DENISE ROCHELLE BODLEY v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2010)

OPINION

Opinion By Justice Moseley

Denise Rochelle Bodley waived a jury and pleaded not guilty to two interference with child custody offenses.   After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at confinement in a state jail facility for 180 days and one year, respectively.   In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the convictions.   We affirm.

Applicable Law

In a factual sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether (1) the evidence supporting the conviction is too weak to support the fact-finder's verdict or, (2) considering conflicting evidence, the fact-finder's verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex.Crim.App.2009).   We may only find the evidence factually insufficient when necessary to prevent manifest injustice.  Id. Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to give to contradictory testimony.   Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

To obtain convictions, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally and knowingly took or retained D.H., a child younger than eighteen years, when appellant knew the taking or retention violated the express terms of a court order from the 255th Judicial District Court, signed March 2, 2006, determining the child's custody.

Evidence Presented

Sonja Garza, an investigation supervisor for the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (CPS) testified her unit began investigating appellant for neglect of supervision on March 23, 2005 because appellant had left her daughter, D.H., outside of the child's father's apartment without notifying the father.   The 255th Judicial District Court issued two citations to appellant, on July 6, 2005 and July 25, 2005, that directed her to appear for a hearing on a “petition in a suit affecting the parent/child relationship for permanent managing conservatorship.”   On September 22, 2005, a status hearing order was issued.   It recited that appellant appeared in person, and a hearing on the petition was scheduled for December 8, 2005.   One day before the scheduled hearing, on December 7, 2005, appellant signed and notarized an “affidavit of relinquishment of permanent managing conservatorship.”   The affidavit stated the reason as “not stable.”   A final order in the suit affecting the parent/child relationship was issued on March 2, 2006.   It named Clara Bodley, appellant's mother, as permanent managing conservator of D.H. The order stated that appellant “failed to appear but previously executed an Affidavit of Relinquishment of Permanent Managing Conservatorship waiving citation, notice, and appearance.”

Mary Jurado, a Dallas police detective, testified appellant had taken D.H. on two separate occasions, on September 19, 2007 and on March 4, 2008.   In both incidents, appellant walked into D.H.'s Head Start daycare and walked out with her.   Appellant's mother filed a police report on both dates that stated her granddaughter had been taken.   Jurado testified Detective Jackson investigated the September incident, and she investigated the March incident.   At the beginning of her investigation, Jurado obtained a copy of the court's order, which showed appellant's mother as D.H.'s legal guardian.   Jurado telephoned appellant and asked her to come in for an interview and to discuss the case that was going to be filed against her.   Appellant came to Jurado's office with D.H. on March 12, 2008.   After a few minutes, an officer removed D.H., and the interview continued.   When Jurado told appellant what the court's order stated, appellant said, “[I] have the release.   I know what's in there, but this child is mine.”   During the interview, appellant also said she had a copy of the court order, she had seen it, and she had a letter from CPS. Appellant said, “[I]'ll go back to where my child is and take her again.”   Appellant wrote out a statement and gave it to Jurado.   In the statement, appellant said she had read a letter from CPS that stated she was to leave the child where she was, and that “I]f I remove her, then Clara Bodley should call the police.”

Appellant testified on direct-examination that she did not know there was a court order stating she could not take D.H. Appellant learned about the court order from her mother, but appellant could not recall the date she knew about the order.   Appellant acknowledged that she voluntarily signed the relinquishment affidavit, but said she did not know why she signed that document.   During cross-examination, appellant admitted that when her uncle and mother telephoned her on September 21, 2007 asking that she bring back D.H., appellant told them she took D.H. from the daycare because “she was my baby and Clara's papers were old.”   Appellant testified that even though on September 21, 2007 she knew she did not have custody of D.H., she thought her mother only had temporary custody.   Appellant claimed she never saw the “modification papers.”   Appellant admitted, however, that when Detective Jackson telephoned and asked her to come to his office for an interview, she left a voice message on his telephone saying she was not going to come in and that the “Dallas Police Department and President Bush could not keep me from seeing my child.”

Discussion

Appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to show she knew of the family court's order.   Appellant asserts that because she did not appear at the final hearing that awarded custody of D.H. to appellant's mother, and her statement to the police shows she was not aware of the custody order, the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions.   The State responds that the evidence is factually sufficient to show appellant knew about the family court's order.

Notwithstanding appellant's denials, the trial judge heard testimony from Jurado that appellant admitted she had seen the court's order and received a letter from CPS telling her not to take the child.   Additionally, appellant told Jurado that she would go back to where the child was and “take her again.”   At trial, appellant admitted that in September 2007, she knew she no longer had custody of the child.   Appellant testified, however, she believed her mother had only temporary custody of the child.   And, while acknowledging she voluntarily signed an affidavit of relinquishment of permanent managing conservatorship, appellant testified she did not know why she signed that document.   As the fact-finder in this case, it was the trial judge's role to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence.   See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).   The trial judge was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence presented by either side.   See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

Viewing all of the evidence under the proper standard, we conclude it is factually sufficient to support appellant's convictions.   See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518.   We resolve appellant's sole issue against her.

In each case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE