NGUYEN v. STATE (2026)

OPINION

After Tu Anh Nguyen pleaded guilty to injuring an elderly person, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed him on community supervision for five years. The State subsequently moved to adjudicate Nguyen's guilt, alleging that he had committed new criminal offenses in violation of the community supervision conditions. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court found that Nguyen violated the community supervision conditions, adjudicated Nguyen's guilt for the charged offense, and assessed his punishment at eight years' confinement.

In his sole appellate issue, Nguyen argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Nguyen's guilt because no capias was timely issued for his arrest after the State filed its adjudication motion. We affirm.

Background

On September 15, 2023, Nguyen pleaded guilty to injuring his elderly mother. The trial court deferred adjudication of Nguyen's guilt and placed him on community supervision for five years. The community supervision conditions imposed several requirements on him, including requirements that he commit no new criminal offenses, that he not harass or threaten his parents, and that he not go within 200 feet of his parents' house. The conditions provided that Nguyen's community supervision period ends on September 14, 2028.

Eleven days after he was placed on community supervision, the State moved to adjudicate his guilt, alleging that Nguyen had committed new criminal offenses, including assaulting his parents. In the prayer for relief, the State requested “that Alias Capias issue and upon arrest that a hearing be given the Defendant and that on the final hearing an adjudication of guilt be entered.” The motion contained a place for the trial court to sign underneath this statement: “MOTION GRANTED AS PRAYED FOR and the Clerk is hereby ORDERED to issue Alias Capias for arrest of the Defendant and that a copy of this Motion be served on the Defendant.” The trial court did so.

That same day, the district clerk issued a “Court Directive: Remand Defendant to Custody.” This document had several options justifying taking a defendant into custody, including the filing of a motion to adjudicate guilt. The document also contained references to three cause numbers representing “new law violations ․ while on deferred.” A signed sheriff's return indicated that Nguyen was placed in custody in the Harris County Jail that day,¹ and a separate sheriff's return indicated that a copy of the motion to adjudicate was delivered to Nguyen approximately two months later. A capias does not appear in the record.

More than a year later, the State filed an amended motion to adjudicate guilt. In addition to the original allegations that Nguyen committed new offenses, this motion alleged that Nguyen harassed or threatened his parents and that he went within 200 feet of his parents' house, further violating his community supervision conditions. The amended motion contained identical language to the original motion relating to a capias. The court signed this motion as well, ordering issuance of a capias. A deputy district clerk ordered the Harris County Sheriff to deliver a copy of the adjudication motion to Nguyen, who was still in custody, and the sheriff's return indicated that a deputy did so. Once again, a capias does not appear in the record.

The trial court held an adjudication hearing on January 14, 2025. After receiving testimony and admitting exhibits relating to the allegations in the amended motion to adjudicate, the court found three allegations to be true. The court adjudicated Nguyen's guilt for the charged offense, revoked his community supervision, assessed his punishment at eight years' confinement, and recommended that he be placed in a substance abuse felony punishment facility.

This appeal followed.

Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Guilt

In his sole appellate issue, Nguyen argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate his guilt because a capias for his arrest did not issue following filing of the adjudication motion.

A. Relevant Law Relating to the Procedure to Adjudicate Guilt

In a criminal case, a trial court's jurisdiction consists of “the power of the court over the subject matter of the case, conveyed by statute or constitutional provision, coupled with personal jurisdiction over the accused, which is invoked in felony prosecutions by the filing of [an] indictment or information if indictment is waived.” State v. Dunbar, 297 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). If the court does not impose community supervision, the defendant does not file a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment, and the defendant does not appeal, then the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant terminates thirty days after sentencing. Id. If the court places a defendant on community supervision, “[t]he execution of the sentence has been delayed contingent upon the successful completion of certain specified requirements.” Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

When a defendant on deferred adjudication community supervision violates a condition of that supervision, Code of Criminal Procedure article 42A.108 entitles him to a hearing:

(a) On violation of a condition of deferred adjudication community supervision imposed under Article 42A.104, the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Article 42A.751.

