Mikhail Babenchuk, Plaintiff, v. Transworld Systems Inc., Defendant. (2026)

On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff Mikhail Babenchuk commenced this consumer debt action against Defendant Transworld Systems Inc., alleging that various statements made in a debt collection letter violated state and federal statutes and constituted negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence per se (see NY St Cts Elec Filing ["NYSCEF"] Doc No. 1; see also NYSCEF Doc No. 10 [Amended Complaint]). Currently before the Court is a motion by Defendant to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of standing (see CPLR 3211 [a] [3]) and the failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]) (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 13-21, 40). Plaintiff opposes the motion (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 24-37).

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the Amended Complaint, Defendant is a Californian company that "regularly collects or attempts to collect debts" (NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶ 6). On or about June 21, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that he "received and read" a letter sent by Defendant concerning an "alleged debt [that] was assigned or otherwise transferred to [Defendant] for collection" (hereinafter, the "June 21 Letter") (id. at ¶¶ 23-49).¹ The Amended Complaint asserts that the June 21 Letter contained a number of statements that would confuse the least sophisticated consumer, including:

• Two separate account numbers with "no explanation as to why these numbers are different" (see id. at ¶¶ 28-32). The Amended Complaint claims that the least sophisticated consumer "would be unsure as to which account the alleged debt is owed" (NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶ 33).

• The statement "[b]etween June 21, 2024, and today" without any dollar amount next to the statement or any date next to the word "today" (id. at ¶¶ 34-35). The Amended Complaint claims that the least sophisticated consumer would be confused "as to the amount actually owed" and "the date that any stated amount is accurate" (id. at ¶¶ 38-39).

• The statement "[t]otal amount of the debt now" and the number "$225.77" without any date provided next to the word "now" (NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶¶ 36-37). The Amended Complaint claims that the least sophisticated consumer would be confused "as to the date that any stated amount is accurate" (id. at ¶ 39).

• The statement that the "creditor is Central Hudson" while providing that payments are to be mailed to Defendant (NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶¶ 42-43). The Amended Complaint claims that the least sophisticated consumer would be "unsure," "confused," "deceived," and "misled" by "the demand to pay [Defendant] when the creditor is listed as Central Hudson" (id. at ¶¶ 46-49).

The Amended Complaint concludes that the above statements constitute "abusive, deceptive, unfair, and unlawful" conduct that was either done "willful[ly], with the purpose to . . . harm Plaintiff" or "with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff that could result" (id. at ¶¶ 51-52). The Amended Complaint alleges that, as a result of the June 21 Letter,

• Plaintiff had to "spend time searching his records," "wasted time," and "lost time" (id. at ¶¶ 53, 56).

• Plaintiff became "aggravated, frustrated, worried, fearful, and distressed" and those conditions "continue to this day" (id. at ¶¶ 54-55).

• Plaintiff suffered the "loss of enjoyment of life" (id. at ¶ 56).

• Plaintiff incurred "fees" (id.).

• Plaintiff's "right to seclusion" was "infringed upon" (id. at ¶ 57).

• Plaintiff's "right to be free from deceptive, confusing, and/or abusive collection efforts" was "infringed upon" (id. at ¶ 58).

•Plaintiff's "right to accurate and clear information about debts Plaintiff is alleged to owe" was "infringed upon" (id. at ¶ 59).

The Amended Complaint asserts five  ² causes of action: (1) violations of New York General Business Law § 349 (see id. at ¶¶ 61-70); (2) violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g (see id. at ¶¶ 71-83); (3) negligence (see id. at ¶¶ 94-90); (4) negligent misrepresentation (see id. at ¶¶ 91-97); and (5) negligence per se (see id. at ¶¶ 98-115).

Defendant now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 13-19). Defendant first argues that dismissal is warranted under CPLR 3211 (a) (3) because the Amended Complaint has not alleged any injury-in-fact and, therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action (see NYSCEF Doc No. 14 at 3-13). Defendant also moves under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), arguing that all of Plaintiff's claims fail to state a cause of action (see id. at 14-18). Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that the Amended Complaint has adequately established that Plaintiff has standing and stated a cause of action with respect to each of his claims (see NYSCEF Doc No. 24).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standing — CPLR 3211 (a) (3)

"Standing is a threshold determination, resting in part on policy considerations, that a person should be allowed access to the courts to adjudicate the merits of a particular dispute that satisfies the other justiciability criteria" (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 769 [1991]). "[S]tanding rules should not be 'heavy-handed,' and . . . [courts] are 'reluctant to apply [standing] principles in an overly restrictive manner where the result would be to completely shield a particular action from judicial review' " (Matter of Sierra Club v Vil. of Painted Post, 26 NY3d 301, 311 [2015] [quotation omitted]). Two types of standing may be established in New York: statutory standing and common law standing (see e.g. Society of Plastics Indus., 777 NY2d at 769, 771 [noting that the "question of standing . . . may, of course, be answered by the statute at issue" but, in "the absence of an answer in the statute," courts must "turn to the case law on standing"]).

Statutory standing looks at whether the plaintiff falls within a "class of persons entitled to seek review" that has been explicitly identified by the statute in question (id. at 769; see e.g. Harkenrider v Hochul, 38 NY3d 494, 508 [2022] [finding that "standing [was] expressly conferred by constitution and statute"]; Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Daniels, 33 NY3d 44, 50 [2019] [finding that Mental Hygiene Law article 9 did not contain a standing provision]; Gregg v Community Care Companions, Inc., 246 AD3d 1495, 1496 [4th Dept 2026] [finding that the plaintiffs had statutory standing under Labor Law § 195]; Matter of Ramos v Ramos, 75 AD3d 1008, 1011 n 2 [3d Dept 2010] [finding that the plaintiffs had statutory standing under Domestic Relations Law § 72]; Matter of International Assn. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union No. 6, AFL-CIO v State of New York, 280 AD2d 713, 715 [3d Dept 2001] [finding that the plaintiffs did not have statutory standing under Labor Law § 220]). Importantly, where statutory standing exists, plaintiffs are "not required to allege actual injury" (Community Care Companions, Inc., 246 AD3d at 1496).

As for common law standing, a plaintiff "must meet the threshold burden of establishing that it has suffered an '[injury-in-fact]' and that the injury it asserts 'fall[s] within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the [respondent] has acted' " (Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 33 NY3d at 50 [quotation omitted]). "The injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has 'an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated' and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not 'tenuous,' 'ephemeral,' or 'conjectural' but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial intervention" (id. [quotations omitted]).

In either event, the moving defendant bears the "burden 'to establish, prima facie, [the] plaintiff's lack of standing as a matter of law' " (Singe v Bates Troy, Inc., 206 AD3d 1528, 1530-31 [3d Dept 2022]) and the Court "must accept the allegations in the [complaint] as true and construe them in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff] (Matter of Seneca Lake Guardian v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 229 AD3d 987, 988-89 [3d Dept 2024]).

1. The FDCPA, General Business Law, and the Negligence Per Se Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing as a matter of law because the Amended Complaint has failed to allege "any tangible injury or harm with a close common law analogue"; in other words, an injury-in-fact (NYSCEF Doc No. 14 at 8). Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff "must establish an injury-in-fact regardless of whether standing arises from a violation of statute or the common law" (id. at 5). Defendant centers its view of standing on the United States Supreme Court decision TransUnion LLC v Ramirez (594 US 413, 425-26 [2021]), and a recent Second Department decision that cites to TransUnion LLC (see Gregg v SN Servicing Corp, 242 AD3d 962, 965 [2d Dept 2025], lv to appeal granted 45 NY3d 906 [2026]).

This Court is not persuaded that TransUnion LLC has altered New York's well-established statutory standing test. Critically, federal constitutional standing rules based on Article III of the United States Constitution—like the rules set forth in TransUnion LLC—are not directly applicable to the standing analysis for New York Courts. As the Court of Appeals has said, the "standing requirement in Federal actions has been grounded in the Federal constitutional requirement of a case or controversy . . . a requirement that has no analogue in the [New York] State Constitution" (Society of Plastics Indus., 777 NY2d at 772 [emphasis added]; see also US Bank N.A. v Nelson, 36 NY3d 998, 1002-03, 1003 n 4 [2020, Wilson, J., concurring] ["The New York Constitution contains no case or controversy requirement; hence, federal constitutional standing doctrine is of little or no relevance . . . state courts are not bound to adhere to federal standing requirements"]). With respect to the Second Department decision in SN Servicing Corp., the Court notes both that (1) the Second Department's decision is not binding on this Court; and (2) the Court of Appeals appears to have reaffirmed the existence of separate statutory standing after the Supreme Court issued TransUnion LLC (see Harkenrider, 38 NY3d at 508 [rejecting a standing argument based on "common-law standing principles" where "standing [was] expressly conferred by [the New York] constitution and statute"]).

The Court therefore first turns to the question of whether the Amended Complaint has adequately established statutory standing for Plaintiff's FDCPA, General Business Law, and negligence per se claims. General Business Law § 349 provides that "any person who has been injured by reason of any deceptive act or deceptive practice made unlawful by this section may bring an action in such person's own name to . . . recover such person's actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater " (General Business Law § 349 [h]). Similarly, Section 1692k of the FDCPA provides that "any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 1692 et seq.] with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of . . . any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure" (15 USCS § 1692k [a] [1]). The Court finds that both statutes have clearly identified a class of persons who are entitled to seek review.

The Court must next examine whether Plaintiff falls within those identified classes of persons. Here, the Amended Complaint has alleged that (1) Plaintiff has been injured as "a direct and proximate result of [Defendant's] violations of New York General Business Law § 349" (NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶ 70); and (2) Defendant violated 15 USCS §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g, and is "liable to Plaintiff" as a result (id. at ¶¶ 82-83). After accepting the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint has adequately alleged that Plaintiff fits within the classes of persons identified by the FDCPA and the General Business Law.

In light of these findings, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint has adequately alleged statutory standing under the FDCPA, the General Business Law, and the negligence per se claim (which is based on alleged violations of those statutes). Accordingly, the portion of Defendant's motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's FDCPA, General Business Law, and negligence per se causes of action for lack of standing is denied.

2. The Negligence and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims

Neither party explicitly addresses how standing applies to Plaintiff's common law negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims (see NYSCEF Doc No. 14 at 3-13; NYSCEF Doc No. 24 at 5-18; NYSCEF Doc No. 40 at 1-9), and it is not clear to this Court whether the concept of "standing," as expressed on this motion, applies to common law negligence claims asserted by one private party against another private party, without any direct connection to a statute or other governmental action. In particular, the Court notes Chief Judge Wilson's concurrence in US Bank N.A. v Nelson, where he states that:

"Standing comes into play when parties aim to enforce public—as opposed to private—rights. . . . Our decisional law on standing treats it as a prudential issue focused on the enforcement of public rights—typically, whether a plaintiff has suffered some injury and 'is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected by the statute' or regulation . . . . Needless to say, when someone purporting to be a party to a contract sues to enforce that contract, no issue of standing is involved. You're either a party to the contract or not. Standing has increasingly been misapplied in cases where private rather than public rights are at issue . . . . Substituting standing for the proper inquiry confuses the legal principle at issue"

(US Bank N.A., 36 NY3d at 1003, 1005-06 [Wilson, J., concurring]). Here, Plaintiff's common law negligence claims explicitly state that they are based on the claim that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of reasonable care under the common law, "[i]ndependent of New York General Business Law § 349 and the FDCPA" (NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶¶ 85, 84-97). It is not clear to the Court how it would apply a rule that considers whether "the injury . . . 'fall[s] within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the [defendant] has acted," where the claims at issue do not rely on any "statutory provision" (Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 33 NY3d at 50). Thus, the Court determines that the concept of standing, as argued on this motion, is inapplicable to these two claims.

Accordingly, the portion of Defendant's motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's negligence and negligent misrepresentation causes of action for lack of standing is denied.

B. Stating a Cause of Action — CPLR 3211 (a) (7)

It is well established that, "[o]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, [the court] must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]). "This liberal standard, however, will not save allegations that consist of bare legal conclusions or factual claims that are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence or are inherently incredible" (DerOhannesian v City of Albany, 110 AD3d 1288, 1289 [3d Dept 2013] [citations omitted], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]; Quail Ridge Assoc. v Chemical Bank, 162 AD2d 917, 918 [3d Dept 1990]).

The Court notes that, although a copy of the June 21 Letter was not attached to the Amended Complaint or Plaintiff's opposition to this motion, Defendant has attached a purported copy of this letter to its motion to dismiss (see NYSCEF Doc No. 15 at ¶ 3; NYSCEF Doc No. 16). It is well established, however, that the "grounds for dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) are . . . strictly limited" and the Court "is substantially more constrained in its review, examining only the plaintiff's pleadings and affidavits" (Carr v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 182 AD3d 667, 668 [3d Dept 2020]). Thus, "a court resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim cannot base the determination upon submissions by the defendant—without regard to how compelling claims made in such submissions may appear" (id.). In light of these restrictions, the Court will not be considering the purported copy of the June 21 Letter submitted by Defendant in support of its motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

1. The General Business Law § 349 Claim

General Business Law § 349 (a) "declares unlawful all '[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state' " (Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 37 NY3d 169, 176 [2021]). To avoid dismissal, "plaintiffs must adequately plead" that "(1) the defendant's conduct was consumer-oriented; (2) the defendant's act or practice was deceptive or misleading in a material way; and (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of the deception" (id., citing General Business Law § 349 [h]). Individuals injured by any deceptive act or deceptive practice made unlawful under this Section "may bring an action . . . to recover [their] actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater" (General Business Law § 349 [h]).

Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that (1) Plaintiff is a consumer within the meaning of Section 349 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶ 64); (2) Defendant, one of the nation's largest debt collectors, engaged in deceptive or misleading consumer-oriented conduct by sending debt collection letters that were "unclear, confusing[,] and deceptive" (id. at ¶ 66); and (3) one such letter caused actual injury to Plaintiff, including emotional distress and the incurrence of attorney's fees (see id. at ¶¶ 54-56, 70). In support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues only that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege an injury (see NYSCEF Doc No. 14 at 17). The Court disagrees. The Court of Appeals has stated that the "actual damages" required by Section 349 (h) need not "necessarily" be "pecuniary" in nature and, as noted above, the Amended Complaint has alleged both emotional distress and the incurrence of attorney's fees (Stutman v Chemical Bank, 95 NY2d 24, 29 [2000]; see also Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 26 [1995]; Wilner v Allstate Ins. Co., 71 AD3d 155, 167 [2d Dept 2010] [finding that the plaintiffs adequately pled damages under General Business Law § 349 with an allegation that they were forced to pay for an attorney]; Wood v Capital One Services, LLC, 718 F Supp 2d 286, 292 [ND NY 2010] [finding that allegations of "non-pecuniary harms" like "humiliation, anger, anxiety, emotion distress, fear, frustration and embarrassment" constituted actual damages]). Therefore, after accepting the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint as true and according Plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint has adequately alleged a cause of action under General Business Law § 349.

Accordingly, the portion of Defendant's motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's General Business Law § 349 cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is denied.

2. The FDCPA Claim

"The FDCPA 'establishes certain rights for consumers whose debts are placed in the hands of professional debt collectors for collection.' " (Easterling v Collecto, Inc., 692 F3d 229, 233 [2d Cir 2012] [quotation omitted]). "In particular, section 1692e of the FDCPA provides that '[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt' " (id., quoting 15 USC § 1692e; see also 15 USC § 1692f ["A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt"]; 15 USC § 1692g). "A violation under the FDCPA requires that: '(1) the plaintiff [must] be a "consumer" who allegedly owes the debt or a person who has been the object of efforts to collect a consumer debt, (2) the defendant collecting the debt must be considered a "debt collector," and (3) the defendant must have engaged in an act or omission in violation of the FDCPA's requirements' " (Johnson v Hunter Warfield, Inc., 1:22-CV-00122, 2022 WL 1421815, at *3 [ND NY May 5, 2022] [quotation omitted]; see also Taylor v Radius Global Solutions, LLC, 88 Misc 3d 133(A) [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2025]). Courts use a " least-sophisticated consumer standard" for determining whether a collection letter violates Section 1692e (Clomon v Jackson, 988 F2d 1314, 1318 [2d Cir 1993]).

Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that (1) Plaintiff meets the FDCPA's definition of "consumer" (NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶ 76); (2) the alleged debt meets the FDCPA's definition of a "debt" (id. at ¶ 78); (3) Defendant meets the FDCPA's definition of a "debt collector" (id. at ¶ 77); and (4) Defendant sent a debt collection letter to Plaintiff that contained statements violating Sections 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g of the FDCPA (see id. at ¶ 82). The Amended Complaint describes the alleged statements and asserts that they would confuse the least sophisticated consumer (see id. at ¶¶ 28-49).

