LITTLETON v. STATE (2026)

OPINION

A jury convicted Stephen Douglas Littleton of one count of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The victim was his stepdaughter, K.D. The trial court sentenced him to thirteen years' confinement. On appeal, Littleton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury charge's definitions of “intentionally” and “knowingly.” Because the evidence is legally sufficient and the charge error did not cause egregious harm, we affirm.

Background

K.D. testified that Littleton became her stepfather when she was less than a year old. She lived with him, her mother, and her two siblings. She described four incidents spanning 2015 and 2016, the first occurring when she was in sixth grade—when she was eleven or twelve years old. In the first, Littleton confronted her about bad grades while the two were home alone, told her to pull down her pants and lean over the bed, and groped her buttocks for “a good few minutes.” She felt the fabric of his shorts at his groin against her. Littleton told her not to tell her mother. In the second, Littleton brought a purple-and-black whip that K.D. described as “a sex whip,” removed her pants and underwear, groped her buttocks, and struck her lightly across her legs and buttocks. She felt against her buttocks “something that felt like a penis,” which felt “sticky.” In the third, in her parents' bedroom, Littleton blindfolded her with a necktie, handcuffed her hands behind her back, and positioned her chest and knees on the bed. He grabbed and rubbed her buttocks and legs with his hands. He hit the side of her buttocks and hit her “private area,” which she identified as her vagina. She thought he apologized immediately afterward. The fourth incident again involved the blindfold, the handcuffs, and light taps with the whip, with her pants off. K.D. testified the incidents were not like parental spanking and “felt wrong.”

K.D. told her mother about the incidents more than once. Her mother grew angry—first at Littleton, then at K.D.—and threatened to send K.D. to her father in El Paso. K.D. was eventually kicked out of the house and went to live with her grandmother. In February 2021, while K.D. was living with her grandmother, Littleton sent her an email with the subject line “I love you.” Littleton wrote that he had “humiliated the living shit out of [her] like a moron, violated [her] trust, [her] mind and [her] body.” He wrote that she “now ha[d] a written confession,” that he “pinkie promise[d]” he was not a “pedophile/child molester,” and that he hoped she would forgive his “heinous actions against” her. K.D. forwarded the email to her grandmother, who took it to law enforcement.

On May 8, 2024, Littleton was indicted for six counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact. On September 12, 2024, a jury trial commenced. Carlos Trevino, the investigating officer, interviewed Littleton, and the recording of that interview was played in part for the jury. During the interview, Littleton confirmed many aspects of K.D.'s story: that he “disciplined” K.D. by forcing her to remove her underwear, bending her over the bed, and spanking her bare bottom. Littleton also confirmed that he owned sex toys, including the whip and handcuffs identified by K.D., and that he threatened to use the handcuffs on K.D. But he denied actually using them. Littleton also denied touching K.D. with his penis. Because K.D.'s outcry was delayed, there was no SANE examination, no DNA, and no other physical evidence. No photographs of the house were taken because the family had moved.

After the State rested, Littleton moved for a directed verdict on all six counts, arguing there was no evidence he acted with intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. The State agreed to waive four counts. The court granted the motion for directed verdict on the waived counts and denied the motion as to the remaining two counts.

In his defense, Littleton called K.D.'s mother, Valerie. She testified she was “100 percent against spankings” and that Littleton knew it. Valerie testified K.D. told her only that Littleton had spanked her, that K.D. described “just a spanking,” and that K.D. never mentioned a whip. She acknowledged the spanking she learned of was on K.D.'s bare bottom and occurred outside her presence. She testified K.D. had lied frequently from an early age and agreed she considered K.D. “generally a liar.” She acknowledged that she and Littleton owned a purple-and-black whip and handcuffs.

At the charge conference, the defense requested a definition of “genitals,” if a statutory definition existed. Neither side otherwise objected to the charge. The next morning, the trial court stated the charge was complete and both parties had agreed to it. The charge defined “intentionally” as to both the nature and the result of conduct: “A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” It defined “knowingly” as to the nature of conduct and surrounding circumstances: “A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist.” The application paragraph for Count V asked whether Littleton “intentionally or knowingly” engaged in sexual contact with K.D. by touching part of her genitals with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire.

The jury found Littleton guilty on one count of indecency with a child. The jury assessed punishment at thirteen years' confinement and no fine. The trial court sentenced Littleton in accordance with the verdict. This appeal followed.

Discussion

On appeal, Littleton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He also argues that the jury charge erroneously defined “knowingly,” failed to limit the definition of “intentionally” to the nature of the conduct, and that using these incorrect terms in the application section of the charge caused him egregious harm.

1 Legal Sufficiency

We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (adopting Jackson as the sole sufficiency standard for findings that must be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, and we defer to its resolution of conflicting evidence. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

To convict Littleton of indecency with a child, the State had to prove he touched K.D.'s genitals, or any part of her body with his own genitals, with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. See Tex. Pen. Code § 21.11(a)(1), (c). Indecency with a child is a nature-of-conduct offense: the intent to arouse or gratify a sexual desire is inseparable from the conduct itself. Ex Parte Guinther, 982 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Washington v. State, 930 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no pet.); see also Tex. Pen. Code § 6.03. The culpable mental state attaches to the act itself, not to the result or the circumstances surrounding it. Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Intent to sexually gratify or arouse someone must correspond with the touching when it happens. Guinther, 982 S.W.2d at 510; Washington, 930 S.W.2d at 700.

A defendant's intent to arouse or gratify their sexual desire can be inferred from conduct alone; oral expressions of intent or visible sexual arousal are not required. Robertson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Tristan v. State, 717 S.W.3d 708, 720–21 (Tex. App.—Waco 2025, pet. ref'd); Scott v. State, 202 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. ref'd). A child's uncorroborated testimony alone can support a conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07.

1.1 The evidence is legally sufficient

Littleton argues the evidence does not support the jury's verdict. We disagree.

K.D. testified that Littleton, her stepfather, engaged in a pattern of sexual contact over four incidents between 2015 and 2016—including an incident in which he removed her pants and underwear, groped her buttocks, and struck her with a whip, and an incident in which he handcuffed and blindfolded her before hitting and rubbing her buttocks and her genitals. Her uncorroborated testimony alone is legally sufficient to support the conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.07; Scott, 202 S.W.3d at 408. Littleton's own recorded interview corroborated much of her account: he admitted disciplining K.D. by removing her underwear and spanking her bare bottom, and he admitted owning the whip and handcuffs K.D. described. And after K.D. disclosed the incidents to her grandmother, Littleton sent her an email acknowledging that he had “violated” her “trust,” her “mind[,] and [her] body,” that she now had “a written confession,” and asking forgiveness for his “heinous actions against” her. A jury could rationally read that email, together with K.D.'s testimony and Littleton's own admissions, as evidence that Littleton touched K.D. with intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. See McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (specific intent for indecency with a child may “be inferred from a defendant's conduct, his remarks, and all of the surrounding circumstances”); Tristan, 717 S.W.3d at 720–21.

The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the resolution of conflicting evidence. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. It may believe or disbelieve any part of a witness's testimony. Gonzalez v. State, 522 S.W.3d 48, 56–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Valerie testified that she knew only of ordinary, non-sexual spanking. But the jury was free to credit K.D.'s testimony over Valerie's, and we may not second-guess that credibility choice on appeal. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

Assessing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational juror could have found every element of indecency with a child beyond a reasonable doubt. Littleton's first issue is overruled.

2 Charge Error

When reviewing jury charge error, we first determine whether the charge was erroneous and, if so, whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to compel reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

For an indecency-with-a-child offense, error exists when a jury charge's abstract portion defines “knowingly” and the application paragraph lists “intentionally and knowingly” together, because indecency requires only the specific intent to arouse or gratify, not a knowing mental state. Bazanes v. State, 310 S.W.3d 32, 36–37 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref'd); Jones v. State, 229 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Rodriguez v. State, 24 S.W.3d 499, 501–02 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd). When a charge improperly includes “knowingly” as a requisite culpable mental state, a jury could convict a defendant without the proper mens rea. See Bazanes, 310 S.W.3d at 37. More generally, trial courts must tailor an offense's culpable mental state to its conduct element, and a court errs when it does not limit the mental state to the appropriate element of conduct. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

The charge's application section ¹ reads: “Littleton did intentionally or knowingly engage in sexual contact ․ with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,” and the abstract section included a definition for “knowingly.” The charge also defined intentionally as when “[a] person acts ․ with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Because indecency with a child is strictly a nature-of-conduct offense, see Washington, 930 S.W.2d at 700, it is error to include result-of-conduct and circumstances-of-conduct language when instructing the jury on the requisite mental state. See Price, 457 S.W.3d at 441. Having found error, we turn to whether it harmed Littleton.

