The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Ronnell Baskett, Defendant. (2026)

The Defendant was arrested on February 5, 2025 and subsequently indicted for Assault in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 120.05(3)), Resisting Arrest (Penal Law § 205.30) and Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 195.05(1)). On July 24, 2025, the People filed a certificate of compliance pursuant to CPL 245.50 and announced their readiness for trial. The action proceeded to trial on April 13, 2026. Prior to jury selection, the People informed the Court that they had served a subpoena duces tecum on Northern Dutchess Hospital on or about April 2, 2026, to obtain certified copy of the complaining witness Police Officer Javier Castaneda's medical records. The People stated that they informed defense counsel of the subpoena the preceding Friday, April 10, 2026. On the second day of trial the People received the medical records and disclosed a copy to the Defendant. The following day, the Defendant made a written motion for an order: 1) directing that the People file a supplemental certificate of compliance; 2) finding the People's statement of readiness illusory; and 3) dismissing the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 and 210.20(1)(g). The Court held determination of the motion in abeyance. The jury acquitted the Defendant of Assault in the Second Degree and found him guilty of Resisting Arrest and Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree. On May 15, 2026, the parties appeared for oral argument on the motion.

Defendant's motion is procedurally deficient. A motion to dismiss an indictment based upon the claimed denial of the right to a speedy trial must be made prior to the commencement of trial or entry of a plea of guilty. See CPL 210.20(1)(g);(2). At oral argument defense counsel conceded that the People notified him of the outstanding subpoena on April 10, 2026.¹ Notwithstanding having the factual predicate for the instant motion over two day before jury selection began, the Defendant did not file this application until April 15, 2026, on the afternoon of the second day of trial. Hence the motion was not timely filed. Compare People v. Roper, 2026 NY Slip Op 02365 (Ct App Apr. 21, 2026).

Even if Defendant's motion was timely filed , it lacks merit because he fails to establish the People made an illusory statement of trial readiness. During the pendency of a criminal case the prosecution must disclose the materials and information delineated in CPL 245.20(1) in their possession, custody or control...or in the possession, custody or control of persons under the prosecution's direction or control. CPL 245.20(1). "[A]ll items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution." CPL 245.20(2). After exercising due diligence and acting in good faith to provide such materials and information required by CPL 245.20(1), the prosecution must serve and file a certificate of compliance attesting to such efforts. See CPL 245.50(1). Absent a finding of special circumstances, "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of [CPL 30.30] until it has filed a valid certificate pursuant to subdivision one of this section." CPL 245.50(3). After stating ready for trial, if the prosecution provides additional discovery and files a supplemental certificate, such filing "shall not impact the validity of the original certificate of compliance if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence pursuant to [CPL 245.20]...." CPL 245.50 (1-a).

Defendant alleges that Officer Castaneda's medical records were discoverable as a record concerning a physical examination relating to the subject matter of this action. See CPL 245.20(1)(j). He submits that the People's failure to disclose the records under CPL 245.20(1) rendered their certificate of compliance illusory and thus the People failed to timely state their readiness for trial. Based on the foregoing, he seeks dismissal of the indictment on CPL 30.30 speedy trial grounds. In opposition, the People contend that they were not obligated to provide the medical records prior to filing their certificate of compliance because the records were not discoverable. They further emphasize that upon obtaining the records, they promptly disclosed them to the Defendant.

Here, it is undisputed that the People did not possess Officer Castaneda's certified medical records until April 14, 2026. They also did not have the documents in their custody or under their control prior to that date because the records were created and maintained by Northern Dutchess Hospital, a third-party entity not under the prosecution's direction or control. The fact that Officer Castaneda was a police witness did not make his medical records automatically discoverable. CPL 245.20(2) imputes possession to the prosecution of all discoverable items and information "in the possession of...[a] local police or law enforcement agency...." (emphasis added). The People obtained Officer Castaneda's certified medical records directly from Northern Duchess Hospital. The record establishes that Officer Castaneda did not possess these records during the pendency of this action, with the exception of nine pages of discharge paperwork which the People timely disclosed. While CPL 245.20(1) obligates the prosecution to disclose materials not only in their direct possession but also within the custody or control of persons under their direction and control, the statute provides specificity about disclosure obligations of documents in the possession of law enforcement. CPL 245.20(2) expressly imputes possession to the People of documents in the possession of law enforcement but does not impute possession, custody or control of such documents to the People based on the officer having anything other than actual possession. It is a longstanding tenet of statutory construction that if general and particular provisions in the same statute are incompatible, the particular provision controls. See People ex rel. Ellis v. Imperati, 45 NY3d 67, 79—80 (2025). Moreover, a court should interpret a statute so as to give effect to all of its parts and avoid an interpretation which renders one of its parts meaningless. See Wang v. James, 40 NY3d 497 (2023). Although Officer Castaneda exercised some degree of control over his medical records to the extent that he presumably could have obtained a copy from Northern Dutchess Hospital, CPL 245.20(2) only imputes possession to the prosecution of materials in the "possession" of a local law enforcement agency. Officer Castaneda's ability to obtain his records does not equate to his actual possession of them. As such, the People did not fail to satisfy their discovery obligations based on Officer Castaneda's mere ability to obtain his medical records from Northern Dutchess Hospital.

Moreover, while the People have a continuing duty to ascertain and obtain discoverable material or information, the prosecution "shall not be required to obtain material or information if it may be obtained with use of a subpoena duces tecum where the defense is able to obtain the same material with the use of a subpoena duces tecum." CPL 245.20(2). Here, the People obtained the subject records via a so-ordered subpoena duces tecum. Such discovery device was equally available to the Defendant to obtain Officer Castaneda's medical records, even without a HIPPA authorization. See 45 CFR 164.512(e)(1)(i) ("A covered entity may disclose protected health information in the course of any judicial or administrative proceeding...In response to an order of a court or administrative tribunal, provided that the covered entity discloses only the protected health information expressly authorized by such order...").

Because at the time they filed their certificate of compliance the medical records were neither in the People's possession, custody or control nor were they obligated to obtain them via subpoena duces tecum, the People's statement of readiness was not illusory. Furthermore, because the People exercised due diligence by promptly providing the Defendant with a copy of the records shortly after obtaining them, the People's subsequent disclosure did not invalidate the prior certificate of compliance and statement of readiness. Accordingly, the Defendant fails to demonstrate a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30. Wherefore, it is

ORDERED that the Defendant's motion is denied.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court. The signing of this decision and order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR § 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule regarding notice of entry.

Dated: June 12, 2026

Kingston, New York

ENTER:

HON. DAVID M. GANDIN, JSC

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant had notice that Officer Castaneda treated for his alleged injuries as early as July 10, 2025 when the plaintiff disclosed his grand jury testimony. Officer Castaneda further testified at a pretrial hearing that he treated at Northern Duchess Hospital. Notably, Defendant never made any request prior to trial for disclosure of his medical records. As set forth below, nor did he seek to independently obtain such records.

David M. Gandin, J.