COASTER LINE COASTER CLUB INC v. CITY OF DALLAS (2026)

OPINION

Coaster Line-Coaster Club, Inc., d/b/a Tiger Cabaret appeals two trial court orders rendered in favor of the City of Dallas and Eddie Garcia solely in his capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Dallas (collectively “the City”). In two issues Coaster Line asserts (1) the trial court erred in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment action because immunity was waived for that claim, and (2) the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment on its appeal from the revocation of its sexually oriented business (“SOB”) license because it applied an incorrect standard of review and genuine issues of material fact exist. We affirm the trial court's order dismissing Coaster Line's declaratory judgment action for want of jurisdiction. We reverse the order granting the City's motion for summary judgment on Coaster Line's appeal from the revocation of its SOB license because we conclude the trial court applied the incorrect standard of review.

Background

Coaster Line operates a licensed SOB called Tiger Cabaret at 9125 E. R.L. Thornton Freeway in Dallas, Texas. Pursuant to Dallas City Code section 41A-12, a licensed SOB may not operate at any location other than the address specified on the license application. See Dall., Tex., Dallas City Code § 41A-12. Nor may the license be transferred to another business. Id.¹ Next door to Tiger Cabaret is Malibu Lounge, a restaurant that is not licensed to operate as an SOB. The two businesses share a parking lot and are connected in the back by a breezeway. Both Tiger Cabaret and Malibu Lounge are owned by the same person.

In January 2022, the City of Dallas amended the Dallas City Code to require all businesses operating with an SOB license to cease operations between the hours of 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Id. § 41A-14.3(a).² After legal challenges to the ordinance were unsuccessful, Dallas police officers hand-delivered notice letters to all SOB license holders in Dallas to ensure the businesses were aware the new law would begin being enforced on November 30, 2023. The notice informed the businesses that if they failed to comply, their licenses would be subject to revocation.

In the early morning hours of December 3, Dallas police officers observed the parking lot in front of Tiger Cabaret was still full of cars after 2 a.m. Undercover investigators were called to the scene. According to Detective Cameron Peterson, a parking lot attendant informed him the cabaret was closed due to the new city ordinance, but “at 2 a.m. they move everyone, including the female dancers, to Malibu Lounge, which is open until 5 a.m.”

Peterson testified he entered the Malibu Lounge with two other detectives around 3:00 a.m. While on the premises, the detectives took photographs and videotaped the activities taking place in the lounge via body-camera. Peterson stated he observed approximately eighteen females who appeared to be dancing for money including performing pole dances and lap dances. Peterson witnessed men throwing money on a stage where women were dancing and placing cash in women's bras and underwear. One of the detectives accompanying Peterson, Jesus Soto, testified he recognized several people, including waitresses, security workers, and exotic dancers, who were employees of Tiger Cabaret. A third detective, Riedrick Alceus, stated he observed a woman dressed as an exotic dancer and holding cash in her hand enter the manager's office “searching for Mark Kirk in order to tip out and pay her house fee.” Alceus later spoke with Kirk on the phone. Kirk told him he was the manager on duty for Tiger Cabaret that night and he left the premises around 4:30 a.m.

Based on their observations, the detectives arrested three individuals–the parking lot attendant, a security guard, and a bartender–for violating the hours-of-operation restriction and operating an SOB at an unlicensed location. All three employees stated they were instructed by Tiger Cabaret's management to transfer all customers and performers from Tiger Cabaret to Malibu Lounge to continue operating as an SOB at the Malibu Lounge.

On December 5, the Dallas Chief of Police revoked Tiger Cabaret's SOB license for violating city code sections 41A-12 and 41A-14.3. The revocation notice stated a police investigation had determined that Tiger Cabaret had moved its SOB operations to the Malibu Lounge to continue its business after 2:00 a.m. The notice informed Coaster Line it could appeal the decision to the Permit and License Appeal Board (“PLAB”) or to state district court. Coaster Line chose to appeal the decision to district court.

Coaster Line filed this suit in December 2023, seeking a declaratory judgment that the City “erred in discriminatorily and selectively enforcing the Ordinance.” It asserted the City's immunity from this claim was waived under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”). As its second “cause of action,” Coaster Line appealed the revocation of its license. In response, the City filed special exceptions, a plea to the jurisdiction, and an original answer.

In its plea to the jurisdiction, the City argued Coaster Line's pleadings failed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction over its affirmative claim for declaratory relief because the UDJA's limited waiver of immunity applies only to claims that (1) an ordinance is invalid, (2) a governmental official acted without legal authority, or (3) a governmental official failed to perform a purely ministerial act. Because Coaster Line's allegations fit none of these categories, the City argued it was immune. The City additionally argued Coaster Line's request for a declaratory judgment failed as a matter of law because the propriety of the license revocation was already being addressed in the appeal.

After the City filed its plea, the Dallas City Charter was amended as a result of the passage of Proposition S in the November 2024 election. The newly added Chapter XXV states that Dallas residents may bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief against the City to require it “to comply with any of the provisions of the charter, any city ordinance, or any law of the State of Texas.” Dall., Tex., City Charter, ch. XXV, § 1(a), (b). It further states the City's governmental immunity from suit and liability is “waived to the extent of liability created by the charter, city ordinance, and/or Texas state law.” Id. § 1(c). Although Coaster Line did not amend its petition to assert the charter provision as a basis for the trial court's jurisdiction, it relied on the provision in its response to the City's plea. Coaster Line argued Chapter XXV waived immunity for its claim that the City's actions amounted to “discriminatory and selectively enforced police actions by the City and Chief to violate Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution.”

The City also filed a motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. It argued there was no evidence to show the Chief's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and there was substantial evidence to support the City's decision to revoke Coaster Line's SOB license as a matter of law. In making this argument, the City based its motion on the application of the “substantial evidence” standard of review applicable to administrative decisions. The City asserted that “to survive summary judgment, [Coaster Line] must produce some evidence that the City's decision to revoke its SOB license ‘is not supported by substantial evidence, defined as more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.’ ”

As to Coaster Line's declaratory judgment action, the City reiterated its argument that revocation of Coaster Line's SOB license was proper as a matter of law under the substantial-evidence standard and there was no evidence the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. It further asserted there was “no evidence and no genuine issue of material fact that DPD's enforcement action against Plaintiff on December 3, 2023 was discriminatory or selective in any way.” In support of the motion, the City submitted evidence including (1) affidavits by the investigating officers, (2) the video footage and photographs taken by the detectives, (3) the charging documents for the Tiger Cabaret employees who were arrested, (4) the notice letter that was delivered to all SOB's before the hours-of-operation restriction went into effect, (5) the letter revoking Coaster Line's SOB license, and (6) documentation showing that Tiger Cabaret and Malibu Lounge are owned by the same person.

Coaster Line responded, arguing the City's motion for summary judgment requested the court to apply an incorrect standard of review. It contended that, because the Chief of Police was not an administrative agency, the standard of review applicable to his unilateral decision to revoke Coaster Line's SOB license was de novo using the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof, not a substantial-evidence review. In the alternative, Coaster Line argued that, even under the substantial-evidence standard, the City's decision was arbitrary and capricious and there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Coaster Line violated city ordinances. Coaster Line denied that any SOB activities were taking place at Malibu Lounge after Tiger Cabaret closed at 2 a.m. As evidence, Coaster line submitted (1) an affidavit by Mark Kirk, (2) the certificate of occupancy for Malibu Lounge showing it was licensed to operate as a restaurant and for “commercial amusement,” (3) the City's responses to discovery, and (4) video from the lounge's DVR system showing the activities that took place on the premises during the relevant time period.

Kirk testified in his affidavit that he was the manager of Malibu Lounge, not Tiger Cabaret, and Malibu Lounge and Tiger Cabaret did not share operations or employees. According to Kirk, when the hours-of-operation ordinance was passed, he decided to operate Malibu Lounge as an after-hours club. He stated he asked Tiger Cabaret to promote Malibu Lounge as a destination for its customers after the cabaret closed at 2 a.m. Kirk explained that, “[e]xcept for the bartender, the doorman, the valet, and a waitress, every person who came to Malibu Lounge on December 3, 2023, after 2:00 a.m. paid a cover charge and entered as a guest of Malibu Lounge.” Kirk denied the lounge was operating as an SOB stating, “there was no exposure of specified anatomical areas and no specified sexual activities occurring as defined by the SOB ordinance.” He further stated he did not require the Tiger Cabaret dancers to perform at Malibu Lounge on December 3, and the dancers have never been paid by, or worked for, Malibu Lounge.

In defense of its claim for a declaratory judgment, Coaster Line argued the City selectively enforced its ordinances against it by “target[ing] the collective assembly of persons solely because of their prior attendance or affiliation with [Tiger Cabaret].” As evidence of the allegedly discriminatory and unconstitutional enforcement, Coaster Line relied solely on one of the City's responses to its requests for admission. In its request, Coaster Line asked the City to admit “that the Ordinance does not prohibit patrons, dancers, or others from going to a business that is permitted to remain open after 2:00 a.m.” In its response, the City admitted “the Ordinance does not prohibit patrons from going to a non-sexually oriented business that is permitted to remain open after 2:00 a.m.,” but denied “the Ordinance permitted Tiger Cabaret dancers and staff to relocate to Malibu Lounge for the purpose of operating a sexually oriented business.” Based on this admission, Coaster Line argued it was the City's position that it is “only lawful for the patrons of Tiger Cabaret to attend the after-hours venue of Malibu, but not the dancers or employees of Tiger Cabaret.”

The City filed a reply brief re-urging the trial court to apply the substantial-evidence standard of review because the “rationale for applying the substantial evidence rule remains the same regardless of whether the administrative decision was made by the Chief or by a board or a commission.” The City further argued that Coaster Line failed to offer evidence that would raise an issue of fact as to whether the Chief's revocation was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

With respect to the declaratory judgment claim, the City contended Coaster Line had not properly pleaded or noticed a claim under Chapter XXV. Even assuming the claim was before the court, the City argued Coaster Line failed to allege facts to establish a facially valid claim of retaliatory or discriminatory enforcement in violation of the Texas Constitution.

The trial court granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction as well as its motion for summary judgment. Coaster Line brought this appeal challenging both rulings.

Analysis

We first consider whether Coaster Line established a waiver of the City's governmental immunity for its declaratory judgment claims under Chapter XXV of the Dallas City Charter. We conclude it did not. We next consider the standard governing a direct appeal from the Chief's revocation decision. We conclude the Dallas City Code does not require the district court to apply the substantial-evidence rule. We therefore conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Coaster Line's appeal from the revocation of its SOB license.

I. Declaratory Judgment

In its first issue, Coaster Line argues the trial court erred in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim because the City's immunity was waived under Chapter XXV of the Dallas city charter.³ Coaster Line further argues the trial court was required to grant it an opportunity to amend its pleadings before dismissing its claim. Because the City filed both a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment challenging Coaster Line's declaratory judgment claim, we will address the propriety of both together.

Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dept of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). “Immunity from suit may be asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction or other procedural vehicle, such as a motion for summary judgment.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. Id. If the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we look beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Id. A plea to the jurisdiction may mirror a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and assert the plaintiff has no evidence of an element required to invoke jurisdiction. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Tex. 2024). Resolution of the jurisdictional issue may implicate both subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770-71.

Chapter XXV of the city charter purports to waive the City's immunity for actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief “against the City of Dallas to require the City to comply with any of the provisions of the charter, any city ordinance, or any law of the State of Texas.” Dall., Tex., City Charter ch. XXV, § 1.⁴ We need not decide whether Chapter XXV is a valid waiver of governmental immunity because Coaster Line has not alleged or produced evidence of a claim falling within Chapter XXV's terms.

To invoke a waiver of immunity under Chapter XXV, Coaster Line was required to identify a charter provision, city ordinance, or Texas law with which it contends the City failed to comply and allege facts demonstrating such failure to comply. The only Texas law Coaster Line has alleged the City violated is article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, which protects the freedom of speech. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 8. Coaster Line makes no argument, however, and has failed to allege facts or provide evidence demonstrating that its right to freedom of speech has been infringed or that a negative action has been taken or threatened against it based on its exercise of that right.

The statement in its petition that Coaster Line points to as setting out the jurisdictional facts supporting a waiver of immunity is an allegation that the City's revocation of its SOB license “constitutes another in a long line of discriminatory and selectively enforced police actions by the City and the Chief to violate Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution.” An assertion of discriminatory enforcement is based on the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law which is found in article I, section 3 of the Texas Constitution. Id. § 3. To establish a claim of discriminatory enforcement, Coaster Line must show it has been singled out for prosecution while other similarly situated SOBs committing the same acts were not. See State v. Malone Serv. Co., 829 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex. 1992). Other than its conclusory allegation of “discriminatory and selective enforcement,” Coaster Line alleged no facts showing that similarly situated SOBs engaged in the same conduct but were treated differently. Nor did Coaster Line present jurisdictional evidence raising a fact issue on that point.

In its response to the City's motion for summary judgment, Coaster Line contended its declaratory judgment claim was based on the City's “targeting the collective assembly of persons” at Malibu Lounge solely because of their prior affiliation with Tiger Cabaret. Assuming this argument was attempting to invoke the right to equal protection, Coaster Line has brought no claims on behalf of the “collective assembly of persons” who congregated at Malibu Lounge on December 3. Its sole claim for relief concerns the revocation of its SOB license. For the reasons stated above, Coaster Line has not alleged facts or shown how the revocation of its license violated its right to equal protection.

If Coaster Line was attempting to assert a claim for violation of the right to freedom of assembly under article I, section 27 of the Texas Constitution, this also fails. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 27. Among other things, Coaster Line has presented no evidence the City revoked its SOB license based solely on the fact that persons affiliated with Tiger Cabaret assembled at Malibu Lounge. All the evidence showed the City revoked Coaster Line's license based on its determination that the conduct of those affiliated persons violated the City's SOB regulations. This was a legally and constitutionally permissible basis for revocation. See Dall., Tex., Dallas City Code ch. 41A, § 41A-12 & 14.3; see also Ex parte Smalley, 156 S.W.3d 608, 610-12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. dism'd). Because Coaster Line has failed to allege facts or provide evidence to show the City failed to comply with a charter provision, city ordinance, or state law, the trial court properly dismissed its claim for declaratory judgment.

Coaster Line contends the trial court should have granted it an opportunity to amend its pleadings, but it makes no argument as to how it would cure the jurisdictional defect. Coaster Line does not identify any provision, ordinance, or law it could allege the City violated in making the determination that Coaster Line's SOB license should be revoked. Where the jurisdictional infirmity is incurable, remanding for an opportunity to amend serves no legitimate purpose. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). We resolve Coaster Line's first issue against it.

II. Appeal of Revocation

In its second issue, Coaster Line contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against it on its appeal from the revocation of its SOB license. Coaster Line argues the trial court applied an incorrect standard of review and genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment.

When construing municipal ordinances we apply the same rules used to construe statutes. Baird v. City of Melissa, 170 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). Our goal is to discern the legislative body's intent. Id. at 925. We look first to the plain meaning of the words of the provisions. Bd. of Adjustment of City of San Antonio v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Tex. 2002). “To give effect to the legislative enactment as a whole, we do not assign a meaning to a provision that would be inconsistent with other provisions of the enactment.” Baird, 170 S.W.3d at 924.

Under section 41A-10 of the Dallas City Code, the Chief of Police must revoke an SOB license if he determines the license holder either transferred its license to another, or operated an SOB at an unlicensed location. Dall., Tex., Dallas City Code § 41A-10(b)(9). The revocation may be appealed to either the PLAB or to state district court. Id. § 41A-11(a).

Appeals to the PLAB from actions of department directors denying, suspending, or revoking a license or permit over which the director has regulatory authority are governed by section 2-96 of the city code. Id. § 2-96. Section 2-96 specifies the PLAB shall hear and consider evidence submitted by any interested person and shall “decide the appeal on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing if there is a dispute of fact.” Id.

Appeals to district court from final PLAB decisions are governed by section 2-99. Id. § 2-99. Under section 2-99, the appeal to district court is “limited to a hearing under the substantial evidence rule.” Id. This parallels section 1-11 which provides that appeals from decisions of city boards and commissions are reviewed under the substantial-evidence rule unless otherwise provided by law. Id. § 1-11.

The parties agree the Dallas City Code does not state the standard to be applied by the trial court when a licensee appeals a revocation decision made by the Chief of Police directly to district court under section 41A-11 instead of first appealing to the PLAB. Coaster Line argues the Chief's unilateral decision is not entitled to substantial-evidence deference because the decision was not made by a board, commission, or other administrative agency following an adjudicative hearing. The City maintains the Chief's decision should be reviewed under the substantial-evidence rule in the same manner as a decision made by an administrative agency, and that by electing to appeal directly to district court instead of to the PLAB, Coaster Line forfeited its right to have disputed fact issues resolved under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

The substantial-evidence rule is a highly deferential form of judicial review under which a court evaluates an agency's decision based on the evidentiary record. See N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Riou, 598 S.W.3d 243, 251 (Tex. 2020). Under that standard, the reviewing court does not determine whether the agency reached the correct result or whether disputed issues of fact exist. See id.; Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1995); S. Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'rs, 318 S.W.2d 619, 622-23 (Tex. 1958). Rather, it asks only whether there is a reasonable basis in the administrative record for the agency's decision—that is, whether the record contains more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the agency's action. Torch, 912 S.W.2d at 792. The evidence may preponderate against the decision and still amount to substantial evidence. Riou, 598 S.W.3d at 251. The trial court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1988).

In contrast, an appeal under the ordinary civil preponderance-of-the-evidence standard requires the reviewing body to determine de novo whether the greater weight and degree of credible evidence supports the decision being appealed. See Herrera v. Stahl, 441 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). The factfinder, although informed of the decision being appealed, does not review the decision for its reasonableness, but rather independently decides the issues based on the evidence presented by both sides. Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 531 (Tex. 1995). Where, as here, a party moves for summary judgment, the question is whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact. If disputed fact issues exist, they are then resolved by the fact finder using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Stary v. Ethridge, 712 S.W.3d 584, 593 n. 45 (Tex. 2025) (where statute is silent as to the burden of proof, it is presumed that the preponderance of the evidence applies).

Courts generally apply the more limited substantial-evidence standard of review to agency decisions out of deference to the agency's expertise in its field. See Torch, 912 S.W.2d at 792. This deference, however, presumes the agency's decision arose from an adversarial proceeding meeting the requirements of due process of law. See Lewis v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 550 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. 1977). At a minimum, due process requires all parties be accorded a full and fair hearing on any disputed issues of fact. City of Arlington v. Centerfolds, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 238, 250 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied). It is only through such a proceeding that the facts may be ascertained and the agency's decision “must manifest a rational connection” to those facts. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. LLC v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 406 S.W.3d 253, 265 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). Where the administrative process denies a party due process, the result is necessarily arbitrary and cannot be sustained. See Lewis, 550 S.W.3d at 16.

A substantial-evidence review is generally conducted on an administrative record produced through the administrative hearing. Riou, 598 S.W.3d at 251. Under the Dallas City Code, the Chief's decision to revoke an SOB license is not made following an adversarial proceeding. Instead, the Chief determines unilaterally whether grounds for revocation exist before the licensee has any opportunity to present evidence, challenge the department's evidence, or litigate disputed factual issues. See Dall., Tex., Dallas City Code § 41A-10. Because the Chief's decision is not preceded by an adjudicative hearing at which the SOB was allowed to present evidence, there is no evidentiary record created through an adversarial administrative process for the district court to review. There is therefore no administrative determination entitled to the deference associated with substantial-evidence review. Cf. Torch Operating, 912 S.W.2d at 792; Riou, 598 S.W.3d at 251; Lewis, 550 S.W.3d at 16.⁵ This conclusion is consistent with the procedural framework reflected in the Texas Administrative Procedure Act. The Act's provisions governing substantial-evidence review contemplate review of an agency decision rendered after a contested case and supported by an administrative record transmitted to the reviewing court. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 2001.174-.175. Those features are absent here.

