IN RE: the Marriage of Donald William Jordan and Margu E rite Ann Jordan From the 87th District Court Freestone County (2010)

Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.

IN RE: the Marriage of Donald William Jordan and Margu E rite Ann Jordan From the 87th District Court Freestone County, Texas Trial Court No. 05-364B MEMORANDUM Opinion This is Marguerite Ann Jordan's second appeal from the divorce proceedings between herself and Donald William Jordan.  In the first appeal, this Court, with Chief Justice Gray dissenting, reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings because of errors in the characterization of certain property and the calculation of Donald's economic contribution claim.  See In re Marriage of Jordan, 264 S.W.3d 850 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, no pet.).  We liberally construe Marguerite's pro se appellate brief as raising three issues challenging:  (1) the characterization of the marital property;  (2) the division of the community estate;  and (3) the court's award of $12,000 to Donald and imposition of a lien in that amount against Marguerite's separate property for his economic contribution claim.  We will affirm. Characterization of Marital Property Marguerite's first issue challenges the manner in which the court characterized some of the marital property.  In particular, she challenges the characterization of:  (1) three tracts of real property;  and (2) Donald's retirement fund.  We review the court's characterization of the marital property under traditional legal and factual insufficiency standards.  Jordan Marriage, 264 S.W.3d at 854;  Dutton v. Dutton, 18 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).  Because Marguerite does not specify which type of challenge she is making, we shall construe her complaint as a legal insufficiency challenge.  In the first appeal, we addressed the proper characterization of the three disputed tracts:  a 5-acre tract we referred to as the “farm” and the homes Marguerite and Donald owned before their marriage.  We concluded that the farm is Marguerite's separate property and each of the homes is the separate property of the person who owned it before they married.  Jordan Marriage, 264 S.W.3d at 855-56.  The divorce decree characterizes these properties consistently with our prior opinion.  Nevertheless, Marguerite contends that the two homes should be characterized as community property because they were refinanced during the marriage.  However, we rejected a similar contention in the first appeal.  Id. at 856 (“that the home was refinanced during the marriage does not change its character as separate property”).  In the first appeal, we held that “the community estate's interest in Donald's retirement benefits is approximately twenty-five percent or $34,688.”  Id. at 855 (emphasis added).  Marguerite states in her brief that we “determined that [her] share of community retirement funds was $34,000.00.”  She made a similar argument in the trial court, “The Appeals Court determined $34,000 that I was entitled to as my share.”  Donald reminded the trial court that $34,000 was determined to be the community's share, not Marguerite's share.  These monies (in addition to the other $105,000 in Donald's retirement fund which was his separate property) were all expended before trial.  The trial court took the community estate's interest in Donald's retirement into account in dividing the community estate.  The evidence relevant to the characterization of these marital properties is such as would enable a reasonable and fair-minded trier of fact to characterize them as the court did.  See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005);  Jordan Marriage, 264 S.W.3d at 854.  Thus, we overrule Marguerite's first issue.  Division of Community Property Marguerite contends in her second issue that the court abused its discretion by the manner in which it divided the community property.  She argues that a proper division of the community property would result in an award to her with a monetary value of $52,799.50.  She does not explain how she arrived at this figure and does not refer to specific evidence in the record to support it.1  Donald and Marguerite each testified about their interests in the community assets, amounts they expended for the benefit of the community or separate property, and their claims regarding the manner in which the community estate should be decided.  Donald provided legal and financial documents to support his testimony.  Marguerite did not.2  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's decision, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by the manner in which it divided the community property.  See In re S.A.A., 279 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.);  Jordan Marriage, 264 S.W.3d at 857.  Thus, we overrule Marguerite's second issue.

No. 10-09-00033-CV

Decided: February 10, 2010

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Reyna, and Justice Davis