David Wilson, Appellant, v. The State of Texas, Appellee. (2016)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following a bench trial, the trial court found appellant David Wilson guilty of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced him to two years in prison.  See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).  By one issue, Wilson contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a controlled substance.  We affirm.

I. Background

On February 1, 2014, at approximately seven o'clock in the morning, Wilson was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and tampering with evidence after officers discovered methamphetamine outside Wilson's vehicle during a traffic stop.  A female passenger who rode along with Wilson that morning was also arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance after officers found quantities of methamphetamine inside her purse.  Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Wilson's passenger pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and testified against Wilson at his trial.

At trial, the trial court admitted into evidence a dash-cam video of the traffic stop.  The video showed that a few seconds after the patrolling officer activated his emergency lights to initiate the traffic stop, Wilson steered his vehicle over to the shoulder of the road.  It also showed a succession of three baggies trickled out from under the center floorboard of Wilson's vehicle and onto the road as Wilson steered over to the shoulder.  After searching Wilson's vehicle, officers noticed that a hole had been cut through a removable cup holder located between the driver and passenger seat providing for access to the ground floor.  Officers also found a weighing scale in the backseat.

Wilson stipulated that the baggies found on the road contained methamphetamine but denied that he tampered with or possessed the controlled substance.  Instead, Wilson argued that he had no knowledge of any drugs found in and around his vehicle, that his female passenger solely possessed the drugs, and that she must have dropped the baggies through the hole without his knowledge as he pulled over to the shoulder.  However, Wilson's passenger testified that she had no knowledge of any hole in Wilson's vehicle.  She also testified that she saw Wilson lift the cup holder as he was pulling over to the shoulder but that she did not see him drop any baggies through the hole because she got distracted by the emergency lights of the officer's patrol car.  After hearing all the evidence, the trial court acquitted Wilson of tampering with evidence but found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance.  This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

By his sole issue, Wilson contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that he possessed a controlled substance.

In reviewing a legal sufficiency point, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and then ask whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 906 n.19 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).  In a bench trial, the trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.  See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647–48 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

To convict Wilson of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State was required to prove that Wilson (1) exercised control, management, or care over the methamphetamine and (2) knew that the substance was methamphetamine.  See Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.2005);  see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(38) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) (providing that possession means “actual care, custody, control, or management”).  Since Wilson was not in exclusive possession of his vehicle at the time of his arrest, the State was also required to “affirmatively link” him to the methamphetamine.¹  See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406.  Factors that might affirmatively link a defendant to drugs to establish possession include:  (1) the defendant's presence when the search was conducted;  (2) whether narcotics were in plain view;  (3) the defendant's proximity to and accessibility of narcotics;  (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested;  (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested;  (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested;  (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee;  (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures;  (9) whether there was an odor of contraband or narcotics;  (10) whether other contraband or narcotic paraphernalia was present;  (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where narcotics were found;  (12) whether place in which narcotics were found was enclosed;  (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash;  and (14) whether the defendant's conduct indicated a consciousness of guilt.  See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (setting out a non-exhaustive list of factors that might affirmatively link a defendant to narcotics).  The number of linking factors present is not as important as the logical force they create to prove that an offense was committed.  See id.  In view of these factors, we now review the evidence in this case.

The evidence showed that Wilson owned and was driving his vehicle when baggies of methamphetamine trickled out from under the center floorboard of the vehicle in plain sight and onto the road, indicating factors one, two, three, eleven, and twelve.  See id.  The evidence also showed that a hole had been cut through the area between the driver and passenger seat of Wilson's vehicle, allowing for items to pass through the hole and onto the road.  Because only Wilson and his passenger occupied the vehicle at the time, the trial court could have logically inferred that either Wilson or his passenger—or both of them acting in concert—were responsible for disposing of the methamphetamine before Wilson pulled over to the shoulder of the road.  Based on the testimony of Wilson's passenger, however, the trial court could have reasonably found that Wilson was the disposing party, as his passenger testified that she had no knowledge of any hole in Wilson's vehicle and actually witnessed Wilson lifting a cup holder located between the driver and passenger seat as he pulled over to the shoulder of the road.²  Believing the passenger's testimony, see Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647–48, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Wilson had exclusive access to the area where methamphetamine was last seen leaving his vehicle, just moments before he pulled over to the shoulder, indicating factors eight, eleven, and twelve.  See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12. Furthermore, a search of the back seat of Wilson's vehicle turned up drug paraphernalia in the form of a weighing scale, which, according to one officer, is commonly used in the drug industry to “weigh different units of drugs, different amounts of illegal substances,” indicating factors five and ten.  See id.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to affirmatively link Wilson to the methamphetamine found on the road.  See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 906 n.19;  see also Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This is known as the “affirmative links” rule, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals described in Poindexter v. State:The “affirmative links rule” is designed to protect the innocent bystander from conviction based solely upon his fortuitous proximity to someone else's drugs.  This rule simply restates the common-sense notion that a person-such as a father, son, spouse, roommate, or friend-may jointly possess property like a house but not necessarily jointly possess the contraband found in that house.  Thus, we have formulated the rule that when the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband.153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (footnotes and citations to authority omitted).

2.   Wilson responds that the trial court could not have rationally found that he disposed of the methamphetamine through the hole in his vehicle because the trial court acquitted him of tampering with evidence.  However, it is well established that inconsistent verdicts do not require reversal for legal insufficiency.  See Jackson v. State, 3 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.) (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393–94 (1932) and explaining that by acquitting the defendant of one offense and finding him guilty of another based on the same facts,” [t]he factfinder may simply be exercising its desire to be lenient, or executing its own brand of executive clemency”).  Thus, even assuming that the trial court's findings created factual inconsistency, it would not render his conviction for possession of methamphetamine legally insufficient.  See id.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez