JAMES EDWARD DAVET v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2026)

OPINION

Appellant James Edward Davet appeals his judgment of conviction for violating a magistrate's order of emergency protection (“MOEP”) issued in favor of his former wife. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.292. In his first two issues, he contends the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to stay proceedings and require a competency examination; and alternatively, the court should have allowed him to represent himself despite his professed incompetence. In his third and fourth issues, he collaterally attacks the MOEP as void because the Harris County criminal law hearing officer who signed it lacked jurisdiction. Finally, appellant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a conviction for violating the MOEP. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

On May 4, 2022, appellant was charged by information with harassing his former wife. Tex. Penal Code § 42.07. The next day, at the initial hearing and on the State's motion, a Harris County criminal law hearing officer signed the MOEP at issue. The MOEP designated appellant's former wife as a protected individual and prohibited appellant from committing family violence against or communicating with, or coming within certain distances of, the protected individual.

Within one week, the State filed a new information charging appellant with violating the MOEP. Appellant entered into a pre-trial diversion program, which the State later terminated. He then pleaded not guilty to the charge, and a jury found him guilty. The parties agreed on a forty-five day jail sentence, and the trial court signed a judgment accordingly. This appeal followed.

Analysis

A. Competency Proceedings

In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to stay proceedings and require a competency examination after becoming aware of a credible suggestion that he may be incompetent to stand trial and after finding some evidence to support an incompetency finding.

As a matter of due process, a criminal defendant who is incompetent may not stand trial. Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). In Texas, an accused is presumed competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(b); see Laflash v. State, 614 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). A person is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(a); see Laflash, 614 S.W.3d at 431-32. Although a defendant is presumed competent and ultimately bears the burden of proving incompetence to stand trial, article 46B “places certain responsibilities on the trial court to inquire into the matter independently and force the parties to litigate the issue, if necessary.” Clark v. State, 592 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref'd).

A trial court's duty to conduct an informal inquiry is triggered on a suggestion from any credible source that a defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(a), (c), (c-1); Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563. Upon receipt of such information, “the court on its own motion shall suggest the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial,” and the court shall determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art 46B.004(b)-(c). The trial court may also appoint one or more disinterested experts to examine the defendant and report to the court on the defendant's competency or incompetency. See id. art. 46B.021(a)(1).

If during the informal inquiry stage the trial court finds more than a scintilla of evidence supporting a rational finding of fact that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 564, then the trial court is required to do three things: (1) “stay all other proceedings in the case,” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(d); (2) appoint an expert to conduct a competency examination (if it has not already done so), id. art.46B021(b); and (3) move forward with a formal competency trial. Id. art. 46B.005(a)-(b).

In May 2022, appellant's prior counsel filed a motion questioning appellant's competence. In the motion, counsel stated, “After interviewing defendant and conversing with defendant's friends by phone on 5/16/22, appointed attorney has reason to believe the defendant may be suffering from a psychiatric condition(s).” The trial court promptly signed an order for a competency examination on May 17, 2022. In March 2023, the Harris Center for Mental Health issued a notice to appellant that it had received a court order requiring a forensic psychological evaluation of appellant and scheduling appellant for that evaluation on May 11, 2023. Appellant did not appear for his scheduled appointment, however, and for that reason the Harris Center notified the trial judge on May 13, 2023 that “an opinion about competency could not be formed.”

Generally, appellate complaints, including constitutional complaints, must be preserved for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Based on this principle, numerous courts have held that an appellant must object to a trial court's failure to make a competency determination to preserve the issue for appellate review.¹

The facts in the Fifth Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion in Mitchell are similar to the present circumstances. There, the trial judge signed a pre-trial order requiring a competency evaluation on an attorney's motion. Mitchell, 2020 WL 4047963, at *4. The court appointed an examiner and ordered her to report findings and opinions within thirty days. Id. However, the appellate record did not contain a written report of the competency evaluation. Id. The court of appeals noted that “neither Mitchell nor the State contend that the trial court made an affirmative determination on the record as to whether some evidence existed to support a finding that appellant was incompetent to stand trial.” Id. Nonetheless, the appellant argued that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing, although he acknowledged that he did not object or ask the trial court to rule on his competency. Id. The court held that the appellant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. Id.

Here, appellant made no request, objection, or motion on which the court ruled adversely to him. Instead, the trial court granted his attorney's motion and ordered a competency examination, for which appellant failed to appear.² Appellant did not raise the issue again. Accordingly, any error is not preserved. E.g., Mitchell, 2020 WL 4047963, at *4-5; Mapps, 336 S.W.3d at 702-03; Salahud-din, 206 S.W.3d at 208; Boitnott, 48 S.W.3d at 293.

We overrule appellant's first issue.

B. Self-Representation

In his second issue, appellant contends that, assuming he was competent to stand trial, the trial court erred by denying him the constitutional right to represent himself. We review the denial of a defendant's request for self-representation for an abuse of discretion. Alford v. State, 367 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and we will imply any findings of fact supported by the record and necessary to affirm the trial court's ruling when, as here, the trial court did not make explicit findings. Id.

The Sixth Amendment's assistance of counsel guarantee encompasses the reciprocal right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975); Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). While the right to counsel is in effect until waived, the right to self-representation does not attach until it has been clearly and unequivocally asserted. Osorio-Lopez v. State, 663 S.W.3d 750, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818, 835. Even if asserted, the defendant is not entitled to invoke it as a means to disrupt the decorum of court, abuse the judicial system, manipulate the trial process, or serve as a delay tactic. E.g., United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46); see also United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 726 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that right to proceed pro se may be waived by defendant's actions).

During pre-trial proceedings, appellant's retained counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which was denied. Immediately before voir dire began, appellant stated that he wanted to “go with other counsel or ․ go pro se.” The associate judge responded, “I don't think there's going to be another counsel because I don't see anybody here.”³ Appellant responded, “it'll be pro se with your approval. It's my understanding, from talking to my attorney, Chad, that there is discovery materials that I've been precluded from seeing. And so for you to take me to trial right now, not having reviewed those –.” The judge interrupted appellant and informed him that a request for self-representation must be asserted timely, which he had not done.⁴ The judge reminded appellant that he was not legally trained, did not know the rules of evidence or procedure, and “[hadn't] even had access to read the materials that you would need to conduct a competent representation.” The judge denied appellant's motion to represent himself, explaining that he had two years to find different counsel and that the judge perceived the timing of appellant's request as an attempt to “use Faretta as a tool for delay.” Jury selection proceeded with appellant's retained counsel representing him, and a jury was empaneled and sworn.

Appellant's counsel raised the issue again the following Monday on the first full day of trial by asking for a continuance “based upon the denial of my client's constitutional right to be his own attorney.” Counsel added that “there was information that [appellant] wanted to obtain from the State that is not ․ in the record or the discovery.” This information concerned unrelated disciplinary actions taken against the officer who investigated and arrested appellant for the charged offense. The trial court granted a brief continuance so that appellant would have time to investigate the disciplinary action.

Regarding appellant's request to represent himself, the following colloquy occurred:

THE DEFENDANT: The only thing left to me by [that judge] was to ask to go pro se because he was not wanting to do anything to delay, right? And so that was where my pro se came from. I'm completely willing to argue this case pro se, right? I don't think it's fair that I was forced to have to use this particular attorney at that particular fee.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm not sure what happened over there with [the other judge]. What I do know is that I would not have been continuing this case for the purposes of hiring counsel. We're way past that. That ship sailed a couple months ago to be quite frank. And I don't know what lawyer you hired that was super cheap that's going to jump in and do this trial on the cheap cheap. But that is not my business. What I will say is that we are set for trial today ․ in a case that carries pretty substantial consequences. And going pro se generally by and large is just a recipe for disaster, right? Even for the smartest of people. I wouldn't be representing myself in a criminal case. But -- so this is where you are. Right now you have counsel. He is here. He is ready, as evidence[d] by what he has done thus far, and will be proceeding tomorrow as your lawyer. If you paid him a dollar, he's about to represent you like you paid him a million because that's where we are.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: That being said, if you wish to proceed pro se, after a short discussion, I will consider that. So you need to let me know; are you trying to represent yourself? Because I'm not delaying it. We would just be jumping into the trial ․ with an opening statement in about five minutes.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. Understood. Two things. One, if I did go pro se, [counsel] would be sitting in second seat to handle the legal issues. So it wouldn't be like I'd be without representation.

THE COURT: No, that's not how it's going to be. I'm not sure what [the other judge] told you; that's not how it's going to be.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. And then the second thing is, I'd like a moment to confer with my counsel.

[Brief recess taken.]

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Davet, what did you decide?

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, firstly, I want to say that I may have misspoken on the advice of counsel when I used the term second seat. He advised me that I do have the right to represent myself with standby counsel to advise me on the elements of law, right? So I think that may have been why you denied it.

THE COURT: Well no, that's not why.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: Because it's not like you think it's going to be where they're like helping you out. He's just like basically sitting there and is only in there in the case of an emergency. But he would not be able to like be what essentially is a second chair.

THE DEFENDANT: Understood.

THE COURT: And I think people generally don't find it all that helpful, because he's just not going to jump up every time you don't know how to introduce evidence or you don't know how to appropriately ask a question so that it's not objectionable.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. Understood.

THE COURT: He's not going to be able to give you a crash course on the law.

THE DEFENDANT: Understood. So I'd just like to tell the Court, right? Two things, I guess. One is I truly feel like I was put into a position by the prior judge to clear his docket, where it's costing me double of what the other attorney would be and left me with only pro se left, okay?

THE COURT: So that is not relevant to me.

․

THE DEFENDANT: ․ That leaves me with a last issue that if I were to go pro se, it's my understanding from [counsel], that I have been precluded at law from seeing evidence on file against me because of the Texas state law. So if I were to go pro se, I would need time to review that evidence obviously to have a fair trial, right? And so, I guess, I'm put into this position where I would like to just -- I'm not too sure if this is the right term, but I'd like to give judicial notice, right? That I believe this entire case, everything around it, is built on lies. We've tried to tell this to the prosecution at every step of the way, including on Friday where I tried to approach Samantha if she was willing to come up. I just want to give judicial notice.

THE COURT: Mr. Davet, not appropriate judicial notice.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: This is the trial.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Everybody in -- I presume it's all lies. You're presumed innocent.

THE DEFENDANT: Cool. So --

THE COURT: So no, no, no. This is the trial. This is where the rubber meets the road. And they can make the case or they can't. You would not get a continuance to review the evidence. The evidence has been made available to your attorney. The prosecutor's office within their internal policy does not give physical evidence over to a pro se litigant. And so you would have to go to their office to review it, normally is how it would have worked.

THE DEFENDANT: Understood.

THE COURT: But we're past that.

THE DEFENDANT: I understand that.

THE COURT: So you would -- now that we're here at the trial, you would just take what your attorney has and try the case with it.

THE DEFENDANT: So the last thing I'd like to say is -- I don't know if this is appropriate or not, right? But I believe there are civil issues at law here from the DAs office, right? From what happened at [the previous judge]'s room, right? I believe there's civil matters here. And I intend to press those. And I just want to give notice that that's where I'm coming from here. I'm looking for justice.

THE COURT: Hopefully you find it. All right. So I'm not sure that I got the question though. Are you proceeding with your lawyer?

THE DEFENDANT: Under these circumstances, I must.

Based on the totality of circumstances shown by our record, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that appellant did not “clearly and unequivocally” invoke his right to self-representation. Cf. Bluntson v. State, 728 S.W.3d 87, 128 (Tex. 2025) (“[W]e note that, based on the totality of circumstances shown by the record, particularly Appellant's ‘ambivalence,’ ‘wavering,’ and ‘conflicted view’ about representing himself, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Appellant did not ‘clearly and unequivocally’ invoke his right to self-representation.”). Instead, appellant's statements are more fairly characterized as a request for hybrid representation, to which he was not entitled. See Ex parte Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd). Moreover, appellant suggested that, if he were to proceed pro se, he would need more time to review the evidence. Such assertions also support a finding that he sought to proceed pro se to delay proceedings. See Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Stone v. State, 951 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.); cf. Huggins v. State, 674 S.W.3d 538, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“The trial court was not required to unconditionally accommodate Appellant's vacillations between counseled and self-representation.”).

Finally, even when a defendant clearly and unequivocally invokes a right to self-representation, he may be deemed to have abandoned it based on subsequent statements or conduct. See Funderburg v. State, 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Alford, 367 S.W.3d at 862. Because waiver of the right to self-representation is not subject to the same “stringent standards as the waiver of the right to counsel,” Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 637, a defendant waives the right to self-representation “if it reasonably appears to the court that [the] defendant has abandoned his initial request to represent himself.” Id.; Alford, 367 S.W.3d at 862. Still, mere acquiescence to a trial court's unmistakable denial of his request to represent himself is not a waiver of the defendant's right to self-representation. Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 642; Alford, 367 S.W.3d at 862.

Both the associate judge during voir dire and the presiding judge at trial denied appellant's request to represent himself when he raised the issue on each occasion. The presiding judge afforded appellant the opportunity to discuss the matter with counsel before proceeding with trial and said she would consider a request for self-representation with the understanding that she would not delay trial and after clarifying that self-representation is not equivalent to hybrid representation. When appellant was informed that he was neither entitled to hybrid representation nor that he could have a continuance to review the evidence, appellant decided to proceed with counsel. We conclude the record supports an implicit finding that appellant accepted representation by counsel and abandoned his request to represent himself. See, e.g., Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 642 (holding defendant abandoned right to self-representation when he informed trial court he decided to accept attorney's assistance); Bailey v. State, No. 05-12-00634-CR, 2013 WL 3974047, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 2, 2013, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Funderburg, 717 S.W.3d at 642-43; Alford, 367 S.W.3d at 862).

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request to proceed pro se. We overrule appellant's second issue.

C. Validity of the MOEP

In his third and fourth issues, appellant challenges the validity of the MOEP. Acknowledging that he may collaterally attack the MOEP in this appeal only on voidness grounds, he claims that the MOEP is void because the criminal law hearing officer lacked authority to sign it for three reasons: (1) only the judge of Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 12 could sign an MOEP once the information was filed and the case assigned to that court; (2) although a criminal law hearing officer has concurrent jurisdiction in criminal cases filed in Harris County criminal courts at law under Government Code section 54.856, that section does not expressly authorize hearing officers to sign a MOEP; and (3) the MOEP was issued without appellant's knowledge or appearance for an offense that did not involve family violence, contrary to Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.292.

Texas courts of appeals, including this one, generally agree that collateral attacks on protective orders are not permissible in an appeal from a criminal conviction for violating the order.⁵ A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment in a proceeding brought for some other purpose. Glandon, 2011 WL 345634, at *5 (citing Adams v. State, 222 S.W.3d 37, 57 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. ref'd)). A void protective order, however, is subject to collateral attack. See id. at *6. “A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment ‘had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.’ ” Id. (quoting Browning v. Prostock, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005)). Only when a jurisdictional defect is apparent on the face of the record is a judgment void and subject to collateral attack. See id.

1. Criminal law hearing officers have limited concurrent jurisdiction with county criminal courts at law over criminal cases filed in those courts.

Appellant argues in his third issue that the criminal law hearing officer had no authority to sign the MOEP on May 5, 2022 because Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 12 obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the case once the information was filed and the case assigned to that court on May 4, 2022.

The Texas Legislature authorized a board composed of certain judges in Harris County to appoint criminal law hearing officers subject to commissioners court approval. See Tex. Gov't Code § 54.852.⁶ Criminal law hearing officers must take the constitutional oath of office required of appointed officers in Texas. Id. § 54.855. They are designated as magistrates, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2A.151(7)(A), and afforded “all other powers and duties of a magistrate specified by the Code of Criminal Procedure and other laws of this state.” Tex. Gov't Code § 54.858(a).

The Legislature specifically prescribed the parameters of criminal law hearing officers' criminal jurisdiction. Id. § 54.856(a). That section provides:

(a) A criminal law hearing officer appointed under this subchapter has limited concurrent jurisdiction over criminal cases filed in the district courts and county criminal courts at law of the county and concurrent jurisdiction over criminal cases filed in the justice courts of the county. In criminal cases filed in the district courts and county criminal courts at law, the jurisdiction of the criminal law hearing officer is limited to:

(1) determining probable cause for further detention of any person detained on a criminal complaint, information, or indictment filed in the district courts or county criminal courts at law;

(2) committing the defendant to jail, discharging the defendant from custody, or admitting the defendant to bail, as the law and facts of the case require;

(3) issuing search warrants and arrest warrants as provided by law for magistrates; and

(4) enforcing judgments and orders of the county criminal courts at law in criminal cases.

Id.

Section 54.856(a) refers to jurisdiction over criminal “cases.” A criminal “case” is “ ‘an action, suit, or cause instituted to secure a conviction and punishment for crime, or to punish an infraction of the criminal law.’ ” Ex parte Clear, 573 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (quoting White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)). Here, the initial alleged harassment offense became a “case” when the complaint and information were filed against appellant on May 4, 2022. There is no dispute that the case was assigned to Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 12 on that date (or at least before the initial hearing occurred) and that the court acquired jurisdiction.

Appellant contends that the jurisdiction of Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 12 was exclusive from May 4 onward, depriving the criminal law hearing officer of jurisdiction to take any action, including signing a MOEP. According to appellant, “Texas law is well-established that a Magistrate loses jurisdiction once a Complaint and Information (or an Indictment) are presented to a specific court.”

In support of his argument, appellant cites Texas Constitution article V, section 12; Code of Criminal Procedure article 4.16; State ex rel. Holmes v. Salinas, 784 S.W.2d 421, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); and Clear, 573 S.W.2d at 228. Under the Texas Constitution, “[t]he presentment of an indictment or information to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 12. Further, Code of Criminal Procedure article 4.16 provides that “[w]hen two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction of any criminal offense, the court in which an indictment or a complaint shall first be filed shall retain jurisdiction except as provided in Article 4.12.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 4.16.⁷ In Clear, the Court of Criminal Appeals construed article 4.16 as providing for exclusive jurisdiction in the court where a complaint is first filed when multiple courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense. See Clear, 573 S.W.2d at 229. In that case, the court held that a justice court acquired jurisdiction exclusive of a district court when the complaint was first filed in the justice court. Id. Holmes considered the jurisdiction of an examining court and held that such court has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over a case until the presentment of an indictment. See Holmes, 784 S.W.2d at 427.

Although Texas Constitution article V, section 12, imbues the trial court with jurisdiction upon presentment of an information, it has never been held to deprive a magistrate (or criminal law hearing officer) of jurisdiction to perform the duties required at an initial hearing following arrest. In Madrid v. State, the El Paso Court of Appeals rejected an argument much like appellant's. See 751 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, pet. ref'd). There, the defendant complained that the El Paso Criminal Law Magistrate's Court ⁸ interfered with the district court's exclusive jurisdiction in violation of Texas Constitution article V, section 8.⁹ Id. at 228. Observing that the magistrate's purpose was to increase docket efficiency, and that the district court retained full control over the magistrate's actions, the court held that “the district court control over the El Paso magistrate's functions precludes characterizing those functions as an encroachment upon or divesting of district court jurisdiction.” Id.

We reach the same conclusion for more than one reason. First, section 54.856 provides that a criminal law hearing officer has concurrent criminal jurisdiction over criminal cases filed in the county criminal courts at law. Tex. Gov't Code § 54.856(a). Cases filed in Harris County criminal courts at law are assigned to one of several courts promptly upon filing.¹⁰ Criminal county court at law jurisdiction upon filing of a complaint or information is supervisory over a criminal law hearing officer; but nothing about article V, section 12, forecloses a criminal law hearing officer's jurisdiction to conduct an initial hearing and perform the limited functions the Legislature has assigned. Subchapter L of chapter 56 does not usurp or supersede any jurisdiction of county criminal courts at law even after a complaint or information is filed; the section merely supplements county court at law jurisdiction to improve court efficiency. Like the law challenged in Madrid, a criminal law hearing officer's actions are subject to review by the court. Id. § 54.856(b).

Neither does Code of Criminal Procedure article 4.16 compel a contrary conclusion. Section 54.856(a) empowers criminal law hearing officers to take limited actions only after a “case” is “filed” in a county criminal court at law. If article 4.16 were read to foreclose criminal law hearing officer jurisdiction after a criminal case is filed, then criminal law hearing officers would serve no meaningful purpose. To construe article 4.16 as appellant suggests would render subchapter L of Government Code chapter 56 a dead letter in Harris County, which is the only county in which it applies. See Tex. Gov't Code § 54.852 (listing only board of judges of Harris County as authorized to appoint criminal law hearing officers). But we presume the Legislature does not intend useless acts,¹¹ and we will not abandon that presumption here. Additionally, neither Clear nor Salinas suggest a contrary outcome, as neither case concerned section 54.856 or the jurisdiction of criminal law hearing officers.

