CHRISTOPHER DALE HAVENS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2026)

OPINION

Appellant Christopher Dale Havens challenges his conviction for family-violence assault by impeding breath or circulation, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(b)(2)(B). The jury assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. Appellant argues by three issues, which we reorder, (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction, (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State of Texas to admit extraneous evidence of an alleged second strangulation victim, and (3) the trial court erred when it prevented defense counsel from asking the doctor who examined the complainant about the doctor's “personal domestic violence experience to show bias for the State.” We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

At trial,¹ Jeana Hicks, the complainant, testified she and appellant dated for about a year starting in 2017. On December 22, 2018, the couple worked at her mother's food truck. The food truck was in a local bar's parking lot, and Jeana and appellant both drank during their shift. Eventually, the two got into an argument. After they closed the food truck down around midnight, appellant left, and Jeana went inside the bar and had a few more drinks. Appellant later picked her up and took her to his father's house where appellant also lived.

Appellant parked the car in front of his father's house, and the two argued in the car for some time. At one point, appellant became angry about a man named “Ben” Jeana was messaging on her phone. Jeana testified appellant asked her to perform oral sex on him, and when she refused, appellant said, “I bet if I was Ben, or whoever, that you would do it,” to which she replied, “I bet I would, too.” Jeana said appellant reacted by choking her with both of his hands. She passed out and woke up in an empty field next to appellant's father's house “hurting all over.” She went inside appellant's father's house to seek help. When she entered, appellant “was sitting on the twin-size bed in the living room with his headphones on playing a video game,” and his father was in his room with the door closed. She tried to get appellant's father's attention, but she had trouble speaking. Appellant then threw her out the front door where she landed on the cement walkway. Jeana went to the neighbor's house where the neighbor called her mother at her request.

Jeana went to the emergency room later that day. Images of Jeana's injuries were admitted and displayed at trial. The images showed Jeana with a black eye, swelling and redness on her face and neck, bruises on her neck, and bruises and scrapes on both arms. Apart from the bruises on her neck from where she testified appellant choked her, she could not recall how she received her other injuries. Jeana confirmed on both direct and cross examination that she was convicted in 2015 for felony possession of methamphetamine. She denied being on methamphetamines on the night of the assault.

While at the hospital, Jeana made statements about the assault to a police officer and the medical personnel who treated her. On cross examination, defense counsel asked her about the alleged inconsistencies made in the officer's video and in her trial testimony. Jeana admitted she told the officer she and appellant had sex in his truck outside appellant's father's house, and that she hid in her vehicle, but testified that in fact she did not recall having sex or hiding from appellant. She also confirmed that she did not know how she got her injuries. However, she explicitly remembered the short conversation about “Ben” which caused appellant to choke her.

Sally Hicks, Jeana's mother, testified Jeana and appellant started dating in 2017, and the two lived together for a time. On the night in question, Jeana and appellant were working at her food truck. Sally went to the food truck “several times to check to see if they needed stuff or just how things were going.” The last time she went was around 11:00 p.m., and she observed the two “had gotten into some kind of a tiff with one another.” Around 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. the following morning, she received a call from an unknown number, and Jeana was on the other line. The couple “had gotten into a fight,” and Jeana “was screaming and crying and saying that she was hurt and that she had gotten strangled and that she had gotten hit and scraped and thrown ․ off of a porch and had at some point woke up in a field next to [appellant's father's] house.” When she picked Jeana up, Sally immediately noticed Jeana “looked like she had been beat to a pulp.” On cross examination, Sally said appellant and Jeana regularly drank while they worked at her food truck, and Jeana has a history of abusing “alcohol, marijuana and methamphetamine.”

Medical records from Jeana's admission to the hospital were admitted into evidence. Nurse Practitioner David Alexander Hadden and Dr. Kim Thuy Nguyen Onufrak treated Jeana.² Both Hadden and Dr. Onufrak testified that Jeana appeared alert and oriented and did not appear to be intoxicated. They also testified Jeana's physical injuries, including “ligature marks” on her neck and a scan showing swelling in her neck, were consistent with strangulation. On cross, Dr. Onufrak testified that just because an injury is consistent with assault does not mean she knows how Jeana's injuries came about.

Clem Havens, appellant's father, testified he was home in the back bedroom on the night in question. Jeana and appellant came home in the middle of the night, and he heard Jeana's “voice real loud like arguing.” He “got up and told her she needs to leave.” Clem later clarified he had witnessed “Jeana be unruly in [his] house on more than one occasion” and did not like her in his house. Clem did not notice any injuries on Jeana, and she did not say anything to him. He also testified that she looked drunk and high. Clem went back to his bedroom and eventually “[i]t got quiet,” and “[s]he was gone.”

Appellant denied the accusations. According to him, on December 22, he worked at the food truck from around 1:00 p.m. until it closed. Appellant saw Jeana finish a twelve-pack of beer while he was there. During their shift, the couple got into an argument because Jeana was acting “paranoid” and did not want to deliver food to customers inside the bar. Appellant believed she was on drugs because of her behavior, and at one point he witnessed her purchase a baggie containing “[a] green pill and a white crystalline substance” from people outside the bar. Appellant delivered food inside, and when he did, some of the patrons bought him shots at the bar. This caused another argument between the couple. Because things were “off,” appellant decided to close the food truck around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. While closing, Jeana kicked him in the back, and appellant left her to close alone. About an hour later, after getting a beer at a different bar, appellant came back to finish closing. Before they left, Jeana had four shots, and she fell outside onto the gravel parking lot two or three times.

Appellant drove her to his father's house, and he parked in front of the house while Jeana yelled and screamed at him. Appellant left her in the car and talked to her from the front porch. Jeana got out of the truck, fell down again, and appellant helped her sit down on a lawn chair in the front yard. He went inside and she continued to yell and scream at him. Appellant eventually told Jeana to leave, and she left. Appellant said Jeana left about an hour or hour and half after they first arrived at his father's house.

Later that night, Clem woke appellant up to confirm that Jeana had left. They went outside and noticed Clem's truck and two of appellant's personal vehicles were open, and the contents were strewn about. They locked up the cars and went back to bed. Appellant was woken up again, this time by Jeana, who came in through the unlocked front door and pulled appellant off the bed. He did not observe any injuries on Jeana. He told her to leave, and she left again. He woke up a third time and went outside to smoke. When he was outside, he saw Sally picking Jeana up from his neighbor's house. He noticed then that Jeana “had scrapes on her elbows and her shirt was messed up.”

After the defense rested, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding another alleged victim, Rhandi Hatfield. The trial court granted the State's request to allow Hatfield to testify in rebuttal. Hatfield testified she and appellant dated in 2021. On the night of September 21, 2021, she went to Clem's house where the two watched a movie and later made a bonfire outside. The two began drinking, and at some point, got into an argument about Hatfield's “phone, like [she] couldn't talk to [her] mother or stuff like that.” The argument escalated, and appellant threw things, screamed at her, and “shoved [her] up against the pole on his house.” When she tried to get away from him, he put his hands around her neck and choked her until she passed out. When she woke up, appellant was gone. She called the police but told officers she did not want to press charges. On cross examination, Hatfield confirmed appellant was charged “in that case against [her],” and the case was “still open and pending.” She also testified she was currently on probation for two separate felony DWI incidents for drinking while her toddler was in the vehicle. She admitted that, as a term of her probation, she was not supposed to drink, and she violated those conditions when she drank with appellant that night.

The jury found appellant guilty of the underlying offense and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. The trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with the jury's verdict. This appeal followed.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

By his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

In conducting a sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We assume that the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences from the evidence in a manner that supports the verdict. Id. “We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.” Id. We consider all the evidence in the record, including evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citations omitted).

Here, such a charge would instruct the jury that a person commits an assault when that person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person's spouse.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1). An assault is enhanced to a third-degree felony if the person commits the offense against a person with whom the defendant has or had “a dating relationship” and “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly imped[es] the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person by applying pressure to the person's throat or neck.” Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(B); TEX. FAM. CODE § 71.0021(b).

A person acts intentionally with respect to the result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. Id. § 6.03(c). “Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies on circumstantial evidence.” Gilder v. State, 469 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd) (quoting Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). “Intent may be determined from a defendant's words, acts, and conduct, and ‘is a matter of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).

B. Analysis

Jeana testified, both on direct and cross examination, that she distinctly remembered appellant choking her until she passed out. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B). She also remembered the preceding argument regarding her messages to “Ben” which caused appellant to choke her. Photographs showing her injuries were admitted, and Hadden and Dr. Onufrak observed injuries consistent with Jeana's claim, including swelling and “ligature marks” or bruises on her neck. This evidence is sufficient to prove the essential elements of the offense, namely, bodily injury by impeding normal breathing. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B); Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (holding the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that appellant impeded the normal breathing or circulation of blood of the complainant by applying pressure to her throat or neck where the complainant testified appellant held pillow against her face and she was unable to take deep breaths); Guzman v. State, 552 S.W.3d 936, 942 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref'd) (holding there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that complainant suffered bodily injury where the State presented evidence of the complainant's description of the struggle with appellant, the officers' testimony regarding the complainant's physical injuries, and the photographs showing complainant's injuries).

Based on Jeana's testimony, a rational jury could also infer that appellant acted with the requisite intent. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.03, 22.01(a)(1); Gilder, 469 S.W.3d at 639. Finally, Jeana and her mother testified Jeana and appellant were in a dating relationship for about a year before the assault occurred, and appellant does not dispute this testimony. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(b)(2); TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 71.0021, 71.005.

Appellant argues given Jeana's “extreme memory loss and intoxication ․ a rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] was the one who assaulted [her] on this occasion.” However, we cannot usurp the role of the factfinder in assessing the weight and credibility of witnesses. See Sanchez v. State, 460 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015) (concluding “the factfinder [wa]s free to believe or disbelieve a witness” where the appellant contended that “[b]ecause of [the complainant's] credibility, ․ without tangible evidence, expert testimony, or medical records to support her allegations, the evidence [wa]s insufficient to show that he assaulted [the complainant]”), aff'd, 499 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Smith v. State, 352 S.W.3d 55, 62 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (noting “it was for the jury to determine whether [the complainant]'s or Appellant's testimony was more credible, and we are not permitted to re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence”). We hold the cumulative force of all the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. See Walker, 594 S.W.3d at 335; Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732. We overrule appellant's first issue.

III. EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE

By his second issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to admit Hatfield's testimony because the evidence was unfairly prejudicial and substantially outweighed any probative value under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. See TEX. R. EVID. 403.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

The trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has ‘an undue tendency to suggest that a decision be made on an improper basis.’ ” Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh'g)). “Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.” Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389. The factors considered in whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403 include, but are not limited to: “(1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence.” Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389–90); see Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

We review a trial court's ruling under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. Pawlak, 420 S.W.3d at 810. The trial court's ruling must be upheld as long as it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. (citing Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

B. Analysis

As to the first factor, the probative value of the evidence was high because the assaults were almost identical. Hatfield testified the assault occurred while the two were dating. Leading up to the assault, they drank alcohol in the evening, they got into a heated argument, and appellant got angry at her using her phone. Appellant then choked her until she passed out, which occurred outside appellant's father's house where she later woke up alone. See Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding the defendant's prior murder conviction was highly probative because of “the extreme degree of similarity between the two murders”); Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref'd) (“[T]he district court could have reasonably determined that the remarkable similarities between the extraneous offenses and the charged offenses strengthened the probative force of the evidence.”); see also Redin v. State, No. 06-25-00019-CR, 2026 WL 867024, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence of the “two other domestic violence victims” was significantly probative because appellant “employed many of the same methods against all three women”).

As to the second factor, the potential to impress the jury was minimal because the extraneous offense was no more serious than the charged offense. See Taylor, 920 S.W.2d at 323 (“[T]he first murder, being no more heinous than the second, was not likely to create such prejudice in the minds of the jury that it would have been unable to limit its consideration of the evidence to its proper purpose.”); Rodriguez v. State, 678 S.W.3d 375, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. ref'd). Moreover, any tendency to draw impermissible inferences of character conformity “can be minimized through a limiting instruction,” and the jury charge instructions contained such an instruction. Rodriguez, 678 S.W.3d at 387 (quoting Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).

