Eric Cisler, Plaintiff, v. JOEL JOHNSTON JACK STRAIGHT STRAIGHT SEPTIC SERVICE SHAWN ARRUDA (2026)

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in April 2019 ("Clifton Park Accident"), as well as a subsequent motor vehicle accident in August 2020 ("Queensbury Accident"). After he commenced this action against the drivers and owners of the vehicles involved in these two accidents, the plaintiff was involved in a third motor vehicle accident in December 2023 ("Third Accident"), which is the subject of a separate lawsuit (see NYSCEF, Schenectady County Supreme Court, Index No. 2025-2066, Eric Cisler v David Mix et al.).

Following the completion of discovery in this action, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, pursuant to CPLR 3212, with regards to the Clifton Park and Queensbury Accidents (Motion No. 1). The remaining defendants in this action, Michelle Johnston, Joel Johnston, and Shawn Arruda have also filed motions for summary judgment in their favor, seeking dismissal of the complaint, on the ground that the plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury (Motion Nos. 2 & 3). The Court has addressed the merits of the defendants' motions in separate written decisions, granting the summary judgment motion of defendants Michelle Johnston and Joel Johnston (Clifton Park Accident) and denying the summary judgment motion of defendant Shawn Arruda (Queensbury Accident). Given the summary dismissal of the claims against defendants Michelle Johnston and Joel Johnston on Motion No. 2, the portion of the plaintiff's motion, which seeks partial summary judgment on liability against the Johnstons, is now academic and therefore denied as moot.

Regarding the Queensbury Accident, the plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment based primarily on his own deposition testimony about the accident, Mr. Arruda's deposition testimony, and the police report. According to the plaintiff, he was driving his Jeep on Ridge Road in Queensbury, New York towards Lake George at approximately 11:25 a.m. on August 26, 2020. When he stopped to turn left into a farm 200 feet southeast of Pickle Hill Road, he heard skidding. When he looked in his rearview mirror, he saw a "gigantic front grill [sic] of a huge vehicle," a 1990 Ford F900 pump truck driven by Mr. Arruda. He "let go of [his] brake and jumped on the gas because of the speed" that Mr. Arruda's vehicle was traveling. As the plaintiff "jumped on the gas," Mr. Arruda's vehicle hit his vehicle at the rear, throwing it into the other lane of traffic.

Mr. Arruda testified that just before the accident, he had crested a hill and was traveling at about 40-45 mph. Despite hitting the brakes as hard as he could, Mr. Arruda was unable to avoid colliding with the plaintiff's vehicle. Mr. Arruda's vehicle allegedly left skid marks on the road at the scene of the accident. Mr. Arruda testified that he usually keeps two to three vehicle lengths between his vehicle and the vehicle in front of it. His vehicle required additional time to stop because of its weight, and it also required more time to stop, or it was more difficult to stop, when descending a hill. Mr. Arruda further testified that nothing was obstructing his view of the road in front of him before the accident occurred.

The plaintiff contends that Mr. Arruda's actions constituted a violation of VTL § 1129(a) and that Mr. Arruda should be deemed negligent as a matter of law. This section of the VTL provides, as follows: "The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway." The plaintiff also contends that a rear-end collision with a vehicle that is slowing down establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle (see e.g. Mahmud v Feng Ouyang, 208 AD3d 861, 861 [2d Dept 2022]; Brooks v High St. Prof'l Bldg., Inc., 34 AD3d 1265, 1266 [4th Dept 2006]), and that this shifts the burden on the motion for the driver of the rear vehicle to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision (see e.g. Mahmud, 208 AD3d at 861; Brooks, 34 AD3d at 1266).

In response, Mr. Arruda's counsel concedes that the accident involved a rear-end motor vehicle accident, and that in light of the presumptions attached to such an accident, Mr. Arruda is required to provide a non-negligent explanation for the happening of the accident. Mr. Arruda's counsel further contends that Mr. Arruda has provided a non-negligent explanation for the happening of this accident based on his testimony in this matter and his affirmation submitted in opposition to the motion, and that at a minimum, a triable issue of fact exists with regard to whether he is liable for the accident.

As for his explanation, Mr. Arruda asserts that he was driving at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour prior to the subject incident. It was a clear day with no precipitation or other hazardous weather conditions. Given that the speed limit in the area of the accident was 55 miles per hour, Mr. Arruda contends that he was traveling at a speed that was prudent in light of the conditions and was thus not negligent in his speed. Furthermore, Mr. Arruda was making observations of the roadway and was not distracted by his phone at the time of the accident.

According to Mr. Arruda, there was a hill shortly before the area where the accident occurred. It was after he crested this hill that Mr. Arruda first saw the plaintiff's vehicle. When he first observed the plaintiff's vehicle, it was in an area of the road where there was no obvious intersection or turn-off and no brake lights were illuminated on the back of the plaintiff's vehicle. Furthermore, the plaintiff had either not activated his turn signal or it was not functioning as Mr. Arruda also observed that the turn signal was not illuminated at the back of the vehicle. Because of this, Mr. Arruda explains that it was not immediately obvious when he first saw the plaintiff's vehicle that the plaintiff was stopped in the road to make a turn. Once Mr. Arruda realized that plaintiff's vehicle was stopped, Mr. Arruda alleges that he hit his brakes and attempted to avoid the plaintiff by swerving to the right. He very nearly avoided the accident entirely but ended up clipping the back right taillight with the front left of his bumper.

When viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Arruda, as the non-moving party on this motion, the events described by Mr. Arruda in his deposition testimony and in his affirmation provide a scenario in which Mr. Arruda was driving safely, carefully, and prudently at all times prior to the collision. As Mr. Arruda has explained, he did not observe that the plaintiff's vehicle was stopped in the road in time to avoid hitting it. According to Mr. Arruda, this was not because he was following too closely or speeding or was distracted. Rather, it was because the indicators that would usually alert a driver to a stopped vehicle in the road (brake lights, the existence of an intersection, a turn signal in operation) were entirely absent in this case. As such, a reasonable juror could find that it took slightly longer for Mr. Arruda to recognize that plaintiff's vehicle was stopped than it would have under normal circumstances. Moreover, a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Arruda took immediate steps to avoid the accident once he was able to discern that the plaintiff's vehicle was stopped in the road. Based on the circumstances, the Court considers it appropriate to submit the issue of liability to the jury for its consideration.

The Court agrees with the plaintiff that issues of his alleged comparative negligence cannot preclude him from receiving a summary judgment award in his favor (see Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312, 323 [2018]; Campney v Hatch, 229 AD3d 879, 881 [3d Dept 2024]; Thompson v Brown, 167 AD3d 1310, 1311 [3d Dept 2018]). The Court nevertheless finds that questions of fact exist here beyond just the plaintiff's own alleged comparative negligence. Rather, Mr. Arruda has created other triable issues of fact which involve credibility determinations, including whether he provided an adequate explanation for the rear-end collision and whether he acted reasonable under the circumstances (see PJI 2:82; Hurley v Izzo, 248 AD2d 674 [2d Dept 1998]; Maisonet v Kelly, 228 AD2d 780 [3d Dept 1996]; see also Klopchin v Masri, 45 AD3d 737 [2d Dept 2007]; compare Appollonia v Bonse, 92 AD3d 1170 [3d Dept 2012]; Rodriguez v City of New York, 259 AD2d 280 [1st Dept 1999]). Again, these are issues for the jury to determine.

It is therefore,

ORDERED, that the plaintiff's motion (Motion No. 1), insofar as it seeks partial summary judgment on liability against the defendants Michelle Johnston and Joel Johnston, is DENIED as moot as a result of this Court's decision on Motion No. 2, which grants summary judgment in favor of these two defendants and dismisses the complaint as against them; and it is further

ORDERED, that the plaintiff's motion (Motion No. 1), insofar as it seeks partial summary judgment on liability against the defendant Shawn Arruda, is DENIED for the reasons set forth above; and it is further

ORDERED, that the parties remaining in this action (i.e., Mr. Cisler and Mr. Arruda) are directed to appear at the Saratoga County Courthouse for an in-person settlement conference on July 29, 2026 at 3:00 p.m.

This shall constitute the Decision & Order of the Court. No costs are awarded to any party. The Court is hereby uploading the original into the NYSCEF system for filing and entry by the County Clerk. The Court further directs the parties to serve notice of entry in accordance with the Local Protocols for Electronic Filing for Saratoga County.

So-Ordered.

Dated: June 5, 2026

at Ballston Spa, New York

HON. RICHARD A. KUPFERMAN

Justice Supreme Court

Enter.

Richard A. Kupferman, J.