Finally, section 56.856(a) largely describes the functions a magistrate is required to perform at an initial article 15.17 hearing within forty-eight hours of an accused's arrest. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.17(a).¹² Article 15.17 does not address whether an information has been filed nor does it condition a magistrate's authority on whether one has been filed. As mentioned, section 54.856 presupposes that a “case” has been “filed” before a criminal law hearing officer performs the enumerated functions. A criminal law hearing officer's jurisdiction to conduct an initial hearing within twenty-four hours after arrest in Harris County misdemeanor cases does not encroach on the trial court's role as the forum for prosecution.

We therefore conclude that neither Texas Constitution article V, section 12, nor Code of Criminal Procedure article 4.16 precludes criminal law hearing officers from exercising at an initial hearing those powers the Legislature granted them in section 54.856(a).

2. A criminal law hearing officer has jurisdiction to sign a MOEP at an initial hearing because it is a matter pertaining to bail.

Appellant's next argument has to do with the specific language of section 54.856(a) and its limits. He contends that a criminal law hearing officer lacks authority to sign an MOEP because none of the powers listed in section 54.856(a) expressly authorize that particular act.

We review statutory construction issues de novo, see Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), focusing on the statute's literal text. Ex parte Stafford, 726 S.W.3d 231, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). We give effect to the statute's plain meaning unless the language is ambiguous or would lead to absurd results that the Legislature could not possibly have intended. Bittick v. State, 707 S.W.3d 366, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). We remain mindful of other statutory provisions as well to harmonize text and avoid conflicts. See Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Statutes with the same purpose or object must be read together harmoniously and afforded a constitutional interpretation when possible. See Diruzzo v. State, 581 S.W.3d 788, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

To be sure, section 54.856(a) does not spell out in so many words that a criminal law hearing officer may sign a MOEP. But we conclude that power falls comfortably within the scope of a criminal law hearing officer's jurisdiction to “admit[ ] the defendant to bail, as the law and facts of the case require.” Tex. Gov't Code § 54.856(a)(2); see Ex parte Gomez, 624 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). This conclusion follows from the text of section 54.856(a)(2) read together with other related statutory provisions.

Section 54.858 specifically states that criminal law hearing officers possess all the powers and duties of a magistrate. Tex. Gov't Code § 54.858(a). That section requires a criminal law hearing officer to be available within twenty-four hours of arrest to conduct the initial hearing and among other things determine “all matters pertaining to bail,” “pursuant to Chapter 17, Code of Criminal Procedure, and as otherwise provided by law.” See id. § 54.858(b), (d). We note the statute authorizing (and in some cases requiring) a magistrate to sign a MOEP—Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.292—is contained within chapter 17 of the code, which is entitled “Bail.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. ch. 17.¹³ Article 17.292 applies to a defendant who has been arrested for certain enumerated offenses, including offenses involving family violence or stalking. Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Article 15.17, moreover, requires the person having custody of someone accused of violating article 17.292 to provide to the magistrate at the initial hearing all information necessary to enable the magistrate to decide whether to sign a MOEP. Id.; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.17(a-2). Because these statutes involve the same purpose or object, we read section 54.856 in appropriate context with them. See Diruzzo, 581 S.W.3d at 799.

We further note that the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law Local Rules implement procedures consistent with statutory requirements in Class A and Class B misdemeanor cases. See Harris Cnty. Crim. Cts. at Law Loc. R. 4.2.1, 4.2.3.¹⁴

Our interpretation is consistent with the purpose of bail and the factors bearing on the bail determination. These include the nature of the offense and the future safety of the alleged victim—considerations a MOEP is designed to address. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15(a); Gomez, 624 S.W.3d at 576; Ex parte Benefield, 403 S.W.3d 240, 242-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In making bail determinations, courts are afforded several legislative tools to “provide suitable oversight” and prevent the accused from “intimidating witnesses, committing crimes, or posing a realistic threat to the community.” See Benefield, 403 S.W.3d at 242-43. A MOEP fits easily into this category.

In sum, a criminal law hearing officer has jurisdiction at an initial hearing to determine all matters pertaining to bail; issuing a MOEP is a matter pertaining to bail; therefore, a criminal law hearing officer has jurisdiction at an initial hearing to sign a MOEP.

We overrule appellant's third issue.

3. Appellant's other complaints are impermissible collateral attacks.

Appellant contends in his fourth issue that the MOEP was void when rendered because it was issued for an offense that did not involve family violence and was entered without appellant's appearance.

“Family violence” when referenced in article 17.292 has the same meaning as “family violence” under Family Code chapter 71. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 17.292(m)(1). As is applicable here, it means, “an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault ․” Tex. Fam. Code § 71.004.

The May 4, 2022 information and the May 5, 2022 MOEP reflect that appellant was alleged to have committed the offense of harassment against his former wife. The MOEP also states that it was issued pursuant to article 17.292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the presumption of regularity, we presume that the MOEP was properly issued pursuant to that article, absent evidence of impropriety. See Light v. State, 15 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Even presuming that the harassment offense alleged in the information does not constitute one involving family violence, and hence would not support a MOEP, this issue at most would render the MOEP voidable, not void, and thus not subject to collateral attack. Cf. In re S.M., 658 S.W.3d 876, 879-80 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (holding that when appellant alleged that agreed protective order was improperly approved by trial court because it lacked requisite family violence findings, order was voidable, not void, and therefore not subject to collateral attack); Torres v. State, No. 08-19-00209-CR, 2021 WL 3400598, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (errors such as lack of evidence to support protective order make an order voidable, not void, and not subject to collateral attack).

Regarding appellant's second complaint, the MOEP contains his signature certifying that he received a copy of the MOEP “in open court at the Magistrate's hearing.” Thus, his contention that it was issued outside of his presence is not supported by the record. Again, this defect would render the MOEP voidable, not void. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, No. 04-25-00068-CR, 2025 WL 3294740, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that a protective order that is not void, only voidable, is only subject to direct attack); Ramirez v. State, No. 08-07-00207-CR, 2008 WL 3522369, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 14, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Appellant asks this Court to find the protective order invalid for want of notice and thereafter issue an acquittal in his criminal prosecution for violating the protective order. This is an impermissible collateral attack.”).

We overrule appellant's fourth issue.

D. Legal Sufficiency

In his fifth and final issue, appellant essentially presents the arguments in his fourth issue in the alternative context of a legal sufficiency challenge. He purports to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for violating the MOEP on the grounds that the MOEP was issued absent his appearance and notice and that the underlying offense did not involve family violence. These substantive arguments are again impermissible collateral attacks on the MOEP's validity.

Even so, we would hold the evidence legally sufficient to support the conviction. In an evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In reviewing the evidence, we must remain mindful that we defer to the jury's determination of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, as the jury is the sole judge of those matters. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; see Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Dunn v. State, 497 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd).

As applicable here, a person commits an offense if, in violation of an order issued under Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.292, the person knowingly or intentionally communicates with the protected individual “in a threatening or harassing manner.” Tex. Penal Code § 25.07(a)(2)(A). To prove that a defendant acted in violation of an order, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in violation of an order that was issued under article 17.292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at a proceeding at which the defendant “appeared.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.292(a). Under the complaint in this case, the State also was required to prove that appellant had knowledge of the MOEP's issuance at the time of the offense.

The hypothetically correct jury charge for this case would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, with knowledge of the issuance of the MOEP and in violation of the MOEP issued under article 17.292 at a proceeding at which he appeared, knowingly or intentionally communicated with the protected individual in a threatening or harassing manner. Appellant says that the State failed to prove that he attended the hearing at which the MOEP was issued and that he lacked knowledge of the order, citing his testimony to that effect. However, as noted above, appellant certified that he received a copy of the MOEP in open court at the magistrate's hearing. Appellant's signature on the order certifying that he received a copy at the magistrate's hearing provides evidence that the magistrate complied with article 17.292. E.g., Dunn, 497 S.W.3d at 117 (noting that the appellant's signature certifying that he received a copy the order provided evidence that magistrate complied with article); see also Torres, 2021 WL 34400598, at *3 (“The respondent's signature on a protective order is evidence that the respondent was present at the hearing, received a copy of the Order, and had knowledge of its existence.”). Indeed, it was within the jury's prerogative to disbelieve appellant's testimony.