(b) The defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to a determination by the court of whether the court will proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge. The court may not proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the alleged violation of a condition of deferred adjudication community supervision is the uncorroborated results of a polygraph examination. The determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation hearing conducted under Article 42A.751(d) in a case in which the adjudication of guilt was not deferred.

(c) A court retains jurisdiction to hold a hearing under Subsection (b) and to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, regardless of whether the period of deferred adjudication community supervision imposed on the defendant has expired, if before the expiration of the supervision period:

(1) the attorney representing the state files a motion to proceed with the adjudication; and

(2) a capias is issued for the arrest of the defendant.2

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.108. A community supervision revocation hearing “is an extension of the original sentencing portion of the trial of a defendant.”³ Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 874; Porras v. State, 629 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref'd) (probation revocation proceeding “is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court”).

When the deferred adjudication community supervision period expires and the trial court has not proceeded to an adjudication of the defendant's guilt, the court “shall dismiss the proceedings against the defendant and discharge the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.111(a). This is a ministerial duty, and the trial court “has no discretion but to dismiss the underlying criminal charges.” In re Leger, 598 S.W.3d 469, 471 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

B. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Hear the Adjudication Motion

Nguyen argues that article 42A.108(c) requires issuance of a capias for the trial court to have jurisdiction to hear an adjudication motion in all instances, pointing to the language that the court retains jurisdiction to hold a hearing and to proceed with an adjudication of guilt “regardless of whether the period of deferred adjudication community supervision imposed on the defendant has expired” if the State moves to adjudicate guilt and a capias issues before the community supervision period expires. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.108(c). He acknowledges that caselaw has created “uncertainty” over whether the capias requirement applies when the community supervision period has not expired.

For example, in Prior v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke deferred adjudication community supervision “after the probationary term has expired, as long as both a motion alleging a violation of probationary terms is filed and a capias or arrest warrant is issued prior to the expiration of the term ․”⁴ 795 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), abrogated by statute as recognized in Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d 786, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see, e.g., Langston v. State, 800 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam) (following Prior), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 843 S.W.2d 34, 35 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Peacock v. State, 77 S.W.3d 285, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (trial court can hear motion to revoke community supervision after supervision period has expired, but for trial court's jurisdiction to extend beyond expiration, motion to revoke must be filed and capias must issue), superseded by statute as stated in Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Nguyen concedes that these authorities imply that if the community supervision period has not expired, the trial court has jurisdiction to hold an adjudication hearing without issuance of a capias. But he posits that other cases suggest the contrary.

Nguyen cites several cases which, he contends, suggest that issuance of a capias is a jurisdictional prerequisite in all cases, even cases in which the community supervision period has not expired. In Brecheisen v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that “[t]wo requirements must be met for a trial court to acquire jurisdiction to revoke probation”: the State must file an adjudication motion and a capias must issue, and both must occur before expiration of the supervision period. 4 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), superseded by statute as stated in Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 22. Although the capias was not served (and the adjudication hearing was not held) in Brecheisen until after the supervision period had expired, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not limit its statement about jurisdictional requirements to situations in which the supervision period had expired. Id.; see also, e.g., Guillot v. State, 543 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (“It is true that in order for the court to have jurisdiction to revoke probation both the motion to revoke and capias for arrest must be issued prior to the termination of the probationary period.”), superseded by statute as stated in Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d at 791; Johnston v. State, 774 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no pet.) (“[O]nce the State filed a motion [to adjudicate] and a capias was issued, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the merits of the motion.”). Nguyen urges us to follow this set of authorities and hold that issuance of a capias is a jurisdictional prerequisite to hold a hearing and proceed with adjudication of guilt in all cases, even cases in which the community supervision period has not expired.