Applying the substantial-evidence rule to the Chief's decision would require the district court to defer to factual determinations made without an adjudicative hearing and without allowing the district court itself to resolve any disputed factual issues that may exist. See Lewis, 550 S.W.2d at 13; S. Canal, 318 S.W.2d at 622–23. Nothing in the Dallas City Code suggests the City Council intended that result. Although the code expressly provides that appeals from decisions of the PLAB and other city boards are governed by the substantial-evidence rule, it imposes no comparable limitation on a direct appeal from the Chief's revocation decision. See Dall., Tex., Dallas City Code §§ 1-11, 2-99. Nor does section 41A-11 require the licensee to exhaust administrative remedies. Instead, Section 41A-11 simply authorizes a licensee to appeal either to the PLAB or directly to district court. See id. § 41A-11(a). We do not read that provision to suggest that, by electing a direct appeal to district court, the licensee must forgo its right to have disputed fact issues resolved based on the evidence presented.

In this case, the City's motion for summary judgment was premised entirely on the application of the substantial-evidence standard. The City did not argue the Chief's unilateral determination that Coaster Line violated sections 41A-12 and 41A-14.3 of the city code was correct as a matter of law; it argued only that his determination was supported by more than a scintilla of evidence and was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious as a matter of law. Because the City moved for summary judgment only on the ground that substantial evidence supported the Chief's decision, the trial court necessarily reviewed the evidence presented by the parties using that standard. See Johnson v. Brewer & & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex. 2002) (court cannot grant summary judgment on grounds not presented in motion). The trial court did not, therefore, examine the evidence to determine whether there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Coaster Line's violation of the ordinance. See S. Canal, 318 S.W.2d at 622-23 (no fact issues determined in review under substantial evidence rule). Without a full and fair hearing to determine whether fact issues exist regarding whether Coaster Line violated the ordinance, and to resolve those fact issues if they are determined to exist, the judgment revoking Coaster Line's SOB license cannot be upheld. See Lewis, 550 S.W.2d at 16.

Accordingly, we conclude that when a licensee elects the direct appeal to district court authorized by section 41A-11, the Dallas City Code does not require the district court to review the Chief's revocation decision under the substantial-evidence rule. Instead, the district court reviews the decision de novo under the ordinary standards governing civil proceedings. Because summary judgment was sought and obtained under the substantial-evidence framework, and because that framework does not govern a direct appeal under 41A-11, we reverse the judgment on Coaster Line's appeal from the revocation of its SOB license and remand that claim for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court's order granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment action.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 41A-12 states, “A licensee shall not transfer his license to another, nor shall a licensee operate a sexually oriented business under the authority of a license at any place other than the address designated in the application.” Dall., Tex., Dallas City Code § 41A-12.

2.   Section 41A-14.3(a) states, “A sexually oriented business must be closed for business each day between the hours of 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.” Id. § 41A-14.3(a).

3.   As it did in its response to the City's plea to the jurisdiction, Coaster Line relies solely on Chapter XXV and makes no argument that the City's immunity was waived by the UDJA.

4.   In a one-sentence footnote, the City asserts Chapter XXV is invalid and unenforceable under the Texas Constitution because only the Texas Legislature has the authority to waive the governmental immunity of a municipality. Because we conclude Coaster Line has failed to establish a claim within the scope of Chapter XXV's purported waiver, we express no opinion on whether Chapter XXV is valid or enforceable.

5.   The City cites a single case, and we have found no other, in which the court of appeals applied the substantial-evidence standard of review to a sheriff's unilateral decision. See Webworld Mktg. Grp., L.L.C. v. Thomas, 249 S.W.3d 19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.), The court's application of the substantial evidence standard (1) was done sua sponte without any briefing by the parties, (2) was the subject of an extensive dissent, (3) did not address the due process concerns discussed above, (4) provided no analysis as to why the sheriff's decision constituted an “agency's factual determination,” and (5) was not reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court. For these reasons, we do not find Webworld persuasive.

Opinion by Justice Jackson