Sanjay Bhardwaj, Appellant v. Anupama Pathak, Appellee (2016)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In a letter dated December 15, 2015, the Court questioned its jurisdiction over this appeal.  Specifically, there does not appear to be an appealable order.  We instructed the parties to file letter briefs addressing the jurisdictional issue.

This case was previously appealed to this Court.  On August 17, 2015, we issued an opinion and judgment that modified the trial court's July 24, 2014 order to provide “the receiver to deliver the net proceeds from the sale of the Texas property equally to both Bhardwaj and Pathak.”  We affirmed the judgment as modified without remanding to the trial court.  The mandate issued on October 27, 2015.  Because we did not remand the case, there was no need for the trial court to make any further order.  See Tex. R. App. P. 51.1(b)(2).  The trial court did, however, sign an order on October 14, 2015 and an amended order on October 30, 2015.  Both orders were in compliance with the judgment in the prior appeal in that they order the receiver to distribute the proceeds from the sale of the Texas property equally between appellant and appellee.  Additionally, the October 14th order clarified the role of the receiver.  The amended order, signed three days after this Court's mandate issued, states that it is entered in accordance with our mandate and it does not contain the clarification language included in the October 14th order.  An order issued in compliance with an appellate court's mandate is not reviewable.  See Denton Cty. v. Tarrant Cty., 139 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

In his notice of appeal filed on October 20, 2015, appellant stated he was appealing from the October 14th order.  In his letter brief, appellant acknowledges that the October 30th amended order corrected the “material modifications” related to the role of the receiver but he asserts that reviewable issues remain.  Appellant first complains of the trial court's failure to vacate the October 14th order.  However, vacating that order was unnecessary as the amended order signed sixteen days later on October 30th superseded the October 14th order.  See Wilmer–Hutchins Indep.  Sch. Dist. v. Blackwell, 529 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd);  see also Kolfeldt v. Thoma, 822 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).

Appellant also contends there are “other reviewable issues” that give the Court jurisdiction over this appeal.  Two of those issues are subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.  Both of these issues were raised in the prior appeal.  Appellant raises for the first time an argument that the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case because he has asserted violations of the federal anti-trust laws.  None of these “other reviewable issues” provide a basis for jurisdiction over the trial court's order that complies with this Court's mandate in appellant's prior appeal.  See Denton Cty., 139 S.W.3d at 23.

Because there is no appealable order, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.  See Tex.R.App. P. 42.3(a).

Opinion by Chief Justice Wright