As to appellant's complaint that the State did not present evidence that the underlying harassment allegation involved “assaultive, threatening, violence, or physical conduct,” this argument squarely presents a prohibited collateral attack on the validity of the protective order in this appeal from his conviction for violating the order. The State was not required to prove the underlying harassment allegation; rather the State was required to prove that appellant violated the MOEP by communicating with the protected person in a “threatening or harassing manner.” See Tex. Penal Code § 25.07(a)(2)(A); see also Torres, 2021 WL 3400598, at *4 (explaining that nothing in section 25.07 requires the State “to relitigate the events that led to the protective order being issued”). The complainant testified that appellant repeatedly texted her and that she felt threatened by his texts, which is supported by copies of multiple text messages sent to the complainant and included in our record.

We overrule appellant's fifth issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See, e.g., Ramsey v. State, 563 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (when appellant claimed to have filed written motion for competency hearing but no motion appeared in the record, competency issue not preserved); Bonner v. State, 520 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (when evidence sufficiently raised competency issue but trial judge failed to impanel jury to decide question, issue was not preserved for appellate review in absence of objection); Mitchell v. State, No. 05-19-00296-CR, 2020 WL 4047963, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Mapps v. State, 336 S.W.3d 700, 702-03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (appellant forfeited right to competency hearing by failing to object before proceeding to trial); Salahud-din v. State, 206 S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, pet. ref'd) (same); Boitnott v. State, 48 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (holding no preservation of alleged error when defendant did not object to trial court's failure to make competency determination).

2.   Appellant has not argued that he cannot forfeit a right to a competency evaluation under Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

3.   An associate judge for the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law conducted the pre-trial proceedings, including voir dire and jury selection.

4.   A defendant's request to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is empaneled. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Birdwell v. State, 10 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd).

5.   See Poteet v. State, 957 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (“[I]t appears that appellant is impermissibly attempting to collaterally attack the protective order after he has violated it.”); see also Hoopes v. State, No. 03-16-00258-CR, 2018 WL 1977121, at *2 n.15 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 27, 2018, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Rogers v. State, No. 09-15-00270-CR, 2017 WL 2698038, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Glandon v. State, No. 14-10-0020-CR, 2011 WL 345634, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 1, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Appellant may not collaterally attack the April 9, 2008 protective order in this appeal from his conviction for violating that order.”); Ramirez v. State, No. 08-07-00207-CR, 2008 WL 3522369, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 14, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Dillard v. State, No. 05-00-01745-CR, 2002 WL 31845796, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 20, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

6.   Subchapter L of Chapter 54 applies only to counties with a population of 3.3 million or more, which includes Harris County. See id. § 54.851; www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/ table/harriscountytexas/.

7.   Article 4.12 pertains to justice courts and is inapplicable here.

8.   The El Paso Criminal Law Magistrate was appointed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the El Paso County Council of Judges, consisting of all district and county court-at-law judges in El Paso County. Id. at 227.

9.   That section provides in pertinent part as follows: “District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.”

10.   See Harris Cnty. Crim. Cts. at Law Loc. R. 2.

11.   Nixon v. State, 483 S.W.3d 562, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

12.   In Harris County, the initial hearing before a criminal law hearing officer must occur within twenty-four hours of arrest. Tex. Gov't Code § 54.858(d); Harris Cnty. Crim. Cts. at Law Loc. R. 4.2.1.1.

13.   Section 54.856(a)(2) also references a criminal law hearing officer's jurisdiction to “commit[ ] the defendant to jail” and “discharg[e] the defendant from custody.” Tex. Gov't Code § 54.856. These phrases notably correspond to chapter 16 of the code, entitled “the commitment or discharge of the accused.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. ch. 16.

14.   These rules provide:When the district clerk files an indictment, information, or complaint alleging the commission of a misdemeanor offense within the jurisdictional limits of a county criminal court at law and the defendant is in the custody of law enforcement officials in Harris County, the district clerk shall update the electronic records in the automated system to reflect that charges have been filed. Further, by general order of the judges of the county criminal courts at law, all law enforcement officials in Harris County shall cause the pretrial detainees in their respective custody, who have been charged with a class A or class B misdemeanor, to be delivered to the criminal law hearing officer not later than 24 hours after arrest for the purpose of conducting a hearing to determine probable cause for further detention.․The criminal law hearing officer shall perform the following for every person for whom a hearing is conducted: ․ in cases involving the offense of stalking or family violence, determine whether a magistrate's order for emergency protection should be entered.

Kevin Jewell Justice