Defendant does not argue that the Amended Complaint has inadequately pled the elements of Plaintiff's FDCPA claim. Instead, Defendant argues that "a simple review of the [June 21] Letter" attached to its motion reveals that the statements made therein would not confuse the least sophisticated consumer as a matter of law (NYSCEF Doc No. 14 at 15, 14-17). However, as noted above, the Court cannot consider evidence attached to a motion to dismiss made under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and, in any event, whether the statements made in Defendant's letter would confuse the least sophisticated consumer is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Thus, after accepting the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint as true and according Plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint has adequately alleged a cause of action under the FDCPA.

Accordingly, the portion of Defendant's motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's FDCPA cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is denied.

3. The Negligence, Negligent Misrepresentation, and Negligence Per Se Claims

"In order to prevail on a negligence claim, 'a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) injury proximately resulting therefrom' " (Pasternack v Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings, 27 NY3d 817, 825 [2016] [quotation omitted]) As for negligent misrepresentation, it is well settled that the plaintiff must " 'demonstrate (1) the existence of a special or privity-like relationship imposing a duty on the defendant to impart correct information to the plaintiff; (2) that the information was incorrect; and (3) reasonable reliance on the information' " (Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173, 180 [2011] [quotation omitted]). Negligence per se allows a plaintiff to establish the elements of duty and breach by showing the unexcused violation of a statute; specifically, by establishing (1) "membership in a class of intended beneficiaries"; (2) "injuries of the type against which the regulations were designed to protect"; (3) "an unexcused violation"; and (4) "causation" (Brown v Reinauer Transp. Companies, LLC, 67 AD3d 106, 112 [3d Dept 2009]).

In each case, it is well established that a plaintiff in a negligence action may not recover nonpecuniary damages in the absence of some physical injury or property damage, except in three narrow instances that are not applicable to this case (see SanMiguel v Grimaldi, __ NY3d __, 2025 NY Slip Op 05780 [2025]). The only pecuniary harm alleged in the Amended Complaint is "the incurrence of fees" (NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶ 56), which itself runs afoul of New York's general rule that " 'attorneys' fees and disbursements are incidents of litigation and the prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties or by statute or court rule' " (Halstead v Fournia, 134 AD3d 1269, 1271 [3d Dept 2015] [quotation omitted]). Thus, even after accepting the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint as true and according Plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint has failed to allege any injury sufficient to support Plaintiff's negligence claims.

Accordingly, the portion of Defendant's motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence per se causes of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is granted.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Accordingly, after carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the portion of Defendant's motion (see NYSCEF Doc No. 13) seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's third cause of action for negligence, fourth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, and fifth cause of action for negligence per se under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's motion is otherwise DENIED.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court. The Court has uploaded this original Decision and Order to the case record in this matter as maintained on the NYSCEF website whereupon it is to be filed and entered by the County Clerk's Office. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of CPLR 2220 and Section 202.5-b (h) (2) of the Uniform Rules of Supreme and County Courts insofar as they relate to service and notice of entry of the filed documents upon all other parties to the action/proceeding, whether accomplished by mailing or electronic means, whichever may be appropriate dependent upon the filing status of the party.

October 14, 2026

Troy, New York

Laura M. Jordan

Supreme Court Justice

Papers Considered:

1. Docket Number 1 (Summons and Complaint)

2. Docket Number 10 (Amended Complaint)

3. Docket Numbers 13-21 (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)

3. Docket Numbers 24-37 (Plaintiff's Opposition)

4. Docket Number 40 (Defendant's Reply)

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court notes that Defendant has attached a purported copy of the June 21 Letter to the motion to dismiss (see NYSCEF Doc No. 15 at ¶ 3; NYSCEF Doc No. 16). For the reasons expressed below, the Court will not be considering or relying on the contents of the letter submitted by Defendant; only on the allegations made in the Amended Complaint.

2.   The sixth cause of action listed in the Amended Complaint states a nonspecific demand for attorney's fees and costs (see NYSCEF Doc No. 10 at ¶¶ 116-18).

Laura M. Jordan, J.