Pine Ridge Stables, Ltd., Plaintiff, v. RODNEY STEWART BVSC (2026)

In this action, the plaintiff (a racehorse breeder) alleges that the defendant veterinarian negligently provided veterinary care to one of its young horses and that this caused the horse's untimely death. The horse (along with three others) was scheduled for a hernia procedure to be completed at the plaintiff's property. The horse died after being administered anesthesia, but before the start of the surgery. The plaintiff alleges in its complaint that the defendants are liable for the horse's death because they (1) failed to obtain informed consent; (2) failed to properly examine the horse; (3) failed to properly monitor the horse and document such monitoring during the anesthetic period; (4) failed to properly induce and maintain anesthesia; (5) failed to have proper equipment available to care for the horse as soon as respiratory failure was noted; and (6) failed to properly perform CPR.

The defendants have denied these allegations of veterinary malpractice and filed a motion seeking summary dismissal of the complaint. They contend that they did not deviate from the standard of care, that any alleged deviations did not proximately cause the horse's death, and that no evidence exists to support the plaintiff's allegations of malpractice. In support of their motion, the defendants have submitted, among other things, the transcripts of the depositions taken during discovery, the report of the post-mortem examination (necropsy) performed on the horse, and an affidavit from their expert.

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which "should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of such issues, or where the issue is arguable; issue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure" (Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 [1957] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Redcross v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 260 AD2d 908, 913 [3d Dept 1999]). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of "tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). If the moving party satisfies its burden, "the party opposing the motion for summary judgment [must] produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

Here, the defendants have readily satisfied their initial burden of demonstrating that they are not liable for any alleged malpractice. Regarding the issue of informed consent, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was not properly informed of the general risks of anesthesia being administered to the horse (e.g., possible death), as well as the risks of administering anesthesia outside a hospital setting (e.g., less equipment and fewer staff members). Even if true, the deposition transcripts submitted by the defendants demonstrate that the plaintiff's agent (the stable manager) was aware of these general risks on the day of the procedure and consented to them by allowing the procedure to occur. In addition, the deposition testimony also demonstrates that the plaintiff's owner would have consented to these risks if they had been disclosed to him, as he allowed the remaining two hernia procedures to proceed that same day for two other horses despite the death of the horse. The general risks of performing surgery and administering anesthesia outside of a hospital setting should have also been readily obvious to the plaintiff's owner, especially as he is a sophisticated business owner.

Although the informed consent allegations are also based in part on the horse's prior pneumonia, the deposition testimony submitted by the defendants demonstrate that the horse was treated for the pneumonia at an equine hospital from July 5, 2023 to around July 7, 2023, and recovered well in advance of the procedure, which occurred on September 1, 2023. In fact, the plaintiff's owner testified that, "The horse came back recovered" and everything was "hunky-dory" until the procedure (NYCEF Document No. 22, at pp. 60-61).

Further, the defendants' expert has refuted the remaining allegations of malpractice set forth in the complaint, including the alleged failure to properly examine the horse, administer anesthesia, monitor the horse's reaction to the anesthesia, and treat the horse's reaction to the anesthesia. In a moving affidavit, the defendants' expert explains that she reviewed the veterinary records and deposition transcripts. She further explains the applicable standards of care and opines that the defendants complied with them.

Nonetheless, in opposition to the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff has submitted detailed opinions from its expert, which raise triable issues of fact. In contrast to the defendants' expert opinions, the plaintiff's expert has opined that the defendants deviated from the accepted standards of care in examining the horse prior to administering anesthesia, monitoring the horse while under anesthesia, and treating the horse for its reaction to anesthesia, among other things. The parties' experts have also expressed a difference in opinion regarding the significance of the horse's prior pneumonia and the appropriate standards of care.

The parties' expert opinions therefore present a classic difference of professional opinion. Such disagreement raises questions of credibility and of fact that are not appropriately resolved on this motion (see Dillenbeck v Shovelton, 114 AD3d 1125 [3d Dept 2014]; Rosenbaum v Camps Rov Tov, 285 AD2d 894 [3d Dept 2001]). The Court therefore denies that part of the motion seeking summary dismissal of the complaint in its entirety, as summary judgment is a "drastic remedy that should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of triable issues of fact" (Piccirilli v. Benjamin, 196 AD3d 895, 896-897 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Insofar as the defendants contend that the opinions expressed by the plaintiff's expert ignore established facts and the applicable standard of care, make improper assumptions, and/or misinterpret various publications, the Court finds that the expert's opinions are detailed enough to survive this motion. The defendants will nonetheless have the opportunity at trial to cross-examine the plaintiff's expert about the applicable standard of care and the facts the expert believes are dispositive, as well as those the defendants believe are being disregarded, improperly weighed, or otherwise assumed without a proper evidentiary basis. After hearing the evidence, Court will further determine how to charge the jury and whether causation has been sufficiently established.

As it relates to informed consent, the Court is DISMISSING that part of the malpractice claim based on the alleged nondisclosure of the general risks associated with anesthesia and its administration outside of a hospital setting. That portion of the malpractice claim based on the nondisclosure of the alleged increased risks due to the horse's prior pneumonia and the alleged need for additional medical equipment due to this alleged increased risk remains an active issue in the case.

In addition, the Court is DISMISSING that portion of the alleged malpractice claim based on the defendants' alleged failure to make contemporaneous records, as the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how these alleged deviations could have possibly caused the horse's death. In addition, the Court disagrees with the plaintiff that sufficient evidence exists to support a finding that the defendants negligently completed the form for the necropsy or that they are somehow responsible for other individuals not examining the lungs more thoroughly during the horse's necropsy. This theory of alleged negligence is speculative, rests on improper inferences being made from the testimony, and lacks a proper foundation.

The Court further questions whether the plaintiff will be able to establish causation at trial. Given the limited support provided by its expert for the opinion on causation, it is unclear whether the administration of the anesthesia at an equine hospital or the availability of certain equipment would have prevented the horse's death (as the expert opines) or whether this would have merely increased the horse's chance of survival. The claim may very well be based on a loss of chance theory, in which case the plaintiff may be unable to prove causation or, alternatively, the damages (if any are found to exist) may have to be reduced to reflect the amount of chance that was lost.

Further, the Court agrees with the defendants that the breach of contract claim is duplicative of the malpractice claim and should be dismissed for this reason. The Court has considered the defendants' remaining grounds for dismissal of the complaint, including that part of their motion seeking dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7), and finds them to be unpersuasive.

It is therefore,

ORDERED that the defendants' motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as explained above; and it is further

ORDERED, that the second cause of action for breach of contract is DISMISSED as duplicative of the first cause of action for professional negligence (veterinary malpractice); and it is further

ORDERED, that the party who has the burden of proof on a claim, cause of action, damage, or defense shall serve its response (and any supplement) to any expert demands by November 10, 2026. The opposing party shall serve its answering response by December 10, 2026. Any replies shall be served by email or hand delivery by December 31, 2026.

ORDERED, that a settlement conference will be held on January 5, 2027 at 2:00 p.m., IN PERSON at the courthouse, with the plaintiff present and the defendants' adjuster available by telephone. Counsel should also be prepared to select trial dates if the parties are unable to resolve this matter. Prior to the conference, by December 31, 2026, the parties' counsel should provide the Court (by email or hand delivery) with a position statement, along with copies of their expert disclosures (including any expert disclosures on causation and damages).

This shall constitute the Decision & Order of the Court. No costs are awarded. The Court is uploading the original into NYSCEF for filing and entry. The Court directs the parties to serve notice of entry in accordance with the Local Protocols for Electronic Filing for Saratoga County.

So-Ordered.

Dated: August 24, 2026

at Ballston Spa, New York

HON. RICHARD A. KUPFERMAN

Justice Supreme Court

Enter.

Papers Considered:

NYSCEF Document Nos. 1-2, 13-62

Richard A. Kupferman, J.