STATE v. TRUJILLO (2026)

OPINION

On March 2, 2026, the State filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's February 12, 2026 order granting Natalie Faith Trujillo's motion to suppress evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5). The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that when appealing an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, the prosecuting attorney must “certif[y] to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence” “is of substantial importance to the case.” See id. Although the State's notice of appeal was timely filed, it failed to include the certification required by Article 44.01(a)(5).

In State v. Redus, 445 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held:

․ substantive defects in the State's notice of appeal cannot be corrected by an untimely amendment. Any amendment must be made before the expiration of the original time to file notice of appeal, that is, within twenty days after entry of the trial judge's ruling. Because the prosecuting attorney's certification is jurisdictional, the State's appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction if the proper certification is not filed within twenty days after the trial court enters its order suppressing evidence.

Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)

On April 29, 2026, we ordered the State to show cause why its appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in light of Redus and its progeny. See id.; see also State v. Vannoord, No. 06-17-00107-CR, 2017 WL 3382333, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because the State's original notice of appeal did not confer jurisdiction on this Court and because the State was not allowed to amend a jurisdictional element of her notice after expiration of the filing deadline, the State failed to invoke this Court's jurisdiction, and we are left with no choice but to dismiss this appeal.”); State v. Rodriguez, No. 14-13-00766-CR, 2014 WL 5309661, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction when the elected prosecutor's certification did not comply with article 44.01(a)(5)). The State responded with a motion to dismiss its appeal.

On May 26, 2026, the State filed a Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Dismiss. The State's motion to withdraw alerted us to State v. Lambert, No. PD-0832-24, 2026 WL 1424212 (Tex. Crim. App. May 21, 2026), reh'g denied (Jul. 23, 2026), and requested “time to review whether [State v. Redus, 445 S.W.3d 151, 155–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)] has been abrogated [by Lambert] and, if so, to outline to the Court why the appeal should not be dismissed.”

On May 27, 2026, we issued a memorandum opinion granting the State's motion to dismiss. The State's motion to withdraw was not processed until May 28, 2026. Upon review of the State's motion to withdraw, we withdrew our previously issued memorandum opinion and judgment, reinstated the appeal, and ordered the parties to brief the jurisdictional question. Both parties have complied with our request for jurisdictional briefing. The State generally contends that “Lambert abrogates Redus.” Trujillo argues that “State v. Lambert never even mentions State v. Redus — much less overrules it.”

In Lambert, 2026 WL 1424212 at *1, a jury convicted the defendant on a count of sexual assault of a child, but the trial court granted the defendant's motion for new trial. The duly elected district attorney signed and caused to be filed a timely notice of appeal that referenced a different date than the date the new trial order had been signed and referenced a “Judgment” that was, according to the notice, a “dismissal of the information based on a supposed defect” in the information. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals presumed that the State used a different document as a template and “forgot to change the substantive text.” Id. at *1, n.2. The appellee moved to dismiss the State's appeal and the intermediate appellate court held that appellate jurisdiction existed. Id. at *1. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on two grounds. Id. at *4–5. First, the court held that “after the trial court granted Appellee's motion for new trial, it was the only appealable ruling under the record's context that the State could contest.” Id. at *4. Second, the court emphasized that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(f) provides, “[a]n amended notice of appeal ․ correcting a defect or omission in an earlier filed notice ․ may be filed in the appellate court ․ at any time before the appealing party's brief is filed.” Id. The court noted that the “defect” in the State's notice of appeal may be properly amended under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(f).

The State's jurisdictional position fails for three reasons. First, Lambert is distinguishable from Redus because Lambert deals with an appeal from an order granting a new trial and Redus deals with an order granting a defendant's motion to suppress. An appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress is subject to a different subsection of Article 44.01, which states:

The state is entitled to appeal an order of a court in a criminal case if the order ․ grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission, if jeopardy has not attached in the case and if the prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence, confession, or admission is of substantial importance in the case[.]

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5) (emphasis added). The subsection relating to an appeal from an order granting a new trial contains no such certification provision. Second, as appellee notes, Lambert makes no mention of Redus, much less overrules it. Third, in 2025, the Texas Legislature amended Article 44.01 to include provisions relating to appeals regarding bail. See Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 339 (S.B. 9), § 15, eff. Sept. 1, 2025. “When the Legislature revises a particular statute that has been judicially construed, without changing the construed language, it is presumed that the Legislature intended that the same construction should continue to be applied to that statute.” Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Thus, we are to presume that the amendments from last year reaffirmed the holding in Redus.

Under Redus, 445 S.W.3d at 156, we lack jurisdiction over the State's attempt to appeal from the trial court's order granting appellee's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice