IN RE: GATEWAY CHURCH (2026)

OPINION

“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into matters of theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” In re Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506, 508–09 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine is grounded in the First Amendment, which protects the right of religious institutions to decide for themselves matters of faith, doctrine, and church government. Id.

In this original proceeding, relators Gateway Church, John D. Willbanks, Kenneth Fambro, and Dane Minor ¹ claim the trial court erred both by finding jurisdiction where the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies ² and by ordering invasive discovery. The underlying suit seeks defamation damages ³ arising from internal church communications ⁴ regarding an admitted allegation of sexual abuse by the church's founding pastor and senior executive pastor. Because we agree with relators' first issue, concluding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims, we conditionally grant relators' petition.

Background

A. The underlying controversy

This original proceeding arises from claims based on statements by church leadership concerning past misconduct by Gateway Church's founding pastor, Robert Morris. Real party in interest Cindy Clemishire claims Morris sexually abused her from 1982–1987 while Morris was a pastor of Shady Grove Church and Clemishire was a minor.

In 2000, Morris founded Gateway Church, where he remained a pastor until 2024. In June 2024, Clemishire publicly alleged that Morris sexually abused her when she was a minor. The allegations received local, then national attention.

On June 14, Gateway's leadership issued a communication to church staff addressing the allegations and providing information about Morris' past misconduct and the church's understanding of events. The statement claimed to convey “absolute thoroughness and transparency of the situation” and stated it was intended to “empower” staff concerning a response should they receive any inquiries. The communication included a message from the church's elders ⁵ and a statement from Morris describing the conduct, his response to the allegations, and subsequent events.

Although the communication was directed to staff, portions of it were later circulated on social media and reported in the news media. The mandamus record does not establish how the communication became public.

Following the public allegations and ensuing attention, Gateway's leadership, including relators Willbanks, Fambro, and Minor, undertook efforts to assess the situation and respond. Relators state this was an effort to uncover the truth, redress past inaction, and remedy the failure of church governance that allowed Morris' past crimes to go unaddressed. They claim they “prayed, looked to Scripture, and acted according to the Church's bylaws.”

On June 18, 2024, Morris resigned. Gateway both internally and publicly confirmed the veracity of Clemishire's allegations and the inadequacy of the June 14 internal statement. The church issued a statement that, prior to June 14, the elders did not have all the facts, including the length of the abuse and Clemishire's age at the time of the abuse. It stated the “elders' prior understanding was that Morris' extramarital relationship, which he had discussed many times throughout his ministry, was with ‘a young lady’ and not abuse of a 12-year-old child.”

Real parties contend that the statements made by Gateway and its leadership in connection with these events were false and defamatory.

Subsequent internal remarks to Gateway staff by relator Fambro and a later statement by relator Willbanks to the congregation also appear in the mandamus record. Real parties do not assert these communications to be actionable, and because the communications therefore do not bear on the jurisdictional question, we do not discuss them further.

B. Gateway's structure

Unlike a church within a hierarchical denomination, Gateway is autonomous and maintains the right to manage its own affairs free of any governing ecclesial body. Gateway has a Board of Elders that manages and governs the affairs of the church and determines and executes the church's policies and procedures to address major issues, including pastoral misconduct. Elders also oversee the vision and daily direction of the church through the Senior Pastor and church staff. Gateway's bylaws, based on Scripture, define the Elders' roles according to the five-fold ministry from Scripture laid out in Ephesians 4:11–12.⁶

Relators Willbanks, Fambro, and Minor are the elders from Morris' time with the church that remain on the Board of Elders. Relators claim that, under their leadership, they have reformed church governance to better protect Gateway and its members.⁷

C. Procedural history

Real parties, Cindy Clemishire and her father Jerry, sued Morris, Morris' wife Deborah,⁸ and Morris' evangelical association;⁹ relators Gateway, Willbanks, Fambro, and Minor; and others. The suit seeks damages, alleging defamation (libel, slander, and defamation per se or per quod), civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, restitution, and disgorgement.¹⁰ The suit alleges the June 14 statement, including its attached statements from the elders and from Morris, is defamatory in a number of respects.¹¹

Relators filed pleas to the jurisdiction,¹² asserting that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the church autonomy doctrine deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001 et seq. Real parties sought limited discovery under the TCPA. The trial court signed two orders. The first denied Gateway's plea to the jurisdiction and Willbanks, Fambro, and Minor's motion to dismiss. The second granted real parties' motion for leave to conduct limited discovery.

Relators filed this petition. Real parties filed a response.

To permit our consideration of the jurisdictional question, at relators' request we stayed proceedings in the trial court between relators and real parties, pending resolution of the petition.

Discussion

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying relators' pleas to the jurisdiction. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars real parties' claims against Gateway, Willbanks, Fambro, and Minor. The doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into ecclesiastical matters or a plaintiff's claims that are inextricably intertwined with matters of doctrine or church governance. Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 514. Because we find that real parties' claims are inextricably intertwined with the church's investigation of Morris' misconduct, the doctrine deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.

A. Standard of review and applicable law

Mandamus relief is appropriate when the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case. See id. at 512. Lack of jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction when religious-liberty grounds form the basis of the jurisdictional challenge. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007); see also Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 512. We review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Hous., 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016). If the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, the plea should be granted without affording the plaintiffs an opportunity to replead. Id.

1. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine generally

The First Amendment prohibits courts from interfering with a church's management of its internal affairs. Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 512–13. Courts must be careful not to intrude upon matters involving church governance, including discipline and conformity to morals, and autonomy. Id. That autonomy extends to the rights of hierarchical religious bodies to establish their own internal rules and regulations for adjudicating disputes over religious matters and extends to a church's conclusions regarding its own ecclesiastical rules, customs, and laws. Id. at 513.¹³

2. Application of Lubbock to this controversy

Lubbock addressed church autonomy in the context of the Catholic Church, so its holding, strictly considered, applies to “hierarchical religious bodies.” See id. Relators argue that church autonomy's protections cannot favor hierarchical denominations over non-denominational evangelical churches. To do so would itself run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause by favoring one church over another based on its chosen form of governance. In the trial court, real parties suggested a different standard should apply to non-denominational churches because they might lack systematic canonical laws common in hierarchical denominations. However, in their response in this Court, real parties concede this point.

We agree with the parties. A church governed by a Board of Elders is entitled to the same constitutional protection as is a church governed by a robust code of canon law. See Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392–94 (First Amendment protections applied to an unincorporated “Christ-centered church” whose leadership consisted of elders, deacons, pastors, ministers, and a treasurer); see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 6 (“But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.”)

We conclude that the Lubbock holdings and analysis apply equally to Gateway and its elders.

3. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies to church investigations

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine extends to claims that are inextricably intertwined with matters of church doctrine or governance. Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 513. When determining whether the doctrine applies, a court should look to whether the substance and nature of the plaintiff's claims implicate ecclesiastical matters, including a church's internal affairs, governance, or administration. Id. at 516. “Investigations that relate to the character and conduct of church leaders are inherently ecclesiastical.” See id. (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 201 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)).

Relying on Lubbock, this Court has previously determined that claims relating to the publication and communication of the results of the investigation cannot be severed from a church's policy to investigate its clergy and fall within the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Dall., No. 05-19-00997-CV, 2021 WL 3556830, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

When a court determines the doctrine applies, it must dismiss the case. Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 514.

4. The neutral principles methodology

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not bar all claims against religious bodies. Courts may exercise jurisdiction over a controversy when neutral principles of law can be applied to decide non-ecclesiastical issues that will not require inquiring into religious doctrine. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has applied the neutral principles methodology only to church property disputes. Id. Our sister courts of appeals have applied neutral principles methodology to certain narrow circumstances. See, e.g., Shannon v. Mem'l Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612, 624–25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not bar suit arising from a church's violation of a settlement agreement that was not an inherently ecclesial activity). When considering whether the neutral principles methodology applies, courts must consider whether its application would impose civil liability on a church for complying with its own internal rules and policies. Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 513.

Texas courts have a constitutional duty to decide disputes within their jurisdiction while respecting the limitations of the First Amendment. Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2013). The line between required judicial action and forbidden intrusion requires courts to “look to the substance and effect of a plaintiff's complaint to determine its ecclesiastical implication, not its emblemata.” Tran v. Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). The analysis falls to whether the particular dispute is ecclesiastical or “merely a civil-law controversy in which the church happens to be involved.” Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 514.

B. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine requires relators' dismissal from the litigation

We conclude that real parties' pleadings invoke the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because they both (1) require inquiry into Gateway's constitutional authority to manage its own affairs, and (2) risk judicial entanglement with a religious question or doctrine.

1. Real parties' claims question Gateway's response to allegations of misconduct by its pastor, thereby requiring an inquiry into Gateway's management of its own affairs

As noted throughout this opinion, the Supreme Court of Texas and this Court have both recently recognized the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars a claim that questions a church's investigation into allegations of a pastor's misconduct, the church's reporting of its investigation and the allegations, the church's actions determining the truth of the allegations, and the church's communications with the public regarding the investigation and allegations. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 515–18; Doe, 2021 WL 3556830, at *8. It is clear from the mandamus record that Gateway made the June 14 communication to staff to report and give updates on the stages of the church's determination, investigation, and eventual confirmation of the veracity of Cindy Clemishire's allegations and to prepare staff to answer any inquiries that might arise from her publication of the story on a public blog. The facts stated in that internal communication came from whatever investigation Gateway and the elders did or did not complete concerning their founder and senior executive pastor.

Lubbock provides the closest factual parallel. Deacon Jesus Guerrero sued the diocese for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress following an internal investigation into Guerrero's alleged sexual misconduct. The diocese published his name on its public website on a list of credibly accused sexual abusers. 624 S.W.3d at 509–11.

The Supreme Court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred Guerrero's claims. The court explained that the diocese acted in accordance with the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops' charter, a directive for each diocese to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and to be more transparent in communications on the matter. Id. at 515–16. Guerrero's claims directly called into question the Diocese's investigation, and any investigation would necessarily involve the internal decision making of a church judicatory body. Id. at 515. The court held that “Guerrero's suit is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the Diocese's decisions to investigate its own clergy, judicial review of which would impermissibly interfere with a church's ability to regulate the character and conduct of its leaders.” Id. at 516.

Real parties argue that ecclesiastical abstention does not apply because they are not members of Gateway Church. Lubbock forecloses that argument. There, the Supreme Court focused on the nature of the dispute, not the audience, and did not distinguish between members and nonmembers. Instead, the inquiry centers on whether adjudication would entangle a court in matters of church governance. Even where statements reach nonmembers, ecclesiastical abstention applies if resolving the claims would require probing a church's internal processes. The Court likewise rejected the argument that publication beyond the church removes constitutional protection. The question is not to whom the church communicated, but whether the “substance and nature” of the claims implicate ecclesiastical matters. Id. at 514–15. As in Lubbock, the challenged publication here “cannot be severed from [the church's] policy to investigate its clergy in the first place,” and even public-facing communications remain protected as “the fruit of this investigation.” See id. at 509, 517.

Gateway's investigation into Morris (or, for that matter, lack of investigation if none was done prior to the communication) is inherently ecclesiastical. Gateway, through its leadership, was communicating with staff about what the church and elders knew about their senior executive pastor and events that transpired some three decades ago. As relators note in their petition, the challenged statements were made for a religious purpose, “shepherding the Gateway congregation in accordance with the dictates of Scripture.”

The facts here fall within the framework established in Lubbock. There, the alleged defamation arose from a public disclosure of an allegation of sexual misconduct following an internal church investigation, and the Supreme Court held that the claims were inextricably intertwined with that investigation. The same is true here. The challenged statements likewise arise from Gateway's internal response to sexual misconduct allegations concerning its pastor and reflect the church's understanding of those events. Although the June 14 communication was initially directed to church staff and later reported publicly, the statements remain rooted in the church's investigation and response.

As Lubbock demonstrates, “a civil suit that is inextricably intertwined with a church's directive to investigate its clergy cannot proceed in the courts.” Id. at 517. Here, real parties' claims intertwine with Gateway's investigation into Morris. Just as the Diocese of Lubbock published its findings in accordance with the Bishops' Charter, Gateway released the internal statement because of a determination made by church leadership. Adjudicating these claims would require inquiry into that determination and the internal process that led to that determination. The First Amendment prohibits that inquiry.

Accordingly, we agree with relators that adjudication of real parties' claims would impermissibly entangle the court in ecclesiastical matters. See id. at 515.

2. Real parties' response

We are not persuaded by real parties' arguments that the neutral principles methodology applies. Real parties point us to two cases: Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996), and Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 18 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied). We conclude that neither supports their arguments that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply.

Real parties correctly state that, in Tilton, the Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court may exercise jurisdiction over a claim that a televangelist defrauded donors. Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 679. However, real parties ignore important distinctions between that case and here. Tilton involved the televangelist Robert Tilton who hosted a prayer line where viewers could receive prayers and other gifts through monetary donations. Id. at 675–76. The plaintiffs there claimed the prayer line stated that “Tilton will personally and actually read, touch, and pray over each of these requests and that thereby, the one making the vow and request will receive whatever is requested.” Id. at 676.

The court noted that plaintiff's fraud claims involved two categories: (1) representations that Tilton would perform certain concrete acts of reading, touching, and praying over requests and (2) fraudulent and deceitful representations of religious doctrine or belief. Id. at 679. The court explained that representations in the first category did not involve religious doctrine because they involve determining whether Tilton made the promises and concretely failed to perform. Id. It further explained that, accordingly, a jury may consider representations in the first category but not the second. Id. at 679–80.

Real parties similarly cite Turner to assert “this Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over a defamation claim brought by a former missionary against his church.” There, former missionary Jon Turner and his wife sued the church for which Jon did missionary work for the injuries he suffered during trips. Turner, 18 S.W.3d at 882. Turner first contracted infectious mononucleosis in Canada then exhibited symptoms consistent with malaria following his trip to Guatemala. Id. at 883–84. While the Turners sued on numerous grounds, we limit the discussion to defamation as real parties have in their response. See id. at 884. The Turners alleged in their defamation claim that the church harmed Jon by communicating to Jon's grandparents information in its records regarding Jon's termination due to his mental or emotional condition. Id. at 895. The specific statement the church released to Jon's grandparents concerning his mental condition was, in relation to his malaria symptoms, “Jon was scared, he hallucinated.” Id. at 885, 902–03.

When determining whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the Turners' claims, this Court categorized the causes of action into three groups: claims concerning the missionary program, claims concerning events after Jon's return to the United States, and claims concerning the existence of a fiduciary relationship between Jon and the church. The Court found that the First Amendment barred the claims in the first and third groups. In finding that the First Amendment did not bar the Turners' defamation claim, this Court stated that “[a]lthough the First Amendment prohibits government regulation of the information a religious organization chooses to record concerning its members, the government may regulate the organization's use of that information if the regulation would not actively involve the government in the organization's internal affairs, religious practice, or religious doctrine.” Id. at 896.

While real parties cite both cases throughout their response, we find both to be too dissimilar to aid real parties' arguments here. This case, unlike Tilton, does not involve a secular look into whether relators made a promise with no intention of performing. And, unlike Turner, real parties' claims here implicate religious doctrine because Gateway's investigation of Morris is inherently ecclesiastical. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 516. (“Investigations that relate to the character and conduct of church leaders are inherently ecclesiastical.”).

Real parties also argue that they do not challenge Gateway's internal management decisions. They first claim that Gateway's statement is not internal because real parties are not members or employees of Gateway and, accordingly, lack the voluntary and consensual nature of affiliation. Real parties say a church “has no claim to autonomy when it deals with outsiders who have not agreed to be governed by its authority.”

