14 v. LEARNING TO KNOW EC LLC DEBRA EBERT AARON CHARLES (2026)

This matter comes before the Court for the second time on the application of Plaintiff to compel the non-party Saratoga County Department of Social Services ("DSS") to produce certain materials from its records relating to its investigation into allegations of sexual abuse of K.M. by defendant Charles in 2022 and/or 2023. All defendants have opposed the motion, with defendant Learning to Know adopting the arguments submitted by defendant Charles

Plaintiff's Notice of Motion seeks four separately stated forms of relief. Plaintiff's first request and third requests overlap substantially. Plaintiff's first request seeks "the complete, unredacted investigative file," while Plaintiff's third request seeks all "non-privileged witness statements, photographs and contemporaneous field notes gathered during the underlying investigation," which would logically be part of the investigative file. While Plaintiff's counsel likely made two separate requests in order to be thorough, counsel for DSS terms them duplicative.

The Court's prior Decision and Order, issued on April 15, 2026, directed DSS to provide to the Court for in camera inspection the complete, unredacted report to the State Registry and the investigative file for SCR Case Id#: 28340029, Intake Stage Id#: 34783024, dated 8/8/2023. The Court also granted Plaintiff's fourth request for relief by directing DSS to provide a privilege log of any privilege being claimed that is not related to Social Services Law § 422.

The parties reached an agreement as to how the subject materials were to be produced to the Court, pursuant to which counsel for defendant Charles hand delivered a sealed envelope containing the subject records to this Court's chambers on June 3, 2026. The envelope had been taped closed and Attorney Evanovich's signature appeared on the tape when the envelope was delivered. The envelope contained 143 pages bearing the heading "Investigation Progress Notes" at the top of each page, and one blank page. No separate document labeled as a "report" was found in the envelope. Also, no privilege log was found in the envelope, leading the Court to conclude that DSS asserts only the statutory provisions of Social Services Law § 422 as precluding disclosure of the materials submitted.

The prior Decision and Order provides that the materials submitted by DSS would be subjected to a two-stage review; first, to determine whether the materials are subject to the seal imposed under Social Services Law § 422(5), and second, to determine if any information not sealed under § 422(5) can be disclosed under § 422(4).

The review begins with the applicable statutory language. The operative language of § 422(5) states:

all information identifying the subjects of the report and other persons named in the report shall be legally sealed forthwith by the central register and any local child protective services which investigated the report.

Two statutory definitions come into play. Social Services Law § 412(4) defines "subject of the report," in relevant part, as follows:

a director or an operator of, or employee or volunteer in, a day-care center who is allegedly responsible for causing injury, abuse or maltreatment to a child who is reported to the statewide central register .

Social Services Law § 412(5) defines "other persons named in the report" as being

limited to the following persons who are named in a report of child abuse or maltreatment other than the subject of the report: the child who is reported and such child's parent, guardian, or other person legally responsible for the child who has not been named in the report as allegedly responsible for causing injury, abuse or maltreatment to the child .

Utilizing these definitions, the seal imposed by § 422(5) would be limited to information that identifies either Plaintiff, or K.M., or defendant Charles. The remainder of the materials would not be subject to the seal. In this case, however, the face of the statute is not the end of inquiry.

The materials that are the subject of this motion are in the possession of DSS. DSS is subject to a set of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Social Services Law, including 18 NYCRR § 432.9, which is entitled "Disposition of unfounded reports." Section 432.9(c)(1) states, "The local district must immediately seal the child protective services case record in which the report has been maintained ."

The parties essentially acknowledge that there is no direct, controlling case authority to apply to the facts here, and the Court has found none. The parties have, however, cited trial-level decisions interpreting § 422(5) to support their respective stances on the extent of the seal.

This Court respectfully declines to follow the ruling cited by Plaintiff's counsel (Matter of Maria S. [Ramon R.], 43 Misc 3d 689 [Fam Ct, Bronx County 2014]) insofar as it holds that only the report itself is sealed. A plain reading of § 422(5) indicates that the seal is imposed more broadly than the report itself. "[A]ll information" held by "any local child protective services which investigated the report" clearly encompasses the investigative file that is the subject of the current motion. The Maria S decision also rejects the language of 18 NYCRR § 432.9 because it goes beyond the language of the statute. However, an agency is free to adopt regulations that go beyond the text of its enabling legislation so long as the regulations are not inconsistent with the statutory language or its underlying purpose (Leadingage New York, Inc. v. Shah, 153 AD3d 10, 16 [3d Dept 2017] aff'd 32 NY3d 249 [2018]).

