HERNANDEZ v. STATE (2026)

OPINION

Appellant Mauricio Alfaro Hernandez was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. We conclude that appellant's Sixth Amendment right to an open trial was violated when the trial court closed voir dire to appellant's family members and other members of the public and did not consider the factors enunciated in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984).¹ We thus reverse appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial.

I. Background

After a soured deal in August 2020 to purchase guns that appellant saw for sale on Facebook, for which the seller just absconded with the money, appellant purportedly decided two weeks later to rob the seller with friends. Instead of a mere revenge robbery, the seller was shot in the head with a shotgun during the crime and died. Appellant, as the alleged shooter, was charged in June 2021 with capital murder for intentionally killing the seller in the course of committing robbery.

At the start of his trial in February 2025, appellant told the trial court that five family members wished to observe voir dire, although he realized the venire would be large, and asked the trial court to make accommodations for them. The trial court demurred:

So given that the only additional seats would be in the jury box, and the fact that this is a panel of eighty, and those panel members will be seated in the jury box, there is no physical space that any family member or any outside members of the public could sit in the courtroom, given that the lawyers are seated at counsel table, the clerks are seated, and the sheriff's office are all seated in the courtroom. So the family and any other members of the public are more than welcome to watch trial once we resume Monday. And Monday is the—Monday the twenty-fourth at 1:00 p.m.

In response, appellant objected “to any family or the public being excluded” from voir dire and again asked the trial court to make accommodations for his family members. The trial court overruled the objection without further explanation.

After a recess, but before the venire was seated for voir dire, appellant re-visited the issue. He explained that there were six family members present and asked again for accommodations to allow them to participate in open court proceedings for trial, even if it meant for just two of them. The trial court responded there was no physical space in the courtroom to make any accommodations and that even the prosecutors who were normally assigned to that court did not have space inside the courtroom. The appellant asked if there were any other accommodations that could be made to allow them to participate, and the trial court stated, “Not during this process. Not during this process, but they can certainly come in on Monday.” The trial court then again overruled the objection.

After voir dire and the parties' use of their peremptory strikes, but before the jury was seated to start opening statements, appellant summarized his previous requests and then re-urged his objection one additional time to avoid possible waiver of his objection when the jury panel was seated.

II. Public Trial

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a public trial. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. This includes voir dire. See Steadman v. State, 360 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A public trial is one that is open to the general public at all times. Williams v. State, 664 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). “It is one that is not secret; it is one that the public is free to attend.” Id. (quoting People v. Jones, 464 P.3d 735, 740 (Colo. 2020)). That way, the public may see that the defendant is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210. An open trial is necessary to ensure that jurors, prosecutors, and the trial court are kept keenly aware of their sense of responsibility and the importance of their functions. See id.; Williams, 664 S.W.3d at 273. It also discourages perjury by holding parties responsible to the public. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210. A violation of this right is a structural error that does not require any showing of harm. Lilly v. State, 365 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated is a mixed question of law and fact, and we defer to the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by the record. Williams, 664 S.W.3d at 266. A defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the trial was closed to the public. Cameron v. State, 490 S.W.3d 57, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (op. on reh'g). The court of appeals resolves on a de novo basis (1) whether a defendant met his burden to show his trial was closed to the public based on the totality of the evidence, and then (2) the ultimate legal question of whether his public-trial right was violated. Williams, 664 S.W.3d at 273.

A. Was Trial Closed to the Public?

To determine whether the defendant has shown his trial was closed, the reviewing court should look to the totality of the evidence, rather than whether any spectator was actually excluded from trial. Cameron, 490 S.W.3d at 68. Here, the State contends that appellant has failed to bring forth a record showing the courtroom was actually closed. We disagree. Specifically, the trial court described that there was a large, eighty-person venire that would fill the courtroom and jury box and explained “there is no physical space that any family member or any outside members of the public could sit in the courtroom” (emphasis added). After further describing the participants who were seated in the courtroom, the trial court then stated, “So the family and any other members of the public are more than welcome to watch this trial once we resume Monday” (emphasis added). Finally, when appellant objected that “we will object to any family or the public being excluded” (emphasis added), the trial court overruled the objection. The trial court's phrasing, the appellant's objection, and the trial court's overruling that objection specifically addressed exclusion of the general public.

Moreover, the trial court's description of the crowded courtroom and lack of space for appellant's family members and any outside members of the public is akin to the scenario addressed in Cameron v. State. See id. at 65–67. In Cameron, the trial court responded to a defendant's request for family to observe voir dire as follows:

We recognize their right to be present during the voir dire. I'm looking around the courtroom, and the jury panel—we have 65 jury panel members that are going to be here. I notice for the record that every single chair that we have available for attorneys that come in during trial and every chair that we have available for other people have been removed and placed in the jury area because that is the only way we can accommodate the number of jurors in this courtroom.