After the parties submitted their briefing in this case, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed this issue head on in an unpublished memorandum opinion. Ibarra v. State, No. 14-25-00140-CR, 2026 WL 937437 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 7, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The trial court placed Ibarra on deferred adjudication community supervision for five years in January 2023. Id. at *1. His community supervision period therefore would not expire until January 2028. In March 2024, he was taken into custody for several alleged new offenses. Id. Several days later, well before the expiration of the supervision period, the State moved to adjudicate guilt on the original charge. Id. As in this case, the State requested that a capias issue, and the trial court signed an order for capias to issue. Id. Also as in this case, no capias ever issued. Id. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to adjudicate, found that Ibarra committed several violations of the community supervision conditions, and adjudicated his guilt for the original charge. Id.

On appeal, Ibarra argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his guilt because no capias ever issued. Id. In disagreeing, the Fourteenth Court took a step back to consider the wider context of deferred adjudication proceedings and “how the trial court here acquired jurisdiction in the first place.” Id. at *2. Once the indictment was filed, the trial court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Ibarra, and “the jurisdiction the trial court possessed prior to ordering community supervision persisted after that order was issued.” Id. When the trial court defers adjudication of guilt and places the defendant on community supervision, “it is ordinarily the expiration of the supervision period that terminates the trial court's jurisdiction over the case”: if the period expires and the court has not proceeded to adjudicate guilt, the court has no discretion but shall dismiss the proceeding and discharge the defendant. Id. (quoting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.111(a) and citing In re Leger, 598 S.W.3d at 471).

Because the “ordinary purpose” of a capias is to secure the presence of the defendant at a proceeding against him, the Fourteenth Court concluded it was “not plausible” that issuing a capias confers jurisdiction on the trial court “it would normally possess already” or that absence of a capias “somehow deprived the trial court of jurisdiction that it would normally possess.” Id. at *3. While a capias can “facilitate a trial court's exercise of jurisdiction by ultimately bringing a defendant before it to potentially have guilt adjudicated,” no capias was needed because Ibarra was already in custody when the State filed the adjudication motion, and he remained in custody throughout the pendency of the motion. Id. “That custody itself enabled [Ibarra] to be brought before the trial court and to have his guilt adjudicated during his community supervision period, even without a capias.” Id.

The Fourteenth Court further focused on the introductory phrase of article 42A.108(c), which uses “ ‘retains’ to describe the trial court's possession of jurisdiction in association with a capias's issuance.” Id. Citing the Black's Law Dictionary definition of “retains,” the court reasoned that that word “encompasses not merely having possession of something (here, jurisdiction), but it actively connotes the avoidance of its loss.” Id.; Retain, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (definitions include “[t]o hold in possession or under control; to keep and not lose, part with, or dismiss”). The court explained why it interpreted “retains” as not requiring a capias when the supervision period had not expired:

We all the more view that term [“retains”] not as requiring a capias for the trial court to possess jurisdiction to adjudicate guilt in the first place, but rather in allowing jurisdiction to be possessed despite something having occurred that would otherwise terminate it. The statutory language itself notes what that terminating thing would be, acknowledging that it allows for jurisdiction to be retained “regardless of whether the period of deferred adjudication community supervision imposed on the defendant has expired.” And the expiration of the supervision period, as we have already mentioned, is what normally terminates a trial court's jurisdiction over such defendants.

Here, that terminating circumstance did not occur; [Ibarra's] guilt was adjudicated in 2025, whereas his supervision period was set to expire in 2028. We do not see the word “retains” as requiring a capias's issuance for jurisdictional purposes when the circumstance requiring “ret[ention]” of jurisdiction (here, the 2028 expiration of [Ibarra's] supervision period) has not yet occurred.

Id. (citation omitted).

After reviewing the relevant statutory authorities and the caselaw, we find the Fourteenth Court's reasoning in Ibarra to be persuasive. When a trial court defers adjudication of guilt and places a defendant on community supervision, the court maintains jurisdiction over the defendant during the community supervision period. See Porras, 629 S.W.3d at 290 (probation revocation proceeding “is considered an extension of the original sentencing portion of the defendant's trial, and therefore it is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court”); cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.051(b) (“The judge of the court having jurisdiction of the case may, at any time during the period of community supervision, modify the conditions of community supervision.”). That jurisdiction terminates when the supervision period ends, at which point the court must dismiss the proceeding and discharge the defendant if the court has not proceeded to adjudicate guilt. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.111(a); In re Leger, 598 S.W.3d at 471 (trial court has no discretion but to dismiss underlying charge if supervision period ends without adjudication of guilt).

Nguyen focuses on a phrase in article 42A.108(c)—“regardless of whether the period of deferred adjudication community supervision imposed on the defendant has expired”—as an indicator that issuance of a capias is required in all cases, even those in which the supervision period has not expired. We read that language instead as preserving a trial court's jurisdiction to adjudicate guilt when jurisdiction otherwise would have terminated, that is, after expiration of the supervision period, so long as the State moves to adjudicate guilt and a capias issues before expiration of the period.

Under this interpretation of article 42A.108(c), the trial court here had jurisdiction to adjudicate Nguyen's guilt. The court placed Nguyen on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of five years on September 15, 2023. The community supervision period would therefore expire on September 14, 2028. The State first moved to adjudicate guilt on September 26, 2023, eleven days after the court placed Nguyen on community supervision. The State amended its motion on November 20, 2024, a date within the supervision period. And the trial court held the hearing and adjudicated Nguyen's guilt on January 14, 2025, a date still within the supervision period. The record reflects that Nguyen had been in custody at least since September 25, 2023, and he remained in custody at the time of the hearing.

We conclude that because Nguyen's community supervision period had not expired, the failure to issue a capias did not present an obstacle to the trial court's adjudicating Nguyen's guilt because it retained jurisdiction to do so.

We overrule Nguyen's sole appellate issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record reflects that Nguyen was already in custody when the State moved to adjudicate guilt, the trial court signed the motion ordering issuance of the capias, and the court directive issued. The record contains an order appointing counsel for Nguyen dated the day before the adjudication motion. Nguyen did not sign this order because he was “in custody.”

2.   A capias is a writ issued by “a judge of the court having jurisdiction of a case after commitment or bail and before trial” and directed to any state peace officer “commanding the officer to arrest a person accused of an offense and bring the arrested person before that court immediately or on a day or at a term stated in the writ.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 23.01; id. art. 23.02 (requirements for capias to be sufficient). “The purpose of the capias is simply to secure the presence of a defendant at a proceeding against him.” Ruiz v. State, 100 S.W.3d 259, 260 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).

3.   We note that Cobb involved community supervision imposed after conviction and sentencing, rather than deferred adjudication community supervision. The Court of Criminal Appeals has directed that due to the similarities in statutes governing “regular” community supervision and deferred adjudication community supervision, we should interpret the statutes similarly. Prior v. State, 795 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), abrogated by statute as recognized in Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d 786, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d at 791 (citing Prior for this proposition).

4.   At the time of Prior, the common law allowed a defense to revocation if, in executing a capias and securing a hearing on the adjudication motion, the State failed to exercise due diligence to apprehend the defendant. Prior, 795 S.W.2d at 184 (recognizing three jurisdictional requirements to adjudicate guilt after end of probationary period: filing of adjudication motion before expiration of period, issuance of capias before expiration, and “due diligence to apprehend the probationer and to hear and determine the allegations in the motion”); Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (recognizing common-law due diligence defense existed). Now, the Code of Criminal Procedure allows an affirmative defense to revocation only for certain violations of community supervision conditions if no officer contacted or attempted to contact the defendant in person at his last known residential or employment address. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.109.

David Gunn, Justice