Real parties next argue that their claims do not require the trial court to evaluate whether Gateway and the Elders followed Gateway's canonical rules and internal policies. They argue that resolution of their defamation claim would require the factfinder to only “determine whether (1) a twelve-year-old girl is a ‘young lady’; (2) rape of a child is ‘inappropriate sexual behavior’; (3) the Clemishires told Morris that they forgave him; and (4) Jerry Lee told Morris that he approved of Morris' return to the ministry.” (Emphasis in real parties' response.)

We find these arguments unpersuasive. As to the first, the question regarding church autonomy is not whether real parties are members of Gateway. Gateway's investigation was into Morris, not into real parties. Real parties' claims directly call into question Gateway's investigation into Morris and the church's statements around that investigation. Claims related to a church's publication or communication of the results of its own investigation cannot be severed from the church's policy to investigate its clergy. Doe, 2021 WL 3556830, at *5. Because real parties' claims are inextricably intertwined with Gateway's directive to investigate Morris, the suit cannot proceed. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 517.

The second misstates the inquiry. Whether a twelve-year old is a young lady, whether rape is inappropriate sexual behavior, and whether the Clemishires told Morris something are not the sole factual disputes. Defamation torts require more than a showing of falsity in the published statements; the defendant must have a requisite degree of fault, either negligence or actual malice. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). Inquiry into that fault and its degree involve inquiry into what Gateway and its elders knew about Morris and his past conduct. In and of itself, that invokes the church investigation into Morris.

Real parties' claim mirrors the argument made by the excommunicated priest in Tran, who argued that his defamation claim did not require inquiry into the ecclesiastical decision but only a determination whether he was excommunicated. 934 S.W.3d at 743. Our sister court in Houston rejected the argument “because whether Father Tran was excommunicated is unavoidably an ecclesiastical matter.” Id.

So too here. The relevant inquiry is not the underlying factual content of the statements but whether adjudicating the claims would require examining Gateway's internal investigations and deliberations. Although real parties argue that establishing knowledge can be a secular fact question in a defamation case, determining what Gateway and its leaders knew, and how they arrived at that understanding, would necessarily involve probing internal church deliberations and processes. That inquiry is inextricably intertwined with ecclesiastical matters and is therefore prohibited.

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine requires dismissal of real parties' claims against relators. We do not address whether Gateway's June 14 statement was defamatory as to Cindy or Jerry Clemishire. Our holding rests solely on jurisdiction; because the claims are inextricably intertwined with ecclesiastical matters, the First Amendment precludes judicial resolution of their merits.

We therefore conclude the trial judge abused her discretion in denying these four relators' pleas to the jurisdiction.¹⁴

Conclusion

We conditionally grant relators' petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial judge to (1) vacate her prior order denying relators' plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss; (2) grant Gateway's plea to the jurisdiction and Willbanks, Fambro, and Minor's motion to dismiss within thirty days; and (3) file with the Clerk of the Court, within forty-five days of the date of our opinion and order, a copy of the trial judge's order showing such compliance.¹⁵ The writ will issue only if the trial judge fails to comply.

CONCURRING OPINION

We open the Court's opinion by observing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is grounded in the First Amendment. I write separately to note my understanding that the doctrine is also grounded in Article I, section 6 of the Texas Constitution. Then-Justice Blacklock hinted at the application of the state charter in his concurrence to In re Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506, 514, 520 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (Blacklock, J., concurring) (“Both the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution compel judges to acknowledge that there are places where our imperfect judicial system does not belong, places where earthly judges have no power.”). It appears the Texas Constitution provides even broader protection to ecclesiastical bodies than is provided by the First Amendment. Compare “No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion” to “Congress shall make no law ․ prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” We have previously noted the greater protections provided by our state charter. See Ex parte Herrera, No. 05-14-00598-CR, 2014 WL 4207153, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (“The Texas Constitution provides greater protections for the free exercise of one's religion than does the federal constitution.”).

