JACQUELINE JOY DORMAN v. << (2026)

Upon the following papers numbered 1 to 4 read on this motion by the petitioner Stacey Dorman, for a protective order regulating the conduct of the respondent during any future depositions, hearings, conferences, or testimony involving the petitioner: Notice of Motion and supporting papers 1-2; Answering affirmation paper 3; Reply paper 4; as well as prior pleadings filed herein, it is

ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth below, the request for a protective order is denied, and it is further

ORDERED that, depositions in this proceeding, if any, shall be held at the Surrogate's Court, located at 320 Center Drive, Riverhead, New York; and it is further

ORDERED that, all parties and counsel are reminded of the standards of civility in civil proceedings and are strongly encouraged to follow same.

Background

Decedent Jacqueline J. Dorman, a/k/a Jacqueline Joy Dorman, died on March 1, 2021, a domiciliary of Suffolk County, New York. She is survived by two adult daughters, Stacey Dorman (hereinafter "petitioner") and Melanie Wohl (hereinafter "respondent"), and one adult son, Bradley Dorman (hereinafter "Bradley").

Prior to the underlying proceeding, respondent, filed a petition for voluntary administration on June 8, 2021. That petition listed only Bradley and respondent as distributees of the decedent, and did not include petitioner.

On April 22, 2024, petitioner filed a petition with this court seeking the Public Administrator of Suffolk County be named as administrator of the estate of the decedent. The petition was later amended to include a request to dismiss the previously filed voluntary administration proceeding and to dispense with service upon Bradley, as his whereabouts are unknown. Bradley has not been served in this matter, nor has he appeared. The court has dispensed with service upon Bradley in this administration proceeding in a separate order referenced below.

Objections were filed by the respondent in the underlying administration proceeding on March 21, 2025, on the basis that there are no assets of the estate of the decedent. Several conferences have been held in this matter and the parties have been engaging in disclosure pursuant to Pretrial Disclosure Orders.

On January 12, 2026, petitioner filed a motion seeking an order striking respondent's objections to and compel a further response to petitioner's discovery demands. That motion has been determined separately from this motion, and that order dispenses with service of process on Bradley in this administration proceeding.

Days later, the petitioner filed the within motion by notice of motion, dated January 20, 2026, seeking a protective order regulating the conduct of the respondent during any future depositions, hearings, conferences, or testimony involving petitioner in this matter. Specifically, she seeks an order: barring respondent from being physically present during petitioner's testimony, or in the alternative, that respondent remain out of petitioner's line of sight; directing respondent to refrain from any verbal or non-verbal communication in the presence of petitioner; directing conditions for petitioner's testimony be sufficient to prevent intimidation, harassment, or interference; and directing that respondent's counsel be responsible for ensuring respondent's compliance with the court's directives.

Respondent has filed opposition to the relief sought in the motion and petitioner has filed a reply.

Arguments

Petitioner seeks a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3103(a), based upon conduct alleged during petitioner's deposition which took place on January 13, 2026. Petitioner asserts that respondent "engaged in aggressive, intimidating, and disruptive conduct that interfered with [petitioner's] ability to testify." Specifically, petitioner states that "respondent shouted at me, called me names, made faces, gestures, and sounds, laughed, smirked, stared aggressively, whispered, and attempted to communicate during questioning." Petitioner also states that "respondent stood up from her chair, lunged toward me, pointed her finger in my face, and shouted 'LIAR' ", requiring intervention in order to continue the proceeding.

Petitioner asserts that she repeatedly requested that respondent be moved out of her line of sight while petitioner testified, but respondent was only moved one chair over and remained in her line of sight. Petitioner claims that the conduct of the respondent during the deposition "caused significant emotional distress [and] materially interfered with [petitioner's] ability to participate meaningfully in the deposition process." She states that she suffers "from an existing mental health condition, including post-traumatic stress disorder, resulting from Respondent's prior conduct toward [petitioner and] Respondent's actions during the deposition exacerbated that condition." Petitioner asserts that she seeks the protective order because she fears that respondent's conduct will continue in future depositions, hearings, conferences, or proceedings.

