INTEREST OF v. << (2026)

OPINION

The trial court signed an order terminating appellant's parental rights to his child on May 28, 2026. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2026, and the trial court appointed appellate counsel for him that same day. His brief was due July 7, 2026. On July 8, 2026, we ordered the brief filed no later than July 28, 2026, and we cautioned that a failure to comply would result in abatement for a hearing on whether appellant wished to prosecute this appeal and whether his appointed counsel had abandoned it. No brief was filed. On July 28, 2026, appellant's appointed counsel filed a motion for extension of time. On July 29, 2026, we denied counsel's motion for an extension of time, abated the appeal, and remanded the cause to the trial court for an abandonment hearing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8.

The trial court held the hearing on August 7, 2026. Appellant and his appointed counsel both appeared in person. Appellant was sworn in as a witness. He confirmed that he does not wish to go forward with his appeal and told the court that he would not pursue it even if a different attorney were appointed. The trial court admonished him that it anticipated this court would dismiss the appeal and that he would not be able to revive it later. Appellant said he understood. He confirmed that this was his final decision.

The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. It found that appellant testified that he does not want to continue his appeal. It concluded that appellant does not want to pursue the appeal, that he understood the appeal would likely be dismissed, and that his decision was made knowingly. It also concluded that counsel did not timely file a brief because of her husband's medical condition and that she abandoned the appeal because appellant no longer wished to pursue it.

A civil appellant may obtain dismissal of his own appeal by motion. In accordance with such a motion, “the court may dismiss the appeal or affirm the appealed judgment or order unless such disposition would prevent a party from seeking relief to which it would otherwise be entitled.” Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). No motion to dismiss has been filed in this court. Unlike its criminal counterpart, Rule 42.1(a)(1) does not require a motion signed by the appellant personally. See id. R. 42.2(a). But here, the record establishes that appellant desires to dismiss his appeal. He said so under oath in open court, and the trial court confirmed this in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. We may suspend a rule's operation in a particular case to expedite a decision or for other good cause. See id. R. 2.; cf. Turullos-Gonzalez v. State, Nos. 03-22-00684-CR & 03-22-00685-CR, 2025 WL 554038, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (suspending the voluntary dismissal requirements based on appellant's “preference not to prosecute these appeals expressed in open court”); Murillo v. State, No. 04-24-00362-CR, 2025 WL 702844, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (per curiam) (same); Hendrix v. State, 86 S.W.3d 762, 763–64 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (per curiam) (same); Conners v. State, 966 S.W.2d 108, 110–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (same).

We have not issued a decision in this appeal, and dismissal will not prevent any party from seeking relief to which it would otherwise be entitled. To expedite a decision resolving this appeal, we suspend the requirement of a written motion to dismiss. See Tex. R. App. P. 2, 42.1(a)(1). We reinstate this appeal and dismiss it in accordance with appellant's stated wishes. See id. R. 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM