NICHOLS v. STATE (2026)

OPINION

Appellant Michael Shawn Nichols appeals from the trial court's judgment adjudicating him guilty of continuous violence against the family and sentencing him to four years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutions Division. Appellant contends that: (1) this court lacks jurisdiction over his appeal because the trial court failed to order that his sentence be carried out; and (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his guilt because the State filed its motion to adjudicate after his supervision period expired, without a proper extension.

We affirm.

Background

Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of continuous violence against the family on October 13, 2021. The trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for three years. His deferred adjudication period was set to expire on October 12, 2024.

In August 2024, the trial court amended the conditions of appellant's community supervision. The amendment order states the trial court found that it was in “the best interest of the public and of [appellant]” that “the terms of supervision” should be modified such that appellant's community supervision would expire on October 12, 2025, with any additional fees for supervision and drug testing waived. It also included a detailed recitation of appellant's rights and obligations, which appellant acknowledged by signing the document. That recitation provides as follows:

I understand that under the laws of this State, the Court shall determine the terms and conditions of Community Supervision, and may alter or modify said conditions during the period of Community Supervision. I further understand that failure to abide by these Conditions of Community Supervision may result in the revocation of Community Supervision or an adjudication of guilt.

I have read or had read to me by the CLO/CSO[1] Officer the conditions the Judge has added or changed. I also understand that if I do not accept these changes to my Conditions of Community Supervision, I must make a timely and specific objection and request to appear before the Judge. I understand that if I refuse to accept these amendments, the Judge may issue a warrant for my arrest and I have a right to be represented by counsel. If I am indigent, the Court shall appoint counsel for me. I also understand that I may voluntarily and knowingly accept this modification.

(emphasis added). Appellant then made the following choice:

Acceptance and Waiver⊠ I understand the terms and consequences for failing to comply with these Conditions of Community Supervision and I knowingly and voluntarily agree to this modification of my conditions. I further understand that by signing these conditions I am affirmatively accepting the terms and I waive any right to object or be represented by counsel.

Objection and Request for Immediate Hearing☐ I object to this modification of my conditions of Community Supervision and request an immediate hearing before the Judge.

Both appellant and a CLO/CSO signed the amendment order on August 26, 2024. The trial court signed the order on August 29, 2024.

On November 13, 2024, the State filed a motion to adjudicate appellant's guilt, which it amended on November 22. The amended motion alleged seven violations of the conditions of appellant's community supervision. Appellant appeared before an associate judge assigned to receive evidence on the State's amended motion on February 4, 2025. Appellant's CSO and appellant testified at the hearing. Appellant's counsel did not object to the extension order or challenge the trial court's jurisdiction. At the close of the hearing, the associate judge told the parties he would provide recommendations to the trial court, and the trial court would sentence appellant on February 12.

The trial court convened an unrecorded sentencing hearing on February 12, and the judgment indicates that appellant “appeared with counsel.” In the judgment adjudicating appellant's guilt, the trial court found:

(1) The Court previously found [appellant] qualified for deferred adjudication community supervision; (2) The Court deferred further proceedings, made no finding of guilt, and rendered no judgment; (3) The Court issued an order placing [appellant] on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of 3 YEARS; (4) The Court assessed a fine of $ N/A; (5) While on deferred adjudication community supervision, [appellant] violated the conditions of community supervision, as set out in the State's original Motion to Adjudicate Guilt, as follows:

BY USING POSSESSING OR CONSUMING ANY ILLEGAL OR PRESCRIPTION DRUG NOT PRESCRIBED BY PHYSICIAN, BY FAILIN[G] TO ABIDE BY BOTH RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE HARRIS COUNT[Y] CSCO, BY FAILING TO PAY FINE AND/OR COURT COSTS.

The trial court then found that appellant committed the offense of continuous violence against the family, adjudged him guilty, ordered him punished as indicated in the judgment (i.e., four years’ incarceration), and ordered his sentence executed.

After he noticed his appeal, appellant filed a motion to abate in this court, urging that the “record doesn't show that the [trial] court orally pronounced sentence in Appellant's presence.” This court abated this appeal so that the trial court could pronounce sentence in appellant's presence in open court.

On August 21, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing on the record, at which appellant and his counsel appeared. The trial court announced that it had found the allegations in the motion to adjudicate guilt true, that it had “sentenced [appellant] to 4 years,” and that it “continues to sentence [him] to 4 years.” The trial court then stated, “[T]he Court having found those allegations to be true, and sentence you to 4 years in the Texas Department of Corrections, [appellant], is there any other legal reason as to why your sentence shouldn't be carried out?” After a brief discussion, the trial court concluded proceedings.

Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial, which was presented to the trial court. The trial court heard the motion and denied it.

Appellate Jurisdiction

In his first issue, appellant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over his appeal because the trial court did not orally pronounce sentence in his presence. He urges that a trial court only “pronounces sentence when it orally orders that the punishment be carried out.” We disagree that a second abatement is necessary to confer jurisdiction on this court.

In a felony proceeding, “sentence shall be pronounced in the defendant's presence.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.03, § 1(a); Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The judgment, including the sentence assessed, is merely a written manifestation of that oral pronouncement. Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500. Oral pronouncement of the sentence in the presence of the defendant is “the crucial moment” when “all of the parties are physically present at the sentencing hearing” and able to hear and respond to the sentence. Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Pronouncement of the sentence is also the appealable event that vests the appellate court with jurisdiction. Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).

Appellant asserts that the trial judge did not pronounce his sentence in his presence because she did not orally order that his punishment be carried into execution in a manner prescribed by law. In making this assertion, appellant relies on article 42.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which defines a sentence as “that part of the judgment ․ that orders that the punishment be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.02. Appellant cites cases when a trial judge's language ordering a sentence carried into execution was held to be a valid pronouncement. See, e.g., Carter v. State, No. 05-25-00281-CR, 2025 WL 3163317, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 12, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). None of these cases, however, held that such precise language was necessary, and this court has recently concluded that it is not. See Lemon v. State, --- S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 2023457, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 14, 2026, no pet. h.). Instead, we observed, “The trial court told Appellant the length of his sentence and Appellant was given an opportunity to respond, thus satisfying the reasons underpinning the necessity of an oral pronouncement.” Id. As shown above, the same is true in today's case: the trial court informed appellant of the length of his sentence and gave him an opportunity to respond. Simply put, “[m]agic words are not required.” Id.; see also Lewis v. State, No. 08-14-00210-CR, 2015 WL 3952871, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We hold the trial court validly pronounced appellant's sentence orally and in his presence. See Swartz v. State, 691 S.W.3d 757, 761-62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.).

We overrule appellant's first issue.

Trial Court's Adjudication Jurisdiction

In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate his guilt on October 12, 2024, so its February 12, 2025 judgment adjudicating his guilt is void. Appellant's contention necessarily rests on the underlying premise that, when the trial court extended his community supervision to October 12, 2025, it did so unlawfully. This is so, appellant claims, because there are five “requirements” that must be met before a judge may extend a community supervision period in a felony case: (1) the supervision period must not have expired, or a motion for revocation was timely filed before the supervision period ended; (2) there must be a hearing; (3) the court must determine that the defendant violated a condition of community supervision; (4) there must be a showing of good cause; and (5) the extended supervision period cannot exceed ten years. We disagree that these requirements apply to appellant's deferred adjudication community supervision case.

In listing these purported requirements, appellant relies on Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42A.752 and 42A.753. However, article 42A.103, which sets the periods for deferred adjudication community supervision, expressly provides that a judge may increase “the maximum period of deferred adjudication community supervision in the manner provided by Article 42A.753 or 42A.757.”² Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.103(c).³ Article 42A.753 provides that, on a showing of “good cause,” a judge “may extend a period of community supervision ․ as frequently as the judge determines is necessary, but the period of community supervision in [felony cases] may not exceed 10 years ․” Id. art. 42A.753(a). This article does not limit a judge to extending community supervision only when a motion to revoke is filed and the court finds that the defendant violated a condition of the original terms of community supervision.⁴ Instead, it expressly authorizes a judge to extend community supervision “as frequently as the judge determines is necessary” provided that a showing of good cause is made. See id.

Courts have held that a trial court has discretion to extend the period of community supervision with or without a revocation motion and with or without a hearing. See Kainer v. State, No. 07-18-00203-CR, 2018 WL 6565010, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2018, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Trial courts have discretion to extend the period of community supervision with or without a motion to revoke or a hearing.”); In re Gandara, No. 08-17-00053-CR, 2017 WL 2822514, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 30, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Article 42A.753(a) does not limit a judge to extending community supervision only when a motion to revoke is filed and the court finds that the probation[er] violated a condition of the original terms of community supervision.”); see also Prevato v. State, 77 S.W.3d 317, 319-21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (interpreting former article 42.12 and rejecting appellant's argument that trial court did not have authority to extend community supervision because it did not hold a hearing or find that appellant had violated the original terms of his community supervision); Calderon v. State, 75 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh'g) (same); Ex parte Harrington, 883 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref'd) (noting that trial court's “general authority” to set “reasonable terms and conditions of deferred adjudication probation” under previous article 42.12 permitted extension of probation without the filing of a revocation motion); cf. Garrett v. State, 377 S.W.3d 697, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Section 5(a) of Article 42.12 permits a trial judge to extend the period of deferred-adjudication community supervision ‘in the manner provided by Section 22(c)[.]’ The first clause of Section 22(c), as well as the last sentence, prescribe the manner, i.e., for ‘good cause,’ ‘as often as the judge determines is necessary,’ and ‘at any time’ within the originally assessed period of community supervision.”). We decline to impose requirements, such as a hearing or a violation finding, that the legislature chose not to impose. E.g., Garrett, 377 S.W.3d at 703 (noting that absent ambiguity, we must construe statutes as written).