2.1 Harm

We analyze harm under the Almanza standard. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The harm required for reversal depends on whether the appellant properly objected to the jury charge. Id. Jury-charge objections are preserved if they isolate the charge deficiency and provide reasoning for the objection. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. Preserved errors require a court to find only “some harm.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. If a party fails to object, though, we may reverse only if the error caused “egregious harm.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. To constitute egregious harm, an error must create harm so “egregious” that the appellant “has not had a fair and impartial trial.” Id. To be harmful, these errors must affect “ ‘the very basis of the case,’ depriv[ing] the defendant of a ‘valuable right,’ or ‘vitally affect[ing] a defensive theory.’ ” Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172). The harm must be actual, not just theoretical. Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When examining a jury charge for error, we examine the charge as a cohesive whole, not as isolated statements. Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Here, there was no objection to the incorrect mental-state definitions, so we review for egregious harm. Under Almanza, we consider (1) the charge itself, (2) the state of the evidence, including contested issues and the weight of probative evidence, (3) arguments of counsel, and (4) any other relevant evidence revealed by the record, such as during voir dire. Olivas, 202 S.W.3d at 144; Nichols v. State, 754 S.W.2d 185, 198–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

The charge itself. The abstract section accurately stated the elements of indecency with a child, including that Littleton must have acted “with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” TEX. PEN. CODE § 21.11. The definition of “knowingly” does not appear in the abstract definition of indecency with a child itself—it appears only in the separate definitions section. And while the application includes “intentionally and knowingly,” specific intent to arouse or gratify was never removed or replaced, and the abstract accurately set out the elements of indecency with a child. Bazanes, 310 S.W.3d at 39.

In Bazanes, the Fort Worth court held that a jury charge with an abstract section defining “intentionally” and “knowingly” and an application section using “intentionally and knowingly” did not cause egregious harm because the charge otherwise correctly defined indecency with a child and the application section included every essential element of the offense, including specific intent. Id. at 37–38. Specifically, because the charge correctly defined indecency with a child and the application section included every essential element of the offense, including the specific intent, the court held these errors did not cause egregious harm. Id. at 37; accord Jimenez v. State, No. 04-22-00525-CR, 2024 WL 950189, *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Because the charge as a whole still conveyed the specific-intent requirement, this factor weighs against egregious harm.

The state of the evidence. During voir dire, the State read Littleton's indictment, which alleged that he “intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual contact with the complainant.” Littleton's attorney immediately clarified that Littleton could not be convicted unless the contact was made with the intent to arouse, that accidental touching does not count, and that sexual intent must accompany the discipline for a crime to have occurred. And we have already reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence—K.D.'s testimony, Littleton's own interview admissions, and his email—supporting a finding of specific intent independent of the charge's mental-state definitions. Given this record evidence and defense counsel's statements at voir dire, the State did not need the flawed mental-state instruction to prove its case.

The arguments of counsel. During closing argument, the State argued that the dispute was “whether all that happened was the light-tap spanking that [Littleton] described or the abuse that [K.D.] described,” without mentioning the need for specific intent. Littleton's attorney countered that the incidents were not as extreme as the State alleged and, again, stressed the specific-intent requirement, arguing that “[t]here is absolutely no evidence, whatsoever, of intent to do anything with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,” and that touching must occur with intent. The State's rebuttal then used the trial evidence to argue specific intent: it contrasted ordinary discipline with Littleton's conduct, argued that the conduct itself showed intent, and tied that intent to the touching of K.D.'s vagina. Both sides' arguments correctly framed specific intent as the contested issue, reducing the risk that the charge's mental-state error misled the jury.

Other relevant information. Counsels' arguments throughout trial reduced harm by consistently and correctly advising the jury on the law—both sides argued specific intent was required, even though they disputed whether the evidence showed it. If a juror believed K.D.'s testimony, they could have rationally inferred Littleton's specific intent to arouse or gratify his own sexual desire from the evidence introduced at trial. See Bazanes, 310 S.W.3d at 38; Alcalachavez v. State, No. 02-25-00134-CR, 2025 WL 3683997, at *5–*7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 18, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

After reviewing the charge, the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the record as a whole, we conclude there is no indication the jury-charge error confused the jury or caused actual harm. See Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165. Accordingly, the error did not cause egregious harm. Littleton's second issue is overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled each of Littleton's issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In a criminal jury charge, the application section applies the legal principles stated in the abstract section to the case's facts, telling the jury what it must find to convict or acquit.

Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice