IN RE: the Construction of the Last Will and Testament of Craig B. Laub (2026)

In this construction proceeding, petitioner Robert E. Laub seeks to bar testator's niece and nephew by adoption, and any descendants of them, from receiving any part of the testator's estate, including any portion that passes by law of intestacy.

The testator died on June 4, 2023. He left a Last Will and Testament dated November 2, 2002. The Will of the testator was admitted to probate on May 22, 2025. Letters of Administration CTA were issued to the Dutchess County Commissioner of Finance, Heidi Seelbach, on the same day.

Testator was never married and had no children. Testator's Will directed that his entire estate be devised to his first cousin, Linda Laub. Linda was also the nominated executor in the Will, and no successor executor was nominated. The Will does not name any successor beneficiaries and contains no residuary clause. Linda predeceased on March 28, 2023.

Petitioner is Linda's brother, and a first cousin of the testator. Although testator and Linda were cousins, Robert explains that they were also life partners who lived together for many years. Linda did have an adopted son, who the testator provided for outside the Will by making him a beneficiary of a life insurance policy.

Testator's parents predeceased him, as did his brother Chester B. Laub, Jr. Chester died on March 7, 1998, and was survived by his wife and her two children from a prior marriage, Chelsea Cumbie Laub and Caleb Cumbie Laub, whom Chester adopted.

When the testator executed the Will, Caleb was 15 years old and Chelsea was 13 years old. Nearly six years after the Will execution, Chelsea gave birth to a daughter, Brooklyn Laub.

Article Sixth of the Will specifically disinherits Caleb and Chelsea, stating

I hereby recognize the existence of the adopted children of my deceased brother, CHESTER B. LAUB, JR., to wit: CALEB DAVIS CUMBIE LAUB and CHELSEA CUMBIE LAUB, and herein declare that I choose not to include them as beneficiaries under this last will and testament.

Petitioner asks this Court to construe the Will as not only disinheriting the testator's adopted niece and nephew, Caleb and Chelsea, but as also disinheriting their descendants and precluding them from taking any part of testator's estate. Petitioner asserts that because the testator's property cannot be disposed pursuant to the terms of the Will, it must therefore pass through intestate distribution. Petitioner contends that - absent Article Sixth - application of the rules of intestacy would pass the estate to Caleb and Chelsea. However, as testator specifically disinherited them, petitioner asserts that Caleb and Chelsea are barred from inheriting testator's property through intestacy. And, Petitioner argues, testator's clear and unequivocal intent to disinherit his deceased brother's adopted children from a prior marriage should also be equally construed as evincing an intent to disinherit their descendants, including Chelsea's daughter Brooklyn.

Petitioner avers that the testator did not have a close familial relationship with Caleb or Chelsea either before or after Chester died. Further, to petitioner's knowledge, the testator did not have contact or any relationship with Brooklyn, and he further states that there is no evidence that the testator even knew of Brooklyn's existence. No evidence contrary to these assertions has been presented in opposition to the construction petition.

Petitioner contends that the testator intended to eliminate his adopted niece and nephew and their entire family line from inheriting any of his estate. To honor that clear intent, Petitioner argues that the Court should construe the negative disposition broadly to apply equally to Caleb, Chelsea, and their respective descendants. Petitioner asserts that this interpretation will produce a result consistent with the testator's clear testamentary intent to limit his potential heirs to his blood relations — namely, the testator's two surviving uncles and the surviving children of the uncles and aunts who predeceased him.

In opposition, Amy Kawa Posner, Esq. as Guardian ad Litem for Brooklyn Laub, argues that her ward is entitled to inherit the testator's estate. The GAL states that the testator's intent is clear from the unequivocal language of the Will. The testamentary instrument devises the entirety of the testator's property to Linda. And the GAL agrees that the testator clearly disinherited Caleb and Chelsea.

The GAL states that the law dictates that where there is no residuary clause in a Will, a testator's property that would otherwise pass through the residuary clause passes through intestacy. The GAL states that if the testator is survived by issue of his parents and no spouse, issue, or parent, the testator's property will normally be distributed to the issue of testator's parents, by representation.

Here, the testator is survived by the issue of his predeceased brother Chester, to wit: Caleb and Chelsea. The GAL agrees with petitioner that under EPTL § 1-2.19 a Will may direct how property shall not be disposed, and further agrees that a negative disposition is equally applicable when all or a portion of the estate lapses into intestacy due to the absence of a residuary clause.

However, the GAL argues that when a Will contains a disinheritance clause, that negative disposition does not automatically extend to the heirs of the named disinherited person. Rather, the GAL argues that a disinherited heir is treated as if he or she predeceased the testator, and that as such the children of the disinherited distributee retain their eligibility (as the issue of a "predeceased" distributee) to inherit through intestate distribution.

Applying the rules of intestate distribution to the testator's estate, the GAL argues that the testator was not survived by a spouse, child or parent, and that therefore his estate will pass to the issue of his parents, by representation. Under these rules, and absent the negative disposition, Caleb and Chelsea would inherit the testator's entire estate. The GAL argues that Brooklyn is the issue of the "predeceased" Chelsea and — by extension — of the testator's parents, and that based on a narrow interpretation of the disinheritance clause Brooklyn should be recognized as the testator's sole distributee under the rules of intestate distribution.

DISCUSSION

If the language of a Will is ambiguous or confusing, the fiduciary may present the Will to the Court for construction under SCPA § 1420 (see Margaret V. Turano, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 58A, SCPA § 1420). A fiduciary who submits a question to the Court for construction can then follow the Court's interpretation without fear of liability (id.).

The Court's role in overseeing the administration of a testator's estate is to implement the testamentary plan the testator intended, determining intent from words used in the Will and construing them according to their everyday and ordinary meaning (see Matter of Walker, 64 NY2d 354 [1985]). To determine the meaning of a particular testamentary provision, it is necessary to first look at the testator's intention which is to be gleaned not from a single word or phrase but from a sympathetic reading of Will as an entirety and all facts and circumstances under which provisions of the Will were framed (see Matter of Kosek, 31 NY2d 475 [1973]).

The Will contains no successor or contingent beneficiaries, nor does it contain a residuary clause. Where there is no residuary clause, intestacy results as to the residuary estate (see Matter of Erhardt, 28 Misc 2d 700 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1961]).

Here, the property of the testator not disposed of by the Will constitutes the testator's entire estate. That property will be distributed to issue of the testator's parents by representation which, absent the negative disposition, would be Chester's adopted children, Caleb and Chelsea (see EPTL § 4-1.1[a][5]). However, EPTL § 1-2.19 provides that a Will can direct how property shall not be disposed of, and such negative disposition not only bars its subjects from inheriting under the Will but also from sharing in any disposition that lapses into intestacy (see Matter of Grutzner, 46 Misc 3d 1228 [A] [Sur Ct, Westchester County 2015]). Accordingly, Article Sixth bars Caleb and Chelsea from inheriting testator's property, whether under the Will or by intestacy (see Matter of Beu, 70 Misc 2d 396 [Sur Ct, Rockland County 1972]).

The GAL's argument that Caleb and Chelsea should be treated as having predeceased the testator — and that as a result Brooklyn should inherit the testator's entire estate — relies heavily on two Surrogate's Court decisions: Matter of Beu, 70 Misc 2d 396 [Sur. Ct. Rockland County 1972), aff'd with no opinion, 44 AD2d 774 (2d Dept. 1974)¹ and Matter of Grutzner, 46 Misc 3d 1228(A) (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 2015).

In Beu, the testator had two children, a son and a daughter. In the Will, the testator left her daughter $5.00, and expressly barred her from any other right or interest to the estate for reasons known to them both — which the Will went on to explain (in case there was any confusion on the point) included testator's assessment that the daughter "has been disobedient and ungrateful and has failed to return the affection and trust that I have bestowed on her."

The Will failed to devise the testator's real property — which constituted the bulk of her estate — and lacked a residuary clause, which resulted in the residuary estate passing by intestacy. In a construction proceeding, the son argued that the daughter's interest in the estate was extinguished by the disinheritance clause, and that as a result he should receive the entire residuary estate through intestacy.

After concluding that EPTL § 1-2.19  ² could not have intended to "exclude forever from intestate succession all descendants of an heir who is specifically disinherited in a will," the Beu court held "there must be read into that statute the fiction that a disinherited person would be considered to have predeceased the testator." Applying this fiction, the Beu court concluded that the son should receive one-half of the estate, and that the disinherited daughter's children would receive the other half of the estate, per stirpes, as if the daughter had predeceased the testator.

The Beu court's decision to apply a legal fiction to EPTL § 1-2.19 relied on another fiction. The court asked the question: What would happen if the daughter had been the testator's only child, and there were no other potential distributees other than the disinherited daughter's children? Under that fiction, if the disinheritance clause was read broadly to disinherit the daughter and her descendants, the estate would escheat to the State — a result that the court felt the testator surely would not have intended.

The flaw inherent in that fiction is that the testator did have a son, Rudolph, who was the testator's nominated executor and who had not been disinherited. Extending the negative disposition to the disinherited daughter's children would not have resulted in escheatment but would have simply led to the favored son inheriting the residuary estate through intestacy. And unfortunately, the Beu decision does not recite any information about the nature and extent of the testator's relationship with the disinherited daughter's children, so there is no way of assessing whether evidence about that relationship would have supported a broad or narrow interpretation of the disinheritance clause.

In Grutzner, the issue was not whether the testator intended to disinherit her son's issue, but rather whether the testator intended that her son be disinherited if her only other child - a daughter — predeceased her. The Will gave that daughter a life estate in the family home and left her the residuary estate. Upon the daughter's death as the life tenant, the Will stated that the house would pass to a Trust. And if the daughter predeceased the testator, the Will stated that the residuary estate would pass to the same Trust. The Will also contained a negative disposition disinheriting her son, stating "I leave to my son, Paul, my love and affection but nothing more knowing that he is financially able to care for himself and his family."

The daughter died without issue, predeceasing the testator by almost nine years. Upon her death, a search for the trust referenced in the Will was conducted without success, and the attorney who drafted the Will confirmed that he never drafted a trust instrument. As a result, the testator's estate passed by intestacy.

Paul (the son) argued that the testator's intent was to provide for her daughter during her lifetime, and that she "could not have intended to disinherit" him if the daughter predeceased her. Paul's two adult children argued that the disinheritance clause extinguished his interest in the estate, that he should be deemed to have predeceased the testator, and that they should inherit the residuary estate as Paul's distributees.

Crucially, no party argued that the negative disposition should be interpreted as disinheriting both Paul and his children. Rather, the sole question presented to the court was whether the testator intended to disinherit Paul if the daughter predeceased her. If the answer to that question was Yes, then Paul's children would inherit the estate. If the answer was No, then Paul would inherit the estate.

The court held that the testator's intent when she executed the Will was to disinherit Paul, and that it lacked the power to modify that provision based upon assumptions about what the testator might have wanted if she had envisioned her daughter predeceasing her. The Court also noted that the testator did not revise the disinheritance clause in the nearly nine-year period that followed her daughter's passing. The court therefore rejected Paul's proposed construction and found that the testator intended the disinheritance clause to remain in effect after her daughter's passing.

As noted, no party argued that the testator intended to disinherit Paul's children if the negative disposition was found to disqualify Paul from inheriting. Nor would there seem to have been solid ground to make such an argument — the court described the negative disposition as a thoughtful decision that did not display any animosity toward Paul or his children. Therefore, in the absence of any claim that the disinheritance clause should be interpreted as extending to Paul's children, the court treated Paul as having predeceased the testator and held that Paul's children would inherit the estate as his distributees.

To the extent that Beu can be interpreted as imposing a per se rule of construction finding that when a negative disposition disinherits a named person but is silent as to that person's issue, a legal fiction must be reflexively applied so that the disinherited person's issue will receive that intestate share by representation — I respectfully disagree and decline to adopt that line of reasoning.³ Similarly, to the extent that Beu reads a legal fiction into EPTL § 1-2.19 to avoid a potentially unintended escheatment of the estate (even though no escheatment would have occurred in that case absent the fiction), I find that an assessment of the testator's intent must control over the fear of a hypothetical outcome unrelated to the actual facts and circumstances.⁴

Rather, I conclude that the impact of a negative disposition on the inheritance rights of a disinherited person's unnamed issue must be considered on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the testator's intent ascertained through a sympathetic reading of the entire Will and upon all the facts and circumstances under which the provisions of the Will were framed (Matter of Perlman, 150 AD3d 1012 [2d Dept. 2017]). And, in fact, that is precisely the approach taken in two other reported Surrogate's Court decisions - Matter of Stoffel, 117 Misc 2d 1036 (Sur Ct, Richmond County 1983) and Matter of Cady, 92 Misc 2d 298 (Sur Ct, Onondaga County 1977).

In Stoffel, the Court rejected the argument that a negative disposition that disinherits a specific person without reference to that person's issue must always be reflexively construed as evincing an intent to preserve the rights of that disinherited person's issue. Rather, quoting Dean Patrick Rohan's Practice Commentaries to EPTL § 1-2.19, the Court held that "whether such disinheritance disqualifies the issue of the named person from taking will be treated as a construction problem and received by an analysis of the facts and circumstances of the particular case." While acknowledging that the court in Beu reached a different conclusion, the court in Stoffel noted that the testator's estate plan had "taken pains to outline his family tree, to identify his nearest kin, and to disinherit them," and read the Will and its codicil as a whole to find that "the only logical conclusion which can be drawn is that Testator did not desire any surviving relative in any degree to share in any way in his estate."

And in Cady, the court interpreted the holding in Beu as a finding "that where the use of a broad disinheritance clause might have an unintended result the disinheritance of a descendant does not disinherit the descendant's issue." However, the Cady court found that construing the disinheritance clause before it broadly would not create an unintended result. On the contrary, the court found that the testator intended to disinherit not only her son's children from an earlier marriage, but to also disinherit their descendants. Thus, the court found that the testator's intent was to treat her son's children from a prior marriage as though they had never existed and to thereby disinherit their entire blood line, rather than to treat them as though they had predeceased her.

Here, in Article Sixth of his Will, the testator specifically "recognize(d) the existence of the adopted children of my deceased brother," and expressed his clear and unequivocal intent "not to include them as beneficiaries under this last will and testament." Caleb and Chelsea were minors when the testator executed his Will, and Brooklyn was not born until nearly six years later. The uncontested evidence submitted in support of petitioner's proposed construction demonstrates that the testator did not have a relationship with Caleb or Chelsea during Chester's lifetime, and that he did not maintain any contact with Caleb, Chelsea or their mother after his death. That uncontested evidence also supports an inference that the testator did not have any contact with or relationship with Brooklyn, and that he likely was not even aware of her existence.

After reading the Will as a whole, the only logical conclusion to be drawn is that the testator did not want Caleb, Chelsea, or their respective issue to inherit from his estate. The Court finds that the testator did not intend for any part of his estate to pass to his late brother's adopted children, who were the children of Chester's wife from a prior marriage.

By selectively disinheriting Caleb and Chelsea, and by his pointed reference to their status as Chester's adopted children, the testator evinced a clear intent to limit his potential heirs to his blood relations, and to eliminate from his line of potential heirs his niece and nephew by adoption with whom he had no relationship. There is no plausible basis to construe the negative disposition as evincing an intent to disinherit Caleb and Chelsea personally while simultaneously preserving a right of inheritance for any children that they might have in the future. Stated differently, I find that — as in Cady — the testator's intent was to treat Caleb and Chelsea as though they never existed, and not as though they had predeceased him.

Finally, while the testator's intent is clear from a reading of the Will as a whole under the facts and circumstances, I also find that the result reached herein is consistent with "the canon of construction which holds that were two interpretations of a given provision of a will are possible, one favoring those of the blood of the decedent and the other favoring strangers to the blood, the former will be adopted if possible." (Matter of Hesch, 133 AD2d 994 [3d Dept. 1987], quoting Matter of Werlich, 230 NY 516 [1921]. See also Matter of Symonds, 79 AD2d 24 [4th Dept. 1981]). It is therefore,

ORDERED, that the Will of Craig B. Laub is construed to disinherit Caleb Laub, Chelsea Laub and their respective issue — including Brooklyn Laub — whether under the Will or through intestacy; and it is further

ORDERED, that the estate be distributed to the testator's two surviving uncles and the surviving children of the uncles and aunts who predeceased him, as his lawful distributees pursuant to EPTL § 4-1.1(a)(6).

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order the Court.

Dated: June 22, 2026

Poughkeepsie, New York

HON. MICHAEL G. HAYES, S.C.J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   An affirmance with no opinion has limited precedential value because it only indicates that the appellate court agreed with the ultimate result reached by the trial court, and not that it agreed with reasons provided by the trial court in reaching that result. (Tepper v. Tannenbaum, 65 AD2d 359 [1st Dept. 1978]).

2.   The Beu court cited EPTL § 1-2.18, which was renumbered § 1-2.19 by L. 1992, c. 595 § 2. This decision applies the updated statutory numbering scheme.

3.   While the decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction are entitled to respectful consideration, they are not binding. (East River Realty Co., LLC v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 22 Misc 3d 404, 413 [Sup. Ct. 2008], aff'd 68 AD3d 564 [1st Dept. 2009]; Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 6 Misc 3d 228, 236 [Sup. Ct. 2004], aff'd 26 AD3d 88 [3d Dept. 2005], aff'd 7 NY3d 653 [2006]).

4.   The GAL also relies on Matter of Emu Assoc (Peabody), 30 AD2d 517 (2d Dept. 1968), aff'd on opinion below, 27 NY2d 948 (1970). However, in that case, the Second Department did not hold that a disinherited person must be treated as predeceased whenever a negative disposition does not expressly disinherit the named person's issue. Rather, the Court held that while the grandson was disinherited in the Trust, it was "evident from the instrument as a whole that there was no intent to exclude his issue." Thus, Emu was decided based upon an assessment of the grantor's intent, and not based upon a per se rule or the application of a legal fiction.

Michael G. Hayes, S.