IN RE: the MARRIAGE OF Amanda Kay DAVIS and Jeffrey Ryan Davis (2026)

OPINION

Jeffrey Ryan Davis (Husband) appeals the Final Decree of Divorce entered in his divorce proceeding against Amanda Kay Davis (Wife). In two issues, Husband argues the trial court erred by (1) characterizing seventy percent of real property located at 7409 Silver Lake Drive, Rowlett, Texas 75089 (Silver Lake) as community property rather than as his separate property and (2) authorizing the appointment of a receiver and a forced sale of Silver Lake. Because the undisputed record shows that Husband gained a contractual right to purchase Silver Lake before the parties’ marriage, we conclude that Silver Lake is Husband's separate property as a matter of law under the inception-of-title doctrine. We reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment that divides the community estate and remand to the trial court for a new property division, vacate the receiver and forced-sale provisions, and otherwise affirm the Final Decree of Divorce.

I. Background

Husband and Wife married on March 20, 2020, in Rockwall, Texas. The parties ceased living together as spouses on or about January 11, 2023. There were no children born of the marriage. Wife filed her Original Petition for Divorce on May 12, 2023. Husband filed his Original Counterpetition for Divorce on June 20, 2023. The case proceeded to bench trial on March 25, 2024. Because the parties had no minor children, the trial addressed only property. The principal asset in dispute was real property located at 7409 Silver Lake Drive, Rowlett, Texas 75089 (Silver Lake).

The parties moved into Silver Lake in 2017. It was originally owned by Husband's uncle, Michael Redmond, who died in 2016. Redmond's will provided Silver Lake was “to be sold” and the net proceeds distributed to named beneficiaries, Husband and his siblings. Husband was to receive thirty percent of those net proceeds, and the six other named individuals were to receive the remainder.

Redmond's will named Husband's mother, Kathleen Margaret Davis (Kathy Davis), as executor. Kathy Davis is a licensed realtor who testified that Husband and his siblings entered into a family settlement agreement. As part of that agreement, the six other beneficiaries of the Redmond estate executed written instruments titled “Agreement to Allow Purchase,” expressly authorizing Husband to purchase all beneficial portions of Silver Lake and acknowledging that the other beneficiaries would receive their devised shares of sale proceeds. These documents were signed before Husband and Wife were married on March 20, 2020. Wife—then named Amanda Scott—notarized several of these instruments before the marriage.

On June 30, 2019, a TREC One to Four Family Residential Contract was signed identifying Husband as “Buyer” and “the Estate of Michael J. Redmond” as “Seller” (the 2019 Agreement). The agreement stated: “Seller agrees to sell and convey to Buyer and Buyer agrees to buy from Seller the Property defined below.” It is undisputed that “the Property defined below” referred to Silver Lake.

Kathy Davis testified that the 2019 Agreement was the purchase contract for Silver Lake. She further testified that she signed the 2019 Agreement as seller and executor, that it consolidated and effectuated the agreement with all the Redmond will beneficiaries, that every heir authorized her signing, and that all relevant parties complied with its terms. Wife's counsel stated “No objection” when Husband's counsel offered the 2019 Agreement as an exhibit during trial; it was admitted into evidence.

Wife testified that she was aware of each document related to the sale of Silver Lake to Husband. Wife further testified that she notarized some of the “Agreement to Allow Purchase” instruments before marrying Husband (in 2020) and that she knew at the time of notarization that the documents pertained to “[g]etting us full ownership of [Silver Lake].”

The sale of Silver Lake closed after the parties’ March 20, 2020 marriage. On August 4, 2020, Kathy Davis and Husband signed an Owelty Agreement, pursuant to which Kathy Davis agreed, as “Selling Co-Tenant,” to execute an owelty deed conveying an undivided interest in Silver Lake to Husband and reserving an owelty lien in the amount of $74,704.91, and Husband agreed, as “Purchasing Co-Tenant,” to execute a promissory note in the same amount secured by a deed-of-trust lien. On October 23, 2020, Kathy Davis and Husband signed an Owelty of Partition Deed, pursuant to which Kathy Davis, as executor of Michael Redmond's estate, conveyed an undivided interest in Silver Lake to Husband for the consideration of a note (1) signed by Husband and payable to HomeTrust Mortgage Company in a specified amount, “$74,704.91 of which represents an owelty of partition,” and (2) secured by a first-lien deed of trust. Husband alone signed the promissory note referenced in the Owelty of Partition Deed, and Wife confirmed at trial that she was not a borrower on the note.

In its Final Decree of Divorce, the trial court confirmed thirty percent of Silver Lake as Husband's separate property and characterized the remaining seventy percent as community property. Regarding the seventy percent characterized as community property, the trial court awarded each party equally thirty-five percent of the net equity in Silver Lake. The decree ordered Husband to pay Wife her thirty-five percent share within sixty days and, failing agreement on value or timely payment, authorized the appointment of a receiver to sell Silver Lake and distribute the proceeds.

The trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 12, 2025. Among the findings, the court found that the remaining seventy percent of Silver Lake was acquired during the marriage, that there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of community property as to that portion, and that the property should be divided accordingly. Husband timely filed Objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a request for Additional and Amended filings on August 22, 2025. Wife did not file objections or request additional or amended findings.

II. Characterization of Silver Lake

A. Standard of Review

A trial court's division of property in a divorce decree is reviewed on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). We will reverse the trial court's ruling only if the record demonstrates that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the error materially affected the just and right division of the community estate. Sink v. Sink, 364 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). While the trial court has broad discretion in dividing the community estate, that discretion is bound by the constitutional and statutory requirement that a court may not divest a spouse of separate property. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140–42 (Tex. 1977). Characterization of property is determined by the Texas Constitution and the Family Code, not by the trial court's discretion. Id.; see also Tex. Const. art XVI, § 15; Tex. Fam. Code § 3.001. It is unconstitutional for a trial court to divest a party of their separate property by awarding any portion of it to the other party in a divorce proceeding. See Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 141. Mischaracterizing separate property as community property is reversible error as a matter of law without the need to conduct a harm analysis because it divests a spouse of separate property. See id. at 140–42 (affirming reversal of the trial court's mischaracterization of separate property as community property without conducting a harm analysis); Dahl v. Dahl, No. 05-07-01338-CV, 2009 WL 866199, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he erroneous characterization of a spouse's separate property as community property is never harmless error.”).

B. Applicable Law

“Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of the marriage ․ is presumed to be community property.” Bean v. Bean, 658 S.W.3d 401, 415 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(a); Sink, 364 S.W.3d at 344). This presumption may be rebutted by proof of a spouse's separate ownership of the property. McClintic v. Midland Grocery & Dry Goods Co., 154 S.W. 1157 (Tex. 1913). The party asserting separate ownership must rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(b).

In Welder v. Lambert, the Texas Supreme Court held that the inception-of-title doctrine may apply to a claim of separate property based on circumstances occurring before the legal title or evidence of title to the property has been attained. 44 S.W. 281, 287 (Tex. 1898). In that case, James Power and James Hewitson entered a colonization contract with the state of Coahuila and Texas in 1828, while Power was single. Id. at 281. The contract provided that, in consideration of Power's and Hewitson's agreement to introduce colonists into the state, they were given the right to a premium in lands to be selected and granted to them upon their compliance with the agreement. Id. at 282. Power married his first wife in 1832; she died in 1836; and he married a second wife who survived him. He received two grants of premium lands in 1834, after the first marriage. Id. at 281–82. The Texas Supreme Court held that the premium lands were Power's separate property because his claim to them originated in the pre-marriage contract. Id. at 287. The court reasoned:

In this cause the title originated in the contract of Power and Hewitson with the state of Coahuila and Texas. That contract ․ was the cause of the title. Power was single when it was entered into, and the right to earn the lands acquired by it was his separate property. The title relates to its origin, and must take the impress of its character from it.

Id. at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Texas Supreme Court has restated the rule in later cases. See Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001) (“Generally, whether property is separate or community is determined by its character at inception ․”); Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. 1984) (citing Welder as deciding that “the status of the property is to be determined by the origin of the title to the property, and not by the acquisition of the final title”). This Court has also quoted the rule as stated by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals: “Inception of title occurs when a party first has a right or claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.” Bean, 658 S.W.3d at 416 (quoting Pettitt v. Pettitt, 704 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

The inception-of-title rule is now statutory. Separate property includes property “owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage.” Id. § 3.001(1). Whether property is separate or community in character “is determined at the time the right to own or claim the property arises.” Tex. Fam. Code § 3.404(a). And “[i]f the community estate of the spouses and the separate estate of a spouse have an ownership interest in property, the respective ownership interests of the marital estates are determined by the rule of inception of title under which the character of property is determined at the time the right to own or claim the property arises.” Id. § 3.006.

C. Analysis

1. The findings

The trial court made the following express findings of fact and conclusions of law relevant to the characterization of Silver Lake:

Findings of Fact

․

12. The Court finds that Jeffrey Ryan Davis inherited as his separate property a 30% interest in the real property located at 7409 Silver Lake Drive, Rowlett, Texas 75089.

13. The Court finds that the remaining 70% ownership interest of the real property located at 7409 Silver Lake Drive, Rowlett, Texas 75089, was acquired during the marriage of Jeffrey Ryan Davis and Amanda Kay Davis.

14. There was insufficient evidence to overcome the community property presumption in the remaining 70% interest in the real property located at 7409 Silver Lake Drive, Rowlett, Texas 75089.

15. The Court finds that the community property ownership interest in the real property located at 7409 Silver Lake Drive, Rowlett, Texas 75089, should be divided as follows: Amanda Kay Davis should receive 35% of the net equity as her community property interest in the property, and Jeffrey Ryan Davis should receive 35% of the net equity as his community property interest in the property.

․

Conclusions of Law

․

6. The Court finds that Jeffrey Ryan Davis inherited as his separate property a 30% interest in the real property located at 7409 Silver Lake Drive, Rowlett, Texas 75089.

7. The Court finds that the remaining 70% ownership interest of the real property located at 7409 Silver Lake Drive, Rowlett, Texas 75089, is community property of the marriage of Jeffrey Ryan Davis and Amanda Kay Davis.

Because there were no express findings regarding Husband's claim of inception of title under the 2019 Agreement, the trial court necessarily impliedly (1) found incredible the evidence establishing the 2019 Agreement as a valid contract for sale or (2) concluded as a legal matter that inception of title did not occur under the 2019 Agreement. We consider the second possibility first.

2. Pre-marriage purchase contracts and the inception-of-title rule

We note that no decision from this Court directly addresses whether a pre-marriage purchase contract fixes the inception of title before the marriage. However, other Texas courts have held that it does. We find their reasoning persuasive and, on the record before us, adopt it here.

In Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, the husband entered into an earnest-money contract to purchase a home before he married his wife. 623 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). He applied for a VA loan as a single man and received a loan commitment in his name alone. Id. After the marriage, the deed was conveyed to the husband “as a single man,” and he alone signed the note and deed of trust. Id. The First Court of Appeals held:

[T]he appellee acquired a claim to the property at the time the purchase money contract was entered into. The earnest money date being prior to the marriage of the parties, the appellee's right of claim to the property preceded the marriage, and the character of the property as separate property was established and the community property presumption was rebutted.

Id. at 732.

In Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ), the husband testified that he signed an earnest-money contract and secured it using funds from his separate account on October 29, 1974. Id. at 779. The parties married on December 7, 1974, and closing took place on January 15, 1975—after the wedding—with both spouses signing the note and deed of trust. Id. The trial court found the earnest-money contract was signed before the marriage. Id. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held: “Appellee acquired a right to title to the property when he entered into the earnest money contract.” Id. The court further held that “[t]he date of acceptance by the seller is not relevant” and that, where “there is no evidence that both spouses were named in the earnest money contract,” the later deed naming both did not change the property's character. Id. at 779–80.¹

In Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 992 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.), the husband signed a contract for deed to the property on February 17, 1978, and began making payments before the marriage in May 1980. Id. at 722. Legal title was later conveyed during the marriage, and the deed named both spouses as grantees. Id. Community funds were used to pay the balance and build a house on the property. Id. The Austin Court of Appeals held that “[w]hen real property is acquired under a contract for deed or installment contract, the inception of title relates back to the time the contract was executed, not the time when legal title is conveyed,” and confirmed the property as the husband's separate property. Id. The court noted that it was “undisputed ․ that [the husband] contracted for the property and began making payments on the property before marriage,” and that there was uncontroverted testimony no gift was intended when both names were included on the deed. Id. at 723. The court reasoned that “absent evidence of a transfer or gift by [the husband] to [the wife], under the inception-of-title doctrine the property was [the husband's] separate property.” Id.

The factual similarities between those cases and the matter before us now are compelling. The 2019 Agreement is a standard TREC One to Four Family Residential Contract (Resale) that states: “Seller agrees to sell and convey to Buyer and Buyer agrees to buy from Seller the Property.” The contract names “Jeffrey Ryan Davis” as Buyer and “The Estate of Michael J. Redmond” as Seller. Id. The contract is dated June 30, 2019, more than nine months before the parties’ March 20, 2020 wedding. Only Husband is named as Buyer; Wife is not a party to the agreement.

Kathy Davis, the executor of the estate and a licensed realtor, testified that the 2019 Agreement was the purchase contract through which Husband acquired Silver Lake, that she signed it as both seller and executor, that she waited until she had permission from all the heirs before signing, and that “[e]verybody fulfilled and went through with the contract that they agreed to in June of 2019.” As noted above, the 2019 Agreement was admitted into evidence without objection.

Under the inception-of-title doctrine, Husband's “right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested,” Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d at 731–32, arose no later than June 30, 2019, the date both Buyer and Seller signed the TREC contract.² That date preceded the marriage. The Owelty Agreement (August 2020), the deed (October 2020), and the note (December 2020) completed the mechanics of closing but did not alter the character established at inception. See id. (“[T]he appellee acquired a claim to the property at the time the purchase money contract was entered into.”); Carter, 736 S.W.2d at 779 (“Appellee acquired a right to title to the property when he entered into the earnest money contract”); Wilkerson, 992 S.W.2d at 722 (“[T]he inception of title ․ relates back to the time the contract was executed, not the time when legal title is conveyed.”).

Moreover, only Husband was named as Buyer on the 2019 Agreement, and Wife was not a party to it. Under Carter, where “there is no evidence that both spouses were named in the earnest money contract,” the later deed naming both spouses—or, as here, the deed naming only Husband—does not change the property's separate character. 736 S.W.2d at 780. And “[t]he date of acceptance by the seller is not relevant.” Id. at 779. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a transfer or gift from Husband to Wife, nor does Wife argue on appeal that Silver Lake or a portion thereof was gifted or transferred to her from Husband. See Wilkerson, 992 S.W.2d at 723 (“[A]bsent evidence of a transfer or gift ․ under the inception-of-title doctrine the ․ property was [the husband's] separate property.”). On this record, Silver Lake is Husband's separate property as a matter of law.

The record is silent as to whether community funds may have been used after marriage for mortgage payments. However, this silence does not alter our conclusion. “Once the character of the property is fixed, the use of funds of another estate to complete the purchase does not alter the character of the property, although the other estate may be entitled to reimbursement for the funds contributed.” Wilkerson, 992 S.W.2d at 722; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 3.404 (“(a) This subchapter does not affect the rule of inception of title under which the character of property is determined at the time the right to own or claim the property arises. (b) A claim for reimbursement under this subchapter does not create an ownership interest in property ․”). Wife neither pleaded nor proved a reimbursement claim.

3. The sufficiency of the evidence regarding the 2019 Agreement

Wife does not dispute the inception-of-title rule or its application to pre-marriage purchase contracts generally. Instead, she argues that the trial court properly “disregarded” the 2019 Agreement because (1) no money changed hands at the time of signing, (2) Husband offered no evidence of financing attempts before marriage, (3) Husband was not legally obligated to pay until the Owelty Agreement in August 2020, and (4) the contract was therefore “illusory” and lacked consideration. Wife further relies on Husband's alleged willingness to sign her name on an unrelated motorcycle-insurance claim as evidence that Husband's “testimony and the purported ‘contract’ were not reliable evidence.”

Given the community-property presumption, it was Husband's burden to prove Silver Lake was his separate property based on inception of title, and Wife argues that he did not carry his burden. Nevertheless, we conclude that to the extent the trial court implicitly found that the 2019 Agreement was not a valid purchase contract, the trial court abused its discretion. Husband adduced evidence that the 2019 Agreement was a valid contract. See, e.g., Thornton v. AT & T Advert., L.P., 390 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (“The elements required for the formation of a valid contract are: (1) an offer, (2) acceptance in strict compliance with the terms of the offer, (3) a meeting of the minds, (4) each party's consent to the terms, and (5) execution and delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and binding.”). The 2019 Agreement is a standard Texas Real Estate Commission form that, on its face, reflects mutual promises: Seller “agrees to sell and convey” and Buyer “agrees to buy.” The mutual promises of a bilateral contract represent consideration, which establishes that the contract was not illusory. See Lefevere v. Sears, 629 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1981, no writ) (an earnest-money contract “is an agreement which binds the purchaser to buy and the seller to sell in accordance with the terms of the contract”). The purchaser under a contract for sale of property has an equitable right to acquire title by performance of the obligations under the contract and, upon such performance, acquires equitable title to the property. Johnson v. Wood, 157 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. [Comm'n Op.] 1941); Siddiq v. Hawkins, No. 05-09-00581-CV, 2011 WL 3211254, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 29, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The fact that no funds changed hands when the 2019 Agreement was signed does not render the contract illusory. See Johnson, 157 S.W.2d at 148; Siddiq, 2011 WL 3211254, at *4.

A fact finder cannot ignore undisputed testimony that is clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible, free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 820 (Tex. 2005); see also Ganguly Holdings, L.L.C. v. Ker-Seva Ltd., No. 05-21-00124-CV, 2022 WL 3024320, at *3–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that some facts were conclusively proved, contrary to the judgment and implied findings). Even though evidence of separate ownership of property is subject to the clear and convincing evidence standard, see Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(b), uncontroverted evidence that property is separate in character constitutes clear and convincing evidence. See Pace v. Pace, 160 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). Kathy Davis's testimony regarding the signing of the 2019 Agreement was clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible, and free from contradictions and inconsistencies. It also was readily controvertible and yet was not controverted. Wife introduced no evidence that the purchase contract was fabricated, and although she had the opportunity to cross-examine Husband and Kathy Davis on the contract's authenticity, she did not pursue that line of questioning. Accordingly, the trial court could not ignore Kathy Davis's testimony regarding the signing of the 2019 Agreement. See Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 820.

Wife argues that Husband's alleged use of his email to electronically sign her name on a motorcycle-insurance claim, in an unrelated matter, demonstrates that Husband is “unreliable” and that the 2019 Agreement should be discredited. The question is whether this evidence controverts the evidence about the 2019 Agreement or somehow makes that evidence not credible. We conclude it does not. As previously noted, the evidence supporting Kathy Davis's account of the family settlement agreement and the 2019 Agreement was clear, positive, and direct. It consisted of evidence regarding objectively verifiable, and thus controvertible, facts and events, some of which Wife herself participated in. Wife does not, however, refer to any evidence impeaching the credibility of Kathy Davis's testimony authenticating the 2019 Agreement and confirming that she signed the 2019 Agreement as seller and executor of Redmond's will and that she did so to effectuate the family settlement agreement. Wife presented no evidence that the 2019 Agreement was fabricated, forged, or in any way intended as a sham transaction. Furthermore, Husband and Kathy Davis performed their respective obligations under the 2019 Agreement, further substantiating its validity. Husband's conduct regarding the motorcycle-insurance claim was unrelated to the Silver Lake purchase and, we conclude, does not impeach the credibility of Kathy Davis's clear, positive, and direct evidence proving up the 2019 Agreement. In sum, the trial court could not reasonably conclude that Husband failed to prove the validity of the 2019 Agreement, and to the extent the court reached such a conclusion, it abused its discretion. See In re C.J., 689 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, no pet.) (holding that the trial court abuses its discretion if the evidence supports only one reasonable conclusion and the trial court fails to reach that conclusion).

On this record, the trial court had no discretion to reach any conclusion except that the 2019 Agreement was a valid contract that established Husband's claim to separate ownership of Silver Lake by inception of title. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in confirming (only) thirty percent of Silver Lake as Husband's separate property and characterizing the remaining seventy percent as community property.

4. Harm

When we conclude that a trial court mischaracterized separate property as community property, the error is by definition harmful and we must reverse and remand. In re Marriage of Vedullapalli, No. 05-22-01248-CV, 2024 WL 3218215, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re S.B.H., No. 05-14-00585-CV, 2016 WL 462495, at *6 n.3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 5, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); Dahl, 2009 WL 866199, at *2. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment that divides the community estate and remand to the trial court for a new property division. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732–33 (Tex. 1985). We sustain Husband's first issue.

III. Receiver and Forced-Sale Provisions

In his second issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by authorizing the appointment of a receiver and ordering the forced sale of Silver Lake. The receiver and forced-sale provisions in the decree rest entirely on the trial court's characterization of seventy percent of Silver Lake as community property, a characterization we conclude is erroneous and reverse. Accordingly, the legal basis for the receiver and forced-sale order no longer exists. We sustain Husband's second issue and vacate the receiver and forced-sale provisions of the decree.

IV. Conclusion

Having concluded that the entirety of Silver Lake is Husband's separate property, we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment that divides the community estate and remand to the trial court for a new property division. We vacate the receiver and forced-sale provisions of the decree. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court's decree.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While the court in Carter acknowledged that “[w]hen a spouse uses separate property consideration to pay for land acquired during the marriage, and takes title to the land in the name of both husband and wife, it is presumed that the spouse intended the interest placed in the other to be a gift,” it also noted that such presumption is rebuttable and was, in that case, rebutted by evidence that no gift was intended. Carter, 736 S.W.2d at 781 (citing Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975)). We note that Husband took title of Silver Lake in his name only, after marriage, and Wife did not argue that the way title was taken of Silver Lake after marriage supported the presumption, or provided evidence, that a gift was intended.

2.   As additional circumstances relevant to inception of title, Husband notes that the other estate beneficiaries, pursuant to the family settlement agreement, signed the written consents authorizing the sale of Silver Lake to Husband and acknowledging that they would receive proceeds of the sale through the estate. One beneficiary signed an Agreement to Allow Purchase on June 19, 2019; four signed on June 22, 2019; and the last one signed on March 6, 2020. We need not and do not decide whether the inception of title may have occurred earlier than June 30, 2019, based on these circumstances. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

Opinion by Justice Rossini