CITY OF HOUSTON v. KELLY SHOWERS (2026)

OPINION

The Texas Tort Claims Act (the TTCA)¹ waives governmental immunity from suit and liability for claims that a governmental employee's operation or use of a motor vehicle proximately caused property damage, personal injury, or death for which the employee would be personally liable.² In this suit arising from a motor-vehicle accident, the City of Houston argues that the trial court erred in denying its traditional motion for summary judgment on the ground that appellant Kelly Showers's claims against the City do not fall within the TTCA's statutory waiver of governmental immunity. According to the City, its summary-judgment established that its employee was not negligent and that Showers's negligence in running a red light was the sole proximate cause of the collision. We agree. We accordingly reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment dismissing Showers's claims with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

It was raining, and sunrise was still over an hour away as Sergeant Paul Pham of the City of Houston Police Department drove a police vehicle northbound on Ella Boulevard in Houston. As Pham was crossing the intersection of Ella Boulevard and West 34th Street, Kerry Ray Showers drove into the intersection from westbound West 34th Street. The two vehicles collided, and when police responded to the site, both drivers claimed to have had a green light.

Showers sued Pham for negligence, gross negligence, and negligence per se, and sued the City for its vicarious liability as Pham's employer and for its own negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Pham. Showers's claims against the City constituted an election to proceed against it rather than Pham, so Pham was dismissed from the suit.³

The City moved for traditional summary judgment on the ground, among others, that Showers was solely responsible for the accident inasmuch as he entered the intersection against a red light. According to the City, Pham was not negligent and would not have been personally liable to Showers, and thus, the TTCA did not waive the City's immunity from Showers's claims.

In support of this ground, the City offered surveillance video from security cameras outside a building near the intersection. The video shows the traffic lights facing northbound Ella Boulevard (facing Pham) and eastbound West 34th Street (opposite the lights facing Showers). Although a building blocks the view of northbound Ella Boulevard at the precise point where it enters the intersection, the video shows that the light facing northbound Ella is yellow both when Pham's vehicle disappears behind the building and as the vehicle begins to emerge from behind it. The light facing northbound Ella Boulevard turns red within a fraction of a second of the collision, when Pham is most of the way across the intersection.

In addition, the City relied on the affidavit of Mazen Abdul-Razzak. Abdul-Razzak is an employee of Houston Public Works who works as Managing Engineer of Houston Transtar. In that position, Abdul-Razzak reviews light-sequencing charts for each City intersection controlled by traffic lights and consults in upgrading those sequences based on changes in traffic patterns at particular times of the year, days of the week, and time of day. Abdul-Razzak attested that the traffic-light sequence at that intersection had been the same for at least two years before the accident. The lights are programmed so that the yellow traffic light for northbound Ella Boulevard lasts for 3.6 seconds, during which time all other traffic lights at the intersection are red. When the light facing northbound Ella Boulevard switches from yellow to red, the lights facing all other lanes of traffic continue to remain red for another 2 seconds before the lights on westbound West 34th Street turn green. Thus, when Pham entered the intersection with a yellow light facing northbound Ella Boulevard, the light facing Showers, who was westbound on West 34th Street, would have been red and would have remained red until after the collision.

Although the police department's initial “Crash Report” made on the date of the accident stated, “Both [vehicles] may have run the red light,” the police issued a supplemental report three weeks later after reviewing the video. The supplemental report, offered in support of the summary-judgment motion, accurately stated, “Surveillance video shows [Pham's vehicle] going through the intersection with a yellow light just before the crash occurs.” Based on the video, Showers was cited for running a red light, but the citing officer failed to appear at traffic court to prosecute the ticket.

In his summary-judgment response, Showers stated that the citation is not proof that Showers was negligent because he is presumed innocent. He argued that the video (a) “does not even show a glimpse of the purported yellow light”; (b) is aimed at a different street; and (c) the only traffic light visible is a red light, and that light faced Pham on northbound Ella Boulevard. Showers also pointed out that the initial crash report did not take a position on liability. Finally, he asserted that even if the light facing Pham was yellow, Pham still would be at fault because drivers facing a yellow light are required to bring the vehicle to a complete stop.