Nonetheless, to extend a period of community supervision under article 42A.753, the movant must show good cause. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.753(a); see also Kainer, 2018 WL 6565010, at *2; Gandara, 2017 WL 2822514, at *3-4; Barton-Rye v. State, No. 07-16-00096-CR, 2016 WL 4678963, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 1, 2016, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “Good cause” is not defined in article 42A.753. Our sister court in Amarillo has defined this phrase as connoting “something akin to a legitimate or substantial reason, as opposed to mere arbitrariness.” Barton-Rye, 2016 WL 4678963, at *1 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 822 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (unabridged 3rd ed. 1976)); see also Kainer, 2018 WL 6565010, at *2 (applying this definition); Gandara, 2017 WL 2822514, at *4 (same). We agree with our sister courts that this definition is well-reasoned and apply it in today's case. See Kainer, 2018 WL 6565010, at *2; Gandara, 2017 WL 2822514, at *4.

Although proof of a violation of the terms and conditions of community supervision always constitutes good cause supporting an extension, a violation is not necessary to support an extension. Kainer, 2018 WL 6565010, at *2; Gandara, 2017 WL 2822514, at *4. Instead, so long as there is some legitimate reason for the trial court's decision to extend the period of community supervision, an appellant is not entitled to relief. See Kainer, 2018 WL 6565010, at *2 (citing Gandara, 2017 WL 2822514, at *4).

In Kainer, the Amarillo Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had sufficient good cause to support an extension of the appellant's community supervision under similar facts as are present here: the appellant agreed in writing to the modification of her probation by signing an “Order Amending Conditions of Community Supervision,” in which she also waived her right to an attorney and hearing. Kainer, 2018 WL 6565010, at *3.

Here, the order states that it “appear[ed] to the court that the best interest of the public and of the defendant as well will be better served by modification of the terms of supervision[.]” Appellant argues that this “best interest” finding does not suffice, because, without a hearing, nothing was “shown” to the court to constitute “good cause.” We have already explained that a hearing was not necessary before the trial court extended appellant's community supervision. Furthermore, one of the terms of his community supervision was that appellant had to “complete any programs” that were indicated by the Harris County Community Supervision and Corrections Department's assessment of him. During the revocation hearing, appellant's CSO testified that completing a “Batterers’ Intervention” program was one of the requirements of appellant's community supervision. Appellant acknowledged that his community supervision had been extended because he was having difficulty participating in a domestic violence treatment program.⁵ Certainly, extending his community supervision rather than incarcerating appellant for this violation serves as a substantial or legitimate reason for the extension. Cf. Barton-Rye, 2016 WL 4678963, at *1. Accordingly, the record establishes that the trial court's August 2024 order extending the terms of his community supervision was supported by good cause.⁶ And appellant agreed in writing to the extension, which does not support his request for relief. See Kainer, 2018 WL 6565010, at *3.

We overrule appellant's second issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled appellant's issues, we affirm the judgment adjudicating his guilt.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to the State, CLO refers to a “court liaison officer,” and CSO refers to a “community supervision officer.”

2.   Article 42A.757 applies only to extensions of community supervision for certain sex offenders, which is not applicable in today's case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.757.

3.   Article 42A.752, which is not referenced in article 42A.103, addresses continuation or modification of community supervision after a violation finding and authorizes the judge, following a hearing, to impose additional conditions, including an extension of the supervision period. Id. art. 42A.752.

4.   See footnote 3, supra.

5.   In fact, the State's amended motion to adjudicate guilt included “failing to participate in domestic violence treatment program” as one of the violations appellant committed.

6.   We note that the better practice would be to more clearly articulate the good cause for extending the supervisory period in the order itself. See Kainer, 2018 WL 6565010 at *3 (order noted that period was extended “to allow the defendant to pay back [her] Court Costs, Community Supervision Fees and Restitution, or complete Court Ordered Programs”); Barton-Rye, 2016 WL 4678963, at *1 (modification order stated that “[a]s an alternative to incarceration, the original probationary period is extended one (1) year(s)”).

Kevin Jewell, Justice