EX PARTE v. << (2026)

OPINION

C.M., appellant, was found to be a child engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. C.M. challenges the habeas court's order dismissing his application for writ of habeas corpus as a subsequent application, and alternatively, denying his application on the merits. We hold that the habeas court abused its discretion in dismissing C.M.'s writ as a subsequent application; however, we affirm the habeas court's order denying C.M.'s application for writ of habeas corpus on the merits.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

In 1998, a jury found C.M. to be a child engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated sexual assault. The complainant in the case was C.M.'s infant sister. The sole witness to the assault was C.M.'s mother, L.M. She testified that in January of 1998, C.M. volunteered to change the baby's diaper and, when she went into the bedroom to check on them, she saw C.M. bending over the baby with his tongue on the baby's vagina. L.M. reported the incident to police.

The jury assessed a fifteen-year determinate sentence to be served in the Texas Youth Commission ¹ with a possible transfer to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to serve out the remainder of his sentence upon C.M.'s becoming a legal adult. This Court affirmed C.M.'s adjudication. See In re C.E.M., No. 05-98-01866-CV, 1999 WL 504551 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 19, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).

L.M. died on July 17, 2006.

C.M. filed his first application for writ of habeas corpus, claiming actual innocence, in 2010. In support of his claims, he attached several affidavits from family members claiming that, prior to her death, L.M. recanted her statement that she saw C.M. sexually assault his sister. The habeas court denied the application. In 2011, C.M. filed his second application for writ of habeas corpus, in which he raised grounds of sufficiency of the evidence and actual innocence. The habeas court also denied that application. C.M. did not appeal the denial of either of those applications.

C.M. filed his third application for writ of habeas corpus in 2022. The habeas court signed an order dismissing the habeas petition as a subsequent application and denying the application on its merits.

On appeal, C.M. raises four issues. C.M. claims (1) the habeas court erred in finding that his habeas petition was successive, (2) he is actually innocent, (3) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the only witness against him and his due process rights to a fair trial, and (4) the prosecution presented false testimony denying him his due process right to a fair trial.

II. Applicable Habeas Law

Juveniles may file applications for writs of habeas corpus pursuant to Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; see also Ex parte Valle, 104 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Section 56.01 of the Texas Family Code limits appeals in juvenile proceedings to certain juvenile court orders, but it “does not limit a child's right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(c), (o). It necessarily follows that the right to appeal a ruling on a writ of habeas corpus is likewise not limited by Section 56.01. See Ex parte R.R., No. 05-24-01399-CV, 2025 WL 1425223, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 15, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Ex parte T.W.A., No. 10-22-00022-CV, 2022 WL 3655150, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we must affirm a habeas court's decision to grant or deny the relief requested in a habeas corpus application. T.W.A., 2022 WL 3655150, at *3. We review a habeas court's legal conclusions de novo. In re M.P.A., 364 S.W.3d 277, 289 (Tex. 2012).

III. Issue One - Successive Petition

We begin by addressing C.M.'s first issue in which he asserts that the habeas court erred in dismissing his habeas petition as a prohibited successive writ. C.M. argues that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 11, which imposes a bar to successive petition applications absent particular circumstances, is inapplicable to juvenile writ proceedings.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 11 governs habeas corpus proceedings in criminal cases. Chapter 11 prohibits a court from considering a subsequent writ application absent particular circumstances. See Valle, 104 S.W.3d at 889; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 4 (listing circumstances allowing subsequent application when an applicant seeks relief from a felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death); id. art. 11.071, § 5 (listing circumstances allowing subsequent application when an applicant seeks relief from a felony judgment imposing a penalty of death); id. art. 11.072 § 9 (listing circumstances allowing subsequent application when an applicant in a felony or misdemeanor case seeks relief from an order or a judgment or conviction ordering community supervision).

The writ application under review in this case, however, is not a criminal writ application filed under Chapter 11; the application was filed pursuant to Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution to challenge C.M.'s juvenile delinquency adjudication. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (district court judges “have the power to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction”); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(o).

Section 56.01 of the Texas Family Code, which provides it “does not limit a child's right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus,” does not expressly restrict a juvenile's right to file a subsequent writ application. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(o).

As a general rule, despite the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile-court proceedings, because “[d]elinquency proceedings are civil in nature,” “the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply unless the Legislature evinces a contrary intent.”² Vasquez v. State, 739 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Moreover, delinquency proceedings “are not to be treated as criminal matters unless specifically mandated.” Valle, 104 S.W.3d at 889. The legislature has not evinced an intent to apply Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 11 to delinquency proceedings. Nor has the legislature specifically mandated that a writ application, filed as a result of a juvenile-delinquency adjudication, be treated as a criminal matter.

