2014 v. << (2026)

This matter is before the Court on the Amended Petition of Raymond J. Hapanowicz (the "Petitioner") for a compulsory accounting and related relief, brought pursuant to SCPA §§ 2205 and 2206 against Leonard Hapanowicz, as Trustee (the "Trustee") of the Reverend Arthur R. Hapanowicz Trust dated March 3, 2014 (the "Trust"). The threshold question submitted for determination is whether the Petitioner has standing to compel an accounting.

Background

On March 3, 2014, Reverend Arthur R. Hapanowicz (the "Grantor") created the Trust as a revocable inter vivos trust. In Article Sixth, the Grantor expressly reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke the Trust, in whole or in part, at any time during his lifetime, without the consent of or notice to any beneficiary. Schedule B of the Trust instrument (Successor Beneficiaries) directs, among other distributions, that the residuary estate be distributed per capita among four (4) named beneficiaries, one of whom was the Grantor's brother, Raymond Hapanowicz, Sr. ("Raymond Sr.").

Raymond Sr. died intestate on December 24, 2020, in Naples, Florida, where he was domiciled, and was survived by three adult sons: the Petitioner, Raymond J. Hapanowicz; Ronald Hapanowicz; and Robert Hapanowicz. The Grantor died on March 7, 2021, as a resident of Oneida County, New York. Upon the Grantor's death, the Trust became irrevocable, the interests of the surviving beneficiaries vested, and Leonard Hapanowicz assumed the role of Trustee.

The Petitioner commenced this proceeding on November 6, 2025, by filing a Petition for a Compulsory Accounting and Related Relief, identifying himself as a Trust beneficiary. He filed the Amended Petition on December 17, 2025, again identifying himself as a Trust beneficiary and seeking an accounting from the Trustee. A citation on the Amended Petition issued on December 22, 2025, returnable January 27, 2026.

At the January 27, 2026 return date, Carl Dziekan, Esq. appeared for the Trustee and Mark Wolber, Esq. appeared for the Petitioner. The Court then directed the parties to submit written statements of their respective positions on whether the Petitioner has standing to seek an accounting. On February 11, 2026, the Trustee filed Objections to the Amended Petition, asserting that (a) the Petitioner lacks standing to bring this proceeding in his individual capacity; and (b) the per capita residuary disposition to Raymond Sr. became ineffective by reason of his predeceasing the Grantor. By letter-report dated February 17, 2026, the Trustee's counsel further raised the contention that the Trustee and Stanley M. Hapanowicz are entitled to a quit-claim deed from the Estate of Raymond Sr. pursuant to a July 1, 2020 Agreement signed by Raymond Sr. and concerning real property located in New York Mills, New York.

By letter dated February 23, 2026, the Petitioner set forth his position that (1) the Estate of Raymond Sr. is entitled to a one-quarter share of the residuary estate on the ground that Raymond Sr.'s interest vested upon the creation of the Trust; and (2) the real property in New York Mills is not before the Court at this time. The Trustee's counsel responded the same day, maintaining that no beneficiary's interest vested until the Grantor's death on March 7, 2021, and that the residuary interest of Raymond Sr. became ineffective upon his predeceasing the Grantor.

Legal Standard

A compulsory accounting under SCPA § 2205 may be directed only upon the petition of a person interested in the trust or estate. A "person interested" is defined to include "[a]ny person entitled or allegedly entitled to share as beneficiary in the estate or the trustee in bankruptcy or receiver of such person" (SCPA § 103[39]). A petitioner who, in the capacity in which he sues, holds no beneficial interest in the trust is not a person interested and may not compel an accounting.

The disposition of a beneficiary's interest under a lifetime trust where that beneficiary predeceases the creator was addressed by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Wagner v. Desalvio, 52 AD3d 504 [2d Dept 2008]). There, the creator established a trust naming herself as primary beneficiary and providing that, upon her death, the remainder and residue of the trust would pass in equal shares to her three children as contingent beneficiaries. The instrument contained no provision directing how the remainder should be distributed should one of the children predecease her. One child predeceased the creator. The Court held that, "[w]here . . . one of the intended beneficiaries predeceases the creator, that beneficiary's remainder interest becomes ineffective," and that the children of the predeceased beneficiary were not entitled to have his interest transferred to them. Applying the statutory predecessor of EPTL § 2-1.15 (then designated EPTL § 2-1.14), the Court held that, because the creator made no effective alternative disposition, the ineffective share passed to the surviving designated beneficiaries.

EPTL Article 6, which classifies, creates, and defines estates in property, governs whether a beneficiary's interest is vested or contingent. A future estate is indefeasibly vested only where it is created in favor of one or more ascertained persons in being and is certain, when created, to become an estate in possession whenever and however the preceding estates end (EPTL 6-4.7). An estate limited to take effect only upon the occurrence of an event that may not happen is a future estate subject to a condition precedent (EPTL 6-4.10) and such an interest is contingent and does not vest unless and until the condition is satisfied.

EPTL § 2-1.15 governs the consequence of such a failure of vesting. It provides that whenever the remainder of a lifetime or testamentary trust passes to two or more designated beneficiaries and is ineffective in part, and no effective alternative disposition has been made in the governing instrument, the ineffective part passes to the other designated beneficiary or beneficiaries in the proportion of their respective interests.

Discussion

The Petitioner is not a named beneficiary of the Trust. Schedule B directs that the residuary be distributed per capita among four named individuals, one of whom was the Grantor's brother, Raymond Sr. The Petitioner contends that the Estate of Raymond Sr. is entitled to a one-quarter share of the residuary on the theory that Raymond Sr.'s interest vested upon the creation of the Trust citing (Matter of Wilder, 49 Misc 3d 1044 [Nassau County Sur. Ct. 2015]).

