Woodstock Land Conservatory, Petitioner, v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Ulster, Respondent(s). (2026)

On March 10, 2026, a verified petition was filed by Woodstock Land Conservancy (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner") seeking, inter-alia, mandamus to compel the Town of Ulster (hereinafter referred to as "Respondents" or Town") to provide an interpretation regarding a proposed development known as "Zena Homes" (hereinafter referred to as "Zena"); and

Notices of Motion having been filed by the Town and Zena seeking dismissal on the grounds that mandamus does not lie insofar as the request for an interpretation is a discretionary act; and

Affirmations in opposition and further submissions having been received and considered by this Court.

NOW, for the reasons set forth herein, the motions to dismiss are hereby denied as outlined below, the Town is directed to provide the requested interpretation and the request for a preliminary injunction is granted  ¹ .

Findings of Fact

Zena has submitted an application to the Town related to the proposed development of a thirty-lot subdivision. It is uncontested that Zena has applied for subdivision and site plan approval from the Town Planning Board and that the application has been before the Planning Board for a significant period of time.

On or about February 10, 2026, Petitioner wrote to the Town's Building Inspector and the ZBA and requested an interpretation regarding the process that the Town was following with-regard-to the review of pending applications. Specifically, Petitioner requested "a determination confirming that the Town Board is required to review the site plan for the Project in accordance with § 145-5 of the Zoning Law (emphasis supplied)". Petitioner continued by outlining the basis for their belief that the project exceeds the minimum threshold for Town Board Review and their further belief that "[w]hen viewed collectively, the scope, scale, and complexity of the Project plainly exceeds the Planning Board's limited site plan jurisdiction of 2,400 gross square feet". Petitioner continues that in their view, "[a]llowing large scale developments to circumvent the Town Board review exceeds the Planning Board's statutory authority and is akin to SEQRA segmentation"² .

It is undisputed that in response to the request for an interpretation, the Town Attorney advised Petitioner "that neither the ZBA nor the Building Inspector was required to issue a formal response to the request, and that the matter was under review in due course". As noted above, given the Town's refusal to respond to the request, the instant proceeding was filed requesting an Order "[c]ompelling the ZBA to accept, process and render a decision upon the Request for Interpretation" or "in the alternative, compelling the Building Inspector to accept, process and render a decision on the Request for Interpretation", or "render a decision on the merits that the Project, including the site plan application, does not fit within the exceptions enumerated in Town Code §§ 145-2(A)(1) through § 145-2(A)(5)". Petitioner further requests that in the event this Court directs that the interpretation be provided, that the Court enjoin the Planning Board from processing or acting upon the Site Plan application pending the issuance of the interpretation.

In support of their motions to dismiss, Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested because "neither the ZBA nor the Building Inspector has a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to act on the 'request for interpretation' ", that this Court cannot render the interpretation requested as that would be an impermissible advisory opinion and that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate entitlement to injunctive relief. Respondents further argue that any claims raised by Petitioner are not ripe as there has been no final action by Respondent.

Notably, while Respondents make extensive representations in their pleadings regarding the applicable provisions of the Code related to subdivisions, and maintain that the process they have been following is in accordance with the Town Code, the pleadings do not address Petitioner's specific inquiry and the submissions fail to explain why the Town will not simply answer the question posed by Petitioners rather than contest this litigation  ³ . This Court has considered the Town's apparent position that they will not respond simply because they are not required to do so. Having considered the arguments presented, the statutory framework at issue, and well-accepted public policies related to inclusive reviews of land use proposals, this Court disagrees and hereby directs that the Town provide the interpretation that has been requested so that the applicable administrative process can run its course.

Applicable Law

Motion to Dismiss - Mandamus

"[M]andamus is an extraordinary remedy which will lie only to enforce a clear legal right . . . It will not lie to compel performance of a discretionary duty by an administrative body, but only to compel performance of an act commanded to be performed by law and involving no exercise of discretion" (Young v. Huntington, 121 AD2d 641 (2nd Dept., 1986)). See also, Matter of South Blooming Grove Fire Dist. V. Village of S. Blooming Grove, 234 AD3d 975 (2nd Dept., 2025); Matter of Cooney v. Town of Wilmington Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 140 AD3d 1350 (3rd Dept., 2016). A discretionary act "involves the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results, whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result" (Tango v. Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34 (1983)). See also, Matter of Willows Condo. Assn. v. Town of Greenburgh, 153 AD3d 535 (2nd Dept., 2017). "The general principle is that mandamus will lie against an administrative officer only to compel him to perform a legal duty, and not to direct how he shall perform that duty" (Klosterman v. Cuomo, supra., 61 NY2d 525). See also, Matter of Hudson v. Town of Orchard Park Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 218 AD3d 1380 (4th Dept., 2023); Matter of New York City Yacht Club v. New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 172 AD3d 606 (1st Dept., 2019); Church of the Chosen v. City of Elmira, 18 AD3d 978 (3rd Dept., 2005).