The time needed to develop the evidence was also minimal. The extraneous offense evidence covered only fourteen pages of the roughly 250-page-record for the State's case-in-chief and only came in through Hatfield's testimony. See id.; Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 221 (holding the extraneous offense evidence “did not consume an inordinate amount of time” because it “was only admitted through the testimony of [the alleged victim],” and “[the alleged victim]'s testimony was only eight pages long” in a record that spanned hundreds of pages).

As to the last factor, the State's need for the evidence was high. Jeana was the only witness to the offense, the defense challenged her credibility at trial, appellant testified to a different version of events which characterized Jeana as the aggressor, and a mistrial had already occurred without Hatfield's testimony.³ Hatfield, by testifying about a strangulation which took place in the same location under similar circumstances, helped rebut appellant's defensive theory and testimony. See Taylor, 920 S.W.2d at 323 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the defendant's prior murder conviction in part because appellant's identity and intent “were hotly contested issues” at the underlying murder trial and two key witnesses whom appellant confessed to the murders “were crack-smoking prostitutes, thus vulnerable to at least some degree to attacks on their credibility”); Rodriguez, 678 S.W.3d at 387; Robisheaux , 483 S.W.3d at 220; see also Redin, 2026 WL 867024, at *8 (holding the State needed the evidence because the appellant called the complainant's credibility into question, the complainant's mother's “testimony was largely circumstantial,” and the complainant's “testimony was the only direct evidence of” the assault).

Given our standard of review, the presumption in favor of admissibility, and the factors discussed above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant's Rule 403 objection. See Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 806; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389; Hernandez, 390 S.W.3d at 324; Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. We overrule appellant's second issue.

IV. WITNESS BIAS

By his last issue, appellant argues the trial court erred when it prevented defense counsel from impeaching Dr. Onufrak about her history of domestic abuse for bias. Before Dr. Onufrak's testimony, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to address the State's motion in limine to exclude “[a]ny reference or mention of Dr. Onufrak being assaulted or abused in the past.”⁴ Afterwards, the court granted the State's motion in limine and would not allow the defense to inquire on her history of domestic abuse.

“We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, and we must uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is nonconstitutional error governed by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 44.2(b) if the trial court's ruling merely offends the rules of evidence. See Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 38 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2011), aff'd, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Nonconstitutional error under Rule 44.2(b) requires reversal only if it affects the substantial rights of the accused. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

Even if we assume without deciding the trial court erred when it prevented defense counsel from cross-examining Dr. Onufrak about her domestic violence experience, we cannot find that appellant's substantial rights were affected. See id. We already held the evidence sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We noted Dr. Onufrak's testimony was generally similar to Hadden's testimony. “If the evidence is generally cumulative of other evidence introduced in the case, no harm attaches.” Celis, 354 S.W.3d at 38 (collecting cases).

Both Hadden and Dr. Onufrak testified about Jeana's injuries and conditions at the hospital, and both testified her injuries were consistent with her allegations of abuse. Appellant does not challenge Hadden's bias on appeal. In fact, he states in his appellate brief that Hadden, in contrast to Dr. Onufrak, was “an objective witness.” We cannot find reversible error where appellant was unable to impeach a witness for potential bias because her testimony was cumulative of another unbiased or objective witness. See id. (“[E]ven if the ruling were an abuse of discretion, it would not be reversible error because the same or similar evidence was admitted through the testimony of appellant and his witnesses.”). We overrule appellant's last issue.

V. CONCLUSION

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Delivered and filed on the 20th day of August, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Appellant was initially tried on July 13, 2021, and his first trial resulted in a mistrial. His second trial began on October 28, 2024.

2.   Another doctor also treated Jeana but did not testify at trial.

3.   Hatfield's alleged assault occurred after appellant's first trial.

4.   The trial court initially denied the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence related to Dr. Onufrak past assault. The State re-urged its motion before Dr. Onufrak's testimony.

JON WEST Justice