What appears at first blush to be inconsistency in the language of § 422(5) does not require a different view. While the language quoted above applies the seal to "all information" without reference to the report, subdivision (5)(a) provides a list of the entities and individuals to whom an unfounded report may be made available, and subdivision 5(b) makes an unfounded report inadmissible in any judicial or administrative proceeding. However, the availability or admissibility of the report itself does not mean, ipso facto, that materials beyond the report are not sealed by the statute. To use a colloquialism, the operative language quoted above "is what it is."

This Court also disagrees with a portion of the holding in Maldonado v. NY Presbyterian Hosp. 92022 NY Misc. LEXIS 30255 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2022]) which is cited by counsel for DSS. While the decision notes that "records" from an unfounded case "are sealed and generally inadmissible as evidence," the ruling does not specifically rest on the seal. Instead, the decision concludes that because the records are inadmissible, they are therefore not discoverable (Id at [*3]). It has long been held, however, that admissibility is not the test to be applied when deciding a discovery motion, but rather whether the material sought is "material and necessary" as stated in CPLR 3101 (see e.g. Wiseman v. American Motors Sales Corp., 103 AD2d 230 [2d Dept 1984]).

Counsel for defendant Charles cites People v. LV (182 Misc 2d 912 [Sup Ct, Rensselaer County 1999]), a case where a district attorney brought a motion seeking disclosure from Rensselaer County DSS of "any and all records pertaining to the investigation into a case involving LV " for the purpose of prosecuting LV for an act described in a report that was labeled unfounded. While acknowledging that the result was "a harsh (and perhaps unanticipated) anomaly," the judge found that the Legislature's "clear, overarching mandate" to seal unfounded reports prevented disclosure to the district attorney because there was no exception in the statute that applied to the district attorney's request (Id. at 914-15). Notably, the decision does not specifically distinguish between reports themselves and records pertaining to the underlying investigation.

All three decisions thus have their drawbacks when applying them to this motion. However, looking at all the materials cited above, there are conclusions that can be drawn which tip the balance toward denying Plaintiff's application. First, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is not on the list of people found in § 422(5)(a) to whom an unfounded report can be made available. Courts generally lack the discretion to expand the lists found in § 422 (see Matter of Sarah FF, 18 AD3d 1072 [3d Dept 2005]). Second, while the DSS regulation found at 18 NYCRR § 432.9, is broader in scope than § 422(5), it is consistent with the statutory language. Third, two of the three most relevant court decisions cited by the parties apply § 422(5) to all records from an unfounded case. This Court concludes that the investigative materials in the hands of DSS are sealed under § 422(5) and 18 NYCRR § 432.9. Because the materials are sealed, there is no reason to consider the confidentiality provisions in § 422(4).

The Court also notes that Plaintiff's counsel is in possession of the documents submitted as Exhibit A to her affirmation, entitled "CPS Investigation Summary" and "Connections Stage Summary," which were provided to Plaintiff by the Office of Children and Family Services ("OCFS") before the report was determined to be unfounded. These documents identify the various actors involved in the investigation of allegations that underly this case, including the names of all students, parents, faculty and administrators of the subject daycare. They also describe the actions taken by investigators and the conclusions reached. This information provides Plaintiff with ample avenues for discovery.

Plaintiff's second request seeks production of "the complete administrative record related to the appeal hearing" that resulted in the Decision After Hearing issued by Administrative Law Judge Ivan Perez on July 2, 2025. In opposition to Plaintiff's motion, counsel for DSS points out that the administrative record would be kept by the Office of Children and Family Services ("OCFS") as the entity conducting the appellate review, and not by DSS which was a party. This stance is corroborated by the factual and procedural recitation found in the opposition submitted by counsel for defendant Charles. Plaintiff has served a subpoena on OCFS which includes a demand for appeal documents regarding this case. This portion of Plaintiff's motion therefore seeks relief that is inapplicable.

The parties' remaining contentions have been considered, but do not affect the outcome of this motion. Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion seeking disclosure from DSS of the investigative file for SCR Case Id#: 28340029, Intake Stage Id#: 34783024, dated 8/8/2023 is denied.

Dated:

ENTER.

Thomas D. Buchanan

Supreme Court Justice

Papers considered:

NYSCEF documents 19 through 22 and 27 through 33.

Thomas D. Buchanan, J.