TANGENIKA LOUISE THOMPSON v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2011)

OPINION

Opinion By Justice Murphy

A jury convicted Tangenika Louise Thompson of theft of property.   Pursuant to an agreement between the State and appellant during the punishment phase, the trial court assessed punishment at ninety days' confinement in the county jail, probated for twelve months, and a $600 fine.   In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction.   We affirm.

Background

On October 21, 2009, appellant and Sherrell McFarland entered a McKinney Walmart store, placed several items of jewelry and socks into McFarland's purse, then walked out of the store without paying for the merchandise.   Appellant and McFarland were confronted by the store's loss prevention officers, who took them to the store's office.   They subsequently were arrested by a McKinney police officer.

During the trial, the jury heard testimony from Randy Nunley and Josephine Jacobs, the Walmart loss prevention officers.   Nunley testified he and Jacobs were “walking the floor” when they saw appellant and McFarland in the jewelry department with merchandise in their hands.   A small girl was sitting down in a shopping cart, and a pink purse was at the top of the cart where a child usually sits.   Nunley saw appellant and McFarland put jewelry items into the purse.   They then went to the women's wear department and selected several pairs of socks.   After placing the socks on top of the purse, appellant and McFarland went to the crafts department, where Nunley saw both appellant and McFarland remove the tags from the jewelry and socks and put the items into the purse.   When appellant and McFarland left the crafts area and went to a self-checkout lane, the child was sitting in the top part of the cart with her legs over the purse.   Appellant selected two soft drinks from a refrigerator near the lane, scanned them, paid cash for them, and handed one of the drinks to McFarland.   Nunley waited until after appellant and McFarland went out the front doors without paying for the items that were inside the purse before he and Jacobs confronted them.

Nunley testified the store's surveillance cameras recorded appellant's behavior while inside the store, except in the area where the women's socks were sold and the crafts department.   Nunley explained to the jury that the store's policy is to have no cameras near the fitting room area, which is where the socks were sold, and in low-end merchandise areas where plastic flowers and other crafts are sold.   According to Nunley, thieves often know the store areas that do not have surveillance cameras.   The surveillance videotape was admitted into evidence and shown to the jury.

Nunley testified there were twenty-seven items found inside the purse.   The items were placed on a table in the office and a store receipt was made.   The receipt lists six items designated as “bracelet,” three items designated as “earring,” one item designated as “dress watch,” one item designated as “necklace,” one item designated as “jewelry,” eight items designated as “socks,” two items designated as “stripe OTK,” two items designated as “Argl knee hi,” two items designated as “Argyle OTK,” and one item designated as “accessories.”   The items totaled $130.   Nunley testified the OTK items were specific types of socks, the jewelry item could be any item from the jewelry department, and the accessories item could be any item from the accessories department.   Nunley explained to the jury that each item in the store has a unique “UPC code” that describes the type and color of the item.   The same item in the same color would have the same code when scanned, but some items are not named specifically and are simply designated by department.   The receipt and a photograph of the items taken from the purse were admitted into evidence.

Josephine Jacobs testified she was with Nunley as they watched appellant and McFarland take store merchandise, remove the tags, and put them into a pink purse.   After appellant and McFarland walked out of the store without paying for the items, she confronted appellant and Nunley confronted McFarland.   Jacobs testified appellant was cooperative and went with her to the office.

McKinney police officer Jaime Cisneros testified he and other officers were dispatched to the store on a theft-in-progress call.   When he arrived, he talked with Nunley and Jacobs about what they had observed, then he reviewed a surveillance videotape showing appellant's activities while inside the store.   The items that had been inside a pink purse were laid out on a table when Cisneros arrived.   Cisneros testified that while appellant was cooperative, McFarland was “verbally abusive” towards the police and loss-prevention officers.   After viewing the surveillance videotape, Cisneros arrested appellant and McFarland for theft.

Applicable Law

In her sole issue, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.   The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard a reviewing court is to apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.   See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.).   Therefore, we will address appellant's issues under the Jackson v. Virginia standard.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.   Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);  Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895.   We are required to defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony.   See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant appropriated property, valued at $50 or more but less than $500, without the owner's effective consent, and with the intent to deprive the owner of the property.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (b) (West Supp.2010).   “Appropriate” means to exercise control over property.   See id. § 31.01(4)(B).

The jury was instructed it could find appellant guilty as a principal actor or as a party to theft of property valued at $50 or more but less than $500, guilty as a principal actor or as a party to theft of property valued at less than $50, or not guilty.   A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if he aids the other person in committing the offense, and acts with the intent to promote or assist the other in the commission of the offense.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2003).   In determining whether the accused is guilty as a party, the fact finder may consider events occurring before, during, or after commission of the offense.   See Michel v. State, 834 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.).

Discussion

Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to prove the items taken were valued at over $50 but less than $500.   Appellant argues that because the information alleges “socks and jewelry” but lists no quantity, and the store receipt shows one entry of “socks” valued at $3 and one entry of “jewelry” valued at $5, the total value of $8 is “clearly less than $50.”   Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that she stole the property as a principal actor or in concert with McFarland.

“Value” is defined as the fair market value of the property at the time and place of the offense.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.08(a)(1).   No one method of proving fair market value is exclusive.   See Keeton v. State, 803 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).   The owner of property is competent to testify as to the value of his own property.   See Sullivan v. State, 701 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

Here, the jury heard Nunley's uncontroverted testimony that there were twenty-seven items inside the purse, and that the value of those items was $130.   The jury saw the receipt, which listed multiple items that could be considered jewelry, including bracelets, earrings, a watch, and a necklace.   The jury also heard Nunley's testimony that although there were items listed as socks on the receipt, there were also several types of speciality socks listed as well.

Viewing the evidence under the proper standard, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted as a party to the theft offense and that the value of the appropriated property was $50 or more but less than $500.   See Michel, 834 S.W.2d at 67;  Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at 908. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.   See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895.   We resolve appellant's sole issue against her.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

MARY MURPHY JUSTICE