. In a single issue on appeal, T.R. contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that a disposition was necessary. We affirm.

Background

At the time T.R. shot and killed J.M., T.R. was 15 years old and J.M. was 17 years old. Evidence at trial indicated that prior to the day of J.M.'s death, J.M. had fired shots at T.R. in T.R.'s neighborhood. Evidence also showed that in another incident, someone had recently fired shots at T.R.'s home. Both incidents had been reported to police, but J.M. had not been interviewed or arrested at the time he was killed. An investigator who testified at trial also disclosed that she learned there was a history of J.M. bullying T.R.

T.R. and J.M. attended the same high school, and T.R. and his father had spoken to school personnel regarding J.M.'s conduct and T.R.'s safety. J.M. was apparently searched and was found in possession of a pair of brass knuckles. There is some evidence in the record that the two boys were asked to sign a “stay away” agreement, but it is unclear if anything else was done to protect T.R.

On the day of J.M.'s death, T.R. was walking down a sidewalk behind the high school, apparently “minding his own business,” when he passed by a car in which J.M. was sitting with another person. According to eyewitnesses, J.M. “jumped” out of the vehicle, pulled a handgun out of his hip pack, and approached T.R. Although witnesses had varying descriptions of what was said, the descriptions included J.M. asking T.R., “Do you want to die today?” and telling T.R., “I could kill you right now,” and stating he was the one who had recently shot at T.R.'s family's house. An investigating police officer agreed at trial that J.M.'s conduct constituted “extreme provocation.”

According to eyewitnesses, immediately after J.M. spoke, T.R. pulled his own gun out and shot J.M. in rapid succession. The autopsy of J.M. revealed that he was shot 17 times and some of the shots T.R. fired entered J.M.'s body through his back. At least one eyewitness reported that J.M. had already turned to walk away from T.R. when T.R. shot him. An investigator subsequently discovered J.M.'s handgun zipped-up inside his hip pack, although it is not clear how it got there. After emptying his weapon into J.M., T.R. fled the scene and was picked up by his mother. His mother subsequently admitted to throwing the weapon T.R. used into a bayou, and police were able to recover the weapon. Two days after the shooting, T.R. presented himself at a police station and was detained.

T.R. remained in juvenile detention for about a year before being released into his grandmother's custody pending trial. The record contains no reports that T.R. caused significant problems in detention, broke any conditions of his release, or committed any further offenses. Indeed, T.R.'s juvenile probation officer testified to his following of rules and conditions. The record reflects T.R. was doing well in school, was employed, and stayed out of trouble.

As mentioned above, T.R. pleaded true to the allegation that he engaged in delinquent conduct. The trial court then submitted questions regarding T.R.'s disposition to a jury, including asking whether “the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the child, [T.R.] is in need of rehabilitation or that the protection of the public or the child, [T.R.] requires that a disposition be made in this case?” The jury answered that question in the affirmative and then assessed his disposition at six years commitment in TJJD, with a possible transfer to TDCJ. The trial court then entered a determinate sentence judgment in keeping with the jury's findings.

Governing Law

It is first important to recognize the limited nature of T.R.'s appeal in this case. T.R. does not challenge the adjudication that he engaged in delinquent conduct; instead, he only challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that a disposition was required because either T.R. is in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or T.R. requires that a disposition be made. He does not challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence on this issue or the actual disposition imposed, only whether a disposition was necessary.

In a juvenile proceeding, once a determination has been made that a juvenile engaged in delinquent conduct, the trial court must then conduct a disposition hearing. In re I.F.M., 525 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code § 54.03(h)). Disposition is akin to sentencing and is used because of the non-criminal character of the juvenile proceedings. Id. Under Family Code section 54.04, no disposition may be made unless the child is determined to be in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or the child requires that disposition be made. Tex. Fam. Code § 54.04(c). If the factfinder does not so find, the court shall dismiss the child and enter a final judgment without any disposition. Id. It bears emphasizing that section 54.04(c) is stated in the disjunctive, such that a disposition may be upheld if a determination is supported under any one of the three alternatives. See In re E.F.Z.R., 250 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.).

