STATE v. BURRELL (2026)

OPINION

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant William Tony Burrell pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”) and possession of a handgun while under the influence. As part of the plea, the Defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the constitutionality of the seizure that led to his arrest. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Defendant's certified question did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as set forth by this Court in State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). State v. Burrell, No. E2023-01404-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4512446 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2025). Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Defendant's certified question did not “identif[y] clearly the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved” as required by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). We granted the Defendant's application for permission to appeal to determine whether he satisfied the procedural requirements for certifying a question of law and to consider revisions to Tennessee's certified-question procedure. We hold that a reviewing court must consider the certified question statement together with the record in determining whether the scope and limits requirement of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) has been met. Reading the Defendant's certified question together with the record, we conclude that Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) is satisfied. We also conclude that the remaining requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) are met. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of the merits of the certified question.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On August 25, 2018, Officer Eric Gentry of the Benton Police Department responded to an anonymous 911 call reporting a speeding driver on Tennessee State Route 314. The anonymous caller described the speeding vehicle as a red Chevrolet pickup truck and provided the dispatcher with the truck's license plate number. The dispatcher relayed this information to Officer Gentry, who proceeded to the reported location.

Upon arriving in the vicinity, Officer Gentry observed a vehicle matching the description provided by the anonymous caller. Officer Gentry, who had been traveling in the opposite direction of the subject vehicle, made a U-turn and began driving one car behind the vehicle. Because he did not personally observe any illegal behavior on the part of the vehicle's driver, Officer Gentry did not activate his blue lights or attempt to pull the driver over.

The vehicle's driver, later determined to be the Defendant, independently turned into the parking lot of a Family Dollar store and pulled into a parking space facing the store. Officer Gentry followed and parked his patrol car directly behind the Defendant's vehicle, effectively blocking it in. At that point, the Defendant had exited his vehicle and was standing outside it. Without activating his lights or sirens, Officer Gentry turned on his dashboard camera, rolled down his passenger side window, and began speaking to the Defendant through the open window.

Officer Gentry began by asking the Defendant if “everything was good,” to which the Defendant responded, “yeah.” Officer Gentry then informed the Defendant that someone had reported him “hammering down 314.” The Defendant admitted that he had consumed “a few drinks” and had indeed been speeding. As Officer Gentry spoke to the Defendant, he noticed that the Defendant was slurring his words and smelled of alcohol.

Officer Gentry then backed up his patrol car, parked in an open space, and exited the car. As he approached the Defendant, Officer Gentry repeatedly instructed the Defendant to keep his hands out of his pockets. When the Defendant refused to comply, Officer Gentry conducted a safety pat down of the Defendant and discovered that the Defendant was carrying a .22 caliber handgun on his person. Thereafter, Officer Gentry conducted a consensual search of the Defendant's vehicle and found a cup filled with alcohol in the passenger seat.

Following the Defendant's repeated admissions that he had consumed alcohol, and failure on multiple field sobriety tests, Officer Gentry informed the Defendant that he would be going to jail for DUI. Thereafter, the Defendant was placed under arrest.

Based on these events, the Polk County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for DUI, possession of a handgun while under the influence, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and violation of the implied consent law. Before trial, the Defendant moved to suppress any evidence obtained from the alleged seizure that led to his arrest, arguing that he was unreasonably seized when Officer Gentry parked his patrol vehicle behind his truck and effectively blocked it in. The Defendant further claimed that the seizure was unconstitutional because it was “based on nothing more than an unidentified 911 call.” The State opposed the motion, asserting that no seizure had occurred and that the interaction constituted a consensual encounter until Officer Gentry developed reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant.

In May 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the suppression motion. Officer Gentry—the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing—testified consistently with the events described above. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made factual findings and instructed the parties to informally brief the issues.¹

On March 24, 2022, the trial court entered a written order denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court credited Officer Gentry's testimony and found that while the 911 call may well have been anonymous, it was “corroborat[ed]” when, shortly after the call, Officer Gentry saw “[the Defendant] on the reported road, in the described vehicle with the reported registration tag.” The trial court further concluded that Officer Gentry seized the Defendant by blocking his truck but nonetheless held that the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the 911 call and Officer Gentry's independent corroboration. Once Officer Gentry smelled alcohol and heard the Defendant's slurred admission that he had been drinking and speeding, the trial court explained, he was justified in continuing the detention and expanding the investigation.

The Defendant and the State subsequently negotiated a plea deal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c) under which the Defendant pled guilty to DUI and possession of a handgun, the State dismissed the remaining charges against him, and the Defendant certified the following question of law for appeal:

Whether or not an unreasonable seizure occurred when the arresting officer blocked the [D]efendant's vehicle into a parking spot based solely on [an] uncorroborated, anonymous caller, who allegedly reported reckless driving regarding an unknown vehicle and driver.

Without addressing the merits of the certified question, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis that the Defendant failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). State v. Burrell, No. E2023-01404-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 4512446, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2025). Specifically, the court found that the Defendant failed to clearly identify the “scope and limits” of the certified question as required by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). Id. at *3. In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on an unreported decision of that court quoting Preston for the proposition that, to strictly comply with the scope and limits requirement of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii), “[a] defendant's certified issue must identify, among other things: (1) ‘the reasons relied upon by defendant in the trial court’ to advance the motion, and (2) the reasons ‘passed upon by the trial judge’ in denying the motion.” Id. (quoting State v. Herbison, No. M2022-01359-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 5846696, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sep. 11, 2023)). The court reasoned that the Defendant's certified question did not adequately identify the scope and limits of the issue reserved because it was “devoid of any of the reasons [the Defendant] relied upon in filing his motion to suppress” or “the trial court's reasons for denying the motion to suppress.” Id. It also pointed out that the Defendant's certified question statement “lack[ed] any mention of whether Officer Gentry had reasonable suspicion to detain [the] Defendant, the existence (or non-existence) of the officer's independent corroboration of the allegations made by the anonymous 911 caller, or even a reference to [the] Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at *4.

The Defendant sought permission to appeal to this Court. We granted review to determine whether the Defendant satisfied the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) and Preston and to consider potential revisions to the procedure and analysis for certified questions. “Issues regarding the construction and interpretation of rules of court, including the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, involve questions of law.” State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tenn. 2011) (first citing Lacy v. Cox, 152 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tenn. 2004); and then citing Green v. Moore, 101 S.W.3d 415, 418 (Tenn. 2003)). We review such questions de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Lowe-Kelley, 380 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tenn. 2012) (citing State v. Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Tenn. 2008)).

II. Analysis

As a general rule, a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional and procedural defects, including alleged constitutional violations. State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996). Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) creates an exception to this general rule, permitting a defendant to appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere provided that certain conditions are satisfied. When adopted in 1978, however, Rule 37(b)(2) contained no procedural guidance for raising such appeals. State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 910, 911 n.4 (Tenn. 2003). Accordingly, in Preston, this Court established the following procedures for pursuing an appeal under Rule 37(b)(2):

[T]he final order or judgment from which the time begins to run to pursue a T.R.A.P. 3 appeal must contain a statement of the dispositive certified question of law reserved by defendant for appellate review and the question of law must be stated so as to clearly identify the scope and the limits of the legal issue reserved. For example, where questions of law involve the validity of searches and the admissibility of statements and confessions, etc., the reasons relied upon by defendant in the trial court at the suppression hearing must be identified in the statement of the certified question of law and review by the appellate courts will be limited to those passed upon by the trial judge and stated in the certified question, absent a constitutional requirement otherwise. Without an explicit statement of the certified question, neither the defendant, the State nor the trial judge can make a meaningful determination of whether the issue sought to be reviewed is dispositive of the case. Most of the reported and unreported cases seeking the limited appellate review pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37 have been dismissed because the certified question was not dispositive. Also, the order must state that the certified question was expressly reserved as part of a plea agreement, that the State and the trial judge consented to the reservation and that the State and the trial judge are of the opinion that the question is dispositive of the case. Of course, the burden is on defendant to see that these prerequisites are in the final order and that the record brought to the appellate courts contains all of the proceedings below that bear upon whether the certified question of law is dispositive and the merits of the question certified. No issue beyond the scope of the certified question will be considered.

759 S.W.2d at 650.

The present version of Rule 37(b)(2) amalgamates the requirements of the original rule with the procedural framework established in Preston. Currently, Rule 37(b)(2) provides that a defendant may appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere if the defendant (1) enters into a plea agreement under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c);² (2) explicitly reserves—with the consent of the State and the trial court—the right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of the case; and (3) ensures that (i) the certified question is stated in the judgment of conviction or a referenced document, (ii) the question clearly identifies the scope and limits of the legal issue, (iii) the judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that it was expressly reserved with the consent of the parties and the trial court, and (iv) the judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that the defendant, the State, and the trial court agree that the question is dispositive of the case. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2) (2022).³ We have held on several occasions that these requirements must be strictly construed. See State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 899 (Tenn. 2008); Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d at 911; State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. 1998).

Here, the record demonstrates that the Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State conditioned upon his ability to appeal a certified question regarding the constitutionality of the seizure that led to his arrest. The Defendant's judgment references a separate agreed order containing a statement of the certified question.⁴ That order expressly provides that the certified question was entered in compliance with Rule 37(b)(2) and Rule 11(c) and reflects the consent of both the State and the trial court, as well as their agreement that the certified question is dispositive of the case.⁵ Accordingly, the separate order, incorporated by reference into the judgment, satisfies the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i), (iii), and (iv).

The State does not dispute that the foregoing requirements are met. Rather, the focus of this appeal is on the requirement of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)—that the certified question in the judgment or related order must clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved. Preliminarily, however, we must address a change in the State's argument from the intermediate appellate court to this Court.

Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State argued that the Defendant's certified question did not clearly define the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved for appeal for multiple reasons. Not surprisingly, then, the analysis of the Court of Criminal Appeals focused exclusively on that requirement. As previously mentioned, the court ultimately determined that the Defendant's certified question failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). Burrell, 2024 WL 4512446, at *3–4.

Before this Court, however, the State has melded its argument that the Defendant's certified question did not clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved with a derivative argument that the scope-and-limits deficiencies “ensure that [the question] cannot be ‘dispositive of the case.’ ”⁶ See Tenn. R. Crim. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A) (requiring that a certified question be “dispositive of the case”). The State advanced this derivative argument by taking the position that the issue of whether a certified question is dispositive is jurisdictional. Thus, the State asserts that it is appropriate to raise this argument for the first time here, even though it was neither raised in nor addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. As explained below, we have determined that the Defendant's certified question satisfies the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the State's contention that the Defendant's certified question is not dispositive by virtue of scope-and-limits deficiencies necessarily fails.⁷ As a result, we conclude that the certified question in this case is dispositive under Rule 37(b)(2)(A).

The truly determinative question in this appeal is whether the Defendant satisfied the “scope and limits” requirement of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). To properly address this issue, we must first look to what “scope and limits” means in context.

We interpret rules of court, including the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, using well-established principles of statutory construction. See State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 744 (Tenn. 2005); see also State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tenn. 2011). When interpreting statutory text, we seek to discern its original public meaning; that is, “how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued.” State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tenn. 2022) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012)). We give the words of a statute their “natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute's general purpose.” Id. at 925 (quoting Ellithorpe v. Weismark, 479 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tenn. 2015)). When a statute does not define a particular term, we can look to the term's meaning in authoritative dictionaries published around the time the statute was enacted. Id. at 925 (citing State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 928 & n.3 (Tenn. 2007)).

As noted above, the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1978. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d at 910. Around that time, authoritative dictionaries defined “scope” to mean “range” or “extent” of a subject matter. See Scope, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2035 (1961) (“the general range or extent of cognizance, consideration, activity, or influence,” or “the limited field or subject under consideration, the range of the matter being treated, the marked off area of relevancy”). Similarly, “limit” is defined as to “set bounds to,” “fix definitely,” or “specify.” VIII Oxford English Dictionary 964 (2d ed. 1989); see also Limit, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1312 (1986) (defining “limit” as “to assign to or within certain limits; fix, constitute, or appoint definitely; to set bounds or limits to; to curtail or reduce in quantity or extent”). Reading these contemporaneous definitions together, we construe Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)’s requirement that a certified question identify “the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved” to mean that the question must delineate the range and boundaries of the subject matter to be decided.

We now address whether the Defendant has sufficiently delineated the range and boundaries of the certified question at issue in this case. We note that, in recent years, the Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to look beyond the statement of the certified question when evaluating the scope and limits of a certified-question appeal. See, e.g., State v. Potts, No. M2020-01489-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 4714716, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2021) (“[The] scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, the reasons relied upon by [the] [d]efendant in the trial court at the suppression hearing, and the trial court's reasoning for denying the motion to suppress should be discernable from the certified question of law without the need to analyze any other portions of the appellate record, including hearing transcripts, exhibits, briefs, and pleadings.”).

This four-corners approach for assessing compliance with Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) has resulted in the dismissal of numerous certified-question appeals—particularly in cases, like this one, in which the certified-question statement omits a summary of the relevant pre-trial hearing. In response to the Court seeking argument on possible revisions to the certified question procedures, the State has proposed a “question-plus-record” approach. Under this approach, if the certified-question statement alone does not provide sufficient information to define the scope and limits of the appeal, the court may consider the statement together with the record.

We conclude that this approach is both logical and consistent with our precedent in two respects. First, Preston requires a defendant to submit a record to the appellate court “contain[ing] all of the proceedings below that bear upon whether the certified question of law is dispositive and the merits of the question certified.” In keeping with this requirement, as noted earlier, we have held that an appellate court's independent determination of the dispositive nature of a certified question must be based on “the record before it.” State v. Dailey, 235 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn. 2007). It follows that the scope-and-limits inquiry likewise should be informed by the record.

Second, in the wake of Preston, this Court, on multiple occasions, has not dismissed a certified-question appeal for failing to comply with Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) on the ground that the certified-question statement did not include a synopsis of the underlying hearing.⁸ See, e.g., State v. Springer, 406 S.W.3d 526 (Tenn. 2013) (finding compliance with Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) notwithstanding the absence of any explanation of the defendant's reasons for filing the suppression motion or the trial court's reasons for denying it); State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 655–56 (Tenn. 2006) (same as to the trial court's rationale); State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tenn. 2005) (same as to both the defendant's and the trial court's rationale).

We hold that when determining the scope and limits of appellate review, a reviewing court must consider the certified-question statement in conjunction with the record. Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) is satisfied when the certified-question statement, read together with the record, contains enough detail to allow the appellate court to identify the scope and limits of the issue.⁹

In light of this holding, we overrule Preston to the extent it requires that the reasons “relied upon by defendant in the trial court” and “passed upon by the trial judge” be included in the certified-question statement. Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650. Preston remains controlling law in all other respects.

Applying these guidelines to the present case, we again note that the Defendant's certified-question statement reads as follows:

Whether or not an unreasonable seizure occurred when the arresting officer blocked the [D]efendant's vehicle into a parking spot based solely on [an] uncorroborated, anonymous caller, who allegedly reported reckless driving regarding an unknown vehicle and driver.

As the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly found, the Defendant's certified-question statement fails to identify the reasons he relied upon in the trial court to advance his suppression motion or the trial court's reasons for denying the motion, in addition to several pertinent facts. Nevertheless, the controlling consideration is whether the substance of the certified question identifies the issue intended to be reserved when read in conjunction with the record.

Here, the question clearly identifies the issue the Defendant aims to reserve as whether an unreasonable seizure occurred when the arresting officer effectively blocked the Defendant's vehicle in a parking spot based solely on an allegedly uncorroborated anonymous tip. Any details omitted from the question—including the reasons underlying the Defendant's suppression motion and the trial court's denial of that motion—are readily discernible from the record. Specifically, the Defendant's motion to suppress asserts that a warrantless seizure occurred when Officer Gentry parked behind the Defendant's vehicle, effectively blocking it in. The motion further claims that the alleged seizure was unconstitutional because it was “based on nothing more than an unidentified 911 call.”¹⁰ At the suppression hearing, defense counsel emphasized that Officer Gentry did not personally observe the defendant engage in any illegal conduct prior to initiating the seizure; instead, he relied solely on information provided by the anonymous tipster to justify the seizure. Defense counsel argued that this information alone was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to seize the Defendant and that any evidence obtained as a result of the seizure therefore must be suppressed. The trial court rejected these arguments, finding in its denial order that although the Defendant indeed was seized when Officer Gentry parked behind and blocked his vehicle, Officer Gentry possessed reasonable suspicion to do so based on his independent corroboration of the information provided by the anonymous 911 caller.

We conclude that, when read in light of the record, the Defendant's certified question provides sufficient information for the appellate court to discern the range and boundaries of the legal issue reserved for review. Accordingly, the Defendant has satisfied the scope-and-limits requirement of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). Because all the criteria for reserving a certified question were satisfied in this case, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in dismissing the Defendant's certified-question appeal.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the Defendant's certified question of law is adequate for review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for the Court of Criminal Appeals to address the merits of the issue. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the State of Tennessee.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties’ briefs to the trial court following the suppression hearing are not included in the record on appeal.

2.   Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 provides, in pertinent part:(a) Plea Alternatives.(1) In General. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere․․(3) Conditional Plea. A defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere in accordance with Rule 37(b).

3.   We apply the version of Rule 37(b)(2) in effect at the time the Defendant entered into the plea agreement with the State. See State v. Lands, 377 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012) (examining the version of Rule 37 that existed “[a]t the time [the] [d]efendant's guilty plea was entered”).

4.   The Defendant's judgment contains the following “special condition”: “Defendant explicitly reserves, with consent of the the [sic] State of Tennessee and this Honorable Court, the right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of the case. See agreed order for details of certified question.”

5.   The caption of the agreed order states: “AGREED ORDER ACCEPTING DEFENDANT'S PLEA AND EXPLICITLY RESERVING — WITH CONSENT OF THE STATE AND OF THE COURT- A CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW THAT IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE CASE.” The body of the agreed order further states, in relevant part: “This Order has been specifically set out to comply with Rule 37 and Rule 11(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure with the consent of the State of Tennessee and the Court.” The order bears the signatures of defense counsel, the assistant district attorney, and the trial court.

6.   The State couches its argument in terms of the dispositive requirement, but the substance of the argument—for instance, complaints about narrow drafting, “baked-in conclusions,” a failure to account for the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, and a failure to focus on the exclusionary rule—addresses whether the certified-question statement clearly identifies the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved. In this way, the State conflates the dispositive requirement with the other, independent requirements of Rule 37(b)(2).

7.   Because we resolve this issue by determining the merits of the scope-and-limits argument, we need not decide today if the “dispositive of the case” issue is truly jurisdictional or if it is subject to waiver or forfeiture. We leave that question for another day.

8.   Importantly, this requirement was not codified in Rule 37(b)(2).

9.   We continue to recognize that “[n]o issue beyond the scope of the certified question will be considered.” Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650; see also Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837; State v. Norword, 938 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); Irwin, 962 S.W.2d at 478–79; Day, 263 S.W.3d at 899. We hold simply that this determination must be made based upon both the certified question and the record taken as a whole.

10.   Although the Defendant's suppression motion does not expressly cite the relevant constitutional provisions, the record reflects that his argument is grounded in the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.

Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J.