However, Wilder is distinguishable on two independent grounds. First, the trust in Wilder was irrevocable, so the beneficiary's interest vested upon creation. The Hapanowicz Trust, by contrast, was revocable, and no interest vested until the Grantor's death. Second, the distribution in Wilder was per stirpes, permitting a predeceasing beneficiary's share to pass to his issue, whereas the Hapanowicz Trust distributes the residuary per capita.

As noted, the disposition of a beneficiary's interest under a lifetime trust where that beneficiary predeceases the creator was addressed by Wagner v. Desalvio, 52 AD3d 504 [2d Dept 2008]). The finding under Wagner disposes of the Petitioner's claim here. Similar to the Petitioner in this case, the Wagner plaintiffs were the children of the predeceased beneficiary and sought to have their father's interest transferred to them. The Wagner court held they were not entitled to it and that the ineffective share instead passed to the surviving designated beneficiaries. The Petitioner stands in precisely the same position. He is the son of the predeceased residuary beneficiary and seeks, in substance, to claim his father's ineffective share. Because the Grantor made no effective alternative disposition for a predeceasing residuary beneficiary, EPTL § 2-1.15 directs that Raymond Sr.'s ineffective share pass to the other designated residuary beneficiaries, i.e. Jean S. Betz, Stanley Hapanowicz, and Marion Malone. Neither the Estate of Raymond Sr. nor the Petitioner in his individual capacity, is entitled to any part of the residuary.

In other terms, in Wagner, under EPTL Article 6, the residuary beneficiaries took future estates in the nature of remainders (EPTL 6-4.2, 6-4.3) that were not indefeasibly vested (EPTL 6-4.7) but were subject to the condition precedent of surviving to the Grantor's death, when the Trust became irrevocable (EPTL 6-4.10). Raymond Sr. died on December 24, 2020, predeceasing the Grantor, who died on March 7, 2021. He therefore never satisfied the condition upon which vesting depended, his contingent residuary interest never vested, and, under Wagner, that interest became ineffective upon his predeceasing the Grantor.

The same reasoning governs the specific bequest of $50,000.00 that Schedule B directs to Raymond Sr. Because the Trust remained revocable throughout the Grantor's lifetime, with the Grantor retaining the unfettered power to amend or revoke it (Article Sixth), no disposition vested while that power subsisted. The specific bequest, like the residuary disposition, was contingent upon Raymond Sr. surviving until the Trust became irrevocable at the Grantor's death (EPTL 6-4.10). Raymond Sr. did not survive the Grantor, and his interest in the specific bequest therefore never vested. The Trustee has conceded the specific bequest would be payable to Estate of Raymond Sr., upon the appointment of a duly appointed fiduciary of that estate. Nevertheless, the Court finds the Petitioner acquired no beneficial interest in the Trust by reason of the specific bequest and therefore lacks standing to compel an accounting.

The Court conducted extensive research in this case to determine whether New York's anti-lapse statute might apply here, as the beneficiaries of the Trust's residuary clause are siblings of the Grantor. EPTL § 3-3.3, is part of Article 3 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, governing the substantive law of wills and provides that a testamentary disposition to a testator's issue, brother, or sister who predeceases the testator leaving surviving issue does not lapse but vests in that issue by representation. By its terms, the statute reaches dispositions made by will, not dispositions under an inter vivos trust. While Surrogate Roth wisely observed revocable trusts function "essentially as testamentary instruments, and therefore must be treated as the equivalents of wills in the eyes of the law" (Matter of Davidson, 177 Misc 2d 928, 931 [Sur Ct New York County 1998]), there are no cases that have applied the specific rules governing testamentary dispositions such as the anti-lapse statute. Indeed, Davidson treated a revocable trust as the equivalent of a will to give a disinherited distributee standing to challenge the trust for lack of capacity after the settlor's death, mirroring the standing to contest a will. The Court finds it would be an unauthorized leap to apply the substantive distribution rules governing wills, such as the anti-lapse statute, to dispositions under an inter vivos trust. This is particularly true when the legislature created substantive rules governing dispositions in Article 2 and specifically did not include an anti-lapse provision.

The Court finds that Petitioner holds no beneficial interest in the Trust. He is not a named beneficiary of any disposition, and the residuary interest of his late father never vested and is ineffective, passing instead to the surviving designated residuary beneficiaries. The Petitioner is therefore not a person "entitled or allegedly entitled to share as beneficiary" in the Trust (SCPA § 103[39]) and lacks standing under SCPA § 2205 to compel an accounting. The Amended Petition must accordingly be dismissed.

The dispute concerning the real property located at the corner of Clinton and New Hartford Streets, New York Mills, New York, is not properly before this Court and therefore is not addressed.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the per capita residuary disposition to Raymond Sr. was a contingent future estate that never vested and became ineffective upon his predeceasing the Grantor and, instead, passed under EPTL § 2-1.15 to the surviving designated residuary beneficiaries. The same holds true for the specific bequest. Accordingly, the Petitioner, holding no beneficial interest in the Trust, is not a person interested within the meaning of SCPA § 103[39] and lacks standing in his individual capacity to compel an accounting.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the Amended Petition of Raymond J. Hapanowicz for a Compulsory Accounting and Related Relief be, and hereby is, DISMISSED for lack of standing and for the reasons stated herein.

Dated: June 22, 2026

Louis P. Gigliotti, Acting Surrogate

Louis P. Gigliotti, S.