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

It is well accepted that court intervention regarding proposed land use issues is not appropriate until and unless parties have exhausted their administrative remedies. "It is hornbook law that one who objects to the act of an administrative agency must exhaust available administrative remedies before being permitted to litigate in a court of law" (Matter of Baywood, LLC v. Office of the Medicaid Inspector Gen., 188 AD3d 1193 (2nd Dept., 2020)). See also, Matter of Shining Star Home Care, LLC v. Zucker, 215 AD3d 1090 (3rd Dept., 2023); Matter of 5055 N. Blvd., LLC v. Incorporated Vil. of Old Brookville, 201 A.D>3d 932 (2nd Dept., 2022). "This doctrine relieves the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an agency, prevents premature judicial interference with the administrator's efforts to develop a coordinated, consistent and legally enforceable scheme of regulation, and allows the agency to prepare a record reflective of its expertise and judgment" (Matter of O'Malley v. Town of New Windsor Planning Bd., 227 AD3d 808 (2nd Dept., 2024)).

As recognized in Town Law, and in the Town Code, in the event of a dispute regarding permissible uses of land, or a disagreement regarding the interpretation of the Town Code, the first step in the administrative process is for the applicant to secure an interpretation from the municipality's Zoning Enforcement Officer and/or the Zoning Board of Appeals. The power to interpret a Town's zoning code is "vested exclusively in local code enforcement officials and the zoning board of appeals" (BKP Harrison, LLC v. Town/Village of Harrison, ____ AD3d ____, 2026 NY Slip Op 02649 (2nd Dept., 2026)). See also, Matter of Smith v. Town of Thompson Planning Bd., 233 AD3d 1107 (3rd Dept., 2024) wherein the Court vacated site plan approval, SEQRA determinations and the granting of a special use permit absent a determination by the ZEO and/or ZBA that "the applicant seeks to use the property in a manner that is expressly allowed in the zoning district". Also, Matter of O'Malley v. Town of New Windsor Planning Bd., supra., 227 AD3d 808; Matter of Grout v. Visum Dev. Group LLC, 197 AD3d 1404 (3rd Dept., 2021). See also, Matter of Catskill Heritage Alliance, Inc. v. Crossroads Ventures, LLC, 161 AD3d 1413 (3rd Dept., 2018) (allegation that "some of the proposed uses were prohibited [is] a claim that, if the zoning code was unclear, would need to first be dealt with by the ZBA").

Preliminary Injunction

"A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, danger or irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction and a balance of equities in its favor" (Petry v. Gillon, 199 AD3d 1277 (3rd Dept., 2021))⁴ . See also, Nobu Next Door, LLC v. Fine Arts Hous. Inc., 4 NY3d 840 (2005); Yeldin v. Lieberman, 102 AD3d 769 (2nd Dept., 2013)). Generally, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (Sarker v. Das, 203 AD3d 973, (2nd Dept., 2022)). "To sustain its burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, the movant must demonstrate a clear right to relief which is plain from the undisputed facts" (Advanced Digital Sec. Solutions v. Samsung Techwin Co., Ltd., 53 AD3d 612 (2nd Dept., 2008).

Discussion

This Court has considered the circumstances and arguments presented and finds that, contrary to Respondents' arguments, Petitioner is entitled to a response to their request for an interpretation. In-this-regard, this Court agrees with Petitioner that Town Law § 267-b as well as Town Code § 190-60 require the Town to provide an interpretation. This conclusion is supported by applicable caselaw regarding land use, including standing rules, SEQRA rules, and, most notably, the requirement that a party exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking court intervention. This conclusion is also fully consistent with the notion that "[i]t is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials" (Gordon v. Village of Monticello, 87 NY2d 124 (1995)).

It is the finding of this Court that the Town's obligation to provide clarification in advance is not only an articulated obligation in both State law and the Town Code, it is also an inherent obligation of the municipality and it is not, in any way, discretionary. In-this-regard, this Court also notes that "the public's right to participate in environmental decision-making is embodied in the SEQRA legislation and cannot be waived or forfeited by any party" (Zagata v. Freshwater Wetlands Appeals Bd., 244 AD2d 343 (2nd Dept., 1997)). See also, 6 NYSCRR 617.3[d]; Matter of Buckley v. ZBA of City of Geneva, 189 AD3d 2080 (4th Dept., 2020).

This Court finds that Respondents' arguments are based upon a conflation of issues and a deliberate attempt to complicate a simple inquiry by interjecting issues that are not, in any way, relevant or are prematurely raised in anticipation of events and issues that have not yet arisen. In-this-regard, this Court has considered and herein rejects the argument that an interpretation is not required because the Planning Board has not taken any final action on the application. Contrary to the arguments presented, the final action that is before this Court is the refusal to provide an answer to a simple inquiry posed by an entity that has expressed interest in participating in the process.