As this proceeding is civil in nature, we look to the Texas Supreme Court for guidance for the applicable statutory construction. Specifically,

The proper construction of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). When a statute's language is unambiguous, “we adopt the interpretation supported by its plain language unless such an interpretation would lead to absurd results.” TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). “We presume the Legislature included each word in the statute for a purpose and that words not included were purposefully omitted.” Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015). We construe statutes and related provisions as a whole, not in isolation, Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001)[.]

In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

Although the legislature has chosen to bar review of subsequent criminal writ applications absent certain circumstances, it has not imposed that same restriction on juvenile writs filed pursuant to Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution and we are not at liberty to create such a rule to govern this case. We decline the State's invitation to judicially adopt a rule barring subsequent juvenile writ applications like the rule set out in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 11.

Because the legislature has not expressly or impliedly restricted a juvenile's right to file a subsequent writ application, any interpretation to the contrary would require that we judicially amend Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 11 to apply to juvenile writ proceedings “by adding words that are not contained in the language of the statute.” Panchakarla, 602 S.W. 3d at 540 (quoting, Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 508). “But we cannot do so because the statute's ‘text is the alpha and the omega of the interpretive process.’ ” Id. at 540–541 (quoting BankDirect Cap. Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76, 86 (Tex. 2017)). Thus, the habeas court abused its discretion in dismissing C.M.'s writ as a subsequent application.³ We sustain C.M.'s first issue.

As we have determined that C.M. was not precluded from filing the subsequent writ, our review is under the parameters of juvenile habeas proceedings.⁴

IV. Issues Two and Four - Actual Innocence and the Use of False Testimony

In his second and fourth issues, C.M. argues that this Court should declare him actually innocent and grant him habeas relief because the State used false testimony at trial; namely, L.M.'s testimony describing C.M.'s sexual assault of his sister.⁵ The State responds that C.M.'s claims are barred by laches and that the habeas court properly rejected C.M.'s claims of actual innocence.

 We reject the State's reliance on laches.

It is unclear whether the criminal or civil standard applies to the analysis of a laches claim in a juvenile habeas appeal. See T.W.A., 2022 WL 3655150, at *1 (holding that in a juvenile habeas case under either the criminal or civil laches standard, the delay of 15 years in bringing this claim is unreasonable); Ex parte Rodriguez, No. 2-07-079-CV, 2008 WL 2510624, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, June 19, 2008, no pet.) (holding the criminal standard applies to a laches analysis in a juvenile habeas case because although juvenile cases are civil in nature, a juvenile habeas application is similar to an adult habeas application). Juvenile cases are classified as civil proceedings, but they are also quasi-criminal in nature, In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1998), and generally are governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapter 38 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Texas Rules of Evidence applicable to criminal proceedings. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.17; In re R.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002); In re D. I. B., 988 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. 1999). In Ex parte Carrio, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the doctrine of laches was appropriate for application in the habeas corpus context. 992 S.W.2d 486, 487–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[T]he doctrine of laches is a theory which we may, and should, employ in our determination of whether to grant relief in any given 11.07 case.”). Here, because the nature of C.M.'s application (actual innocence) is sufficiently similar to those made in adult habeas applications, we will apply the criminal standard to this case. Rodriguez, 2008 WL 2510624, at *2.

The equitable doctrine of laches refers to a party's failure to assert a claim in a timely manner which, along with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, bars the claim. Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The doctrine also includes the failure, for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what should have been done. Id. When deciding whether to apply the doctrine of laches, a court considers the totality of the circumstances, including all forms of prejudice. Id. at 208.

Courts may reject the State's reliance on laches when the record shows that (1) an applicant's delay was not unreasonable because it was the result of a justifiable excuse or excusable neglect; (2) the State would not be materially prejudiced as a result of the delay; or (3) the applicant is entitled to equitable relief for other compelling reasons, such as new evidence showing that he is actually innocent of the offense or, in some cases, that he is reasonably likely to prevail on the merits. Id. at 218.

The State points out that approximately twenty-two years elapsed between the time C.M.'s adjudication was final and the time he filed this habeas application. Further, the State points out that L.M., the sole witness to the sexual assault, is deceased and as a result the State would be unable to retry this case. While the State is correct, we reject the State's reliance on laches because the record shows that C.M. may be “actually innocent of the offense” or is “reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of his actual innocence claim.” Id.

An applicant is entitled to habeas relief based on a claim of actual innocence if he can prove by clear and convincing evidence that no rational jury would convict him based on newly discovered evidence. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 209. Newly discovered evidence is evidence that is “not known to the applicant at the time of trial and could not be known to him even with the exercise of due diligence.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The newly discovered evidence must be weighed against the inculpatory evidence offered at trial. Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 207.

Along with his application for writ of habeas corpus, C.M. presented numerous statements from relatives reporting that L.M. fabricated the story about C.M. sexually assaulting his infant sister. C.M. claims that these statements present newly discovered evidence demonstrating L.M. fabricated the sexual assault in order to have him removed from her care. Additionally, as C.M. points out, because the victim in this case was an infant, L.M.'s eyewitness testimony was the primary evidence against him. We agree that the numerous statements reporting L.M. fabricated the sexual assault allegation against C.M. may provide clear and convincing evidence that no rational jury would convict him. In other words, for purposes of laches, C.M. may be “actually innocent of the offense” or is “reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of his actual innocence claim.” Accordingly, we reject the State's argument that laches bars consideration of C.M.'s writ application. See Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 209.

 We decline to enter a finding that C.M. is actually innocent.6

C.M. asks this Court to enter a finding that he is actually innocent of the sexual assault of his sister. However, absent a clear abuse of discretion, we must affirm a habeas court's decision to grant or deny the relief requested in a habeas corpus application. In re M.P.A., No. 03-08-00337-CV, 2010 WL 2789649, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin July 14, 2010) (mem. op.), rev'd in part and remanded on other grounds, 364 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. 2012). Almost total deference is accorded to the habeas court's factual findings in habeas proceedings if supported by the record. In re M.P.A., 364 S.W.3d at 289.

C.M.'s claim of actual innocence is based on affidavits from family members asserting that L.M. recanted her claim that C.M. sexually assaulted his sister. These statements consist of multiple levels of hearsay originating from a deceased declarant. Thus, the habeas court was within its discretion in finding these statements not credible and insufficient to support his actual innocence and use of false evidence claims. In re M.P.A., 2010 WL 2789649, at *5. Accordingly, we decline to enter a finding that C.M. is actually innocent due to the State's alleged use of false testimony.

 C.M. failed to request an evidentiary hearing.

Alternatively, C.M. requests that if we do not enter a finding that he is actually innocent, we remand this case to the habeas court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. C.M. claims the habeas court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to judge the credibility of his newly discovered evidence.⁷

When deciding whether a habeas court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we recognize certain discretionary factors a habeas court should consider in deciding whether to hold a hearing. For instance, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a habeas court should consider whether the applicant made a claim that, if true, establishes affirmative evidence of his innocence. Franklin, 72 S.W.3d at 678. The court explained that, at the hearing, the habeas judge can assess the witness's credibility, examine the “newly discovered evidence,” and determine whether the “new” evidence, when balanced against the “old” inculpatory evidence, unquestionably establishes the applicant's innocence. Id.

Additionally, in deciding whether an actual-innocence habeas applicant is entitled to a hearing, the habeas judge should consider whether he or she presided over applicant's trial or adjudication. An evidentiary hearing is not required for an actual innocence claim supported by newly discovered, affirmative evidence of innocence if the judge before whom the habeas application is pending also presided over the applicant's prior proceeding. See Ex parte Harris, No. 05-18-00008-CR, 2018 WL 2749686, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (in context of article 11.072 writ application); see also Ex parte Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref'd) (same); cf. Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). A trial judge who has had the opportunity to assess the credibility and demeanor of a witness's testimony is in a better position than this Court to evaluate the credibility of an applicant's alleged new evidence. Harris, 2018 WL 2749686, at *3; Franklin, 310 S.W.3d at 921. Yet, a habeas judge who did not preside over a prior trial proceeding does not have personal knowledge of the trial and did not personally view the witnesses testifying and, thus, should hold a hearing to evaluate the credibility of the new evidence. Franklin, 310 S.W.3d at 921.

Finally, habeas courts may forego evidentiary hearings in actual innocence cases if such a hearing is “impractical.” Id., at 922–23.

In this case the habeas judge did not preside over C.M.'s adjudication hearing and therefore did not have the previous opportunity to observe the witnesses's demeanor so as to make a credibility determination. See Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d at 559. Thus, the habeas judge was not in an appreciably better position than this Court to evaluate the credibility of appellant's alleged new evidence.

Moreover, the newly discovered evidence in this case is compelling; it is an alleged recantation by the only witness of the allegation that led to the juvenile court's finding that C.M. engaged in delinquent behavior by sexually assaulting his sister. See Franklin, 310 S.W.3d at 920; see also Ex parte Salazar, 510 S.W.3d 619, 628 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. ref'd) (holding hearing was appropriate under circumstances of case to assess credibility of affirmative exculpatory evidence in form of sworn recantation by child witness where habeas judge did not preside over trial and thus did not have prior opportunity to observe witness's demeanor so as to make credibility determination).

Finally, there is no finding in the record indicating that an evidentiary hearing would have been impracticable. See Franklin, 310 S.W.3d at 922.

Whether we might otherwise conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, here we are constrained from considering the issue because the record does not reflect that C.M. requested an evidentiary hearing regarding his newly discovered evidence. Thus, he has not preserved this issue for our review. See Salazar, 510 S.W.3d at 627–28 (holding that appellant preserved the issue of the habeas court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing by requesting a hearing, which the trial court denied); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (outlining preservation of error standard).

C.M. failed to ask the habeas court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding his newly discovered evidence. Thus, C.M. failed to preserve this issue for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

We overrule C.M.'s second and fourth issues.

V. Issue Three

In his third issue, C.M. claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the only witness against him and violated his due process right to a fair trial.

At the adjudication proceeding, C.M. sought to introduce evidence of what he characterized as motive or bias on the part of L.M. to manufacture the sexual assault allegations against him. The trial court ruled that the evidence was not admissible. At trial, C.M. never objected that his right to confrontation was violated. Further, C.M. did not raise the issue of the excluded evidence on appeal.

The courts have long held that a person may not raise a claim for the first time in a habeas corpus proceeding if he had reasonable opportunity to raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal and failed to do so. Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because the writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only when there is no other adequate remedy at law. Id.

C.M. could have raised the issue of the excluded evidence on direct appeal, but he did not. Thus, since C.M. did not raise this issue on appeal, he is barred from raising this claim through an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Id.

We overrule C.M.'s third issue.

VI. Conclusion

We affirm the habeas court's order denying C.M.'s application for writ of habeas corpus.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Texas Youth Commission no longer exists. It was the State's juvenile corrections agency for decades, but it was abolished in 2011 and replaced by the Texas Juvenile Justice Department.

2.   The Texas Legislature has repeatedly integrated the Code of Criminal Procedure into the Texas Family Code, relying on it across many statutes to establish essential guidelines for juvenile delinquency proceedings, evidentiary standards, and the enforcement of family violence protective orders. For example, Texas Family Code § 51.17(b) explicitly mandates that discovery in juvenile cases is governed entirely by the Code of Criminal Procedure and criminal case decisions. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.17(b). Texas Family Code § 51.17(c) mandates that the Code of Criminal Procedure provisions regarding a defendant's name and pseudonyms for victims apply directly to juveniles. Id. § 51.17(c). Texas Family Code § 51.05(i) requires that attorneys appointed to represent children in juvenile proceedings be paid according to the fee schedule established in Article 26.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. § 51.17(c). And Texas Family Code § 55.45(c) relies on Article 42A.054 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to identify specific violent offenses that block the release of a mentally ill or unfit juvenile from a residential facility without a formal hearing. Id. § 55.45(c).

3.   As we have determined the habeas court abused its discretion in dismissing the application as a subsequent or successive application, we do not address the propriety of then ruling on the merits of an application that has been dismissed. However, because the habeas court reached the merits, we address C.M.'s issues as to the same.

4.   Even a juvenile offender who, upon adulthood, is transferred to the TDCJ cannot be granted habeas relief through Article 11.07. In re Hall, 286 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. 2009) (citing Valle, 104 S.W.3d at 889) (other citation omitted). And the Texas Supreme Court, not the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, is the court of last resort when seeking state habeas relief. In re Dorsey, 465 S.W.3d 656, 656-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Richardson, J., concurring).

5.   Claims of actual innocence are categorized either as Herrera-type claims or Schlup-type claims. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). A Herrera-type claim involves a substantive claim in which an applicant asserts his bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314, 115 S.Ct. 851; see also Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc). A Schlup-type claim, on the other hand, is a procedural claim in which applicant's claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314, 115 S.Ct. 851. In this case, applicant asserts a Herrera-type claim in which he argues that newly discovered evidence, L.M.'s admission that she fabricated the sexual assault allegations against C.M., entitles him to habeas relief.

7.   Texas courts of appeals possess the authority to remand a habeas case to the habeas court for further factfinding when necessary. This authority includes remanding a case to the habeas court to hold an evidentiary hearing when a habeas applicant asserts an actual innocence claim. See Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Opinion by Justice Goldstein