GONZALES v. CONTRERAS (2026)

OPINION

Lorenzo Contreras brought this forcible-detainer action against his stepfather, Alvino Gonzales. Following the death of his mother (Gonzales's wife), Contreras claims that he owns the home under an affidavit of heirship and warranty deed, and that Gonzales is holding over after termination of a lease. Gonzales, instead, claims he has a life estate in the home based on his status as a surviving spouse.

The justice court awarded Contreras possession. On de novo appeal, the county court rendered judgment awarding Contreras possession. This appeal followed. Because the right to immediate possession in this case cannot be determined without resolving the parties' dispute over title to the property, we vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Discussion

Shortly after the clerk's record was filed, Gonzales filed an emergency motion seeking to vacate the trial court's judgment because the underlying dispute must be determined by adjudicating title. Therefore, Gonzales argues that the justice court, and consequently the county court, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the eviction suit. We agree.

Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). While justice courts have jurisdiction over eviction suits, they have no jurisdiction over suits regarding title to land. Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004; Tex. Gov't Code § 27.031(b)(4). The only issue in an eviction action is the right to actual possession. Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e). When the right to possession is so intertwined with a genuine title dispute that possession cannot be determined without first determining title, “neither the justice court, nor the county court on appeal, has jurisdiction.” Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (op. on reh'g); see also Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 708–09 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (explaining an eviction suit determines only the right to immediate possession, leaving title disputes to district court).

Contreras's claim to possession rests on his claim to ownership: based on the affidavit of heirship and deed, he alleges that Gonzales signed a lease that has since been terminated. Gonzales denies that any landlord-tenant relationship exists. He asserts that he is illiterate and never knowingly signed away his rights in the home, and that his surviving-spouse homestead right entitles him to remain there. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 52; Tex. Est. Code §§ 102.002–.005.

The Texarkana court addressed a similar set of facts in Smith v. Bourcy, No. 06-23-00023-CV, 2023 WL 8008357 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 20, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). There, the decedent's daughter held a recorded warranty deed from her father and sought to evict the occupant, who claimed to be her father's surviving common-law wife. Id. at *1. The occupant asserted that the property was her homestead and that the warranty deed had been executed without her signature. Id. Because the occupant's homestead claim could not be resolved without adjudicating the merits of title between her and the deed holder, the county court lacked jurisdiction to decide possession, and the Texarkana court vacated the judgment and dismissed the appeal. Id. at *4.

The same is true here, where the right to immediate possession turns on the validity of Contreras's warranty deed and Gonzales's life estate. See Geldard v. Watson, 214 S.W.3d 202, 206–09 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (no jurisdiction where occupant asserted probate homestead right against decedent's heir). Because that question is one of title, the justice court—and the county court on de novo appeal—lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide it. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004; Tex. Gov't Code § 27.031(b)(4). The resulting judgments are therefore void. Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

We vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(e).¹ All pending motions are denied as moot.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We express no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute, including the issue of who owns the subject property. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice