ANTHONY v. FIELDS (2026)

OPINION

Drew Anthony appeals the trial court's denial of his Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss the lawsuit filed against him by Sarah Fields. In three issues, he challenges the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss under the TCPA and contends he is entitled to attorney fees and costs, and sanctions against Fields. We affirm.

Background

Karmelo Anthony, now age nineteen, was tried for murder in Collin County for fatally stabbing a fellow high school student during a high school track meet in 2025. This incident and its associated trial became a media sensation, i.e., TikToks, podcasts, YouTubes, and other social media. Fields, a self-described “independent journalist reporting on matters of public interest,” reported on the incident and matters leading up to the trial.

Fields sued Karmelo's father, Drew Anthony, alleged “spokesperson and advocate” for the Anthony family, Tiffney Lynn McAdoo a.k.a. Tiffney Billions, and Charleston White for defamation per se, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy—public disclosure of private facts, civil conspiracy, and negligence per se—false report to law enforcement/CPS.

Fields alleged that Anthony appeared on McAdoo's public TikTok live panel on November 22, 2025, and made false statements accusing Fields of doxing Anthony and his family.¹ Fields further alleged this did not occur.

Fields also alleged that Anthony “selected [McAdoo] as his family's spokesperson and advocate,” and that Anthony, White and McAdoo acted in concert “with each other to harm Fields through their coordinated campaign of defamation, harassment, and false reporting, and harm was caused by this reporting, including ․ [a] swatting incident ․ [and] false CPS reports.” Fields further alleged that McAdoo utilized X and a public TikTok live panel and is the leader of what she calls “the Disrupters,” a “group of activists who go after anyone who disagrees with her position on issues related to the Karmelo Anthony case.” Allegations as to McAdoo's conduct include accusations that Fields committed various crimes, statements that Fields is a “drug addict,” “whore,” “crack head,” “meth head,” and “crack whore,” doxing Fields's personal information, and false reporting to authorities resulting in “swatting.” Fields further alleged McAdoo “encouraged and applauded the use of false reports of child endangerment to Child Protective Services against [Fields]” and that “while [Fields] was in labor, [CPS] arrived at [Fields's house] based on defamatory statements put out there by Defendants.”

Anthony answered and asserted a general denial, various affirmative defenses and a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Of the three defendants, only Anthony moved to dismiss under the TCPA. He argued that dismissal was appropriate because Fields's claims “seek to chill protected speech on matters of public concern without any valid legal foundation.” Specifically, Anthony asserted that Fields's claims are defamation-related and thus invoke the TCPA. He further asserted that Fields's claims arise from a statement regarding a matter of public concern for purposes of the TCPA, because they were made on the public forum of TikTok and related to Fields's reporting on the “Karmelo Anthony case,” which was the subject of intense online and public discussion. Anthony alleged that Fields did not have clear and specific evidence to make a prima facie case for each essential element of her claims as required to survive a TCPA motion to dismiss.

Fields did not request discovery under TCPA Section 27.006(b). Fields responded to the motion and attached (1) a pro-se court pleading from Collin County, in which McAdoo moved to recuse presiding Judge John Roach, and (2) a USB flash drive.

After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss without specifying a particular ground. The trial court denied Anthony's request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.

TCPA Motion to Dismiss

We consider de novo the legal question of whether the movant established by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged legal action is covered by the TCPA. Baylor Scott & White v. Project Rose MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 274 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied); MediaOne, L.L.C. v. Henderson, 592 S.W.3d 933, 939 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. denied). We also review de novo a trial court's determination of whether a nonmovant presented clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case of each essential element of the challenged claims. Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 274. Similarly, we review questions of statutory construction de novo. Id.; see also Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). We review the pleadings and the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 274; Dolcefino v. Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). We do not blindly accept a movant's attempts to characterize a nonmovant's claims as implicating protected expression; instead, we favor the conclusion that the claims are not predicated on protected expression. Helling v. Kerr, No. 08-24-00357-CV, 2025 WL 3713957, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 22, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Venero Lugo v. Cordova Sanchez, No. 03-21-00058-CV, 2021 WL 5312323, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 12, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Pursuant to Section 17.003(b), “A motion to dismiss a legal action under this section must be filed not later than the 60th day after the date of service of the legal action.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003(b). “The statute requires a defendant seeking its protections to move for dismissal and obtain a hearing on the motion within certain clearly defined periods. The failure to meet these requirements results in the defendant forfeiting the statute's protections.” In re C.T.H., 617 S.W.3d 57, 61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.).

The TCPA's statutorily expressed purpose is “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.002; see also Walgreens v. McKenzie, 713 S.W.3d 394, 398–99 (Tex. 2025). The statute serves this dual purpose “by authorizing a motion to dismiss early in the covered proceedings, subject to expedited interlocutory review.” Walgreens, 713 S.W.3d at 398–99; see McLane Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907, 914 (Tex. 2023) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.003, 27.008).

To accomplish this objective, the TCPA provides a three-step process for the dismissal of a “legal action” to which it applies. Baylor Scott & White v. Project Rose MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 275 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied); see Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 295–96 (Tex. 2021). First, the movant must demonstrate that the “legal action” is “based on or is in response to” its exercise of the right of speech, petition, or association. Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 275 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.003(a), 27.005(b)). Second, if the movant meets that burden, the nonmovant may avoid dismissal by establishing “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” Id. (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c)). Finally, if the nonmovant satisfies that burden, the court still must dismiss the “legal action” if the movant “establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(d)).

The TCPA's Applicability

In Anthony's first issue, he contends the TCPA applies to Fields's claim because it is based on or in response to Anthony's exercise of the right of free speech.

Governing Law – Exercise of the Right of Free Speech

Anthony was required to demonstrate that Fields's “legal action[s]” are “based on or in response to” Anthony's exercise of the right of speech. Ekstam v. Wells, No. 12-25-3170992, 2025 WL 3170992, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 12, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.003(a), 27.005(b)(1)(A)). The TCPA's required “based on” nexus is satisfied at minimum for legal actions that “are factually predicated on” allegations of conduct that fall within one of the TCPA's protected rights. See Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 276. The level of nexus required “includes no qualification as to its limits,” and is very broad. Id. A plaintiff's claims are “in response to” a protected activity when they react to or are asserted subsequently to the communication. Id.

An “exercise of the right of free speech” means a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(3). A “communication” is defined broadly as “the making or submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium.” Id. § 27.001(1); see also Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018). A “matter of public concern” includes a statement or activity regarding a “person who has drawn substantial public attention due to the person's fame, notoriety, or celebrity[,]” “a matter of ․ other interest to the community[,]” or “a subject of concern to the public.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(7). Texas courts have interpreted this phrase to mean that the statute requires only that the communication have a “tangential relationship” to such a matter, and the connection need not be more than “tenuous or remote.” Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 276. The TCPA does not require that the communications specifically mention a matter of public concern or have more than a “tangential relationship” to such a matter. Id. at 276–77. Rather, the TCPA applies so long as the movant's statements are “in connection with” any of the matters of public concern listed in the statute. See id. at 277.

In determining whether the TCPA is applicable, we conduct “a holistic review of the pleadings.” Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. 2018). Our analysis is not constrained by the “precise legal arguments or record references” made by the moving party regarding the TCPA's applicability. Id. Rather, our focus is “on the pleadings and on whether, as a matter of law, they are based on or [in response to] a matter of public concern.” Id. In the final analysis, “[w]hen it is clear from the [nonmovant's] pleadings that the action is covered by the [TCPA], the [movant] need show no more.” Id. (quoting Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017)); see also ExxonMobil Pipeline Company v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 901–02 (Tex. 2017) (holding as matter of law that private statements by movants concerning plaintiff's alleged failure to gauge storage tank related to matter of public concern); Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. 2015) (holding as matter of law that provision of medical services by health care professional was matter of public concern).

For a movant to trigger the TCPA's dismissal framework, there must first be a “communication” as defined by Section 27.001(1). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(1). Neither party challenges whether the statements at issue constitute “communications.” Because the lawsuit involves claims predicated on more than one communication, we must consider each in determining whether Anthony satisfied his burden that the communications were made while exercising his right of free speech. See Austin v. Amundson, No. 05-22-00066-CV, 2022 WL 16945911, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that when lawsuit involves claims predicated on multiple communications, court may appropriately analyze in categories).

Statements at Issue

Here, there are numerous, overlapping statements at issue, and six causes of action. For each cause of action, Fields re-alleges all statements as a basis for the causes of action. The relevant categories of statements are as follows:

Direct Statements by Anthony made on McAdoo's public TikTok live panel

• Anthony's direct statement regarding what Fields's reporting has done to his life

• Anthony's direct statement regarding Fields's doxing of his home address

McAdoo's Statements with alleged Agency of Anthony

• McAdoo's name calling statements made on TikTok and X: calling Fields a “meth head,” “whore,” “crack head,” “crack whore,” and “drug addict”

• McAdoo's doxing statements made on TikTok and X: Fields's home both by photo and address, and full name of oldest daughter

• McAdoo's change.org petition: using a false identity to create a petition seeking review of Fields's parenting, and related promotion communications including Fields's 2012 arrest docket as support

• False reports to authorities resulting in “swatting”: Public encouragement, promotion and celebration of false reports of child endangerment to CPS, August 24, 2025 false report to law enforcement by “McAdoo or another at her assistance” which “resulted in swatting Fields's home” on that same date, and a false report resulting in an event on August 25, 2025 in which “CPS arrived at Fields's house based on defamatory statements put out there by defendants” while “Fields was in labor”

• McAdoo's accusation that Fields is harassing Anthony

• McAdoo's accusation that Fields neglects and mistreats her animals, and public encouragement, promotion and celebration of the idea of her followers making false reports to animal control authorities to have her dog removed

• McAdoo's accusation that Fields committed the crimes of tampering with evidence, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, civil rights violations, insider access to gain private information from the Collin County courthouse, and wire fraud

Each statement is analyzed to determine whether it pertains to Fields's reporting on the alleged criminal acts of Karmelo Anthony, the murder trial, or other critiques of Fields's reporting. Id. § 27.001(7); Page v. Bakewell, No. 05-21-00905-CV, 2022 WL 4007879, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 2, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that allegations a person engaged in and admitted to engaging in criminal activity were communications made in connection with a matter of public concern).

Applicability of TCPA to Anthony's Direct Statements

First, we determine whether Fields's legal action against Anthony is based on or in response to Anthony's exercise of his right to free speech on a matter of public concern. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(3). Fields complained of Anthony's direct statements as follows:

Anthony appeared on a live TikTok panel on November 22, 2025, and told the host that “y'all don't really know how much effect [Fields's reporting] has done to my life. But[ ] wait. Time is gonna tell, I promise you.

․

Anthony ․ falsely stated that he begged [Fields] to stop sharing his address or “doxxing” him and his family knowing that no such communication ever occurred because [Fields] never shared [Anthony's] address.

․

The only communications that [Anthony] sent to [Fields] were for him asking her to stop reporting on the case because he claimed her reporting was “harassment,” which she declined.

[McAdoo] then asked [Anthony,] “so what you are saying is that she knew she had doxed y'all because you had told her ․” and [Anthony] said, “yes, I told her. 100%. 100%.” This statement is false and [Anthony knew the statement was false ․ [N]o such discussion occurred.

These same statements are re-alleged in support of Fields's causes of action for defamation per se, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy—public disclosure of private facts, civil conspiracy, and negligence per se—false report to law enforcement/CPS.

Anthony contends that the TCPA applies to these statements because Fields's legal action against him is based on or in response to Anthony's exercise of his right to free speech on a matter of public concern. We agree.

Anthony's statements occurred on McAdoo's public TikTok forum. Social media posts receive the same TCPA protection as other forms of communication when they address matters of public concern. See Whitelock v. Stewart, 661 S.W.3d 583, 596 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied); cf. Samples v. Estate of Brown, No. 07-23-00225-CV, 2024 WL 3249335 at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 8, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that radio shows/podcasts are communication under the TCPA and their statements fall within the TCPA if they are in connection with a matter of public concern). These statements involve Anthony's assertions critiquing Fields's public reporting about his son and his family in connection with the alleged murder. Fields is a self-described “independent journalist” who reports on “matters of public interest.” Public matters include, among other things, the commission of a crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions. Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. 2017); Samples, 2024 WL 3249335 at *4 (holding that interviews/theories about causes of deceased's mysterious disappearance and death were in connection with matter of public concern because they involve crime). Anthony discusses the effect of Fields's reporting on his life and agreed with McAdoo that he asked Fields to stop sharing his address and doxing him and his family.

Anthony's statements bear a tangential relationship to a matter of public concern because the statements pertain to Fields's public reporting on his family. Again, the TCPA does not require that the communications specifically mention a matter of public concern or have more than a “tangential relationship” to such a matter. See Baylor Scott & White v. Project Rose MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 276–77 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied). Rather, the TCPA applies so long as the movant's statements are “in connection with” any of the matters of public concern listed in the statute. See id. at 277. We conclude that the TCPA applies to Anthony's direct statements.

 Prima Facie Case

Having determined the TCPA applies to Anthony's direct statements, we now determine whether Fields presented clear and specific evidence to support the challenged causes of action.

Anthony contends that because Fields presented no evidence whatsoever to the trial court in response to the TCPA motion, she failed to meet her step-two burden and her claims must be dismissed. On appeal, Fields does not attempt to argue that she made a prima facie case for any of the six causes of action she alleged. Instead, Fields contends that she had no obligation to present evidence because the trial court ruled on step one.

In determining whether a legal action is subject to or should be dismissed under the chapter, the court shall consider the pleadings, evidence a court could consider under Rule 166a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.006. In general, for purposes of issue preservation for appeal, a trial court's ruling on an objection to summary judgment evidence is not implicit in its ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 289; Seim v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161, 165–66 (Tex. 2018). Summary judgment evidence must be admissible. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f); United Blood Services v. Longoria, 938 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1997).

To defeat Anthony's motion to dismiss, the TCPA requires Fields to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of her claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c). “Clear” means unambiguous, sure or free from doubt, and “specific” means explicit or relating to a particular named thing. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015). A prima facie case is “the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.” Id. It refers to evidence sufficient as a matter of law to establish a given fact if it is not rebutted or contradicted. Id. To meet the “clear and specific evidence” requirement, a plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim. Id. at 591. The TCPA does not require direct evidence of each essential element of the underlying claim to avoid dismissal. Id. However, conjecture, guess, or speculation cannot survive “clear and specific” scrutiny under the TCPA. See Van der Linden v. Khan, 535 S.W.3d 179, 195 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied).

Further, the response must be supported by admissible evidence. See Baylor Scott & White v. Project Rose MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 290 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied). The supporting evidence can include pleadings, affidavits stating the facts that the defendant's liability is based on, and any other evidence that the court could consider under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.006(a). Although the court can consider the plaintiff's pleadings in ruling on the motion to dismiss, pleadings alone are insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's prima facie burden. See Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 290; Buzbee v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 14, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). As explained in Buzbee, “accepting all allegations as true for purposes of establishing a prima facie case—without concomitantly demanding evidence that is legally sufficient to establish the allegations as factually true if it is not countered ․ would nullify the very purpose of the TCPA's burden-shifting mechanism.” Buzbee, 616 S.W.3d at 29.

At the trial court level, Fields responded to the motion and attached (1) a pro-se court pleading from Collin County in which McAdoo moved to recuse presiding Judge John Roach, and (2) a USB flash drive. The court pleading filed by McAdoo contained an unsworn declaration in writing and subscribed as true under penalty of perjury, but lacked McAdoo's address and date of birth. The USB drive contained two videos and was not authenticated. Anthony objected to the lack of authentication before the hearing, but did not obtain a ruling on the objection. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

In the past, we acknowledged that “given the early stage” of litigation, the evidence presented by the nonmovant under a TCPA motion to dismiss “need not necessarily present the best evidence to satisfy this burden.” Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 290–291. However, in Baylor Scott & White, there was at least an unsworn declaration in writing and subscribed as true under penalty of perjury. Id. (holding that declaration's shortcomings such as address and date of birth, are not fatal for TCPA purposes because it was made under penalty of perjury); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 132.001. Here, we are faced with similar circumstances and determine that McAdoo's unsworn declaration is not fatally deficient. See id. However, this evidence is largely irrelevant to her claims. Within this document, McAdoo states, “[McAdoo], also known publicly as ‘Tiffney Billons,’ is a well-known community activist who is actively, prominently, and publicly advocating on behalf of Karmelo Anthony․” While this is potentially some evidence of agency on behalf of Anthony, there is no other substantive evidence within this document that could support any of Fields's six claims.

Further, there is no authentication of any kind for the USB drive. While we are not aware of any cases addressing whether failure to authenticate is a defect of substance in the TCPA context, we follow analogous and well-established summary-judgment evidence authority and conclude that a complete lack of authentication is a defect of substance and no objection is necessary to preserve error. See Bookout v. Shelley, No. 02-22-00055-CV, 2022 WL 17173526, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that no-evidence motion for summary judgment principle that courts cannot consider arguments raised for the first time in reply brief applies to TCPA motions to dismiss); Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp., 74 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (holding that nonmovant's submission of over 300 pages of documents and court records in response to motion for summary judgment but which included only one affidavit that did not identify, reference, or attempt to authenticate documents was defect in substance and could be raised for first time on appeal).

Accordingly, we hold that because of the total lack of evidence that the court could consider under Rule 166a, there is no proof that the court can consider under the TCPA. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.006. As to Anthony's direct statements, Fields failed to make a prima facie case as to each essential element of Fields's causes of action. Anthony's first issue is sustained in part.

Applicability of TCPA to McAdoo's Statements

We first address Anthony's argument that the pleadings do not sufficiently raise theories of respondeat superior or agency for McAdoo's statements. We disagree. We note that although Anthony's answer included a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, Anthony did not specially except to Fields's petition, and Anthony never set the Rule 91a motion for hearing. Davis. v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co., 700 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.) (holding Rule 91a motion to dismiss is not substitute for special exception practice). Absent special exceptions, we will apply the “fair notice” pleading standard. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896–97 (Tex. 2000). Thus, our procedural rules merely require that the pleadings provide fair notice of the claim and the relief sought such that the opposing party can prepare a defense. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 45(b), 47(a); Davis, 700 S.W.3d at 843; see also DeRoeck, v. DHM Ventures, LLC, 556 S.W.3d 831, 835–836 (Tex. 2018). With specific regard to TCPA cases, the Supreme Court explained:

A pleading must give fair notice not just of alleged facts, but of the claim and the relief sought such that the opposing party can prepare a defense ․ and ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant ․ Providing only fair notice of factual allegations does not provide fair notice of claims or causes of action asserted based on those alleged facts.

Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 300 (Tex. 2021).

Here, Fields alleged that

[Anthony] ․ has selected [McAdoo] as his family's spokesperson and advocate․

․

Defendants acted in concert with each other to harm [Fields] through their coordinated campaign of defamation, harassment, and false reporting, and harm was caused by this reporting, including but not limited to the swatting incident [and] the false CPS reports.

․

[Anthony] ․ defended [McAdoo's] actions in representing him saying that [McAdoo] “is a beast at putting stuff on other people,” clearly indicating support for and in furtherance of his objective to harm [Fields] through [McAdoo] and her “disruptors.”

Further, Fields alleges a cause of action—a civil conspiracy claim against all defendants. To recover for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must prove the following essential elements: (1) defendant was a member of a combination of two or more persons; (2) the combination's object was to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means; (3) the members had a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one of the members committed an unlawful, overt act to further the object or course of action; and (5) the plaintiff suffered injury as the proximate result. Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits Int'l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. 2019). In Agar, the Supreme Court specifically “determined that civil conspiracy is a theory of vicarious liability․” Id. at 141–142.