This Court has considered and herein rejects the Town's alternate argument that the request for an interpretation is essentially too late because the Planning Board has started their review of the application and that the commencement of the review essentially answers Petitioner's inquiry. With-regard-to this argument, this Court notes that there is nothing in either the State or Town statute that sets a deadline for the request for an interpretation and this Court has not been presented with any authority to support the argument that the commencement makes the request for interpretation untimely. This Court has also considered and herein rejects the Town's apparent argument that the answer to the inquiry is self-evidenced by the decision of the Planning Board to proceed with the review of the application. Under the circumstances, this fact merely underscores how simple it would be for the Town to answer the request for an interpretation and provide Petitioner with a reviewable determination so they can decide with their attorneys how best to proceed.

Upon review of the arguments and the applicable law, this Court finds that accepting Respondents arguments would lead to the absurd result that a party who wishes to protect the right to participate in a project review would have to guess as to the applicable administrative processes. Then, if they guess incorrectly, they would later be forced to defend against an argument that they did not pursue administrative remedies that the Town refused to clarify nor disclose. Alternatively, they would be presented with an argument that they did not preserve their objections to the process that was unilaterally determined by the municipality. Clearly, such an absurd result is inconsistent with longstanding case-law and applicable New York State statutes that govern land use.

This Court also notes that this proceeding is brought at the very early stages of a project by an entity that seemingly has every intention of participating in the review process to the extent allowed by law. Given the scope of the project, this Court anticipates a lengthy review and potential further litigation. This Court will not permit the Town to abdicate its responsibility to the community by refusing to provide necessary clarity and specificity, thereby leading to an individual or entity with a potential interest being denied the basic procedural information that they would need to properly exercise whatever rights they may have to meaningfully participate. This Court will also not endorse the Town taking affirmative steps to orchestrate a defense in subsequent proceedings based upon either the failure to preserve an issue or the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

This decision and order relate strictly to the request that the Town be directed to provide the requested interpretation. This Court is not, and will not, interject itself into the administrative process by deciding whether the Town Board or the Planning Board should ultimately exercise jurisdiction over the pending applications. Similarly, this Court is not, and will not, provide an advisory opinion regarding other issues related to timeliness or segmentation that may ultimately be raised in a subsequent challenge to a final determination. The matter before the Court is far more simple. Petitioners have requested an interpretation, the Town has refused to answer the request, and this Court herein finds that under the circumstances, the Town has a non-discretionary obligation to respond. Given the Town's refusal to answer Petitioner's simple inquiry, all other issues that may arise in connection with the review of the application are not ripe for judicial review.

This Court has considered all other arguments raised by Respondents in their submissions. To the extent these arguments are not specifically addressed in this writing, for the reasons set forth by Petitioner, and in accordance with the applicable law, the arguments are found to be without merit.

Preliminary Injunction

It is the finding of this Court that under the circumstances, Petitioner has established their entitlement to a preliminary injunction, and Respondents are herein enjoined from any further actions with-regard-to the pending applications for site plan review, subdivision approval or any other land use administrative process related to the proposed development. It is the finding of this Court that Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities favors Petitioner. The injunction will continue until the Town complies with this Court's order to issue the requested interpretation.

Absent the injunction, the review process would continue, and Petitioner would be irreparably harmed by being denied the opportunity to participate in what is specifically geared to be an inclusive process. The extent and character of their participation is directly tied to and determined based upon what process the Town intends to follow. The Town's refusal to clarify that process appears to this Court to be specifically intended to thwart whatever rights Petitioner may have and to deny Petitioner the opportunity to tailor their actions and participation accordingly. Under the circumstances, it is the finding of this Court that a balancing of the equities overwhelmingly favors the granting of the injunction.

Petitioner shall submit a proposed Order granting the preliminary injunction on three-day Notice of Settlement to Respondents through NYSCEF.

Conclusions

For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss is denied. A scheduling Order with-regard-to the underlying petition shall be issued by the Court forthwith.

The signing of this Order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR § 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule regarding notice of entry.

Dated: June 2, 2026

Kingston, New York

ENTER,

HON. KEVIN R. BRYANT, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In determining this Petition, the Court has considered the documents specifically cited herein as well as all other documents electronically filed in this matter as appearing on NYSCEF.

2.   NYSCEF, doc. 3

3.   Under the circumstances, the Court is left wondering whether Respondents have some good faith basis to decline to answer or whether they are merely trying to obstruct Petitioners ability to fully participate in the review by refusing to provide details of what process to anticipate.

4.   Internal quotations, citations and punctuation omitted from all case quotations herein.

Kevin R. Bryant, J.