In opposition, respondent's attorney provided an affirmation wherein she states, "I was personally present for the entirety of Petitioner's deposition, which took place on January 13, 2026. The allegations set forth in Petitioner's moving papers grossly mischaracterize the events of that day, omit Petitioner's own improper conduct, and bear no resemblance to what actually occurred during the deposition." Respondent's attorney asserts that it was the conduct of the petitioner that was disruptive. It is alleged that petitioner "frequently failed to answer the questions asked, spoke over counsel and the court reporter, interjected unsolicited commentary, and made repeated outbursts directed at Respondent, including comments concerning Respondent's notetaking during the deposition."

Regarding the allegation that respondent lunged at petitioner and shouted at her, it is asserted that did not happen. The opposition explains, "while the parties did exchange words,...at no point did Respondent stand, approach Petitioner, advance toward her, or physically menace her in any manner."

Regarding the request for the respondent to move out of petitioner's line of sight, counsel for respondent stated that "Respondent moved her chair over as much as reasonably possible under the circumstances. It was neither realistic nor appropriate for Respondent to be positioned on the opposite side of the conference room, as Respondent was entitled to sit with counsel, quietly take notes, and confer with [counsel] during the deposition."

Regarding the assertion that respondent's presence caused emotional distress and interfered with petitioner's ability to testify, counsel for respondent stated that, "Petitioner testified at length, asserted herself freely, engaged in argument, and demonstrated no difficulty in speaking, responding, or attempting to control the course of the examination."

Respondent cites to the language of the statute and caselaw to support her argument that CPLR 3103(a) was not intended to exclude a party from the proceedings. The impracticality of doing so is laid bare in the opposition.

In reply, the petitioner states that she "relies upon the certified transcript and documentary evidence and welcomes the Court's independent review." However, she simultaneously indicates that she is not in possession of the transcript. Petitioner states that respondent has not refuted the circumstances of the deposition, while acknowledging that both parties have competing views of what transpired.

Notably, to date, neither party has filed a copy of the transcript of the January 13, 2026 deposition that is genesis of this motion.

Discussion

To establish entitlement to a protective order, a party must make a "factual showing of 'unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice' " (see Hartheimer v. Clipper, 288 AD2d 263, quoting CPLR 3103[a]). Even upon such a showing, the court has broad discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy balancing the competing interests of the parties and the truth-finding goal of the discovery process (see Brignola v. Pei-Fei Lee, M.D., P.C., 192 AD2d 1008).

Additionally, "public access to court proceedings is strongly favored" and in the limited instances where courtroom closures are permitted, those with a direct interest in the outcome of the matter, as well as jurors, witnesses and officers of the court, are still permitted entry (see Paulson v. Paulson, 217 AD3d 546, 547). While depositions are not considered "sittings of court", generally all parties, officers of the court, and counsel are permitted to attend (see Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Marbach, 66 AD2d 335, 338).

Here, each of the parties have their own perspective of what occurred during the deposition. In light of the fact that no transcript has been filed, the court is unable to independently review what transpired. Indeed, while non-parties may be easily barred from proceedings, barring a party from the proceedings would seem to require a heavy burden be met, as it would impede the barred party's ability to confront evidence, assist counsel or otherwise participate in the matter of which she has a direct interest. Thus, petitioner has failed to make the required factual showing of "unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice" to grant a protective order barring the respondent from the proceedings.

Since the parties seemingly agree that there were disruptions during the deposition, the appropriate remedy is that all future depositions, if any, should take place in the courthouse. Additionally, all parties and counsel are reminded of the standards of civility in civil proceedings and are strongly encouraged to follow same.

DATE: June 18, 2026

VINCENT J. MESSINA, JR., Surrogate

Vincent J. Messina, Jr., S.