In an appeal from a disposition order under section 54.04, we review any challenged findings for sufficient evidence and then review the disposition decision for an abuse of discretion. In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.). When a finding is challenged for legal sufficiency, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. In re R.P., No. 14-24-00315-CV, 2025 WL 3523077, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 9, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d at 106. The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. The evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the finding under review. Id. A juvenile court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles or its decision is essentially arbitrary, given the evidence upon which it is based. Id. at 106–07.¹

In a determinate murder case such as this, the factfinder may assess the disposition of an adjudicated juvenile at commitment in TJJD, with a possible transfer to TDCJ, for up to 40 years. Tex. Fam. Code § 54.04(d)(3)(A)(ii). Generally, a court does not abuse its discretion in rendering a commitment order when a delinquent juvenile has engaged in some type of violent activity that makes the juvenile potentially dangerous to the public. E.g., In re R.P., 2025 WL 3523077, at *4; In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d at 110; In re W.J.P., No. 01-19-00988-CV, 2021 WL 2931437, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Discussion

As T.R. points out, this case presents a fairly unusual set of circumstances. Except for the brutal murder of J.M., the record reflects that T.R. is generally an upstanding young man who does well in school, follows the rules, and holds a job. T.R. urges us to focus on these positive qualities and minimizes the importance of the murder he committed, which T.R. suggests was a natural result of the terror campaign J.M. waged against him and the failure of the authorities to do anything about it. In his briefing, T.R. alleges and emphasizes that prior to the day he shot J.M., police officials and school administrators failed to take action to protect him from J.M., even though they were aware J.M. had previously shot at T.R. and someone had fired shots at his family's home. As T.R. frames events, he was forced to take the matter of his very survival into his own hands.

However, this court is not the jury or the trial judge in this case, and our standard of review necessitates respect for their decisions. See In re R.P., 2025 WL 3523077, at *9; In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d at 106–07. Although the record reflects essentially one bad episode by T.R., that incident involved T.R. carrying a fully-loaded, semi-automatic handgun into a school zone, which included a high school and nearby elementary school, and unloading all 17 bullets into another student.

Based on the evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that T.R. did this after J.M. had already returned his own weapon to his hip pack and perhaps was turning away from T.R. Although evidence indicated T.R. otherwise apparently stayed out of trouble, the jury could have been reasonably concerned, based on his response to J.M.'s provocation, with what T.R. might do in other stressful or antagonist situations. In other words, the jury could have reasonably concluded that T.R. posed a substantial risk of danger to the public and that the protection of the public therefore necessitated a disposition be made. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.04(c) (providing that no disposition may be made unless the child is determined to be in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or the child requires that disposition be made); see also In re R.P., 2025 WL 3523077, at *4 (explaining that a court generally does not abuse its discretion in rendering a commitment order when a delinquent juvenile has engaged in some type of violent activity that makes the juvenile potentially dangerous to the public); In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d at 110 (same); In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *3 (same); see also In re A.W.B., 419 S.W.3d 351, 361 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, no pet.) (holding essentially that severity of delinquent conduct constituting a first degree felony was sufficient to support commitment disposition for the protection of the public).

T.R. suggests that if we affirm his disposition in this case it would effectively create an extra-statutory rule that any serious offense necessitates a disposition. But that argument ignores the applicable standards of appellate review. The trial court and the jury made the determination that a disposition was necessary in this case. We are affirming their determination as it is within their province, largely based on the severity and circumstances of T.R.'s delinquent conduct. See In re R.P., 2025 WL 3523077, at *4; In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d at 110; In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *3; In re A.W.B., 419 S.W.3d at 361. We are not holding that every serious offense requires disposition as a matter of law, regardless of the circumstances underlying the offense or other evidence regarding the youth.²

Because T.R. only challenges the legal sufficiency of the jury's finding that a disposition was necessary in this case and the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that the protection of the public required a disposition be made, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a disposition judgment. Accordingly, we overrule T.R.'s sole issue.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   T.R. questions whether we should apply the criminal standard of legal sufficiency review from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979), or the civil standard as set forth in the text above, but he also suggests the standards would be “functionally similar” under the circumstances. We have, however, previously used the civil standard in reviewing a determination that a disposition was necessary, see In re R.P., 2025 WL 3523077, at *9, and In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d at 106–07, although we noted in In re J.H. that the civil standard was the only standard cited by both parties in that case. We additionally recognize that use of the civil standard in reviewing disposition findings is by far the prevailing methodology among Texas courts of appeals, and the Texas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue. See In re E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d 670, 673–76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (surveying cases); In re T.E.G., 222 S.W.3d 677, 678–79 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (same); see also In re J.R.C.S., 393 S.W.3d 903, 914 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). Accordingly, we will use the civil standard in our review. We perceive no reason to use a different standard of review for disposition findings under subsection 54.04(c) as opposed to disposition findings under subsection 54.04(i). Tex. Fam. Code § 54.04(c), (i).

2.   We pause to note that T.R.'s suggestion that the seriousness of a single offense could never by itself be sufficient to require disposition could lead to alarming results, such as the release of a school shooter because he had otherwise always followed the rules.

Maritza M. Antú, Justice