Relators assert that the freedom-of-worship clause provides an additional, independent basis for mandamus relief. Lubbock was decided, however, on a federal constitutional basis. Because Lubbock controls our decision, we have no need to determine whether Article I, section 6 provides an additional reason for abstention or the extent to which it requires abstention. In a case not so clearly controlled by Lubbock, we may find a need to consider the breadth of Article I, section 6.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Other defendants Robert Morris, Deborah Morris, and Robert Morris Evangelical Association filed a companion petition, No. 05-25-01689-CV. We denied that petition based on the predicate-request requirement. See In re Morris, No. 05-25-01689-CV, 2025 WL 3722808, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). These parties then filed a new petition, No. 05-25-01257-CV. Our opinion resolving that petition is issued concurrently with today's action.

2.   Relators' first issue uses the term “church autonomy doctrine.” We have previously noted the interchangeable use of the terms “autonomy doctrine” and “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.” Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Dall., No. 05-19-00997-CV, 2021 WL 3556830, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2021, no pet.) (“citing the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, also known as the religious autonomy doctrine”). Texas courts appear to prefer the term “ecclesiastical abstention,” see, e.g., Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506, whereas the Fifth Circuit appears to prefer using religious or church “autonomy,” see, e.g., McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 155 F.4th 415 (5th Cir. 2025), when discussing the same doctrine.In their response, real parties note the U.S. Supreme Court refers to the doctrine as “church autonomy,” whereas the Texas Supreme Court prefers “ecclesiastical abstention.”It appears the use of the different terms comes merely from the focus of the inquiry. Religious denominations and their memberships have autonomy grounded in the constitutional protections. Because of that autonomy, civil courts lack constitutional competence to address controversies implicating that autonomy; hence, we abstain. Whichever term is used, it implicates the same concept, “that there are places where our imperfect judicial system does not belong, places where earthly judges have no power.” Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 520 (Blacklock, J., concurring).In this opinion, we default to the term “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” to align with the recent Texas Supreme Court precedent.

3.   All of real parties' remaining causes of action, including intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy, are premised upon defamation theories.

4.   The original petition addresses both a June 14, 2024 internal communication and a pair of June 18, 2024, communications, at least one of which was publicly disseminated. However, the mandamus record confirms real parties claim only the June 14 internal statement, discussed at length below, is actionable.

5.   Explored more below, the Elders act as executives in managing Gateway's affairs.

6.   “And He gave some as apostles, and some as prophets, and some as evangelists, and some as pastors and teachers, for the equipping of the saints for the work of service, to the building up of the body of Christ.” Ephesians 4:11–12 (New American Standard Bible).

7.   Of course, subsequent reformation of church governance bears no consequence to the alleged defamatory nature of the June 14 statement or of our jurisdictional analysis.

8.   Real parties' original petition alleges Deborah Morris is also a former leader of women's ministry at Gateway.

9.   See supra note 1.

10.   According to the record, real parties have abandoned the unjust enrichment, restitution, and disgorgement causes of action.

11.   The original petition also claims portions of the June 18 statement were defamatory, but the allegations appear to have confused the contents of the June 14 elders' statement with the June 18 public statement. In any event, the mandamus record confirms that real parties rely solely on the June 14 statement in alleging defamatory torts.

12.   Relators Willbanks, Fambro, and Minor's plea to the jurisdiction was entitled “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction” and was functionally identical to relator Gateway's “Plea to the Jurisdiction.”

13.   Citing our opinion in Ex parte Herrera, No. 05-14-00598-CR, 2014 WL 4207153, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.), and the Supreme Court's opinion in Southern Methodist University v. Southern Central Jurisdictional Conference of the United Methodist Church, 716 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. 2025), among other authorities, relators argue that the Texas Constitution's freedom to worship clause provides greater protection to religious congregations than does the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution. While we agree, see Herrera at *4 (“The Texas Constitution provides greater protections for the free exercise of one's religion than does the federal constitution.”), Lubbock was decided based on the federal constitutional analysis; and because we find Lubbock controlling, we need not reach the state constitutional analysis.

14.   Our resolution of the jurisdictional question renders moot relators' second issue regarding the TCPA-related discovery.

15.   Our order issued today also lifts the stay issued November 21, 2025, to permit the trial judge to comply with our order.

Opinion by Justice Lee

Lee, J., concurring.