2007 OAG 1992 OAG 1992 OAG OAG OAG v. << (2010)

/s/

FOOTNOTES

FN4. The OAG also contends that the 1999 Louisiana order is ambiguous and, considering extrinsic evidence, that the Louisiana order should not be construed as a modification to the 1992 Texas support order.   As explained below, the Court's resolution of the jurisdictional issue moots this particular argument.   We therefore need not address whether the 1999 Louisiana order is ambiguous.   See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1..  FN4. The OAG also contends that the 1999 Louisiana order is ambiguous and, considering extrinsic evidence, that the Louisiana order should not be construed as a modification to the 1992 Texas support order.   As explained below, the Court's resolution of the jurisdictional issue moots this particular argument.   We therefore need not address whether the 1999 Louisiana order is ambiguous.   See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.

FN5. Father also argues that Louisiana attempted to modify the 1992 Texas support order in the 1998 Louisiana order that directed Father to pay an additional $80.00 a month for outstanding arrears.   We need not address this particular argument because the Court's resolution of the jurisdictional issue moots the argument.   See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1..  FN5. Father also argues that Louisiana attempted to modify the 1992 Texas support order in the 1998 Louisiana order that directed Father to pay an additional $80.00 a month for outstanding arrears.   We need not address this particular argument because the Court's resolution of the jurisdictional issue moots the argument.   See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.

FN6. The OAG only sought enforcement of the 1992 Texas support order;  the OAG made no effort to modify the 1992 Texas support order.   Compare Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 159.205, with § 159.206..  FN6. The OAG only sought enforcement of the 1992 Texas support order;  the OAG made no effort to modify the 1992 Texas support order.   Compare Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 159.205, with § 159.206.

FN7. It is also worth noting that we do not construe Mother's request to cease collection services rendered by the OAG as a mutual agreement between the parties to modify the 1992 Texas support order..  FN7. It is also worth noting that we do not construe Mother's request to cease collection services rendered by the OAG as a mutual agreement between the parties to modify the 1992 Texas support order.

FN8. Because the Louisiana court did not have jurisdiction to modify the 1992 Texas support order, Father's argument that the 1998 Louisiana order also modified the Texas order is of no legal consequence.   Louisiana lacked jurisdiction to modify the Texas order-in 1998 and 1999-because the statutory requirements were not satisfied under the UIFSA..  FN8. Because the Louisiana court did not have jurisdiction to modify the 1992 Texas support order, Father's argument that the 1998 Louisiana order also modified the Texas order is of no legal consequence.   Louisiana lacked jurisdiction to modify the Texas order-in 1998 and 1999-because the statutory requirements were not satisfied under the UIFSA.

FN9. Because we reverse the trial court's January 23, 2009 order and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion, we do not address the OAG's second issue regarding the amount of arrears accrued under the 1992 Texas support order..  FN9. Because we reverse the trial court's January 23, 2009 order and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion, we do not address the OAG's second issue regarding the amount of arrears accrued under the 1992 Texas support order.