The trial court denied the City's motion, and in the dispositive issue in this appeal, the City argues that Showers failed to raise a genuine issue as to Pham's negligence so as to bring his claims within the TTCA's waiver of immunity.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Subject-matter jurisdiction is necessary to a court's authority to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). A plaintiff must allege facts affirmatively showing the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction, id. at 446, and a party may challenge the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by filing a plea to the jurisdiction or by other means, including, as here, by a motion for summary judgment. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000); Buzbee v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Because the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); City of Brazoria v. Ellis, No. 14-14-00322-CV, 2015 WL 3424732, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

To obtain a traditional summary judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the movant must produce evidence showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. 2019). The nonmovant may raise a genuine issue of material fact by producing “ ‘more than a scintilla of evidence establishing the existence of the challenged element.’ ” Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004)). Though the City asserted immunity by way of a traditional summary-judgment motion, the applicable standards generally mirror those governing review of an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; Ellis, 2015 WL 3424732, at *3. A defendant's jurisdictional plea may challenge either the plaintiff's pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. The City challenged the existence of jurisdictional facts, so we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to do. See id. at 227. Whether immunity is asserted by a traditional motion for summary judgment or a plea to the jurisdiction, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts arising from such evidence in the nonmovant's favor. See id. at 228. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or a fact question is not raised relative to the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law. Id. If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the factual dispute must be resolved by the fact finder. See id. at 227–28.

III. THE TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT

The state generally has sovereign immunity from suit and liability. See Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 429–30 (Tex. 2016). When political subdivisions of the state act in a governmental capacity, they share in the state's immunity, which is then referred to as governmental immunity. See id. Unless waived, governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004).

The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity if certain conditions are met. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021, 101.025. Under these provisions, governmental immunity from suit and liability is waived for, among other things, personal injuries or property damage proximately caused by the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of a governmental employee acting within the scope of employment if the harm or damage “arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle” and “the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” Id. § 101.021(1). Governmental immunity is waived to the extent of liability created by the TTCA, permitting a plaintiff to sue for those damages allowed by the statute. Id. § 101.025.

IV. ANALYSIS

The parties to this case often seem to be describing different videos, and one could plausibly argue that there is a genuine issue of material fact if the outcome depends on the eye of the beholder. But this case shines a light on an interesting caveat: a genuine issue of material fact does not arise simply because the outcome depends on the eye of the viewer—if, by “viewer,” you mean media viewer.

The video in this case is an MP4 file that, when viewed through most media players, shows the traffic lights facing northbound Ella Boulevard at the extreme topmost edge of the video. But as this Court discovered, whether those lights are discernible is affected by the media viewer used to play the video. In at least one application, the frame of the media viewer obscured that part of the video.

Although user-controlled variables such as choice of media player or screen resolution may affect the extent to which the user can see the information captured on the video, the information itself does not change and it is not open to interpretation: the surveillance cameras recorded the incontrovertible facts that (a) the City is correct in representing that when Pham entered the intersection, the traffic light facing him was yellow; and (b) contrary to Showers's assertions, the red traffic lights visible in the video at that time do not face northbound Ella Boulevard but instead face eastbound West 34th Street.

These facts eliminate all of Showers's arguments that are based on the assumption that Pham ran a red light.

Showers argued in his summary-judgment response that if Pham entered the intersection while facing a yellow light, then Pham was negligent because a driver facing a yellow light must bring the vehicle to a complete stop. In support of this contention, Showers cited Texas Transportation Code section 544.007. But section 544.007 states that a steady yellow light is a warning signal that “movement authorized by a green signal is being terminated” or “a red signal is to be given.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 544.007(d). “The statute does not prohibit a motorist from entering the intersection on a steady yellow light.” Samford v. Duff, 483 S.W.2d 517, 523 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing predecessor statute). “The purpose of the steady yellow light is to warn the approaching driver that the red light will be exhibited forthwith when he shall give up his right of way, not to warn him that a driver on the intersecting street will crash the red light.” Id.

And the City's summary-judgment evidence did establish that Showers entered the intersection against a red light. Abdul-Razzak attested that the lights at the intersection are programmed so that the light facing westbound West 34th Street is red throughout the time that the light facing northbound Ella Boulevard is yellow, and remains red for two seconds after the light facing northbound Ella Boulevard turns red. There is no controverting evidence. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Pham was already lawfully in the intersection when Showers drove through a red light and into Pham's path.

In sum, the City established that at the time of the collision, Pham had the right of way and that Showers himself was negligent per se for running a red light. Showers does not contend that Pham—driving in rain and darkness—should have known that Showers would run the red light, much less that Pham should have come to that realization in time to avoid the collision despite the wet roads. Because the City established that Pham would not have been personally liable to Showers, the City also established that its governmental immunity from Showers's claims has not been waived.

We sustain this issue.

V. CONCLUSION

Because the City established that Showers's claims do not fall within the TTCA's waiver of immunity as alleged, it is unnecessary to address the City's remaining issues. We reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment dismissing Showers's claims with prejudice.

FOOTNOTES

1.   TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.001–.109.

2.   See id. § 101.021(1) (waiving immunity from liability); id. § 101.025 (waiving immunity from suit to the extent of liability).

3.   See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(a) (“The filing of a suit under this chapter against a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.”); id. § 101.106(e) (“If a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.”).

Tracy Christopher Chief Justice