We hold that this pleading provides fair and adequate notice that Fields pleaded a claim in which Anthony is vicariously liable for McAdoo's statements as his family's spokesperson and advocate such that Anthony can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant. See DeRoeck, 556 S.W.3d at 835–836 (holding that although claim was not actually named in petition, plaintiff pleaded facts sufficient to provide defendant with fair notice of claim).

We next turn to Anthony's “step one burden” to establish that McAdoo's statements on his behalf were communications “in connection with” a matter of public concern under the TCPA. Again, as the movant, it is Anthony's burden to demonstrate that the “legal action” is “based on or is in response to” the exercise of the right of speech, petition, or association. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.003(a), 27.005(b). This only requires raising the argument and an examination of the pleadings, which are the best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the action. McElroy v. Shaeffer, 05-25-00078-CV, 2025 WL 3722805, at *5 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Even though the burden is not a heavy one, there is at least a minimum burden to raise the argument or forfeit the protections of the statute. Cf. Id.; In re C.T.H., 617 S.W.3d 57, 61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.).

For example, in McElroy, wife sued her deceased husband's parents for harassment and stalking because they complained to CPS and the police about her treatment of the children. McElroy, 2025 WL 3722805, at *1. The grandparents filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA. Id. at *2. Our sister court held that the grandparents discharged their burden by simply making the argument in their motion that the petition “specifically strikes at [movant's] right to speak freely, to speak and confer with governmental entities charged with the protection of children, and to petition the Courts.” Id. at *5.

In Anthony's motion, he made no attempt to argue to the trial court how McAdoo's statements were communications “in connection with” a matter of public concern. Anthony instead argued McAdoo's statements are not attributable to him, that he should not be lumped in with other defendants, and that “[Fields's] own petition fatally undermines any claim against Anthony by attributing the actual disclosure exclusively to McAdoo.” In his motion, Anthony never contends that McAdoo's statements involve a right to speak freely, or speak and confer with governmental entities, or that they regard in some other way a matter of public concern. See Bookout v. Shelley, No. 02-22-00055-CV, 2022 WL 17173526, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that movant must raise all grounds for TCPA motion to dismiss within that motion and new grounds cannot be raised in reply). By failing to make that minimal showing, the burden never shifted to Fields to make a prima facie case regarding Fields's causes of action based upon McAdoo's statements. See Baylor Scott & White v. Project Rose MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 275 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied) (explaining burden shifting framework). We conclude that Anthony failed to satisfy his step-one burden regarding his vicarious liability for McAdoo's statements. Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 301 (Tex. 2021) (noting courts cannot dismiss facts, they dismiss claims, causes of action, cases and lawsuits).

Accordingly, we overrule Anthony's issue one in part.

Disposition

We sustained Anthony's first issue in part to the extent it relates to his direct statements, and overruled Anthony's first issue in part to the extent it relates to his vicarious liability for McAdoo's statements. Because the causes of action remain viable as to Anthony's vicarious liability for McAdoo's statements, we hold that no cause of action can be dismissed. See e.g. Bookout, 2022 WL 17173526, at *14 (holding that “we are not required to determine that every statement that Bookout made is defamatory to conclude that Appellees carried their burden to prove that they have a viable cause of action for defamation ․ the inquiry is whether Appellees presented sufficient proof to establish a viable defamation cause of action, and that task requires only that we determine whether any of the statements made by Bookout were defamatory”). Because the TCPA permits dismissal of causes of actions—not statements—the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.² Montelongo, 622 S.W.3d at 301.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Doxing” is “the nonconsensual online posting of a person's personal information, such as home address, e-mail address and place of employment, especially for purposes of harassment.” Schubiner v. Julis, No. 05-24-00888-CV, 2026 WL 1481432, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 26, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Andrews v. D'Souza, 696 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1340 n.8 (N.D. Georgia 2023); see Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

2.   Given our disposition of Anthony's first issue, we overrule his second and third issues as to attorney's fees and sanctions.

C. Michael Davis, Justice