IN RE: FORT BEND CHRISTIAN ACADEMY (2026)

OPINION

Relator Fort Bend Christian Academy (the Academy) seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate an order denying its plea to the jurisdiction. The Academy contends that the trial court erred because the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the court from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims, which are based on the school's internal policies governing academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and discipline, as well as on by-laws promulgated by the Texas Association of Private and Parochial Schools (TAPPS) for athletic participation.

Without expressing an opinion on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, we conclude that the trial court erred, in part, in denying the Academy's plea to the jurisdiction. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims based on the Academy's internal policies on academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and discipline, because resolving those claims would require the court to interpret religious doctrine and interfere with the school's internal governance decisions. But the doctrine does not bar the plaintiffs' claims alleging the Academy breached concussion-management obligations arising from its membership in TAPPS, because those claims can be resolved under neutral principles of law without interpreting religious doctrine or imposing civil liability on the Academy for its internal governance decisions.

Because mandamus relief is appropriate when a trial court acts without subject matter jurisdiction, we conditionally grant relief in part.

I. Background

The Academy is a private school located in Sugar Land, Texas, serving students from pre-kindergarten through twelfth grade. It states that it “exists to glorify God through excellence in college preparatory Christian education.” It strives to “provide a biblically-based college-preparatory curriculum” that “equip[s] students to embrace biblical truth, academic excellence and model Christ-like leadership to influence their homes, churches and communities for Christ.”

In January 2025, real parties in interest Scott and Lyndsey Hagan (the Hagans) filed a lawsuit against the Academy.¹ Their petition alleged the following:

• The Hagans enrolled B.H. at the Academy for his sophomore year of high school.

• B.H.'s enrollment was based on an agreement (Enrollment Agreement) between the Academy and the Hagans, which incorporated the Academy's Student and Family Handbook (the Handbook).

• The Handbook contains policies governing academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and discipline. It also incorporates by reference by-laws promulgated by TAPPS, including policies governing concussion-management for student-athletes.

• One day, a teammate assaulted B.H. at football practice by “violently” head-butting him. “The incident was witnessed by the coaching staff, who did nothing.”

• Following the incident, B.H. exhibited concussion symptoms, but “the coaching staff did not institute the concussion protocol or the emergency medical plan incorporated in [the Handbook],” which resulted in B.H. sustaining a traumatic brain injury.

• B.H. suffered diminished cognitive function due to his brain injury. After the Academy failed to provide academic accommodations, the Hagans were forced to withdraw B.H. from the Academy and enroll him at a school tailored to students with disabilities.

The Hagans sued the Academy for negligence on B.H.'s behalf, seeking damages for his personal injuries. They also sued the Academy in their individual capacities for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). They alleged that the Academy breached obligations arising from the Enrollment Agreement and Handbook, and that these breaches resulted in increased educational and medical costs for B.H.

The Academy filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that as a religious-based organization, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the Hagans's individual claims. It did not challenge the trial court's jurisdiction over the negligence claim on B.H.'s behalf. The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction following a hearing. The Academy then initiated this mandamus proceeding.

II. Standard of Review

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only when the relator demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Mandamus is appropriate when the trial court acts without subject matter jurisdiction, and the relator need not show that it does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d 500, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding).

“Lack of jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction when religious-liberty grounds form the basis of the jurisdictional challenge.” Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007). We review de novo a plea to the jurisdiction questioning the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings, we determine whether the plaintiff has met its burden by pleading facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In doing so, we “construe the plaintiff's pleadings liberally, taking all factual assertions as true, and look to the plaintiff's intent.” Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). A plea may also challenge the existence of jurisdictional facts, and when it does, the parties may present evidence. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012). In those situations, our review of the jurisdictional plea mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment. Id. The plea to the jurisdiction should not be granted if a fact issue exists regarding the court's jurisdiction, but if the pleadings affirmatively demonstrate an incurable jurisdictional defect, the plea must be granted. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395.

When, as here, the plea to the jurisdiction challenges multiple claims asserted in the petition, we review jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis. San Jacinto River Auth. v. City of Conroe, 688 S.W.3d 124, 133 (Tex. 2024); McClelland v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 702 S.W.3d 807, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied).

III. Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I, XIV; see Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Tex. 2013). It prohibits the government — including courts ––from interfering with an individual's ability to observe his faith or with a church's ability to manage its internal affairs. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 512–13; Shannon v. Mem'l Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612, 621 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).

Texas courts use the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” to enforce the constitutional prohibition against governmental interference in religious matters. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 508–09; Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 621. The doctrine is more than just a limitation on a court's actions, it is a limitation on its subject matter jurisdiction. Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 605–06. It does not, however, divest courts of jurisdiction over every dispute involving a religious entity. See In re St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 507. Because churches, their congregations, and their hierarchies exist and function within the civil community, they remain “amenable to rules governing civil, contract, and property rights in appropriate circumstances.” Id. (citing Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 622).

“A court may exercise jurisdiction over a controversy if it can apply neutral principles of law that will not require inquiry into religious doctrine, interference with the free-exercise rights of believers, or meddling in church government.” Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 513. Under this methodology, courts decide non-ecclesiastical issues “ ‘based on the same neutral principles of law applicable to other entities, while deferring to religious entities’ decisions on ecclesiastical and church polity questions.’ ” Id. (quoting Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 596). “[A]ny exception to ecclesiastical abstention by application of neutral principles must be narrowly drawn to avoid inhibiting the free exercise of religion or imposing secular interests on religious controversies.” Id. This requires considering not only whether neutral principles exist without regard to religion, “but also whether the application of neutral principles would impose civil liability upon a church for complying with its own internal rules and regulations or resolving a religious matter.” Id.

In determining whether a dispute is “ecclesiastical” or merely a civil law controversy involving a religious institution, courts examine the substance and nature of the plaintiff's claims. Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 514; see Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 606 (recognizing “differences between ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical issues will not always be distinct”). Although wrongs may exist in the ecclesiastical setting, and a religious institution's administration may be inadequate to provide a remedy, “the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle it overshadows the inequities that may result from its liberal application.” Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 622.

IV. Analysis

The Academy contends that the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because ecclesiastical abstention prevented the court from exercising jurisdiction over the Hagans's individual claims. In response, the Hagans do not dispute that the Academy is a religious organization enjoying First Amendment protection for the free exercise of religion. See St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 509–10 (holding school with faith–based mission and curriculum that requires student participation in church-related services and activities to be religious institution). They dispute only whether the Academy's status as a religious organization divests the trial court of jurisdiction.

The Academy argues that the Hagans's individual claims will require the trial court to interfere with its ability to manage internal policies that are based on religious doctrine. It therefore contends the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars the court from exercising jurisdiction over all of the Hagans's individual claims. Conversely, the Hagans assert the doctrine does not apply because, regardless of how their claims are framed in their pleading, they seek only to hold the Academy liable for failing “to enforce secular safety obligations that [the school] expressly recognized and voluntarily adopted” through the Enrollment Agreement, the Handbook, and its membership in TAPPS. They maintain that their individual claims will not require the court to interpret religious doctrine or interfere with the school's internal governance.

The Hagans pleaded individual claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and DTPA violations, alleging the school breached obligations arising from policies on (1) academic accommodations; (2) bullying, harassment, and discipline; and (3) concussion management for student-athletes. We examine the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine's application to each claim in turn.

A. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars the Hagans's individual claims based on the Academy's alleged breach of obligations arising from its academic accommodations policies.

We first consider whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies to the Hagans's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and DTPA claims to the extent those claims allege that the Academy breached obligations arising from its academic accommodations policies. Texas courts have held that a religious school's management of its internal affairs and governance — including discipline, retention, or promotion of students — are ecclesiastical matters to which the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies. See, e.g., In re Prince of Peace Christian Sch.., No. 05-20-00680-CV, 2020 WL 5651656, at *7-9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 23, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (doctrine applied to claims because resolution “will require a trial court or jury to determine whether [Christian school's] policies, investigation, management of student and staff conduct, and employment and enrollment decisions satisfied contractual and common law duties regarding [students'] education and psychological well-being”); Doe v. Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, No. 01-18-01056-CV, 2020 WL 3820886, at *2–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (doctrine applied to claims arising from family's expulsion from Catholic school based on school's disciplinary process and policies, where plaintiffs alleged expulsion was retaliation for their complaints about teacher bullying student); St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 513–14 (doctrine applied to claims arising from student's expulsion from religious school based on school's determination that “his parents violated the Student–Parent Handbook by falsely accusing a teacher of sexual harassment” because judicial resolution impeded school's ability to manage internal affairs regarding discipline and expulsion); In re Vida, No. 04-14-00636-CV, 2015 WL 82717, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 7, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (court may not exercise jurisdiction over claims arising from religious school's refusal to promote student to first grade because “imposing civil tort liability on the superintendent of Catholic schools for enforcing a policy that established an age requirement would impinge upon the Diocese's ability to manage its internal affairs by adopting policies regarding admission requirements for Catholic schools”).

In their pleading, the Hagans alleged that they enrolled B.H. at the Academy because the school “agreed to provide a quality education based on Christian values and comply with the policies and procedures in [the Handbook].” The Handbook includes a policy titled “Accommodations for Students with Learning Differences,” which states that “[w]hile [the Academy] does not modify its curriculum and is not equipped to offer special programs for students with learning differences, it sometimes becomes necessary to provide accommodations to meet the educational needs of our students.” The policy describes how students may qualify for academic accommodations, but cautions that “the school is not equipped to address or meet the academic and behavioral needs of students with disabilities requiring a modified curriculum and/or specialized services.”

Relying on this policy, the Hagans alleged that the Academy breached its obligation to make academic accommodations for B.H. after he suffered the brain injury. The Academy, however, is a college preparatory school committed to offering “a superior academic experience integrated with a consistent, Christian worldview and biblical perspective.” Accordingly, the Hagans's claims alleging the Academy failed to accommodate B.H. do not turn on neutral principles of law but on the Academy's application of its policy governing when — and to what extent — it modifies its biblically-based curriculum for students. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 513 (stating a court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over controversy involving religious body if it can apply neutral legal principles that will not require inquiry into matters such as religious doctrine and ecclesiastical governance). These claims therefore present a purely ecclesiastical matter beyond the trial court's jurisdiction, and the trial court erred in denying the Academy's plea as to them. See Prince of Peace Christian Sch., 2020 WL 5651656, at *7-9; Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, at *2–6; St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 513–14; Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at *2–3.

B. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars the Hagans's individual claims based on the Academy's alleged breach of obligations arising from its bullying, harassment, and disciplinary policies.

Next, we consider the doctrine's application to the Hagans's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and DTPA claims to the extent those claims allege that the Academy breached obligations arising from its bullying, harassment, and disciplinary policies. In their pleading, the Hagans alleged that the Academy breached its obligation “to ensure the safety and well-being of B.H.” by failing to stop other students from bullying him, and that the bullying ultimately led to a teammate assaulting him at practice.

These claims rely on the Handbook's “Anti-Bullying Policy,” which states the school is “committed to maintaining an academic environment ․ which is free from all forms of harassment, including ․ bullying.” The policy further states the school is “prepared to take action to prevent and correct any violations of this policy,” and that “[a] student who violates the policy will be subject to disciplinary action up to and including expulsion and legal action.”

Additionally, the Hagans alleged that, before B.H.'s enrollment, Academy officials made specific promises that he would not be subjected to bullying and harassment. During his deposition, Scott recalled that officials promised “zero-tolerance on bullying” and that B.H. “was going to be protected.”

We conclude these claims too concern ecclesiastical matters over which the trial court lacks jurisdiction because they arise from the Academy's application of internal policies grounded in religious doctrine. These claims are premised on the Academy's alleged failure to enforce its anti-bullying policy and prevent students from bullying B.H. But the policy states the Academy will provide “discipline that [is] Bibliocentric,” and that its approach to discipline is for students “to grow in self-discipline according to God's Word so that external discipline measures become less needed.” Consistent with that framework, the policy explains that “[t]he careful resolution of each [bullying] incident will be for the benefit of each person involved, as they grow in discipleship; and of the whole school.” Consequently, the trial court cannot adjudicate these claims without deciding questions of religious doctrine and interfering with the Academy's internal governance. See, e.g., Prince of Peace Christian Sch., 2020 WL 5651656, at *7-9; Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, 2020 WL 3820886, at *2–6; St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 513–14; Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at *2–3.

Still, the Hagans contend that these claims can be resolved under neutral principles of law because they arise from the Academy's alleged failure to protect their son from a foreseeable physical assault. They further contend that Texas courts have consistently held that claims implicating physical health and safety — or conduct contrary to societal norms — remain subject to judicial scrutiny even when the challenged conduct is undertaken under the guise of religious practice. In their view, applying ecclesiastical abstention here would set a dangerous precedent by effectively shielding from judicial review any act or omission by a religious school, including those affecting the physical health and safety of students.

We disagree that applying ecclesiastical abstention here runs afoul of Texas precedent. We are aware that both our federal and state constitutions differentiate between the freedom to believe, which is absolute, and the freedom to act, which “ ‘remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.’ ” Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940)). The Texas Supreme Court has stated that religious practices that threaten the public's health, safety, or general welfare cannot be tolerated as protected religious belief; thus, the First Amendment does not immunize religious institutions from every claim that may touch on religion. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008) (“We do not mean to imply that ‘under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity,’ commit intentional torts upon their religious adherents.” (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306)); see Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 677 (“The Free Exercise Clause never has immunized clergy or churches from all causes of action alleging tortious conduct.”); see also Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 404–05 (holding that court interference through imposition of tort liability would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment as neither health nor safety at issue). Indeed, this court has acknowledged the First Amendment “does not protect actions in violation of social duties or subversive to good order.” Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 622 (citing Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 677 and Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 264 S.W.3d at 12).

But our conclusion that ecclesiastical abstention bars the Hagans's claims predicated on the Academy's obligations under its bullying, harassment, and disciplinary policies does not rest on any view that the doctrine shields the Academy from all civil liability for its role in causing B.H.'s physical injuries. To the contrary, it does not bar the Hagans's negligence claim, brought on B.H.'s behalf for personal-injury damages, because that claim arises from duties imposed by law — independent of any agreement between the Academy and the Hagans — and may be adjudicated under neutral tort principles without imposing liability on the Academy for complying with its religious-based policies. See Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395 (“Government action may burden the free exercise of religion in two quite different ways: by interfering with an individual's observance or practice of a particular faith ․ and by encroaching on the church's ability to manage its internal affairs.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991) (“Tort obligations are in general obligations that are imposed by law—apart from and independent of promises made and therefore apart from the manifested intention of the parties—to avoid injury to others.”) (citation omitted).

The Hagans's claims predicated on the Academy's alleged obligations under its bullying, harassment, and disciplinary policies, however, are different. Those claims rest on religion-based policies. Thus, they cannot be resolved without interfering with the Academy's ability to interpret and enforce its religious-based policies. Abstention is therefore required. See Prince of Peace Christian Sch., 2020 WL 5651656, at *7 (regardless of plaintiffs' efforts to frame their claims as grounded in secular obligations rather than school's internal policies, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred claims because court could not “divorce [the plaintiffs'] contentions of abuse, harassment, and failure to report abuse, from [the school's] supervision and discipline of [the children], its investigation of [the plaintiffs'] complaints, and its ultimate expulsion of [the children] and their families,” actions taken pursuant to school's internal policies).

The Hagans contend that the “school-governance cases” applying the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine — on which the Academy and this court rely — are distinguishable because the plaintiffs in those cases challenged “admissions, promotion, and expulsion” decisions, whereas the Hagans do not. But that contention rests on an unduly narrow view of the doctrine, and our supreme court has instructed that any exception to ecclesiastical abstention by application of neutral principles must be narrowly drawn to avoid imposing secular interests on religious controversies. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 513. In the school-governance context, ecclesiastical abstention is not limited to particular categories of disputes; it applies whenever adjudicating the claim would require a court to intrude on decisions the First Amendment reserves to the religious school. See id.; Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 607 (“Civil courts are constitutionally required to accept as binding the decision of the highest authority of a hierarchical religious organization to which a dispute regarding internal government has been submitted.”). As our sister court explained in Prince of Peace Christian Sch. while rejecting a similar argument, “the reasons for the school's actions in [the school-governance cases] — its internal discipline and management of its affairs — rather than the result of that discipline[,] warranted application of the doctrine.” 2020 WL 5651656, at *8 (collecting cases). In other words, the doctrine applied because resolving the claims would require the court to entangle itself in the school's internal disciplinary and governance decisions, regardless of the outcome of those decisions. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 514 (“Because courts are prohibited from risking judicial entanglement with ecclesiastical matters, if the substance and nature of the plaintiff's claims are inextricably intertwined with matters of doctrine or church governance, then the case must be dismissed.” (internal citations omitted)); Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 264 S.W.3d at 12 (“courts must carefully scrutinize the circumstances so as not to become entangled in a religious dispute”).

The claims here seek to hold the Academy liable for breaching alleged obligations arising from its religious-based policies governing bullying, harassment, and discipline. Because judicial resolution of these claims requires interference with the Academy's internal disciplinary and governance decisions, they present ecclesiastical matters beyond the court's jurisdiction. The trial court therefore erred in denying the Academy's plea as to these claims.

C. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not bar the Hagans's individual claims based on the Academy's alleged breach of concussion-management obligations arising from its membership in TAPPS.

Finally, we consider the doctrine's application to the Hagans's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and DTPA claims to the extent those claims allege that the Academy breached concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS membership. The Hagans alleged that they enrolled B.H. at the Academy after the Academy assured them that “it had trained medical staff and a strict concussion protocol should B.H. play sports.” They further alleged that, after B.H. exhibited concussion symptoms following the assault, “the coaching staff did not institute the concussion protocol or the emergency medical plan incorporated in [the Handbook].” According to the Hagans, this failure delayed treatment for B.H.'s concussion and exacerbated his brain injury.

It is undisputed that the Academy is a member of TAPPS, the nation's largest private athletic organization. TAPPS limits membership to Texas private and parochial schools serving students from ninth through twelfth grade. TAPPS defines “private schools” as those schools that are established, conducted and primarily supported by a non-government agency or primarily supported by student tuition. It defines “parochial schools” as those schools that are controlled by, supported by, or within the jurisdiction of a church parish. Accordingly, TAPPS itself — unlike some of its members schools — is not a religious institution, and TAPPS membership does not require schools to be religious-based.

TAPPS promulgates by-laws governing athletic participation, player safety, and injury responses, and member schools must comply with these rules to maintain membership and the right to participate in TAPPS contests. For instance, TAPPS requires member schools to maintain “a health and safety plan for extracurricular activities.” It also requires coaches to complete annual concussion management training and member schools to adopt policies mandating that any player exhibiting signs, symptoms, or behaviors associated with a concussion be removed from participation in practices, scrimmages, and contests until an appropriate healthcare professional clears the player to return.

The Hagans's response to the Academy's plea included excerpts from the deposition of the Academy's athletic trainer. She confirmed that the Academy has a concussion protocol in place. She testified that the protocol requires any player exhibiting concussion signs or symptoms to be evaluated by the athletic trainer, who conducts the evaluation using various assessment tools. She further testified that, if a concussion is still suspected, the player may not return to play until cleared by the athletic trainer and a physician. Although she believes parents are aware of the protocol, she personally educates them on the protocol and the requirements for a player's return to play.

The athletic trainer confirmed that, immediately after the incident involving B.H., no coaches reported that he was exhibiting concussion symptoms, and, as result, he did not undergo an evaluation. The next day, B.H. complained of worsening headaches, sensitivity to light, and difficulty concentrating. The athletic trainer suspected he had a concussion and referred him to the team physician, who diagnosed him with a concussion the following day.

We conclude that the claims seeking to hold the Academy liable for breaching alleged concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS membership present secular, non-ecclesiastical issues over which the trial court may exercise jurisdiction. Resolving these claims would require inquiries into (1) whether the Academy had any concussion-management obligations to the Hagans under TAPPS's bylaws; and (2) if so, whether the Academy breached those obligations. Because all member schools — religious or not — must comply with TAPPS's by-laws, resolving these claims would not require inquiry into religious doctrine, unlike the claims arising from the Academy's bullying, harassment, and disciplinary policies. Nor would resolving these claims interfere with the Academy's internal governance because the alleged obligations arise from the Academy's voluntary membership in TAPPS, an independent secular organization. The trial court therefore can resolve them under neutral principles of law without entangling itself in decisions the First Amendment reserves to the Academy as a religious institution. See Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 622 (“acknowledging that churches, their congregations, and hierarchy exist and function within the civil community, they can be as amenable to rules governing civil, contract, or property rights as any other societal entity”); see also Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 125–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (holding that by voluntarily incorporating under non-profit corporation statute, church “became amenable to the provisions of that statute,” and that member's suit under statute to inspect church financial records could be resolved under neutral principles of law without offending First Amendment principles).

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not shield the Academy from civil liability for allegedly breaching concussion-management obligations arising from its TAPPS membership. Holding otherwise would be “subversive to good order.” See Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 622. Accordingly, without expressing an opinion on the merits, we hold the trial court did not err in denying the Academy's plea to the jurisdiction as to these claims. See Harris Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Houston Pipe Line Co LP, 706 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“a plea to the jurisdiction is a procedural device for challenging a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a suit without reference to the merits of the underlying claims”).

V. Conclusion

We conclude the trial court erred in denying the Academy's plea to the jurisdiction as to the Hagans's individual claims based on the Academy's academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and disciplinary policies. We also conclude the Academy does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. See Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 512; St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d at 514. We conditionally grant, in part, the Academy's petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate the portion of its January 23, 2026 order denying the plea to the jurisdiction as to those claims. We deny mandamus relief as to the portion of the trial court's order denying the plea with respect to the Hagans's individual claims alleging the Academy breached concussion-management obligations arising from its membership in TAPPS. We also lift the stay previously entered by this court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   B.H. was a minor when the underlying lawsuit was originally filed but has since reached the age of majority.

Brad Hart Justice