IN RE: A.F. and I.M.A.F. (2026)

OPINION

Appellants A.F. and I.M.A.F. (collectively, “the juveniles”) each filed motions to dismiss in their separate cases below, alleging that the State only served their mother instead of serving both their mother and their father.¹ The trial court denied their motions. In a single issue on appeal, the juveniles argue that the trial court erred by not granting their motions to dismiss. Because the clear statutory language does not require service on both parents, we affirm.

I. Background

In November 2023, the State filed its original indeterminate petition in Case No. 2023-02602J alleging A.F. committed delinquent conduct, specifically for his unlawful carry of a handgun.² In December 2024, the State filed its original indeterminate petition in Case No. 2024-03081J alleging A.F. evaded arrest on foot.

In January 2025, the State filed two original indeterminate petitions related to I.M.A.F. In Case No. 2025-00010J, the State alleged he committed delinquent conduct, specifically evading arrest by motor vehicle. In Case No. 2025-00012J, the State alleged he committed delinquent conduct, specifically aggravated assault with bodily injury. The State served the juveniles' mother but it did not serve their father, despite the State having knowledge of his name and address.

In April 2025, the juveniles filed motions to dismiss their cases, alleging that by failing to serve both parents, the State had failed to comply with the requirements of § 53.04(d) and (e) of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.04(d), (e). After receiving briefing from the parties and conducting a separate hearing for each of the juveniles, the trial court denied the motions. The juveniles entered a stipulation of true to the allegations in both cases. Disposition was assessed pursuant to an agreement with the State, but the juveniles reserved their right to a limited appeal. This appeal followed.

II. Issue on Appeal

In their sole issue, the juveniles contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to dismiss. More specifically, they allege that by failing to serve their father despite knowing his address, their cases should be dismissed because the State violated the Family Code by not serving both parents.

A. Standard of review

Generally, we review a trial court's order on a motion to dismiss under an abuse of discretion standard. Hintz v. Lally, 305 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). “However, the proper standard of review is determined by the substance of the issue to be reviewed rather than the type of motion to which the trial court's order pertains.” Id. (citing In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000)).

Matters of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. City of San Antonio v. Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003). Here, the juveniles' motions to dismiss presented an issue of statutory interpretation under § 53.04 of the Family Code. Thus, the trial court's denial of the juveniles' motions to dismiss is subject to de novo review on appeal.

“In construing a statute, our primary goal is to determine and effectuate legislative intent.” Grimes Cnty. Bail Bond Bd. v. Ellen, 267 S.W.3d 310, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (citing In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding)).

When we construe a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting it. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to rules of construction or other aids to construe it. Even then, however, we may consider, among other things, the statute's objectives, its legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction.

Canales, 52 S.W.3d at 702 (internal citations omitted).

B. The State is not required to serve both parents

The juveniles' sole contention on appeal is that by failing to serve their father in addition to their mother, the State failed to meet the mandatory requirements of § 54.03(d)(3), (4) of the Family Code. We will first look at the plain language of the statute in question.

Section 53.04(d) provides, in pertinent part, that

(d) The petition must state:

․

(3) the names and residence addresses, if known, of the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child and of the child's spouse, if any;

(4) if the child's parent, guardian, or custodian does not reside or cannot be found in the state, or if their places of residence are unknown, the name and residence address of any known adult relative residing in the county or, if there is none, the name and residence address of the known adult relative residing nearest to the location of the court[.]

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.04(d)(3), (4).

According to the juveniles, because subsection 3 refers to “addresses” in the plural, the statute mandates that both parents must be served if both of their addresses and names are known. To support this proposition, the juveniles rely on two cases: L.G.R. v. State, 724 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. 1987) and Matter of D.M., 679 S.W.3d 864, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). However, neither of these cases are on point. In L.G.R., the court does not discuss whether both parents must be served; rather, the court reached the broad conclusion that “the petition and notice requirements of section 53.04 of the Family Code must be satisfied.” L.G.R., 724 S.W.2d at 776. And in D.M., neither the mother nor father were named in the petition or served. See D.M., 679 S.W.3d at 867. The court of appeals treated this as a defect in the petition and then spent the rest of the opinion discussing the consequences of that defect and the procedure for the State to remedy said defect. Id. at 870–75. However, the opinion does not address the question of whether both parents must be served.

The juveniles further claim that “there is no Texas case holding that service on only one parent satisfies the statutory requirements. Any such rule would implicate fundamental due process concerns[.]” It is true that there is no published opinion reaching that precise conclusion, but there is a memorandum opinion from the Thirteenth Court of Appeals reaching that conclusion. See Mavoides v. State, No. 13-04-00079-CR, 2006 WL 1965814, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 13, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Based on our review of the language contained in section 53.04(d)(3), we conclude the statute does not require that both parents be named in the petition.”).

Furthermore, we note that the language in § 53.04(d)(3) mirrors the language in § 53.06(a)(2), which addresses summons instead of petitions. Thus, we find it insightful to look at the plain language of § 53.06 and the cases that have interpreted it. Section 53.06(a) provides: “The juvenile court shall direct issuance of a summons to ․ the child's parent, guardian, or custodian[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.06(a)(2). Looking at the plain language of § 53.06, other courts have concluded that it is not mandatory to issue summons to both parents. See In re P.C., 858 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (“While it is true his father is a parent, it is equally true his mother is a parent, and the summons was issued to her. Section 53.06(a)(2) specifically states, “the child's parent” in the singular․ It does not require both parents be issued a summons.”); K.M.P. v. State, 701 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (“The issuance of a summons to either of the child's parents is sufficient to comply with section 53.06(a) of the Family Code.”); see also In Matter of C.P., No. 03-15-00276-CV, 2016 WL 4979223, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that “service on one parent is sufficient” to satisfy the requirements of § 53.06).

We find these cases persuasive in interpreting the language in § 53.04(d). Just as § 53.06 only requires “the parent, guardian, or custodian” to be issued a summons, § 53.04(d)(3) only requires that “the parent, guardian, or custodian” of the child be served. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.04(d)(3) (emphasis added). So even though § 53.04 refers to “names” and “residence addresses” in the plural, “parent, guardian, or custodian” are listed all in singular form and in the disjunctive. Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, there is no affirmative language in the statute indicating that “both,” “every,” or “all” known parents/guardians/custodians must be served. Therefore, we conclude that serving a singular parent satisfies the requirements of § 53.04(d)(3).

We further conclude that the State did not violate § 53.04(d)(4) because that subsection is only applicable if the parent's address is unknown or can't be found within the state, which is not applicable here.

Accordingly, we overrule the juveniles' sole issue.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the judgments of the trial court as challenged on appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The juveniles filed separate appellate briefs, but they are nearly identical and raise the same exact issue. Therefore, for the sake of judicial efficiency, we have consolidated the appeals of A.F. (Trial court cause numbers 2023-02602J and 2024-03081J, which correspond with appellate case numbers 14-25-00767-CV and 14-25-00779-CV, respectively) with the appeals of I.M.A.F. (Trial court cause numbers 2025-00012J and 2025-00010J, which correspond with appellate case numbers 14-25-00772-CV and 14-25-00773-CV, respectively) into a single opinion.

2.   A juvenile faces two types of commitments when being transferred to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD):The first type is indeterminate sentencing. With this type of sentencing, the juvenile offender is not committed for any particular term of years or months. The juvenile offender receives rehabilitative treatment during the period of his commitment until TJJD determines that he is eligible for release, that he should be transferred to another facility, or that he has reached the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first.The other type is determinate sentencing, in which the juvenile offender is committed for a fixed term of years or months. With this disposition, the juvenile offender receives credit for time served while in pretrial detention, and he is released when TJJD decides to parole him or when his term is completed. If the juvenile offender does not complete his determinate sentence before his nineteenth birthday, he is transferred to an adult facility within TDCJ.Matter of J.A.A., No. 14-20-00729-CV, 2021 WL 1538261, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 245.151).

Tonya McLaughlin, Justice