So we're talking about 65 jury panel members. It's going to take up a huge majority of this courtroom, plus counsel table. I don't see any room whatsoever where anybody else would be able to sit and observe.

Id. at 65.² On remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals, the court of appeals agreed that “the trial court's own statements on the record show that the public was not permitted inside the courtroom during voir dire.” Cameron v. State, 535 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref'd).³ Rather, the judge's statements on the record showed there was no room in the courtroom for spectators. Id. at 580–81. The court of appeals further stated that if the voir dire “had actually been open to the public, the trial court would not have needed to cite space limitations as justifications for excluding the public.” Id. at 580. Thus, it concluded that the defendant had met her burden to show the courtroom was in fact closed to the public during voir dire. Id. at 581. We likewise conclude that the trial court's description of space limitations and statements on the record show that voir dire was closed to the public.

The State nonetheless argues that the trial court's statements on the record are ambiguous and could have meant either (1) no outside members of the public were present and none would be allowed or (2) there were already some members of the public in the courtroom but family members and additional members of the public would not be accommodated. However, in viewing the totality of the record, we do not agree the trial court's statements could reasonably be interpreted in two ways. Like Cameron, it would have been unnecessary for the trial court to observe that “there is no physical space that any family member or any outside members of the public could sit in the courtroom” if there were already some members of the public present who stayed for voir dire. See id. at 580. The trial court's stated concern about space was not particularized to additional members of the public but applied to the general public.⁴

B. Was the Closure Proper?

For fully closed proceedings to be proper, a trial court must satisfy the narrow constitutional criteria for closure set forth in Waller v. Georgia: (1) whether there is an overriding interest (2) based on findings (3) that closure is essential to preserve higher values and (4) the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that value. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45–46, 104 S.Ct. 2210. Further, “the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding.” Id. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210; see also Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214–15, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) (noting that trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials and must consider alternatives even absent defendant's proffer of alternatives); Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 328 (stating that a trial court must fulfill its obligation “to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials”).

Here, the sole reason the trial court stated it closed the courtroom was its concern there was no available space. The trial court did not engage in a Waller analysis, make requisite findings, or consider reasonable alternatives.⁵ Concerns about space and overcrowding may be legitimate concerns of a trial court, but they must not outweigh a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. See Presley, 558 U.S. at 215, 130 S.Ct. 721 (noting that splitting the venire is a reasonable accommodation for the public during voir dire which solves concerns about space and security); Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 509 (same); see also Cameron, 490 S.W.3d at 63. Trial courts are expected to know and apply this basic rule. When they do not, public confidence is diminished and all participants—the State, the defense, the defendant and the defendant's family, the victim and the victim's family, and witnesses—must repeat the process. The costs of that repetition are entirely avoidable when, as here, all the court needed to do was either find an accommodation that preserved constitutionally required public access or make the constitutionally required findings before ordering the closure.

Because the trial court closed voir dire without fulfilling that analysis, it committed structural error and left this Court with no option but to reverse and order a new trial. We sustain appellant's issue six, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand for a new trial.⁶

FOOTNOTES

1.   We address the sixth issue presented in appellant's amended brief, which this Court granted leave to file several months before the State's brief was received. See Hernandez v. State, No. 14-25-00292-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 23, 2025) (notice), available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=bf212d0c-1a71-49f8-9ec8-99322124508b&coa=coa14&DT=MT% 20AMEND% 20BRIEF% 20DISP&MediaID=55826d23-9f4f-4d3a-9ca2-ca998ef0f7c3. This Court had discretion to allow an amended brief as justice required. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.7; Randle v. State, 878 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.); see also Champion v. State, 126 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.) (permitting appellant's supplemental briefs, which “were filed at a time when the State had the opportunity to, and did, respond to the issues raised in those briefs”). We thus decline to revisit our previous ruling permitting appellant's amended brief.

2.   The Cameron trial court then refused to rule that the courtroom was closed. Id. at 66–67.

3.   Initially, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed the record sufficiently showed that voir dire was closed to the public. Id. at 62. On rehearing, however, instead of just affirming the court of appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. Id. at 65.

4.   Even if we agreed with the State that the trial court's comments could be interpreted to mean some members of the public were already present, but family members were excluded, this would mean the courtroom was partly—not fully—closed. See Williams, 664 S.W.3d at 275. We would still proceed to a determination of whether the closure was proper and whether the trial court considered reasonable alternatives. See id. at 275–76.

5.   At the end of voir dire, defense counsel says that he was “told that there was no remote set up,” meaning there was no way to view proceedings electronically from another location. However, nothing in the record indicates defense counsel was told this information by the trial court.

6.   Given our disposition of issue six, the other five issues raised in this appeal are moot, and we do not address them. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (opinion must dispose of issues necessary to disposition of appeal).

Brad Hart, Justice